Speech at the 10th Annual U.S. Missile Defense Conference
Monday, March 26, 2012
WASHINGTON - Sen. Carl Levin, D-Mich., chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, spoke at the 10th Annual U.S. Missile Defense Conference sponsored by the U.S. Missile Defense Agency and the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics. His remarks follow.
Thank you, General O’Reilly, and thanks to MDA and AIAA for sponsoring this 10th annual program on missile defense. It’s good to be with so many people who actually do the hard work of making one of the world’s most complex weapon systems, and making it work. This isn’t just rocket science that you’re involved in. It’s much harder. It’s “anti-rocket science.” Some of the seminar titles here attest to just how hard that is.
I have focused over the years on the importance of developing, testing and deploying operationally effective, cost-effective and affordable missile defenses to protect against actual threats – and to do this by demonstrating that they work through rigorous and realistic testing before we deploy them and through strong acquisition processes and accountability.
For too many years, our acquisition process for missile defense systems did not apply the same standards that Congress had for our other major weapon systems. I’m glad to say that we’ve eliminated that double standard, so that we expect our missile defense systems to meet rigorous standards, and we expect the Administration and the Department of Defense will work to uphold those standards.
Several years ago, General O’Reilly and I were discussing quality problems in our missile defense programs. I suggested that MDA should have a “defects clause” in its contracts – so that taxpayers did not have to pay for defective products. He said that he would aim to get such a clause written into MDA contracts and, for the first time, in December MDA did include a clause in the GMD Development and Sustainment Contract to prevent what it calls “quality escapes.” It will make contractors – not taxpayers – liable for the costs of defective products.
Now, thanks to his efforts, that will hopefully become a standard clause in future MDA contracts. And, by using competition for that development and sustainment contract, MDA will save nearly $1 billion, and reduce the price of future GMD interceptors by about $20 million each – from about $75 million to about $53 million. So, we’ll be getting more missile defense for our taxpayers’ dollar.
We have also made progress in other ways on improving the quality of missile defense systems. Last year, our Armed Services Committee investigated counterfeit electronics parts in Defense Department weapon systems. We found 1,800 cases in the supply chain involving more than 1 million counterfeit parts – overwhelmingly from China. The Missile Defense Agency was not immune to the problem. But under General O’Reilly’s leadership, MDA has tackled the issue head-on. General O’Reilly created some of the strongest protections in the Department of Defense to protect our weapons from counterfeit electronic parts. Our contractors cooperated with our investigation. They have much at stake in protecting the systems on which our security depends from this flood of counterfeit parts.
We included critical protections in the National Defense Authorization Act for 2012 that will help stem the tide of counterfeit parts from China and strengthen the ability of the Department of Defense and contractors to keep counterfeit parts out of the supply system.
Let me now turn to some specific policy issues involving our missile defense programs. A good starting point is that, today, we have a deployed inventory of 30 Ground-Based Interceptors protecting the homeland against possible future long-range missiles from countries such as Iran and North Korea. The system defends the entire U.S. homeland from that threat.
We are ahead of the threat, because neither North Korea nor Iran has yet deployed – or successfully tested – intercontinental ballistic missiles that can reach our nation. Iran hasn’t yet developed such missiles, and we are working hard to persuade Iran not to do so.
To stay ahead of the threat, the Defense Department has adopted or is planning a number of significant improvements to the GMD system, including reliability improvements to the interceptors, improvements in command and control and sensors, additional test and spare interceptors, and extra capacity to deploy additional interceptors if needed.
The system still has some bugs. When the last two flight tests of the GMD system failed, using the newest model of the Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle, General O’Reilly did the right thing. He had an independent group of experts determine exactly what caused the problem, designed a fix, and plans to demonstrate in extensive ground tests and two flight tests that the fix works – and to do all that before producing, assembling or refurbishing more of the new kill vehicles. That is the approach our committee recommended in our bill last year, and we generally favor – flying before buying.
When General O’Reilly discovered that the contractors who are responsible for the kill vehicle did not have sufficiently rigorous and repeatable high-quality production practices, he made sure that they made the necessary improvements. The intercept flight test will use the same hardware planned for operational deployment – called “production representative” hardware. So we will have confidence that these kill vehicles will work as intended – before we deploy them.
The resulting delay of a few months in the intercept flight test is worth it because the test will show how the actual system works. General Charles Jacoby, the Commander of U.S. Northern Command – who is the combatant commander responsible for operating the GMD system and defending the homeland – told our committee the other day that he supports this plan.
But the most pressing missile threat that the world faces, hands down, is the threat of regional ballistic missiles from Iran.
In September 2009, President Obama announced that he had accepted the unanimous recommendation of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs to proceed with the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA). This approach, along with a similar approach in the Middle East, was designed by our combatant commanders to provide the defenses needed against the existing and emerging regional missile threat from Iran.
There is deep and justified concern in the Administration and in Congress about the threat a nuclear-armed Iran would pose. But Iran already poses a significant threat in its inventory of hundreds of ballistic missiles, which can reach our deployed forces and allies in Europe and the Middle East, including Israel.
