US Rolled Dice in bin Laden Raid
Tuesday, May 03, 2011
U.S. Rolled Dice in bin Laden Raid
By SIOBHAN GORMAN and ADAM ENTOUS , The Wall Street Journal
As two Black Hawk helicopters packed with American special
forces skimmed their way across a moonless sky toward Osama bin
Laden's lair, the mission's planners still weren't even sure their
target lived there.
Some of the analysts who assessed the intelligence put the
chances as low as 60%.
President Barack Obama had also chosen a risky attack option: A
direct raid on the house, deep within Pakistan-potentially putting
American fighters in face-to-face combat within a maze-like
compound-instead of simply bombing the place from a stealth
aircraft.
In Abbottabad, a prosperous enclave an hour's drive outside of
Islamabad, the helicopters came in low Sunday over the sprawling
property, spread over an acre of lush farmland covered with
eucalyptus trees. At its center, a three-story building stands,
surrounded by concrete walls some 14 feet high and topped by barbed
wire and security cameras.
One helicopter was badly damaged after hitting the ground hard
in a "vortex" created by the high walls-a heart-stopping moment
that encapsulated the U.S.'s biggest fears about the mission.
The team of about two dozen U.S. Special Operations Forces spent
40 minutes, with guns blazing, charging through each of the
structures on the property. Bin Laden and his family were found on
the second and third floors of the large main structure, the final
building to be searched.
According to U.S. officials, bin Laden tried to defend himself
before being shot through the left eye. One of the team sent word
to the U.S. that "Geronimo"-the code name for bin Laden-was
believed to have been killed in action.
After a decade of frustration, chasing bin Laden's shadow from
the caves of southern Afghanistan to the lawless provinces of
eastern Pakistan, the risky decision by U.S. officials to attack
the Pakistani compound had proven its worth. An examination of the
American decision shows the extent to which it was built on months
of tenacious planning, but that ultimately, it came down to gut
instinct.
"What swayed people was there was no other plausible
explanation" for who else might be living there, one U.S. official
said. The other possibility, some said, was al Qaeda No. 2 Ayman
al-Zawahiri.
In December, the Central Intelligence Agency called a secret
meeting with lawmakers to line up tens of millions of dollars in
funding, kicking off a five-month scramble that climaxed in
Sunday's events. This account is based on interviews and briefings
with nearly a dozen officials from the White House, intelligence
agencies, Pentagon and Congress.
Clearly, the focus of the U.S. spy community's interest-the
walled compound in Abbottabad-was built to shelter someone who
didn't want to be seen. By last fall, the U.S. had figured out that
most of its 22 residents were relatives of one of bin Laden's most
trusted "couriers," a close confidant responsible for shuttling
messages among al Qaeda leaders and friends world-wide.
But there was also another family in the sprawling, three-story
building, and it remained a deep mystery. Intelligence officials
knew there was an adult male in there, but they couldn't catch a
glimpse. He never stepped in to view.
For more than a decade, the U.S. had sought bin Laden, and
missed half a dozen times. Amid these frustrations, the seeds of
last weekend's mission were sown.
In 2002 and 2003, not long after bin Laden had escaped in the
cave-riddled mountains of Tora Bora in Afghanistan, interrogations
of CIA detainees revealed the nom de guerre of one of his couriers.
The man, who hasn't been named by U.S. officials, was a protégé of
the mastermind of the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed, and a trusted assistant aide to Abu Faraj al-Libbi, a
former al Qaeda No. 3 previously captured.
The key tip on the courier came from an al-Qaeda operative
apprehended in Iraq in 2004, Hassan Gul. Mr. Gul pointed to a man
known as Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti. In the interrogations of Messrs.
Mohammed and al-Libbi, the two Qaeda operatives appeared to go to
great lengths to hide any connection to the courier, which
indicated to intelligence officials that Mr. al-Kuwaiti was a key
player.
It took several more years simply to learn the courier's real
name. In 2007, CIA analysts finally obtained it. Still, the trail
remained cold. Leon Panetta's first briefing on bin Laden as CIA
chief, in February 2009, was discouraging. Spies around that time
had "caught a glimpse" of the courier, who was working with his
brother. But the two men had been extremely careful about covering
their tracks.
The big break took more than a year. In August 2010, the CIA was
able to follow the courier directly to the place where he lived:
the Abbottabad compound. Intelligence officials had locked on to
him when he made a phone call to a number they were tracking.
His property came in for intense scrutiny. Teams from the CIA,
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and National Security
Agency studied it with satellite and other surveillance equipment.
Mr. Panetta got weekly updates.
Built in 2005, the compound was on the outskirts of the town
center, at the end of a dirt road. The main three-story building
had few windows facing outward. There was a terrace on the third
floor with a seven-foot wall, preventing people from seeing
inside.
"Once they saw it, they knew they were on to something," a U.S.
official said.
Spies couldn't even rustle through the trash for clues. Unlike
almost all the neighbors, the residents of the compound burned
their garbage.
In September, Mr. Obama was told about the compound and informed
that it might be housing valuable targets in the war on terror-the
courier and his family, as well as the family of the courier's
brother.
In addition, "There was a mysterious third family living there,"
a U.S. official said. "There was an adult male they couldn't
visualize but knew he was there. There was also a female,
potentially a wife and children, whose family matched Osama bin
Laden's potential family." Members of the third family never
left.
In November, Mr. Panetta directed the Counterterrorism Center to
provide 10 proposals to gain better intelligence on who lived
there. They delivered 38, but only a few were viable. "That was the
balance, the more you creep in, the more you risk tipping him off,"
a U.S. official said.
