Jul 28 2010

Readiness and Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittees: Surface Fleet Readiness

Opening Statement of Readiness Chairman Ortiz

 

Readiness Chairman Solomon Ortiz Opening Statement

Joint Readiness and Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittees

Hearing on Surface Fleet Readiness

 
July 28, 2010

“The subcommittees will come to order.  Today the Readiness and Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittees meet to hear testimony on issues affecting the readiness of the Navy’s non-nuclear surface fleet.  I thank our distinguished witnesses from the Department of the Navy for appearing before the subcommittees today.

 

“Admiral Harvey, as you note in your prepared statement, you and your colleagues are here today because the surface force’s overall readiness trends remain in the wrong direction.

 

“When the Navy Board of Inspection and Survey in April 2008 deemed the USS Chosin and USS Stout unfit for combat operations because of their material readiness condition, it confirmed the Subcommittees’ concerns regarding the readiness of the surface force.

 

“The Readiness Subcommittee in March 2009 examined issues the Navy faces in sustaining its surface force ships for their expected service life and beyond.  The Navy reported at that hearing that it had begun taking steps to address gaps in ship maintenance funding and to assess ship material conditions through a pilot program of technical inspections.

 

“Since last spring, however, other reports and incidents have come to the Subcommittees’ attention that once again raises the issue of whether the Navy can achieve, let alone extend, the design service life of its surface force ships.

 

“These reports and incidents call into question the ability of the surface fleet to accomplish assigned missions.

 

“Concerns range from quality assurance issues affecting the USS San Antonio, the lead ship in the new LPD class of amphibious transport docking ships, to the conclusion of a Fleet Review Panel that surface force readiness has degraded to a point that it is well below acceptable levels to support reliable, sustained operations at sea.

 

“The subcommittees today will examine the factors that appear to have contributed to these concerns.   These factors are wide-ranging in nature and comprehensive in impact, from manpower and manning to funding, training, equipping, command and control, and culture.

 

“We also will address what steps the Navy is taking to move from a period of degraded readiness where, as you noted, Admiral Harvey, commanders were allowed to operate and maintain their ships below established standards, back to a Navy that fulfills our Sailors’ expectations regarding their deployed readiness – where effectiveness is more important than efficiency.

 

“Our witnesses today are: Admiral John Harvey, Commander, Fleet Forces Command; Vice Admiral William Burke, US Navy, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Fleet Readiness and Logistics (N4); and Vice Admiral Kevin McCoy; Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command.

 

            “The Chair now recognizes the distinguished gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Forbes, the ranking member of the Readiness Subcommittee, for any remarks he would like to make.”

 

 

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