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SECRETARY OF THE SENATE
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RITCHIE: Today I'd like to talk about when you became secretary of the Senate in 1966. I was interested in how you became secretary, when the decision was made.

VALEO: Yes, let me try to recall the circumstances. I had been serving as secretary for the majority for a period of time, without any major problems, for two or three years. There had been no more scandals, and generally speaking I think people were fairly well satisfied with the way the Senate was being handled then. I don't think you can divorce my situation from the general changes that were taking place. Most senators liked the way the changes were going, because it enhanced their own individual stature, and that was basically the whole thrust of Mansfield's leadership—and to move the whole Senate towards a better concept of equal treatment for all members. Although theoretically senators were equal, they actually had not been in practice, and they knew that. They saw the effect of the Mansfield changes as time went on.

Well, traditionally, or at least in everybody's living memory, the secretary for the majority normally became secretary of the Senate. There were several reasons for that. First of all, he

was known to the majority as secretary for the majority, and he would normally be someone who was closely associated with the leadership. So it was a natural kind of thing to put him on what was regarded as one level higher, and along with the sergeant at arms, the principal officer of the Senate. So by tradition the appointment should have come to me, although there's nothing to require that. In fact, as you probably know, the secretary of the Senate is elected by the Senate, not even by the majority, but it's one of the few things that the caucus usually agrees on and stays with and votes together on, the election of the officers of the Senate, along with the committees and the other subsidiary bodies of the Senate. So what it amounted to was that you got an endorsement from the majority and then the minority never opposed that for the simple reason that they knew the majority would stand firm and would, therefore, be able to elect the person that they had given an endorsement to, or nominated in effect.

Normally, there were no opposing nominations on the floor, although I think the precedents will show there may have been one or two fights on that, historically, in the Senate. That was one of the things that came up at that time. Word got around that Senator Long was going to try to get someone else in the job, a fellow named Charles Jones, who later became head of the recording studio. I think he was either a North or South Carolinian. A nice chap, pleasant and amiable and well liked. Had no particular

background for the job as secretary of the Senate. At that time, I forget what his job was, I think the senator he worked for may have died just at that point, or retired and he was sort of at loose ends and they were looking for a job for him. No, I'm sorry, I've got it confused. That was for the secretary for the majority job.

The question arose in this case with Emery Frazier, who was the chief clerk (as it was then called) for many, many years. He had also been the reading clerk at the Democratic presidential conventions. He had a very large booming voice and became a very familiar television figure in those conventions. He was a very pleasant person, had a great love for the Senate, was liked by just about everybody in the Senate, I don't think he had an enemy of any kind, anywhere. He was what you might call a traditional figure of the Senate staff structure. He was the one that did most of the hiring of people for the secretary. He had a good eye for the needs of the Senate in the context of that period, particularly for what was needed on the floor, so he chose people with that very much in mind.

His superior at the time was a chap named Felton Johnston, who was known affectionately as Skeeter. Skeeter had become secretary, as I recall, because [Lyndon] Johnson didn't want him as secretary for the majority anymore, he wanted Bobby Baker in that job, so he found an opening and just made him secretary of

the Senate. He ran it essentially as an administrative job and depended very heavily on Emery Frazier. Skeeter had very little connection, as far as I'm aware, with Johnson, and certainly almost no connection with Mansfield, other than the most formal. He was not liked by Mansfield particularly, tolerated after he took over until Skeeter decided to retire. The only connection really that the secretary of the Senate had at that time with the Mansfield leadership was that traditionally the Policy Committee had met in the secretary's conference room. Mansfield continued that practice while Johnston was still secretary of the Senate. He did sit in on the Policy Committee luncheons and he sat in on the Democratic caucuses. I had no personal feelings one way or the other towards Skeeter. I hardly knew him. He was always most pleasant to me.

But when he decided to retire, an effort was made to elevate Emery Frazier, almost as a gesture to Emery for his long service in the Senate, into the job. Russell of Georgia was a part of that. I'm sure Long must have been a part of it. There may have been others, I don't know who else was involved. Mansfield got wind of that, and he didn't want to have a head-on battle so he moved, rather astutely, on his own—I had nothing to do with it. I knew that there was a problem, that there was some question rising. It didn't bother me one way or the other, I was secretary

for the majority and not discontented in that role. But what Mansfield did was to suggest to Russell that they give Emery Frazier the post until his seventieth birthday, or something like that, and then have him retire; but to do the election of both Emery and his successor—which would be me—at the same time. This headed off any kind of a real dispute in the caucus. Nobody could really argue with that because the desire for Emery in the office was essentially an affectionate one and they knew of course that I was quite close to Mansfield and that I was obviously Mansfield's choice for the job. So that's the way it worked.

