# In the Senate of the United States,

November 16, 2006.

Resolved, That the bill from the House of Representatives (H.R. 5682) entitled "An Act to exempt from certain requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 a proposed nuclear agreement for cooperation with India.", do pass with the following

#### **AMENDMENT:**

Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert:

### 1 TITLE I—UNITED STATES-INDIA

- 2 **PEACEFUL ATOMIC ENERGY**
- 3 **COOPERATION**
- 4 SECTION 101. SHORT TITLE.
- 5 This title may be cited as the "United States-India
- 6 Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act".
- 7 SEC. 102. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
- 8 It is the sense of Congress that—
- 9 (1) strong bilateral relations with India are in
- 10 the national interest of the United States;

- (2) the United States and India share common democratic values and the potential for increasing and sustained economic engagement:
  - (3) commerce in civil nuclear energy with India by the United States and other countries has the potential to benefit the people of all countries;
  - (4) such commerce also represents a significant change in United States policy regarding commerce with countries not parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which remains the foundation of the international non-proliferation regime;
  - (5) any commerce in civil nuclear energy with India by the United States and other countries must be achieved in a manner that minimizes the risk of nuclear proliferation or regional arms races and maximizes India's adherence to international non-proliferation regimes, including, in particular, the Guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG); and
  - (6) the United States should not seek to facilitate or encourage the continuation of nuclear exports to India by any other party if such exports are terminated under United States law.

1	SEC. 103. DECLARATION OF POLICY CONCERNING UNITED
2	STATES-INDIA PEACEFUL ATOMIC ENERGY
3	COOPERATION.
4	It shall be the policy of the United States with respect
5	to any peaceful atomic energy cooperation between the
6	United States and India—
7	(1) to achieve as quickly as possible a cessation
8	of the production by India and Pakistan of fissile
9	materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear ex-
10	plosive devices;
11	(2) to achieve as quickly as possible the Govern-
12	ment of India's adherence to, and cooperation in, the
13	full range of international non-proliferation regimes
14	and activities, including India's—
15	(A) full participation in the Proliferation
16	$Security\ Initiative;$
17	(B) formal commitment to the Statement of
18	$Interdiction\ Principles;$
19	(C) public announcement of its decision to
20	conform its export control laws, regulations, and
21	policies with the Australia Group and with the
22	Guidelines, Procedures, Criteria, and Controls
23	List of the Wassenaar Arrangement; and
24	(D) demonstration of satisfactory progress
25	toward implementing the decision described in
26	$subparagraph\ (C);$

- 1 (3) to ensure that India remains in full compli-2 ance with its non-proliferation, arms control, and 3 disarmament agreements, obligations, and commit-4 ments:
  - (4) to ensure that any safeguards agreement or Additional Protocol thereto to which India is a party with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) can reliably safeguard any export or reexport to India of any nuclear materials and equipment;
  - (5) to meet the requirements set forth in subsections a.(1) and a.(3)-a.(9) of section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153);
  - (6) to act in a manner fully consistent with the Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers and the Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software and Related Technology developed by the multilateral Nuclear Suppliers Group and the rules and practices regarding NSG decision-making;
  - (7) given the special sensitivity of equipment and technologies related to the enrichment of uranium, the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, and the production of heavy water, to work with members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, individually and collec-

1	tively, to further restrict the transfers of such equip-
2	ment and technologies, including to India;
3	(8) to maintain the fullest possible international
4	support for, adherence to, and compliance with the
5	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; and
6	(9) that exports of nuclear fuel to India should
7	not contribute to, or in any way encourage, increases
8	in the production by India of fissile material for non-
9	civilian purposes.
10	SEC. 104. WAIVERS FOR COOPERATION WITH INDIA.
11	(a) Waiver Authority.—If the President submits a
12	determination under section 105 to the appropriate congres-
13	sional committees and makes available to such committees
14	the text of the agreement described in paragraph (3) of such
15	section, the President may—
16	(1) subject to subsection (b), exempt a proposed
17	agreement for cooperation with India arranged pur-
18	suant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of
19	1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) from the requirement of sub-
20	section $a.(2)$ of such section;
21	(2) waive the application of section 128 of the
22	Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2157) with re-
23	spect to exports to India; and
24	(3) waive the application of any sanction with
2.5	respect to India under—

1	(A) section 129 $a.(1)(D)$ of the Atomic En-
2	ergy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2158(a)(1)(D)); and
3	(B) section 129 of such Act (42 U.S.C.
4	2158) regarding any actions that occurred before
5	July 18, 2005.
6	(b) Joint Resolution of Approval Require-
7	MENT.—An agreement for cooperation exempted by the
8	President pursuant to subsection (a)(1) shall be subject to
9	the second proviso in subsection d. of section 123 of the
10	Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153(d)) applicable
11	to agreements exempted by the President pursuant to sub-
12	section (a) of such section.
13	SEC. 105. DETERMINATION REGARDING UNITED STATES-
14	INDIA PEACEFUL ATOMIC ENERGY COOPERA-
15	TION.
16	The determination referred to in section 104 is a writ-
17	ten determination by the President, which shall be accom-
18	panied by a report to the appropriate congressional com-
19	mittees, that—
20	(1) India has provided to the IAEA and the
21	United States a credible plan to separate its civil nu-
22	clear facilities, materials, and programs from its

- (2) India has filed a complete declaration regarding its civil nuclear facilities and materials with the IAEA:
  - (3) an agreement between India and the IAEA requiring the application of safeguards in perpetuity in accordance with IAEA standards, principles, and practices to civil nuclear facilities, programs, and materials described in paragraph (2) has entered into force;
  - (4) India and the IAEA are making substantial progress toward implementing an Additional Protocol;
  - (5) India is working with the United States to conclude a multilateral treaty on the cessation of the production of fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
  - (6) India is supporting international efforts to prevent the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology to any state that does not already possess full-scale, functioning enrichment or reprocessing plants;
  - (7) India has secured nuclear and other sensitive materials and technology through the application of comprehensive export control legislation and regulations, including through effective enforcement actions,

1	and through harmonization of its control lists with,
2	and adherence to, the guidelines of the Missile Tech-
3	nology Control Regime and the Nuclear Suppliers
4	Group;
5	(8) India is fully and actively participating in
6	United States and international efforts to dissuade,
7	sanction, and contain Iran for its nuclear program
8	consistent with United Nations Security Council reso-
9	lutions; and
10	(9) the Nuclear Suppliers Group has decided to
11	permit civil nuclear commerce with India pursuant
12	to a decision taken by the Nuclear Suppliers Group
13	that—
14	(A) was made by consensus; and
15	(B) does not permit nuclear commerce with
16	any non-nuclear weapon state other than India
17	that does not have IAEA safeguards on all nu-
18	clear materials and all peaceful nuclear activi-
19	ties within the territory of such state, under its
20	jurisdiction, or carried out under its control
21	anywhere.
22	SEC. 106. PROHIBITION ON CERTAIN EXPORTS AND REEX-
23	PORTS.
24	(a) Prohibition.—