Looming over the operation was an equally pressing worry: The
U.S. might tip off the Pakistanis, who weren't deemed trustworthy
enough to keep the secret. The Pakistanis had provided the U.S.
some information on the courier, but may not have realized his
significance, a U.S. official said. Some U.S. officials had long
suspected elements of the Pakistani government or military were
aiding bin Laden.
The evidence remained circumstantial. Nevertheless, in December,
the CIA's Mr. Panetta decided the intelligence in hand was
compelling enough to act. He called a secret meeting with lawmakers
to seek tens of millions of dollars to fund a program aimed at
intensive collection of intelligence about the property.
After Mr. Panetta secured the money from Congress in December,
CIA analysts remained split on the likelihood bin Laden was even
there. Some put the chances at 60%; others said 80%. Mr. Panetta
struggled with the uncertainty, one official said, but concluded
the American public would back an operation even if the odds were
only 50-50.
In February, Mr. Panetta believed it was time to begin planning
an operation. He met with Vice Adm. William McRaven, who heads the
military's special operations command, and asked for a small team
to game out the options.
An early favorite: a bombing raid. That approach would minimize
risk to American troops and maximize the likelihood of killing the
residents of the compound. But it might also have destroyed any
proof bin Laden was there.
A helicopter raid would be more complex, but more likely to
deliver confirmation. Some officials were wary of repeating a
fiasco like "Black Hawk Down" in Somalia, when U.S. forces were
killed after a botched raid on a warlord.
John Brennan, the White House chief counterterrorism adviser,
said Obama advisers were divided given the risks, the
circumstantial evidence, and the uncertainty about the true
identities of all the residents. Top national-security advisers
briefed the president in the Situation Room on March 14. They told
him there was a high-value target at the compound, and most likely
it was bin Laden.
"This is a go," Mr. Obama told the principals.
Two weeks later, Mr. Obama told his team he wanted them to start
rehearsing a raid on the compound. The team built a mock-up of the
compound in Afghanistan to test out dry runs of possible
attacks.
In April, Mr. Panetta was holding daily meetings. "This is the
best lead we have," he told his team at one meeting. "We've got to
find out what the hell is in that compound."
On April 19, Mr. Panetta told the president the CIA believed bin
Laden was there. Other advisers briefed Mr. Obama on preparations
for an assault, including the outcomes of the dress rehearsals. Mr.
Obama told them to "assume it's a go for planning purposes and that
we had to be ready," an administration official said.
That same day, Mr. Obama gave provisional approval for the
commando-style helicopter assault-which was launched from
Jalalabad, Afghanistan-despite the added risk. Senior U.S.
officials said the need to get a positive identification on bin
Laden became the deciding factor.
At 8 a.m. Friday, April 29, in the White House Diplomatic Room,
Mr. Obama summoned National Security Adviser Tom Donilan, Chief of
Staff William Daley and Mr. Brennan, and authorized the
operation.
Mr. Panetta called Adm. McRaven. "It's in your hands, friend,"
he told Adm. McRaven. "I wish you the best. All I can do is pray a
hell of a lot."
On Sunday morning, Mr. Obama gave the mission a final go, after
a 24-hour delay due to bad weather. Mr. Panetta went to church. Mr.
Obama played nine holes of golf.
National Counterterrorism Center Director Michael Leiter, who
got married on Saturday night in Washington, had to postpone his
honeymoon due to the attack. Back in 2009, Mr. Leiter caught some
flak when he took a planned ski vacation after the Christmas Day
underwear-bombing attempt of a Detroit-bound airliner. (The White
House defended Mr. Leiter's decision.)
As Sunday's operation unfolded, Mr. Panetta monitored it from
his seventh-floor conference-room-turned-war-room. And at the White
House, Mr. Obama and his top aides monitored the unfolding action
in real time from the Situation Room. "The minutes passed like
days," Mr. Brennan said.
After the firefight, bin Laden's body was initially identified
by members of the military strike force, and by a woman at the
compound identified as one of his wives.
The assault team also had orders to remove items of intelligence
value. "They picked up anything they could get their hands on,"
including computer hard drives, said a U.S. intelligence official.
"They're being exploited to find anything we can on them."
Video footage on local TV following the attack showed a
bloodstained bed inside the house. A senior defense official said
bin Laden was killed by "U.S. bullets," ruling out that he was
killed by his own guards to prevent his capture.
Three other adult men were killed, including the two couriers
and one of bin Laden's adult sons. One woman was killed when she
was used as a "shield" by one of the men. Two other women were
injured. The disabled helicopter was destroyed by the U.S. crew
before the strike team left.
At 3:50 p.m. Sunday, the president first learned that bin
Laden's body was tentatively identified. At 7:01 p.m., Mr. Obama
was told there was a "high probability" the body was bin
Laden's.
To identify him, CIA specialists also compared photos of the
body to known photos of bin Laden and were able to determine with
95% certainty it was him. Monday morning, an initial DNA analysis
showed a "virtually 100%" match of the body against DNA of several
bin Laden family members.
Bin Laden was buried at sea Monday, in accordance with Islamic
tradition that burial take place within 24 hours of death. A senior
U.S. defense official said religious rites were read on the deck of
the USS Carl Vinson. The body was placed in a weighted bag.
"After the words were complete," a senior defense official said,
"the body was placed on a prepared flat board, tipped up, whereupon
the deceased's body eased into the sea."