Emery took over as secretary for less than a year, and during that period, in effect I was secretary-elect to replace him on his seventieth birthday, or sometime thereabouts. That was how it developed. Emery and I had no problems with it. He was very decent about it. At one point he said, "I don't want to make any major appointments that aren't agreeable with you in this period." He said, "I need to replace myself as chief clerk, and I have somebody in mind whom I think you'll like and whom you'll certainly agree with." I said, "Well, who's that, Emery?" He said, "It's Darrell St. Claire." Well, I had known Darrell for many years and was personally very fond of him and knew that he knew the Senate very, very well indeed. So he was an ideal choice for the job. I told him, "By all means, go right ahead and appoint him. I couldn't think of anybody I'd rather have in there more

than Darrell." And that's the way Darrell was made assistant secretary of the Senate.

This reminds me of another problem I used to run into occasionally with Mansfield on appointments. It became a question of choosing my successor as secretary for the majority. Word came to me from the Montana office that he had Stan Kimmitt in mind for the job. I didn't know Stan Kimmitt very well, but I got the impression from the people in the Montana office that they did not like him. It was clear that what they were suggesting to me was to try to sidetrack the designation. Stan had been around the Senate as a kind of a military attaché, or military liaison for many years, knew a lot of members, mostly on the conservative side of the Democratic party, from the military committees. I received prodding from the Montana people—Stan was also from Montana, and I thought this resistance to him might involve Montana politics in some way. Moreover, I personally had reservations about putting a military man in the job, in all candor.

There was one other person who occurred to me at that time. He was an administrative assistant to Senator Pat McNamara of Michigan, who had just died, Robert Perrin. I knew the man only slightly, but I had a very high respect for him. I liked McNamara very much, I thought he was a really outstanding senator. Considering his background, I think he was head of the Plumbers Union, or he had a card in the Plumbers Union, he brought a bit of

America into the Senate, from that economic group, which I thought was extremely refreshing. He was a powerful, positive influence for social legislation that I thought, myself, personally desirable. Anyhow, he had this assistant and I thought he would have made an ideal person. He was a personality very much like Mansfield, actually, sort of reticent and withdrawing, but with a very deep knowledge of the legislative process. So I dropped the name in Mansfield's presence. I didn't say anything about Stan Kimmitt, but I dropped the name of Bob Perrin. He didn't like it one bit. He sort of pinned my ears back on that one, and he said, "That job goes to Stan Kimmitt." So he had already made up his mind, for some reason or other, that it was going to go to Kimmitt. He later regretted it, but at that time he was very strong for it.

I used to get that situation occasionally with Mansfield. There was another case of a woman who had tendencies towards alcoholism when he hired her. She was a lovely person, and I was very fond of her. He said, "Why don't we put her in the job?" I sort of resisted it for a while, but he finally became very insistent, and I went along with it. The alcoholism caught up with her at a later point. He would say to me later, "You know, we have made some very bad appointments around here," referring usually to appointments he had made. I caught this with Charlie Ferris on another occasion, on the policy committee, where again I had

nothing to do with the choice, but I always got the "we" when he decided they weren't very good appointments.

RITCHIE: Why do you think that was? Do you think he was too trusting of people in the beginning?

VALEO: No, like all of us his judgment wasn't infallible. He could pick the wrong people. He could pick them for the wrong reasons. He could pick them because of pressures that were put on him. I made the same mistake. In one case he had a chap—I won't mention his name—but he must have been a distant cousin of Russell's. He was a lawyer down in the Treasury Department, and Russell had suggested that he be appointed to one of the leadership committees. Mansfield responded to Russell, where he normally would not respond to suggestions of that sort necessarily from other members, but he was always very deferential to Russell, I think in recognition of his power within the southern group. So he asked me to check the fellow out. I had a friend in the Treasury Department who was also a lawyer and had worked in the same department. I called him and asked him about him, and I thought I detected a kind of reticence. He didn't want to say "No, don't hire him," he probably felt he couldn't say that. But it was certainly a lukewarm endorsement.