1	(1) Nuclear regulatory commission.—Ex-
2	cept as provided in subsection (b), the Nuclear Regu-
3	latory Commission may not authorize pursuant to
4	part 110 of title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, li-
5	censes for the export or reexport to India of any
6	equipment, materials, or technology related to the en-
7	richment of uranium, the reprocessing of spent nu-
8	clear fuel, or the production of heavy water.
9	(2) Secretary of energy.—Except as pro-
10	vided in subsection (b), the Secretary of Energy may
11	not authorize pursuant to part 810 of title 10, Code
12	of Federal Regulations, licenses for the export or reex-
13	port to India of any equipment, materials, or tech-
14	nology to be used for the enrichment of uranium, the
15	reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, or the production
16	of heavy water.
17	(b) Exceptions.—Exports or reexports otherwise pro-
18	hibited under subsection (a) may be approved if—
19	(1) the end user—
20	(A) is a multinational facility partici-
21	pating in an IAEA-approved program to provide
22	alternatives to national fuel cycle capabilities; or
23	(B) is a facility participating in, and the
24	export or reexport is associated with, a bilateral

1	or multinational program to develop a prolifera-
2	tion-resistant fuel cycle; and
3	(2) the President determines that the export or
4	reexport will not improve India's ability to produce
5	nuclear weapons or fissile material for military uses.
6	SEC. 107. END-USE MONITORING PROGRAM.
7	(a) In General.—The President shall ensure that all
8	appropriate measures are taken to maintain accountability
9	with respect to nuclear materials, equipment, and tech-
10	nology sold, leased, exported, or reexported to India and to
11	ensure United States compliance with Article I of the Nu-
12	clear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
13	(b) Measures.—The measures taken pursuant to sub-
14	section (a) shall include the following:
15	(1) Obtaining and implementing assurances and
16	conditions pursuant to the export licensing authori-
17	ties of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the
18	Department of Commerce and the authorizing au-
19	thorities of the Department of Energy, including, as
20	appropriate, conditions regarding end-use moni-
21	toring.
22	(2) A detailed system of reporting and account-
23	ing for technology transfers, including any retransfers
24	in India, authorized by the Department of Energy
25	pursuant to section 57 b. of the Atomic Energy Act

1	of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2077(b)). Such system shall be ca-
2	pable of providing assurances that—
3	(A) the identified recipients of the nuclear
4	technology are authorized to receive the nuclear
5	technology;
6	(B) the nuclear technology identified for
7	transfer will be used only for peaceful safe-
8	guarded nuclear activities and will not be used
9	for any military or nuclear explosive purpose;
10	and
11	(C) the nuclear technology identified for
12	transfer will not be retransferred without the
13	prior consent of the United States, and facilities,
14	equipment, or materials derived through the use
15	of transferred technology will not be transferred
16	without the prior consent of the United States.
17	(3) In the event the IAEA is unable to imple-
18	ment safeguards as required by an agreement between
19	the United States and India arranged pursuant to
20	section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42
21	U.S.C. 2153), arrangements that conform with IAEA
22	safeguards standards, principles, and practices that
23	provide assurances equivalent to that intended to be
24	secured by the system they replace, including—

- (A) review in a timely fashion of the design of any equipment transferred pursuant to the agreement for cooperation, or of any facility that is to use, fabricate, process, or store any material so transferred or any special nuclear material used in or produced through the use of such material and equipment;
  - (B) maintenance and disclosure of records and of relevant reports for the purpose of assisting in ensuring accountability for material transferred pursuant to the agreement and any source or special nuclear material used in or produced through the use of any material and equipment so transferred; and
  - (C) access to places and data necessary to account for the material referred to in subparagraph (B) and to inspect any equipment or facility referred to in subparagraph (A).
- 19 (c) Implementation.—The measures described in 20 subsection (b) shall be implemented to provide reasonable 21 assurances that the recipient is complying with the relevant 22 requirements, terms, and conditions of any licenses issued 23 by the United States regarding such exports, including those 24 relating to the use, retransfer, safe handling, secure transit, 25 and storage of such exports.

### 1 SEC. 108. IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE.

2	(a) Information on Nuclear Activities of
3	India.—The President shall keep the appropriate congres-
4	sional committees fully and currently informed of the facts
5	and implications of any significant nuclear activities of
6	India, including—
7	(1) any material non-compliance on the part of
8	the Government of India with—
9	(A) the non-proliferation commitments un-
0	dertaken in the Joint Statement of July 18,
11	2005, between the President of the United States
12	and the Prime Minister of India;
13	(B) the separation plan presented in the na-
14	tional parliament of India on March 7, 2006,
15	and in greater detail on May 11, 2006;
16	(C) a safeguards agreement between the
17	Government of India and the IAEA;
18	(D) an Additional Protocol between the
19	Government of India and the IAEA;
20	(E) a peaceful nuclear cooperation agree-
21	ment between the Government of India and the
22	United States Government pursuant to section
23	123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C.
24	2153) or any subsequent arrangement under sec-
25	tion 131 of such Act (42 U.S.C. 2160):

1	(F) the terms and conditions of any ap-
2	proved licenses; and
3	(G) United States laws and regulations re-
4	garding the export or reexport of nuclear mate-
5	rial or dual-use material, equipment, or tech-
6	nology;
7	(2) the construction of a nuclear facility in
8	India after the date of the enactment of this Act;
9	(3) significant changes in the production by
10	India of nuclear weapons or in the types or amounts
11	of fissile material produced; and
12	(4) changes in the purpose or operational status
13	of any unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle activities in
14	India.
15	(b) Implementation and Compliance Report.—
16	Not later than 180 days after the date on which an agree-
17	ment between the Government of India and the United
18	States Government pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic
19	Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) enters into force, and
20	annually thereafter, the President shall submit to the appro-
21	priate congressional committees a report including—
22	(1) a description of any additional nuclear fa-
23	cilities and nuclear materials that the Government of
24	India has placed or intends to place under IAEA
25	safeguards;

1	(2) a comprehensive listing of—
2	(A) all licenses that have been approved by
3	the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Sec-
4	retary of Energy for exports and reexports to
5	India under parts 110 and 810 of title 10, Code
6	$of\ Federal\ Regulations;$
7	(B) any licenses approved by the Depart-
8	ment of Commerce for the export or reexport to
9	India of commodities, related technology, and
10	software which are controlled for nuclear non-
11	proliferation reasons on the Nuclear Referral
12	List of the Commerce Control List maintained
13	under part 774 of title 15, Code of Federal Regu-
14	lations;
15	(C) any other United States authorizations
16	for the export or reexport to India of nuclear
17	materials and equipment; and
18	(D) with respect to each such license or
19	other form of authorization described in subpara-
20	graphs (A), (B), and (C)—
21	(i) the number or other identifying in-
22	formation of each license or authorization;
23	(ii) the name or names of the author-
24	ized end user or end users;

