

**STATEMENT BY**

**GENERAL CRAIG R. McKINLEY  
CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU**

**BEFORE THE**

**SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE**

**FIRST SESSION, 112<sup>TH</sup> CONGRESS**

**ON**

**EXPANSION OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF TO INCLUDE THE  
CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU**

**NOVEMBER 10, 2011**

NOT FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION  
UNTIL RELEASED BY  
THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

## **Opening Remarks**

Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, distinguished members of the Committee; I am honored to appear before you today, representing 465,000 Citizen-Soldiers and Airmen in the Army and Air National Guard, an organization that is historically part of the foundation of our great democracy. America's National Guard remains ready, reliable, and accessible. As members of an operational force, regularly used by the President and State Governors, the Soldiers and Airmen of the National Guard contribute daily to our nation's overseas and domestic security objectives. I thank you for the opportunity to discuss the possibility of making the Chief, National Guard Bureau a statutory member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I would like to address some of the issues surrounding this debate.

## **The National Guard as a Reserve Component**

The National Guard of the United States is by statute a reserve component (RC) of the U.S. Army and Air Force, and representation on the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) would not degrade that relationship. We are very proud of our history with and lineage to the U.S. Army and Air Force. Never have we contemplated abandoning our historical ties, and suggestions that adding the Chief, National Guard Bureau (CNGB) as a JCS member would create a separate military service are divisive and unfounded. Pride in our Service affiliations is a core competency of the National Guard. The Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force would continue to prescribe the training of the National Guard, procure its equipment, and validate its requirements. The Directors of the

Army and Air National Guard would continue to participate in planning and budgeting meetings as representatives of the RCs of those services.

### **The National Guard and the Secretary of Defense**

Statutorily, the CNGB is a principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the JCS on matters involving non-federalized National Guard matters that are not under the authority and direction of the Secretaries or the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and the Air Force. As the “channel of communications,” the CNGB is the most current and knowledgeable source of information within the federal government about the National Guard in its non Title 10 roles, and is thus the best single source of advice for leaders about unique Guard-related matters, particularly those which are critical to homeland defense.

### **Unique Role of the National Guard**

Two unique roles that stand out are the CNGB’s expertise in the National Guard’s employment and deployment for domestic purposes, and experience in the vitally important interagency collaboration needed for domestic response in the homeland. Indeed, roughly 70 percent of the Department of Defense’s response to Weapons of Mass Destruction is comprised of National Guard forces.

Threats faced by the United States have significantly grown since the 1990s, especially in the decade since 9/11 when America herself became a

battleground. Domestic response in the homeland is a matter of national security with international ramifications. In light of these changes, the duties of the JCS were adjusted; in 2006, providing military advice to the Homeland Security Council was added to the JCS statutory responsibilities. The CNGB is uniquely positioned to both provide situational awareness of state and federal military forces operating in unity of effort in the homeland and to ensure that resourcing decisions fully consider the domestic mission. Adding CNGB as a full member of the JCS would be the next logical step to improve the Joint Chiefs' ability to provide the best possible military advice to civilian leaders.

The CNGB's advice and opinion are also uniquely relevant because DoD policy charges CNGB with responsibility to "facilitate and de-conflict the use of National Guard forces among the States to ensure that adequate and balance forces are available and responsive for domestic and foreign military operations, consistent with national security objectives and priorities." Whereas the Service Chiefs provide definitive advice as to the capabilities of their federal RC to perform foreign military operations and domestic title 10 missions, only the CNGB can speak with authority on the strategic balancing required to ensure that the National Guard forces of 54 states and territories have the capability to perform their Federal missions and their domestic title 32 and state missions.

### **National Guard Budget**

Under US Code Title 10, Chapter 1011, which establishes the National Guard Bureau, the Secretary of Defense-approved charter (DoD Directive 5105.77) specifies CNGB's functions and responsibilities, both as identified in the

statute and others. Relative to National Guard budgets and capabilities, the DoDD indicates the CNGB shall:

- a) Plan, program, and administer the budget of the Army National Guard of the U.S. and the Air National Guard of the U.S. The CNGB is directly responsible for nearly \$25 billion annually, and is the appropriation sponsor for National Guard Military Personnel, Operations and Maintenance, Military Construction , and Procurement (via National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriation), and thus responsible for producing a President's Budget submission to Congress for these appropriations.
- b) Supervise the acquisition and supply of federal property through the U.S. Property and Fiscal Officers (USPFO) appointed under section 708 of Title 32, U.S. Code. The USPFO's work directly for the CNGB and provide the federal oversight and accountability of federal funds and property issued to the States, Territories, and District of Columbia, to ensure compliance with the Purpose and Anti-Deficiency Acts as well as with diverse DoD directives and regulations.

Although the CNGB has clearly delineated budgetary authority, this authority and responsibility are not necessary to perform JCS members' statutory duties, which include providing military advice to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Counsel, and the Secretary of Defense. This advisory role is separate and distinct from the role they fulfill in leading and administering their respective Services, whose budgets are ultimately the

responsibility of the Service Secretaries. Duty as a Joint Chief is additive to, and not a function of, Service responsibilities.

### **Similar Examples**

Considering the example of the Navy and Marine Corps Chiefs both being members of JCS contradict any contention as to a separate Service being divisive, or a Service having authority without accountability. The Marine Corps is part of the Department of the Navy and their budget request to Congress is included inside the Navy request. Yet no one would argue that the Marines are hindered by this construct in being able to articulate their requirements or deliver their unique capabilities. The CNGB has a similar Departmental-level role, and, as outlined above, also possesses significant budget authorities and responsibilities.

### **Closing Remarks**

Thank you for the opportunity to be here today, I look forward to your questions.