I didn't think that that was enough to support the appointment, but then the woman who was in charge of that particular

group became very ill, and even though he didn't know her, he wrote her a lovely letter. I happened to go out to see her when she was recovering, and she showed me the letter. I must say, I was completely taken with it. I thought anybody who could write such a warm letter to someone whom he didn't know must be a pretty decent human being. So this persuaded me that the appointment was probably solid. I went back and reported to Mansfield that I thought it would probably be a good appointment. Well, it turned out to be a disaster. We finally had to fire him. So you see, it's possible to make mistakes, usually in hiring people for the wrong reasons. And Mansfield was not immune to that by any means.

I should mention one other thing. The secretary's office was really in the doldrums at that time. Skeeter Johnston didn't do anything with it. At least in the period I knew him he was basically getting ready to fold up and go. His sight was going and he was not in the best of health. He had no influence with the leadership. He had some with Hayden. There were attempts made at that time to move the secretary's office out from the control of the majority leader where it had been with Johnson and put it under the control of the president pro tem, just as the legal counsel's office was under the control of the president pro tem. But Hayden would not buy that. Hayden was president pro tem

during that period. He really didn't want to be bothered with this, so he'd refer all questions to Mike, because he was used to referring them to Johnson. So the office didn't move out from under the control of the leadership. Really the caucus has the control ultimately of it. I think Skeeter finally felt it was time for him to get out, and he resigned. Then I took over after Emery Frazier.

When I was getting ready to move into the office, Emery Frazier knew I was a hiker—I used to hike the Skyline Drive trails and the Potomac Appalachian trails, and he went up there a great deal for vacations. So he said, "How about spending a weekend at Skyline. I'll tell you all about the secretary's office if we do that." I said, "Fine, Emery." We went up and spent two or three days at one of the lodges. Emery gave me the whole background on everything connected with the secretary's office in the thirty or more years that he was with the Senate. It was really very amusing how he picked people. He said, "I hire people on my sense of whether they'll fit in the job, even though their job applications do not necessarily indicate that that's the case. Like for instance, I hired this fellow. I was walking through Union Station one day, and I saw this fellow sitting on a bench and I sat down next to him. We had a little talk. He needed a job and I decided he'd be good for one of the jobs in the secretary's office, and I brought him in. I didn't have an opening for

him at the time, but expected that there would be a change, and I knew he would be ideal for it, so that's the way I chose him." Well, I thought this was pretty far-fetched, but it seemed to work—the fellow is still in the job as far as I know, and would probably recognize himself if he hears the tape!

But the thing, I think, that disturbed me the most in this situation was that, as you may know, in that earlier period there was a kind of dividing line between black employees of the secretary's office and the rest. Black employees were then called messengers, uniformly, although they did a variety of other tasks besides being messengers, one of which was to take care of the secretary's inner sanctum, especially for occasional drinks when people would drop in during a late session. Although I understand at one point the secretary's office was a pretty heavy drinking center, it was not that during my period, very specifically because Mansfield instructed me to cut down on the booze around the Senate, and this was one of the sources of booze. I did not encourage people to come in and have a drink. They went elsewhere perhaps, but they didn't very often come into the secretary's office, except on a very late night sometimes, we'd have a group of maybe eight or nine.

Anyhow, among other jobs, the black employees drove; they waited tables for the secretary's luncheons and for the leadership luncheons. When I was about to become secretary, Emery Frazier

called in all the black employees, including the senior member of the staff, Ellsworth Dozier, who became a highly trusted friend. He lined them up and said, "I want to introduce you to your new boss." He gave my name, and then he said, "and he can fire any one of you, if he pleases." Well, these poor guys were standing there, shivering in their boots, and it just made me feel very, very bad. I knew that something had to be done to change that. I made some sort of gesture of protest at the time, but he was very insistent on making the point, and I thought there was something about this that was kind of—I couldn't live with it, I knew that was not the way it had to go and I did change it.

That, in effect, was the way I started as secretary of the Senate. The next thing I ran into was the tendency of the Disbursing Office to break away from the secretary's office, although the secretary had legal responsibilities with regard to the Disbursing Office. If I had a basic concept of the job, it was based upon what I had seen in the British system, which was that the supporting services of the Senate, at least, if not of the whole Congress, ought to be integrated and put at some point under one direction, and as far as possible removed from politics. That would have been the underlying concept with which I approached the job; it would have been based primarily on the British experience, and partly on the belief that you could not run the kind of Senate it was becoming as though it were a

personal club of some kind, that somehow or other you had to get a structure which gave at least the staff part of it some kind of institutional status and career continuity.