1	(iii) the name of the site, facility, or
2	location in India to which the export or re-
3	export was made;
4	(iv) the terms and conditions included
5	on such licenses and authorizations;
6	(v) any post-shipment verification pro-
7	cedures that will be applied to such exports
8	or reexports; and
9	(vi) the term of validity of each such
10	license or authorization;
11	(3) any significant nuclear commerce between
12	India and other countries, including any such trade
13	that—
14	(A) does not comply with applicable guide-
15	lines or decisions of the Nuclear Suppliers
16	Group; or
17	(B) would not meet the standards applied to
18	exports or reexports of such material, equipment,
19	or technology of United States origin;
20	(4) either—
21	(A) a certification that India is in full com-
22	pliance with the commitments and obligations
23	contained in the agreements and other documents
24	referenced in subparagraphs (A) through (F) of
25	subsection $(a)(1)$ ; or

1	(B) if the President cannot make such cer-
2	tification, an identification and assessment of all
3	compliance issues arising with regard to the ad-
4	herence by India to its commitments and obliga-
5	tions, including—
6	(i) the steps the United States Govern-
7	ment has taken to remedy or otherwise re-
8	spond to such compliance issues;
9	(ii) the responses of the Government of
10	India to such steps; and
11	(iii) an assessment of the implications
12	of any continued noncompliance, including
13	whether nuclear commerce with India, if
14	not already terminated under section 129 of
15	the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C.
16	2158), remains in the national security in-
17	terest of the United States;
18	(5) a detailed description of—
19	(A) United States efforts to promote na-
20	tional or regional progress by India and Paki-
21	stan in disclosing, securing, capping, and reduc-
22	ing their fissile material stockpiles, pending cre-
23	ation of a world-wide fissile material cut-off re-
24	gime, including the institution of a Fissile Mate-
25	rial Cut-off Treaty;

1	(B) the reactions of India and Pakistan to
2	such efforts; and
3	(C) assistance that the United States is pro-
4	viding, or would be able to provide, to India and
5	Pakistan to promote the objectives in subpara-
6	graph (A), consistent with its obligations under
7	international law and existing agreements;
8	(6) an estimate of—
9	(A) the amount of uranium mined in India
10	during the previous year;
11	(B) the amount of such uranium that has
12	likely been used or allocated for the production
13	of nuclear explosive devices; and
14	(C) the rate of production in India of—
15	(i) fissile material for nuclear explosive
16	devices; and
17	(ii) nuclear explosive devices;
18	(7) an analysis as to whether imported uranium
19	has affected the rate of production in India of nuclear
20	explosive devices; and
21	(8) a detailed description of efforts and progress
22	made toward the achievement of India's—
23	(A) full participation in the Proliferation
24	Security Initiative;

1	(B) formal commitment to the Statement of
2	$Interdiction\ Principles;$
3	(C) public announcement of its decision to
4	conform its export control laws, regulations, and
5	policies with the Australia Group and with the
6	Guidelines, Procedures, Criteria, and Controls
7	List of the Wassenaar Arrangement; and
8	(D) demonstration of satisfactory progress
9	toward implementing the decision described in
10	subparagraph (C).
11	(c) Submittal With Other Annual Reports.—
12	(1) Report on proliferation prevention.—
13	Each annual report submitted under subsection (b)
14	after the initial report may be submitted together
15	with the annual report on proliferation prevention re-
16	quired under section 601(a) of the Nuclear Non-Pro-
17	liferation Act of 1978 (22 U.S.C. 3281(a)).
18	(2) Report on progress toward regional
19	NON-PROLIFERATION.—The information required to be
20	submitted under subsection (b)(5) after the initial re-
21	port may be submitted together with the annual re-
22	port on progress toward regional non-proliferation re-
23	quired under section 620F(c) of the Foreign Assist-
24	ance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2376(c)).

- 1 (d) FORM.—Each report submitted under this section
- 2 shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain
- 3 a classified annex.
- 4 SEC. 109. UNITED STATES COMPLIANCE WITH ITS NUCLEAR
- 5 NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY OBLIGATIONS.
- 6 This title shall not be deemed to constitute authority
- 7 for any action in violation of any obligation of the United
- 8 States under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
- 9 SEC. 110. INOPERABILITY OF DETERMINATION AND WAIV-
- 10 **ERS**.
- 11 A determination under section 105 and any waiver
- 12 under section 104 shall cease to be effective if the President
- 13 determines that India has detonated a nuclear explosive de-
- 14 vice after the date of the enactment of this Act.
- 15 SEC. 111. MTCR ADHERENT STATUS.
- 16 Congress finds that India is not an MTCR adherent
- 17 for the purposes of Section 73 of the Arms Export Control
- 18 Act (22 U.S.C. 2797b).
- 19 SEC. 112. TECHNICAL AMENDMENT.
- Section 1112(c)(4) of the Arms Control and Non-
- 21 proliferation Act of 1999 (title XI of the Admiral James
- 22 W. Nance and Meg Donovan Foreign Relations Act, Fiscal
- 23 Years 2000 and 2001 (as enacted into law by section
- 24 1000(a)(7) of Public Law 106–113 and contained in appen-
- 25 dix G of that Act; 113 Stat. 1501A-486)) is amended—

1	(1) in subparagraph (B), by striking "and" after
2	the semicolon at the end;
3	(2) by redesignating subparagraph (C) as sub-
4	paragraph (D); and
5	(3) by inserting after subparagraph (B) the fol-
6	lowing new subparagraph:
7	"(C) so much of the reports required under
8	section 108 of the United States-India Peaceful
9	Atomic Energy Cooperation Act as relates to
10	verification or compliance matters; and".
11	SEC. 113. DEFINITIONS.
12	In this title:
13	(1) The term "Additional Protocol" means a
14	protocol additional to a safeguards agreement with
15	the IAEA, as negotiated between a country and the
16	IAEA based on a Model Additional Protocol as set
17	forth in IAEA information circular (INFCIRC) 540.
18	(2) The term "appropriate congressional com-
19	mittees" means the Committee on Foreign Relations
20	of the Senate and the Committee on International Re-
21	lations of the House of Representatives.
22	(3) The term "atomic energy" has the meaning
23	given the term in section 11 c. of the Atomic Energy
24	Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014(c)).

