Heal the International Atomic Energy Agency
IAEA Key to Stopping Nuke Proliferation
By Senator Richard G. Lugar
As published in Defense News
September 21,2008

Early last month, a small amount of deadly plutonium leaked at the key laboratory near Vienna, Austria, for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the world's nuclear watchdog.

The good news is that the radioactivity was contained and no one was injured. The bad news is that the accident was symptomatic of something very dangerous indeed: the world's decaying ability to detect clandestine nuclear weapon proliferation.

The Safeguards Analytical Laboratory, built in the mid-1970s, is a critical link in the global system to prevent civilian nuclear power programs from being used illegally to develop nuclear weapons.

Its mission is to provide timely warning that nuclear material is being diverted from civilian use to weapon development. More than 1,000 nuclear samples are sent there every year by IAEA inspectors for testing, as provided under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).

Unfortunately, this aging front-line detection facility is severely hampered by outmoded equipment and dangerous working conditions. The IAEA itself concedes that the lab no longer meets safety and security standards. Because of its dilapidated air purification system, technicians are limited in the time they can spend analyzing evidence in the "hot" part of the lab.

As more countries embark on nuclear power programs and send more samples, these shortcomings will become ever more crippling.

The recent plutonium accident is an important wake-up call. Although only a small area of the lab had to be sealed off for decontamination, next time a more serious leak could shut down the whole operation.

The degradation of this key IAEA facility is part of a larger problem. The global nuclear nonproliferation regime has suffered significant setbacks in recent years. India and Pakistan stayed outside the NPT and have gone nuclear. North Korea renounced its NPT obligations and tested a nuclear bomb in 2006, while Iran, still an NPT member, appears headed down a similar path.

Earlier this month, the IAEA reported that Tehran was stonewalling its inspection process of looking into allegations of secret weapon work.

The expected surge of new nuclear power plants in response to high oil prices and climate change will place new stresses on the nonproliferation system. It could provide a pretext for more nations to seek their own nuclear enrichment and reprocessing facilities, which can be used to make nuclear reactor fuel - or fissile material for a nuclear weapon.

The spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology poses an unacceptable risk. It would multiply the chances that these new nuclear reactor nations could one day develop nuclear weapons or that terrorists could obtain bomb-making material.

To forestall this grave peril, the international community must make clear that enrichment and reprocessing technology are neither technologically nor economically necessary for a successful nuclear power program.

To support such an effort, I and my Indiana colleague, Sen. Evan Bayh, have introduced legislation to establish an international nuclear fuel bank. It would guarantee nuclear reactor fuel in a safe manner at reasonable prices to any country that agrees to forgo its own enrichment and reprocessing facilities. I am pleased that the Bush administration has donated $50 million, approved by Congress last year, to the IAEA to establish an International Nuclear Fuel Bank.

The anticipated growth of nuclear power also means we can no longer operate the chief nuclear sentry, the IAEA, on a shoestring budget with outdated equipment.

Last year, I visited the IAEA in Vienna and the laboratory. The employees there clearly need better and newer equipment to do their jobs, which will become even more demanding as states expand their nuclear power infrastructure.

Administration officials have acknowledged to Congress the need for upgrades at IAEA's facilities. A year has passed since I wrote Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice about "the failure of the administration to lead in the reconstruction of the IAEA's decrepit verification capabilities and safeguard system," yet the deficiencies persist.

The Lugar-Bayh nuclear fuel bank legislation, still awaiting Senate action, provides money for refurbishing or replacing the Safeguards Analytical Laboratory.

This should be part of modernizing the entire IAEA infrastructure. Other countries and the IAEA itself must do their part, but the United States should lead. One way to do so is by bolstering our own verification activities through the State Department's Key Assets Verification Fund, the Energy Department's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative, and our Program of Technical Assistance to the IAEA safeguards program.

In a world of rapidly spreading nuclear technology, there can be no excuse for the United States to shirk its responsibilities to help build the best possible safeguards system to provide for international peace and security. Peaceful uses of nuclear energy are only as good as the means to verify them.