This had not been the case in earlier changes from Republican to Democratic control or vice versa; there had been sort of a wholesale bloodletting of people, and very few, with some exceptions, like Emery Frazier, very few survived. Skeeter Johnston had also seen this problem and he had a lot of time to work on it; he was gradually moving it away from the idea of a change over. He hired Republicans as well as Democrats, he tried to keep some sort of a rough divisions of sources of supply for personnel from both parties. He at least was attempting to move it in that direction. To a degree he had been successful in keeping on people who had lost their patrons, so to speak, who had basically been under something called the Patronage Committee. Well, I found out that Patronage Committee had been Hayden's committee, when he was president pro tem, but again, it was one of those functions which he exercised with Johnson's okay. So I went to the leadership and got Mansfield to become chairman of the Patronage Committee. The way Skeeter had tried to move it away from the old fashioned approach was to have the jobs put under the patronage, so to speak, of the secretary of the Senate, which gave the secretary of the Senate the ability to hire or fire.

When I came in, maybe about 30 percent of the jobs were still controlled by individual members who had been assigned the patronage by the Patronage Committee. I made it one of my goals to try to reduce that and have the appointments consolidated under the secretary so that you could then avoid the political element. By the time I left, we were pretty well down to maybe 10 percent, and relatively minor jobs, still left under patronage. I always took the view that the secretary should change with a change of administration. I felt that essential under our system. And possibly the assistant secretary, but I was trying to get it to the point where you wouldn't go any further than that, that the other people would have job security below that, at least to the extent that it might be jeopardized by political changes. You saw what happened when the Republicans came into a majority on the committees a few years ago. The same sort of thing went on in the committee structures. There was a big changeover and that was what I was trying to avoid as far as possible in the secretary's office.

RITCHIE: And you did. There wasn't much of a change there in 1980.

VALEO: No, there wasn't. And to stress it, I did not expect Kimmitt to succeed me; I thought that Hildenbrand would succeed me. I knew Bill very well and explained to him as I was going along what I was trying to do, on the assumption that he would be the next Republican secretary of the Senate, if ever

there were one. He didn't say he agreed with it, but I thought I made some impression on him. I said, "Look, first of all I'm not hiring any of these people on the basis of whether they're Democrats or Republicans. That's not a question that's being asked any longer." I said that from the point of view of the Senate, I felt it was essential that it be done that way. He didn't say no, and he didn't say yes, but when he finally took over, I saw him again and we had a long talk, and it was clear that he was going to do it that way.

When Robert Dole took over, I saw Dole and had essentially the same talk with him. He referred me to Jo-Anne Coe. I described what we had tried to do, and I said that actually the jobs were technically now under the secretary's patronage so that they were subject to change, but that I didn't think you could run an effective Senate that way, and for the good of the institution I thought you'd have to have a good deal of continuity. I said, "That doesn't mean that some jobs can't change, but I just think that ought to be the guiding principle, or I think you'll run into a lot of trouble." I saw her at the suggestion of Dole. He was a little surprised when he found out how few jobs were left to the leadership for patronage purposes. I don't know how that's developed, I haven't followed it that closely, but I did try to spread that message. When Stan Kimmitt took over I told him the same thing. He certainly accepted the idea, and Bill Hildenbrand

accepted the idea. Both of them ran, I thought, the secretary's office in a very effective way.

One of the ways we got to that state, as I tried to point out, was by having Mansfield assign to the secretary the patronage of every senator who was either defeated or retired. So by attrition we were gradually getting to the point—and some of them didn't even know they had the patronage, they had forgotten about it, and so when we had a vacancy we didn't remind them that they had the patronage. We'd just go ahead and fill them. We lost the lists of who was entitled to what patronage jobs in the secretary's office. I think Darrell and I conveniently lost those lists, I'm not sure. And I must say, there was no heavy pressure for political appointee jobs in the secretary's office at that time, which made it easier. There were a lot of other jobs around. But when you come in after you've been out for a long time, like the Republicans, you're under a lot more pressure. When you change from Democratic administration to Democratic administration that isn't quite as powerful a factor in the situation. So those things conspired to make the institutional development a practical thing. In addition there was a tendency on the part of the leadership on both sides, certainly with [Hugh] Scott as well as Mansfield, to see the necessity for change. I guess when [Howard] Baker came in he changed the parliamentarian, but I think there was a personal problem that precipitated that.