- (4) The term "dual-use material, equipment, or 1 2 technology" means those items controlled by the De-3 partment of Commerce pursuant to section 309(c) of 4 the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978. 5 (5) The term "IAEA safeguards" has the mean-6 ing given the term in section 830(3) of the Nuclear 7 Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 (22 U.S.C. 8 6305(3)). 9 (6) The term "nuclear materials and equipment" 10 has the meaning given the term in section 4(5) of the 11 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (22 U.S.C. 12 3203(3)). 13 (7) The term "Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty" means the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nu-14 15 clear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and 16 Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered into force March 17 5, 1970 (21 UST 483). 18 (8) The terms "nuclear weapon" and "nuclear 19 explosive device" have the meaning given the term 20 "nuclear explosive device" in section 830(4) of the 21 Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 (22) 22  $U.S.C.\ 6305(4)$ ).
- 23 (9) The terms "reprocessing" and "reprocess"
  24 refer to the separation of nuclear materials from fis25 sion products in spent nuclear fuel.

1	(10) The term "source material" has the mean-
2	ing given the term in section 11 z. of the Atomic En-
3	ergy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014(z)).
4	(11) The term "special nuclear material" has the
5	meaning given the term in section 11 aa. of the Atom-
6	ic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014(aa)).
7	(12) The term "unsafeguarded nuclear fuel-cycle
8	activity" means research on, or development, design,
9	manufacture, construction, operation, or maintenance
10	of—
11	(A) any existing or future reactor, critical
12	facility, conversion plant, fabrication plant, re-
13	processing plant, plant for the separation of iso-
14	topes of source or special fissionable material, or
15	separate storage installation with respect to
16	which there is no obligation to accept IAEA safe-
17	guards at the relevant reactor, facility, plant, or
18	installation that contains source or special fis-
19	sionable material; or
20	(B) any existing or future heavy water pro-
21	duction plant with respect to which there is no
22	obligation to accept IAEA safeguards on any nu-
23	clear material produced by or used in connection

with any heavy water produced therefrom.

1	SEC. 114. UNITED STATES POLICY REGARDING THE PROVI-
2	SION OF NUCLEAR POWER REACTOR FUEL
3	RESERVE TO INDIA.
4	It is the policy of the United States that any nuclear
5	power reactor fuel reserve provided to the Government of
6	India for use in safeguarded civilian nuclear facilities
7	should be commensurate with reasonable reactor operating
8	requirements.
9	SEC. 115. UNITED STATES-INDIA SCIENTIFIC COOPERATIVE
10	THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM.
11	(a) Establishment.—The Secretary of Energy, act-
12	ing through the Administrator of the National Nuclear Se-
13	curity Administration, shall establish a cooperative threat
14	reduction program to pursue jointly with scientists from
15	the United States and India a program to further common
16	nonproliferation goals, including scientific research and de-
17	velopment efforts related to nuclear nonproliferation, with
18	an emphasis on nuclear safeguards (in this section referred
19	to as the "program").
20	(b) Consultation.—The program shall be carried out
21	in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Sec-
22	retary of Defense.
23	(c) National Academies Recommendations.—
24	(1) In General.—The Secretary of Energy shall
25	enter into an agreement with the National Academies

1	to develop recommendations for the implementation of
2	the program.
3	(2) Recommendations.—The agreement entered
4	into under paragraph (1) shall provide for the prepa-
5	ration by qualified individuals with relevant expertise
6	and knowledge and the communication to the Sec-
7	retary of Energy each fiscal year of—
8	(A) recommendations for research and re-
9	lated programs designed to overcome existing
10	technological barriers to nuclear nonprolifera-
11	tion; and
12	(B) an assessment of whether activities and
13	programs funded under this section are achiev-
14	ing the goals of the activities and programs.
15	(3) Public Availability.—The recommenda-
16	tions and assessments prepared under this subsection
17	shall be made publicly available.
18	(d) Consistency With Nuclear Non-Prolifera-
19	TION TREATY.—All United States activities related to the
20	program shall be consistent with United States obligations
21	under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
22	(e) Authorization of Appropriations.—There are
23	authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be nec-
24	essary to carry out this section for each of fiscal years 2007

25 through 2011.

#### 26 TITLE II—UNITED STATES ADDI-**PROTOCOL TIONAL** IMPLE-2 **MENTATION** 3 4 SEC. 201. SHORT TITLE. 5 This title may be cited as the "United States Additional Protocol Implementation Act". SEC. 202. FINDINGS. 8 Congress makes the following findings— 9 (1) The proliferation of nuclear weapons and 10 other nuclear explosive devices poses a grave threat to 11 the national security of the United States and its 12 vital national interests. 13 (2) The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has 14 proven critical to limiting such proliferation. 15 (3) For the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to 16 be effective, each of the non-nuclear-weapon State 17 Parties must conclude a comprehensive safeguards 18 agreement with the IAEA, and such agreements must 19 be honored and enforced. 20 (4) Recent events emphasize the urgency of 21 strengthening the effectiveness and improving the effi-

ciency of the safeguards system. This can best be ac-

complished by providing IAEA inspectors with more

information about, and broader access to, nuclear ac-

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23

- tivities within the territory of non-nuclear-weapon
   State Parties.
  - (5) The proposed scope of such expanded information and access has been negotiated by the member states of the IAEA in the form of a Model Additional Protocol to its existing safeguards agreements, and universal acceptance of Additional Protocols by non-nuclear weapons states is essential to enhancing the effectiveness of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
  - (6) On June 12, 1998, the United States, as a nuclear-weapon State Party, signed an Additional Protocol that is based on the Model Additional Protocol, but which also contains measures, consistent with its existing safeguards agreements with its members, that protect the right of the United States to exclude the application of IAEA safeguards to locations and activities with direct national security significance or to locations or information associated with such activities.
  - (7) Implementation of the Additional Protocol in the United States in a manner consistent with United States obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty may encourage other parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, especially non-nuclear-weapon State Parties, to conclude Additional

- 1 Protocols and thereby strengthen the Nuclear Non-2 Proliferation Treaty safeguards system and help re-3 duce the threat of nuclear proliferation, which is of 4 direct and substantial benefit to the United States.
  - (8) Implementation of the Additional Protocol by the United States is not required and is completely voluntary given its status as a nuclear-weapon State Party, but the United States has acceded to the Additional Protocol to demonstrate its commitment to the nuclear non-proliferation regime and to make United States civil nuclear activities available to the same IAEA inspections as are applied in the case of non-nuclear-weapon State Parties.
  - (9) In accordance with the national security exclusion contained in Article 1.b of its Additional Protocol, the United States will not allow any inspection activities, nor make any declaration of any information with respect to, locations, information, and activities of direct national security significance to the United States.
  - (10) Implementation of the Additional Protocol will conform to the principles set forth in the letter of April 30, 2002, from the United States Permanent Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Vienna Office of the United Nations

- to the Director General of the International Atomic
   Energy Agency.
- 3 SEC. 203. DEFINITIONS.
- 4 In this title:
- 5 (1) Additional protocol.—The term "Addi-6 tional Protocol", when used in the singular form, 7 means the Protocol Additional to the Agreement be-8 tween the United States of America and the Inter-9 national Atomic Energy Agency for the Application 10 of Safeguards in the United States of America, with 11 Annexes, signed at Vienna June 12, 1998 (T. Doc. 12 107-7).
- 13 *APPROPRIATE* CONGRESSIONALCOMMIT-14 TEES.—The term "appropriate congressional commit-15 tees" means the Committee on Armed Services, the 16 Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee 17 on Appropriations of the Senate and the Committee 18 on Armed Services, the Committee on International 19 Relations, and the Committee on Appropriations of 20 the House of Representatives.
- 21 (3) COMPLEMENTARY ACCESS.—The term "com-22 plementary access" means the exercise of the IAEA's 23 access rights as set forth in Articles 4 to 6 of the Ad-24 ditional Protocol.