Our missile defenses, particularly our Phased Adaptive Approach in Europe and in the Middle East, and our extensive missile defense cooperation with Israel, are designed to deter and defend against this Iranian threat. Last year, the Navy deployed an Aegis-equipped cruiser to the Mediterranean, and announced it will base four Aegis ships in Spain, to help implement this approach. That approach also includes the powerful U.S. missile defense radar we have deployed with our Army personnel in Israel, and a similar radar we have deployed in Turkey. That radar in Turkey also improves the capability of our GMD system to defend the homeland against future Iranian missiles.
The layered missile defense system in Israel is playing a crucial, but under-appreciated, role today in the effort to dissuade Iran from going nuclear.
This administration and past administrations, along with Congress, have made a major, sustained effort to help Israel develop and field effective, layered missile defenses, including systems such as Arrow, Patriot, David’s Sling and Iron Dome. We have also deployed the X-band radar that I mentioned in Israel and we share with Israel missile launch data from U.S. early warning satellites. This cooperation on missile defense has major implications for our efforts to deter Iran from deciding to develop nuclear weapons.
The decision to pursue a nuclear weapon would be a fateful one for Iran. If Iran’s leaders were to decide to move forward to acquire nuclear weapons, it would likely invite a military attack against Iran’s nuclear sites. Iran presumably, as part of its decision-making process, would look at whether its ability to threaten retaliation with its missile arsenal would deter such an attack. Iran would have to factor Israeli missile defense capability into its calculations. And since that missile defense system is very capable, Iran would not be able to count on deterring an attack against its nuclear facilities by its ability to retaliate with its missiles. So, I believe that missile defenses, created cooperatively by Israel and the United States, are serving an essential role right now in helping to deter Iran from pursuing nuclear weapons.
That’s but one important part of our overall missile defense efforts toward Iran. The European Phased Adaptive Approach will provide increasing capability over the next decade to defend all of NATO Europe against Iran’s emerging missiles. A new version of the Standard Missile-3 now under development will also provide significant additional capability to the Phased Adaptive Approach and additional protection of our homeland against possible long-range missiles from Iran.
We could strengthen our missile defenses against Iran in another way – by forging a cooperative agreement with Russia. Pursuit of such cooperation has been the longstanding policy of the United States, going back to President Reagan, and including the Administration of George W. Bush. It should command bipartisan support in Congress.
Why should we want that cooperation? The reason is straightforward: it would be good for our security. It would improve the capability of the United States, NATO, and Russia to defend against the common threat of Iranian regional missiles. It would also send a powerful signal to Iran that the United States and Russia are united in opposing Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons and of long-range missiles. Cooperation between the United States and Russia would help wake up Iran to the situation she faces in the world and might help persuade Iran not to pursue long-range missiles and nuclear weapons. That would be a huge plus for our security, and for the world’s security.
Last month an independent group, called the Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative, released a study advocating such cooperative missile defense with Russia. The study leaders included Steve Hadley, who served as National Security Advisor to President George W. Bush, and former Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Trubnikov.
This international group of experts proposed that the United States, NATO, and Russia share satellite and radar early warning data at joint cooperation centers, thus improving their ability to detect, track, and defeat missiles. Command and control would remain a sovereign responsibility and would be consistent with the current U.S. and NATO approach and proposals, and hopefully this idea can take hold.
One of the barriers to cooperation with Russia is Russia’s concern that our approach would be able to defeat its ICBMs and thus diminish its nuclear deterrent. Russia’s fears are unwarranted. General O’Reilly has explained to Russian officials in the NATO-Russia Council, that our missiles planned for deployment in Romania and Poland, including the SM-3 Block IIB, are not a threat to Russia’s missiles, because Russia’s missiles are simply too capable and numerous to be threatened by our missile defenses.
There are actually numerous examples of current security cooperation with Russia.
We have security cooperation in the Northern Distribution Network, in which Russia allows NATO to transport equipment and personnel into and out of Afghanistan from Russian territory. We cooperate on counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, counter-piracy, and counter-hijacking. And we have longstanding cooperation under a variety of arms control agreements.
Our two nations are already cooperating on missile defense in several ways. In 2005, Russia agreed to let us launch an air-launched target missile from Russian airspace for a missile defense radar calibration test. The George W. Bush Administration invited Russian officials to observe a GMD test in 2007, providing them access to U.S. missile defense data. And through the NATO-Russia Council, we have had joint theater missile defense exercises.
I believe that the best way for Russia to gain confidence that our missile defense programs are not aimed at their missiles is to try cooperating with us in the manner that NATO and the independent international expert group have proposed. That proposal is very much in line with the previous U.S.-Russian plan for a Joint Data Exchange Center. Russia has nothing to lose by trying, and could gain significant security benefits without risk. If Russia tries this cooperative approach, I believe it will conclude that we are sincere in our desire to cooperate in a way that enhances the security of both our nations. Missile defense could – and should – unite us, not divide us.
Scientifically and strategically, missile defense is a complex endeavor, as all of you know. But it has powerful potential to protect our security and the world’s security. Already, today, deployed missile defense systems are protecting us, our troops and our allies. It can defend our homeland and the homelands of other nations from attack, particularly by rogue or fanatic regimes. It can help deter countries such as Iran from pursuing dangerous and destabilizing policies. These capabilities, and more, give missile defense a place of growing importance to our national security. We are grateful to you for your contributions to this vital cause of helping to keep America secure in an insecure world.
Thank you.