I think I may have mentioned in our earlier discussion how we got the Curator's Office set up, and set up the Historian's Office. The biggest problem that was presented to us in this period was the administration of the campaign contributions law, in its first form, before it was amended, before the commission was set up. There will be one other thing that I'll want to hit, and that's the Commission on the Organization of the Senate, which was also set up in this period.

The campaign contributions law presented us with a major challenge. It was not a responsibility which I would have sought. In connection with the effort to reorganize the office along new lines, I had hired Lan Potter as a consultant to study the structure of the Senate secretary's office and to come up with suggestions on how we might improve it. Before we go into that, I better go back and touch on the dispute with the Disbursing Office, which was a very important one, and a critical one at this period. It was a development which was to determine whether in the long run the staff structure of the Senate might have a chance of going the way I thought it ought to go, that is, towards consolidation, or whether it would go into further dispersal, just like the Senate was going in its dispersal of power in this period, the Senate itself. I was trying to resist that on the staff side, even as it was spreading among the senators.

The problem came up with a Senate clerk who was named Bob Brenkworth. To give you a little background beyond that, before Brenkworth, there was another financial clerk of the Senate who committed suicide. He committed suicide probably because the accounts in the Disbursing Office were so screwed up and there was so little control over the use of funds. I don't think there were any major crimes committed, but it was just almost a paper and pencil bookkeeping system that they used in the Disbursing Office in that period. After he committed suicide, Bob Brenkworth was made financial clerk, this was before I had anything to do with it. He ran it very tightly, but he also ran it extremely bureaucratically.

When I first came into the office, I found out that the Disbursing Office had virtually become an independent office, quite separate from the Senate secretary. The way that was done: Brenkworth came in at the very beginning and said, "Now if you'll sign this, I'll take care of the Disbursing Office." In effect, it was a complete delegation of the secretary's powers over the Disbursing Office. I demurred for a moment, not wanting to sign it until I knew a little bit more about what I was signing. But he said that all my predecessors had done this, and that this was the only way in which you could insure the integrity of financial transactions of the Senate. Well, he was bonded and I was bonded and I thought it would be all right, so I went ahead and did that.

Then I found out this was also part of the business of taking the secretary completely out of the affairs of the Disbursing Office. Brenkworth was able to do this because of the fear engendered by the previous scandal and the suicide, and also by the fact that he had made himself in effect, if not in name, the budget officer for the Senate by a close relationship with the Appropriations Committee, who needed someone in this role. They had a chief clerk at that time named Tom

RITCHIE: Scott?

VALEO: Tom Scott. He had been there for many years and was trusted by Hayden among others. Brenkworth had totally independent access to the Appropriations Committee, which was the nearest thing to a governing committee for the secretary's office as well as for many of the secretary's services. Brenkworth, playing a kind of dual role of being the secretary's disbursing officer and the Appropriations Committee's budget officer, had managed to work both sides of the street, until he was in a rather unassailable position. The only thing I had were some very serious worries about how he was hiring people for the office—I understood that what he did was put an ad in the newspaper and then screen out the appointments on that basis. Nobody knew who he hired. I think I might have mentioned that one time somebody had come to me about getting a job for somebody in the secretary's office. I sent him over there and that was later thrown up at me

as being political interference in the operation of the Disbursing Office. I think it was a Republican who had asked me to look into the possibility of getting him a job!

Anyhow, I went down to testify—this was unprecedented—on the secretary's budget. I made it clear to Brenkworth, who had always done this job for the secretary, that I wanted to appear in person before the committee. He looked a little shocked at this, but he went along with it. He said, "Well, you know your predecessors never went down. I took care of the budget for the secretary's office." I said, "Well, that's all right, you come down too. But I want to go down and make myself known to the committee." I had said to him earlier: "I'm worried about the business of paying people in cash. At this late date in the history of the United States government, we're still paying staff people in the Senate every two weeks in an envelope with cash in it." He said, "That's the only way you can do it." I said, "Well, why is it the only way?" His response was: "They can get paid in check if they're prepared to wait till the end of the month. We'll give them a check at the end of the month." I said, "You know, I'm really very worried about this business of having five hundred thousand"—I don't know how much the payroll was at that time—"every two weeks lying around in the Senate. You know, we don't have the best of cops around here to protect this. It might make sense to try to do it the other way." Well, he said

he'd look into it, but he didn't think it was possible to do it. The other point I raised with him was the office's antiquated system. I said, "Computers are being introduced everywhere else." "Oh," he said, "that's impossible under the Senate system."