1	(4) Executive agency.—The term "executive
2	agency" has the meaning given such term in section
3	105 of title 5, United States Code.
4	(5) FACILITY.—The term "facility" has the
5	meaning set forth in Article 18i. of the Additional
6	Protocol.
7	(6) IAEA.—The term "IAEA" means the Inter-
8	national Atomic Energy Agency.
9	(7) Judge of the united states.—The term
10	"judge of the United States" means a United States
11	district judge, or a United States magistrate judge
12	appointed under the authority of chapter 43 of title
13	28, United States Code.
14	(8) Location.—The term "location" means any
15	geographic point or area declared or identified by the
16	United States or specified by the International Atom-
17	ic Energy Agency.
18	(9) Nuclear non-proliferation treaty.—
19	The term "Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty" means
20	the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weap-
21	ons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July
22	1, 1968, and entered into force March 5, 1970 (21
23	UST 483).
24	(10) Nuclear-weapon state party and non-

NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATE PARTY.—The terms "nu-

1	clear-weapon State Party" and "non-nuclear-weapon
2	State Party" have the meanings given such terms in
3	the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
4	(11) Person.—The term "person", except as
5	otherwise provided, means any individual, corpora-
6	tion, partnership, firm, association, trust, estate, pub-
7	lic or private institution, any State or any political
8	subdivision thereof, or any political entity within a
9	State, any foreign government or nation or any agen-
10	cy, instrumentality or political subdivision of any
11	such government or nation, or other entity located in
12	the United States.
13	(12) Site.—The term "site" has the meaning set
14	forth in Article 18b. of the Additional Protocol.
15	(13) United states.—The term "United
16	States", when used as a geographic reference, means
17	the several States of the United States, the District of
18	Columbia, and the commonwealths, territories, and
19	possessions of the United States and includes all
20	places under the jurisdiction or control of the United
21	States, including—
22	(A) the territorial sea and the overlying air-
23	space;

(B) any civil aircraft of the United States

or public aircraft, as such terms are defined in

24

1	paragraphs (17) and (41), respectively, of section
2	40102(a) of title 49, United States Code; and
3	(C) any vessel of the United States, as such
4	term is defined in section 3(b) of the Maritime
5	Drug Law Enforcement Act (46 U.S.C. App.
6	1903(b)).
7	(14) Wide-Area environmental sampling.—
8	The term "wide-area environmental sampling" has
9	the meaning set forth in Article 18g. of the Additional
10	Protocol.
11	SEC. 204. SEVERABILITY.
12	If any provision of this title, or the application of such
13	provision to any person or circumstance, is held invalid,
14	the remainder of this title, or the application of such provi-
15	sion to persons or circumstances other than those as to
16	which it is held invalid, shall not be affected thereby.
17	$Subtitle \ A-\!$
18	SEC. 211. AUTHORITY.
19	(a) In General.—The President is authorized to im-
20	plement and carry out the provisions of this title and the
21	Additional Protocol and shall designate through Executive
22	order which executive agency or agencies of the United
23	States, which may include but are not limited to the De-
24	partment of State, the Department of Defense, the Depart-
25	ment of Justice, the Department of Commerce, the Depart-

- ment of Energy, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
   shall issue or amend and enforce regulations in order to
- 3 implement this title and the provisions of the Additional
- 4 Protocol.
- 5 (b) Included Authority.—For any executive agency
- 6 designated under subsection (a) that does not currently pos-
- 7 sess the authority to conduct site vulnerability assessments
- 8 and related activities, the authority provided in subsection
- 9 (a) includes such authority.
- 10 (c) Exception.—The authority described in sub-
- 11 section (b) does not supersede or otherwise modify any exist-
- 12 ing authority of any Federal department or agency already
- 13 having such authority.

# 14 Subtitle B—Complementary Access

- 15 SEC. 221. REQUIREMENT FOR AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT
- 16 COMPLEMENTARY ACCESS.
- 17 (a) Prohibition.—No complementary access to any
- 18 location in the United States shall take place pursuant to
- 19 the Additional Protocol without the authorization of the
- 20 United States Government in accordance with the require-
- 21 ments of this title.
- 22 *(b) AUTHORITY.*—
- 23 (1) In General.—Complementary access to any
- 24 location in the United States subject to access under

1	the Additional Protocol is authorized in accordance
2	with this title.
3	(2) United states representatives.—
4	(A) Restrictions.—In the event of com-
5	plementary access to a privately owned or oper-
6	ated location, no employee of the Environmental
7	Protection Agency or of the Mine Safety and
8	Health Administration or the Occupational Safe-
9	ty and Health Administration of the Department
10	of Labor may participate in the access.
11	(B) Number.—The number of designated
12	United States representatives accompanying
13	IAEA inspectors shall be kept to the minimum
14	necessary.
15	SEC. 222. PROCEDURES FOR COMPLEMENTARY ACCESS.
16	(a) In General.—Each instance of complementary
17	access to a location in the United States under the Addi-
18	tional Protocol shall be conducted in accordance with this
19	subtitle.
20	(b) Notice.—
21	(1) In General.—Complementary access re-
22	ferred to in subsection (a) may occur only upon the
23	issuance of an actual written notice by the United
24	States Government to the owner, operator, occupant,

1	or agent in charge of the location to be subject to com-
2	plementary access.
3	(2) Time of notification.—The notice under
4	paragraph (1) shall be submitted to such owner, oper-
5	ator, occupant, or agent as soon as possible after the
6	United States Government has received notification
7	that the IAEA seeks complementary access. Notices
8	may be posted prominently at the location if the
9	United States Government is unable to provide actual
10	written notice to such owner, operator, occupant, or
11	agent.
12	(3) Content of Notice.—
13	(A) In General.—The notice required by
14	paragraph (1) shall specify—
15	(i) the purpose for the complementary
16	access;
17	(ii) the basis for the selection of the fa-
18	cility, site, or other location for the com-
19	plementary access sought;
20	(iii) the activities that will be carried
21	out during the complementary access;
22	(iv) the time and date that the com-
23	plementary access is expected to begin, and
24	the anticipated period covered by the com-
25	plementary access; and

1	(v) the names and titles of the inspec-
2	tors.
3	(4) Separate notices required.—A separate
4	notice shall be provided each time that complemen-
5	tary access is sought by the IAEA.
6	(c) Credentials.—The complementary access team of
7	the IAEA and representatives or designees of the United
8	States Government shall display appropriate identifying
9	credentials to the owner, operator, occupant, or agent in
10	charge of the location before gaining entry in connection
11	with complementary access.
12	(d) Scope.—
13	(1) In general.—Except as provided in a war-
14	rant issued under section 223, and subject to the
15	United States Government's rights under the Addi-
16	tional Protocol to limit complementary access, com-
17	plementary access to a location pursuant to this title
18	may extend to all activities specifically permitted for
19	such locations under Article 6 of the Additional Pro-
20	to col.
21	(2) Exception.—Unless required by the Addi-
22	tional Protocol, no inspection under this title shall ex-
23	tend to—
24	(A) financial data (other than production
25	data);

1	(B) sales and marketing data (other than
2	$shipment\ data);$
3	(C) pricing data;
4	(D) personnel data;
5	(E) patent data;
6	(F) data maintained for compliance with
7	environmental or occupational health and safety
8	regulations; or
9	(G) research data.
10	(e) Environment, Health, Safety, and Secu-
11	RITY.—In carrying out their activities, members of the
12	IAEA complementary access team and representatives or
13	designees of the United States Government shall observe ap-
14	plicable environmental, health, safety, and security regula-
15	tions established at the location subject to complementary
16	access, including those for protection of controlled environ-
17	ments within a facility and for personal safety.
18	SEC. 223. CONSENTS, WARRANTS, AND COMPLEMENTARY
19	ACCESS.
20	(a) In General.—
21	(1) Procedure.—
22	(A) Consent.—Except as provided in
23	paragraph (2), an appropriate official of the
24	United States Government shall seek or have the
25	consent of the owner, operator, occupant, or

agent in charge of a location prior to entering that location in connection with complementary access pursuant to sections 221 and 222. The owner, operator, occupant, or agent in charge of the location may withhold consent for any reason or no reason.

- (B) Administrative search warrant.—
  In the absence of consent, the United States Government may seek an administrative search warrant from a judge of the United States under subsection (b). Proceedings regarding the issuance of an administrative search warrant shall be conducted ex parte, unless otherwise requested by the United States Government.
- (2) Expedited access.—For purposes of obtaining access to a location pursuant to Article 4b.(ii) of the Additional Protocol in order to satisfy United States obligations under the Additional Protocol when notice of two hours or less is required, the United States Government may gain entry to such location in connection with complementary access, to the extent such access is consistent with the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, without obtaining either a warrant or consent.

1	(b) Administrative Search Warrants for Com-
2	PLEMENTARY ACCESS.—
3	(1) Obtaining administrative search war-
4	RANTS.—For complementary access conducted in the
5	United States pursuant to the Additional Protocol,
6	and for which the acquisition of a warrant is re-
7	quired, the United States Government shall first ob-
8	tain an administrative search warrant from a judge
9	of the United States. The United States Government
10	shall provide to such judge all appropriate informa-
11	tion regarding the basis for the selection of the facil-
12	ity, site, or other location to which complementary ac-
13	cess is sought.
14	(2) Content of Affidavits for Administra-
15	TIVE SEARCH WARRANTS.—A judge of the United
16	States shall promptly issue an administrative search
17	warrant authorizing the requested complementary ac-
18	cess upon an affidavit submitted by the United States
19	Government—
20	(A) stating that the Additional Protocol is
21	$in\ force;$
22	(B) stating that the designated facility, site,
23	or other location is subject to complementary ac-
24	cess under the Additional Protocol:

1	(C) stating that the purpose of the com-
2	plementary access is consistent with Article 4 of
3	$the\ Additional\ Protocol;$
4	(D) stating that the requested complemen-
5	tary access is in accordance with Article 4 of the
6	$Additional\ Protocol;$
7	(E) containing assurances that the scope of
8	the IAEA's complementary access, as well as
9	what it may collect, shall be limited to the access
10	provided for in Article 6 of the Additional Pro-
11	tocol;
12	(F) listing the items, documents, and areas
13	to be searched and seized;
14	(G) stating the earliest commencement and
15	the anticipated duration of the complementary
16	access period, as well as the expected times of
17	day during which such complementary access
18	will take place; and
19	(H) stating that the location to which entry
20	in connection with complementary access is
21	sought was selected either—
22	(i) because there is probable cause, on
23	the basis of specific evidence, to believe that
24	information required to be reported regard-
25	ing a location pursuant to regulations pro-

1	mulgated under this title is incorrect or in-
2	complete, and that the location to be
3	accessed contains evidence regarding that
4	$violation;\ or$
5	(ii) pursuant to a reasonable general
6	administrative plan based upon specific
7	$neutral\ criteria.$
8	(3) Content of Warrants.—A warrant issued
9	under paragraph (2) shall specify the same matters
10	required of an affidavit under that paragraph. In ad-
11	dition, each warrant shall contain the identities of the
12	representatives of the IAEA on the complementary ac-
13	cess team and the identities of the representatives or
14	designees of the United States Government required to
15	$display \ identifying \ credentials \ under \ section \ 222(c).$
16	SEC. 224. PROHIBITED ACTS RELATING TO COMPLEMEN-
17	TARY ACCESS.
18	It shall be unlawful for any person willfully to fail
19	or refuse to permit, or to disrupt, delay, or otherwise im-
20	pede, a complementary access authorized by this subtitle or
21	an entry in connection with such access.

1	Subtitle C—Confidentiality of
2	In formation
3	SEC. 231. PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMA-
4	TION.
5	Information reported to, or otherwise acquired by, the
6	United States Government under this title or under the Ad-
7	ditional Protocol shall be exempt from disclosure under sec-
8	tions 552 of title 5, United States Code.
9	Subtitle D—Enforcement
10	SEC. 241. RECORDKEEPING VIOLATIONS.
11	It shall be unlawful for any person willfully to fail
12	or refuse—
13	(1) to establish or maintain any record required
14	by any regulation prescribed under this title;
15	(2) to submit any report, notice, or other infor-
16	mation to the United States Government in accord-
17	ance with any regulation prescribed under this title;
18	or
19	(3) to permit access to or copying of any record
20	by the United States Government in accordance with
21	any regulation prescribed under this title.
22	SEC. 242. PENALTIES.
23	(a) CIVIL.—
24	(1) Penalty amounts.—Any person that is de-
25	termined in accordance with paragraph (2) to have

violated section 224 or section 241 shall be required by order to pay a civil penalty in an amount not to exceed \$25,000 for each violation. For the purposes of this paragraph, each day during which a violation of section 224 continues shall constitute a separate violation of that section.