Well, that's what I was confronted with. I went down and I testified. I had some research done, and I found out that the only place in the American government where people were still being paid in cash, besides the United States Senate, was an army outpost up in Alaska where they were still paying in silver dollars! This made an impact, and it was shortly after that that he must have decided that I was really pressing too hard on the Disbursing Office, so there began a plot to try to get it out from under the secretary entirely. Since he worked closely with Tommy Scott on the Appropriations Committee, they were able to put something in a bill which in effect would have removed the Disbursing Office from the secretary's jurisdiction and would have made it an independent office of the Senate. This is what happened in the House and it would have gone in exactly the opposite direction from which I thought an effective, efficient management of Senate affairs ought to go.

I discovered the plot in time and I called it to Mansfield's attention. This had been slipped in without any real hearings on it or anything else. Apparently Russell had agreed to it at the time. Mansfield was really furious and he went to Russell, and

Russell said, "Oh, I don't feel very strongly about that. Tommy or somebody told me it would be a good idea to do it this way and I just went along with it. I have no strong feeling about it." Well, it was immediately taken out of the legislation. Not too long after that, Brenkworth resigned.

Bill Ridgely, who was the next in line for the job, came in to see me about it. I had no objections to appointing Bill Ridgely. I had always found him quite accommodating and quite service oriented. He asked about the job. Yes, I said, I didn't see any reason why he shouldn't move into it. But I laid down two conditions. One was that he eliminate all payment in cash as quickly as possible. The second one was that he make a really good faith effort to have the Disbursing Office analyzed for computerization. He agreed to the conditions and I appointed him to the job. He kept both commitments very completely and within a couple of months everyone was being paid in check without any great disasters to any of the staff people or the Senate. I felt safer. I slept better at night. The computer process he went at very slowly. It took him two or three years to do it, and he had both systems running simultaneously for the longest time, but eventually we got to the point where it was adopted. Bill later was very pleased with the outcome of this. He even went one step further; not only did he pay people in check but then he agreed to actually transfer salaries directly to the banks so employees

wouldn't even have to bother with a check. On the computerization, he pointed to it with pride as a great achievement in bringing the Senate's procedures up to date.

All the while, Lan Potter and Marilyn Courtot were both working on various other organizational problems when we were suddenly hit with the campaign contributions law. The reformers were trying to go for the commission approach right away and were attempting to remove the Senate secretary and the Clerk of the House from the process. They couldn't get it through in that form, there was too much resistance to it in the House committee. Then in lieu of a commission they thought of giving the supervisory power entirely to the Comptroller General. Pat Jennings who was then Clerk of the House resisted this very strongly. He came over to see me and he said, "I don't think we should let the control of congressional elections get into the hands of a Comptroller General." He didn't think he was the best person to administer the law. So he said he was going to have somebody put in the bill—I don't know where it was at that point in the process—he said he was going to get the clerk added and the secretary of the Senate as the administering officers for the elections on both sides of the Congress. Well, that seemed to me to put us in an awkward place for us to be, but I didn't know what else to do at that point, if he felt that strongly about it. I didn't want it done for the House without something comparable being done for the Senate.

Well, the campaign contributions law was probably the only thing that made me any enemies in the Senate. I knew I had Lan Potter to do the actual job, so that relieved me to some extent, but I still didn't want the responsibility, because I knew what was going to happen: I'd have a parade in of Senate people who were getting into difficulties complying with the law. But the provision was adopted, so we had the responsibility. I immediately assigned Lan Potter to work on that exclusively. Our first requirement was to get up a list of rules and regulations to interpret the law into practice. I also hired Neil Kennedy, who as a Republican lawyer had been very effective on the civil rights legislation. He had worked for Dirksen and was then in private practice. I hired him as a consultant, and I hired someone I knew, Paul Treusch from the Treasury Department, because I thought the writing of the rules and regulations on this would be very similar to some of the stuff that the Internal Revenue Service puts out—I hoped not as complicated. I didn't know what his credentials were politically, but I thought he might be vaguely a Democrat and that would keep some kind of a balance between the parties. My contribution was to set forth the principles, there were four or five, that I wanted to govern the administration of the law.