### (2) Notice and Hearing.—

- (A) In GENERAL.—Before imposing a penalty against a person under paragraph (1), the head of an executive agency designated under section 211(a) shall provide the person with notice of the order. If, within 15 days after receiving the notice, the person requests a hearing, the head of the designated executive agency shall initiate a hearing on the violation.
- (B) Conduct of Hearing.—Any hearing so requested shall be conducted before an administrative judge. The hearing shall be conducted in accordance with the requirements of section 554 of title 5, United States Code. If no hearing is so requested, the order imposed by the head of the designated agency shall constitute a final agency action.
- (C) Issuance of orders.—If the administrative judge determines, upon the preponderance

of the evidence received, that a person named in the complaint has violated section 224 or section 241, the administrative judge shall state his findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issue and serve on such person an order described in paragraph (1).

- (D) Factors for determining the amount of any civil penalty, the administrative judge or the head of the designated agency shall take into account the nature, circumstances, extent, and gravity of the violation or violations and, with respect to the violator, the ability to pay, effect on ability to continue to do business, any history of such violations, the degree of culpability, the existence of an internal compliance program, and such other matters as justice may require.
- (E) CONTENT OF NOTICE.—For the purposes of this paragraph, notice shall be in writing and shall be verifiably served upon the person or persons subject to an order described in paragraph (1). In addition, the notice shall—
  - (i) set forth the time, date, and specific nature of the alleged violation or violations; and

	-
1	(ii) specify the administrative and ju-
2	dicial remedies available to the person or
3	persons subject to the order, including the
4	availability of a hearing and subsequent
5	appeal.
6	(3) Administrative appellate review.—The
7	decision and order of an administrative judge shall be
8	the recommended decision and order and shall be re-
9	ferred to the head of the designated executive agency
10	for final decision and order. If, within 60 days, the
11	head of the designated executive agency does not mod-
12	ify or vacate the decision and order, it shall become
13	a final agency action under this subsection.
14	(4) Judicial review.—A person adversely af-
15	fected by a final order may, within 30 days after the
16	date the final order is issued, file a petition in the
17	Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
18	or in the Court of Appeals for the district in which
19	the violation occurred.
20	(5) Enforcement of final orders.—
21	(A) In general.—If a person fails to com-
22	ply with a final order issued against such person

under this subsection and—

23

1	(i) the person has not filed a petition
2	for judicial review of the order in accord-
3	ance with paragraph (4), or
4	(ii) a court in an action brought under
5	paragraph (4) has entered a final judgment
6	in favor of the designated executive agency,
7	the head of the designated executive agency shall
8	commence a civil action to seek compliance with
9	the final order in any appropriate district court
10	of the United States.
11	(B) No review.—In any such civil action,
12	the validity and appropriateness of the final
13	order shall not be subject to review.
14	(C) Interest.—Payment of penalties as-
15	sessed in a final order under this section shall
16	include interest at currently prevailing rates cal-
17	culated from the date of expiration of the 60-day
18	period referred to in paragraph (3) or the date
19	of such final order, as the case may be.
20	(b) Criminal.—Any person who violates section 224
21	or section 241 may, in addition to or in lieu of any civil
22	penalty which may be imposed under subsection (a) for such
23	violation, be fined under title 18, United States Code, im-
24	prisoned for not more than five years, or both.

### 1 SEC. 243. SPECIFIC ENFORCEMENT.

2	(a) JURISDICTION.—The district courts of the United
3	States shall have jurisdiction over civil actions brought by
4	the head of an executive agency designated under section
5	211(a)—
6	(1) to restrain any conduct in violation of sec-
7	tion 224 or section 241; or
8	(2) to compel the taking of any action required
9	by or under this title or the Additional Protocol.
10	(b) Civil Actions.—
11	(1) In general.—A civil action described in
12	subsection (a) may be brought—
13	(A) in the case of a civil action described in
14	paragraph (1) of such subsection, in the United
15	States district court for the judicial district in
16	which any act, omission, or transaction consti-
17	tuting a violation of section 224 or section 241
18	occurred or in which the defendant is found or
19	transacts business; or
20	(B) in the case of a civil action described in
21	paragraph (2) of such subsection, in the United
22	States district court for the judicial district in
23	which the defendant is found or transacts busi-
24	ness

1	(2) Service of process.—In any such civil ac-
2	tion, process shall be served on a defendant wherever
3	the defendant may reside or may be found.
4	$Subtitle\ E-Environmental$
5	Sampling
6	SEC. 251. NOTIFICATION TO CONGRESS OF IAEA BOARD AP-
7	PROVAL OF WIDE-AREA ENVIRONMENTAL
8	SAMPLING.
9	(a) In General.—Not later than 30 days after the
10	date on which the Board of Governors of the IAEA approves
11	wide-area environmental sampling for use as a safeguards
12	verification tool, the President shall notify the appropriate
13	$congressional\ committees.$
14	(b) Content.—The notification under subsection (a)
15	shall contain—
16	(1) a description of the specific methods and
17	sampling techniques approved by the Board of Gov-
18	ernors that are to be employed for purposes of wide-
19	$area\ sampling;$
20	(2) a statement as to whether or not such sam-
21	pling may be conducted in the United States under
22	the Additional Protocol; and
23	(3) an assessment of the ability of the approved
24	methods and sampling techniques to detect, identify,

1	and determine the conduct, type, and nature of nu-
2	clear activities.
3	SEC. 252. APPLICATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY EXCLU-
4	SION TO WIDE-AREA ENVIRONMENTAL SAM-
5	PLING.
6	In accordance with Article 1(b) of the Additional Pro-
7	tocol, the United States shall not permit any wide-area en-
8	vironmental sampling proposed by the IAEA to be con-
9	ducted at a specified location in the United States under
10	Article 9 of the Additional Protocol unless the President has
11	determined and reported to the appropriate congressional
12	committees with respect to that proposed use of environ-
13	mental sampling that—
14	(1) the proposed use of wide-area environmental
15	sampling is necessary to increase the capability of the
16	IAEA to detect undeclared nuclear activities in the
17	territory of a non-nuclear-weapon State Party;
18	(2) the proposed use of wide-area environmental
19	sampling will not result in access by the IAEA to lo-
20	cations, activities, or information of direct national
21	security significance; and
22	(3) the United States—
23	(A) has been provided sufficient opportunity
24	for consultation with the IAEA if the IAEA has

1	requested complementary access involving wide-
2	area environmental sampling; or
3	(B) has requested under Article 8 of the Ad-
4	ditional Protocol that the IAEA engage in com-
5	plementary access in the United States that in-
6	volves the use of wide-area environmental sam-
7	pling.
8	SEC. 253. APPLICATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY EXCLU-
9	SION TO LOCATION-SPECIFIC ENVIRON-
10	MENTAL SAMPLING.
11	In accordance with Article 1(b) of the Additional Pro-
12	tocol, the United States shall not permit any location-spe-
13	cific environmental sampling in the United States under
14	Article 5 of the Additional Protocol unless the President has
15	determined and reported to the appropriate congressional
16	committees with respect to that proposed use of environ-
17	mental sampling that—
18	(1) the proposed use of location-specific environ-
19	mental sampling is necessary to increase the capa-
20	bility of the IAEA to detect undeclared nuclear activi-
21	ties in a non-nuclear weapons state;
22	(2) the proposed use of location-specific environ-
23	mental sampling will not result in access by the
24	IAEA to locations, activities, or information of direct
25	national security significance; and

1	(3) with respect to the proposed use of environ-
2	mental sampling, the United States—
3	(A) has been provided sufficient opportunity
4	for consultation with the IAEA if the IAEA has
5	requested complementary access involving loca-
6	tion-specific environmental sampling; or
7	(B) has requested under Article 8 of the Ad-
8	ditional Protocol that the IAEA engage in com-
9	plementary access in the United States that in-
10	volves the use of location-specific environmental
11	sampling.
12	SEC. 254. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.
13	As used in this subtitle, the term "necessary to increase
14	the capability of the IAEA to detect undeclared nuclear ac-
15	tivities in the territory of a non-nuclear-weapon State
16	Party" shall not be construed to encompass proposed uses
17	of environmental sampling that might assist the IAEA in
18	detecting undeclared nuclear activities in the territory of
19	a non-nuclear-weapon State Party by—
20	(1) setting a good example of cooperation in the
21	conduct of such sampling; or
22	(2) facilitating the formation of a political con-
23	sensus or political support for such sampling in the
24	territory of a non-nuclear-weapon State Party.

## 1 Subtitle F—Protection of National

# 2 Security Information and Activities

- 3 SEC. 261. PROTECTION OF CERTAIN INFORMATION.
- 4 (a) Locations and Facilities of Direct National
- 5 Security Significance.—No current or former Depart-
- 6 ment of Defense or Department of Energy location, site, or
- 7 facility of direct national security significance shall be de-
- 8 clared or be subject to IAEA inspection under the Addi-
- 9 tional Protocol.
- 10 (b) Information of Direct National Security
- 11 Significance.—No information of direct national security
- 12 significance regarding any location, site, or facility associ-
- 13 ated with activities of the Department of Defense or the De-
- 14 partment of Energy shall be provided under the Additional
- 15 Protocol.
- 16 (c) Restricted Data.—Nothing in this title shall be
- 17 construed to permit the communication or disclosure to the
- 18 IAEA or IAEA employees of restricted data controlled by
- 19 the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C.
- 20 2011 et seq.), including in particular "Restricted Data" as
- 21 defined under paragraph (1) of section 11 y. of such Act
- 22 (42 U.S.C. 2014(y)).
- 23 (d) Classified Information.—Nothing in this Act
- 24 shall be construed to permit the communication or disclo-

- 1 sure to the IAEA or IAEA employees of national security
- 2 information and other classified information.
- 3 SEC. 262. IAEA INSPECTIONS AND VISITS.
- 4 (a) Certain Individuals Prohibited From Ob-
- 5 TAINING ACCESS.—No national of a country designated by
- 6 the Secretary of State under section 620A of the Foreign
- 7 Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371) as a government
- 8 supporting acts of international terrorism shall be per-
- 9 mitted access to the United States to carry out an inspec-
- 10 tion activity under the Additional Protocol or a related
- 11 safeguards agreement.
- 12 (b) Presence of United States Government Per-
- 13 sonnel.—IAEA inspectors shall be accompanied at all
- 14 times by United States Government personnel when inspect-
- 15 ing sites, locations, facilities, or activities in the United
- 16 States under the Additional Protocol.
- 17 (c) Vulnerability and Related Assessments.—
- 18 The President shall conduct vulnerability, counterintel-
- 19 ligence, and related assessments not less than every 5 years
- 20 to ensure that information of direct national security sig-
- 21 nificance remains protected at all sites, locations, facilities,
- 22 and activities in the United States that are subject to IAEA
- 23 inspection under the Additional Protocol.

1	$Subtitle\ G$ — $Reports$
2	SEC. 271. REPORT ON INITIAL UNITED STATES DECLARA-
3	TION.
4	Not later than 60 days before submitting the initial
5	United States declaration to the IAEA under the Additional
6	Protocol, the President shall submit to Congress a list of
7	the sites, locations, facilities, and activities in the United
8	States that the President intends to declare to the IAEA.
9	SEC. 272. REPORT ON REVISIONS TO INITIAL UNITED
10	STATES DECLARATION.
11	Not later than 60 days before submitting to the IAEA
12	any revisions to the United States declaration submitted
13	under the Additional Protocol, the President shall submit
14	to Congress a list of any sites, locations, facilities, or activi-
15	ties in the United States that the President intends to add
16	to or remove from the declaration.
17	SEC. 273. CERTIFICATION REGARDING VULNERABILITY AND
18	RELATED ASSESSMENTS.
19	Concurrently with the submission to Congress of the
20	initial declaration list under section 271 and each list up-
21	date under section 272, the President shall submit to Con-
22	gress a report certifying that—
23	(1) each site, location, facility, and activity in-
24	cluded in the list has been examined by each agency

1	with national security equities with respect to such
2	site, location, facility, or activity; and
3	(2) appropriate measures have been taken to en-
4	sure that information of direct national security sig-
5	nificance will not be compromised at any such site,
6	location, facility, or activity in connection with an
7	IAEA inspection.
8	SEC. 274. REPORT ON EFFORTS TO PROMOTE THE IMPLE-
9	MENTATION OF ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS.
10	Not later than 180 days after the entry into force of
11	the Additional Protocol, the President shall submit to the
12	appropriate congressional committees a report on—
13	(1) measures that have been or should be taken
14	to achieve the adoption of additional protocols to ex-
15	isting safeguards agreements signed by non-nuclear-
16	weapon State Parties; and
17	(2) assistance provided by the United States to
18	the IAEA in order to promote the effective implemen-
19	tation of additional protocols to existing safeguards
20	agreements signed by non-nuclear-weapon State Par-
21	ties and the verification of the compliance of such
22	parties with IAEA obligations.

### 1 SEC. 275. NOTICE OF IAEA NOTIFICATIONS.

- 2 The President shall notify Congress of any notifica-
- 3 tions issued by the IAEA to the United States under Article
- 4 10 of the Additional Protocol.

# 5 Subtitle H—Authorization of

# 6 **Appropriations**

- 7 SEC. 281. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
- 8 There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as
- 9 may be necessary to carry out this title.

Attest:

Secretary.

# 109TH CONGRESS H. R. 5682

# **AMENDMENT**