Potter went to work on it right away, he was not a lawyer but with their legal advice we got together, before the House or the

GAO, a set of rules and regulations for the enforcement of the law in Senate elections. My thought then was that we should try to bring it into harmony with what they were going to do in the House and what the Comptroller General was going to do in connection with presidential campaign contributions. So we had several joint meetings. Basically they adopted the rules and regulations that Lan Potter together with these lawyers had put together. We were out in front on it.

We went through the first election under the law, and it was really almost a disaster. The first couple of campaigns that Potter brought to my attention for noncompliance had to do with some minor candidates out in one of the western states, I think Arizona or New Mexico or somewhere out there. Somebody obviously was running on a shoe-string, on his own, someone who thought he ought to run for the Senate without any party backing. He said, "This fellow's not filing his reports properly." I said, "Lan, what's the total amount of his contributions?" It was a couple of thousand dollars. It just seemed to me to be ridiculous to try to enforce the law or to refer that to the attorney general for enforcement on such a trivial thing.

From the time Potter began to bring me these noncompliance cases dealing with minor candidates, I saw that the law was going to end volunteerism in politics, that it would frighten away what had been one of the few balancing factors against money in

campaigns, which was the willingness of people to sweat out an election without compensation, without anything else, or maybe throw ten bucks into the pot for a candidate they believed in. They were going to get scared to do things like that, and in a way that's exactly what's happened. Elections have become big business. I had one of the candidates who was running for the Senate, he had been in the House and he was running for the Senate, and he was having problems. He came to see me and he said, "Can you help me? I have a problem." I said, "What's the trouble." "Well," he said, "I have a couple who run a Mom-and-Pop restaurant in my district. They gave me a contribution for about \$150 and instead of giving it to me in cash or on a personal check they gave it to me on the only check they've got, which is the restaurant's check, and that's a corporation. The FBI has been out there going over their books for the last three or four days!" He said, "They just hound those people to death."

I just felt that this was the kind of thing that was going to come from this. I thought that the law itself had attempted to strike so far and so deep that it was going to miss the real point by tracing down trivia. Admittedly, it would have been very difficult to define it another way. At that time—well, you still are, for anything over a contribution of \$10 I think you have to list your occupation and a few other things. Any law involving campaign contributions which tries to get at anything less than a

thousand dollars seems to me is doomed to fail in terms of real control of expenditures by the very enormity of the task, and by concentrating in the area where harmless errors are most likely to occur, that is, in a contribution of less than a thousand, perfectly innocent errors. Meanwhile, those who were able to afford comptrollers and lawyers would have no problems with it. Not long after the law went into effect, I had a letter from the Association of Comptrollers or Accountants of the United States, or something, offering to put out a free book on how to comply with the law if I would distribute it on their behalf. Of course, I turned that down. It was obvious that they saw a lot of business coming in campaign contributions. They were not very happy with me for having turned it down.

I had about half a dozen members who came to me directly with problems of their own, or problems of associates in their states. My reaction to them was uniformly the same: I had laid down some guidelines for Potter when he started and among them were that he would have to approach a sitting member in no different light than a challenger from the point of view of candidacy. Once they began running, from the point of view of the law, you would have to treat them both identically. It wouldn't make any difference whether you were a sitting member or a challenger. It would make no difference whether you were a Republican or a Democrat. I can't remember the full list, but they were essentially the principles

which I thought would have to govern enforcement. I cleared these with Mike Mansfield. He agreed that that would be the only approach that could be taken, if we were going to do it at all. As far as I'm aware, I did it that way, and as far as I know Potter did it that way.

I had maybe a half dozen sitting members who came in at various times on various problems and I stayed with that same pattern. It didn't help me very much, some were angry with it, but I didn't know how else to do it, on both sides of the aisle. I felt that if we tried anything else it would be a disaster. I didn't want to go to jail to begin with and I didn't believe that I should do it any other way. I felt that I had had enough time in government so that if I had to quit I could quit. The only person who could do that kind of a job would be somebody who was in a position to quit if you were forced to it. That's why it irritated me no end when the press began to run stories about how these "political hacks" such as the secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House, were expected to enforce this law against their masters, to have that kind of comment, after having sweated blood trying to do it, and having made enemies for the first time I think in the years I was in the Senate as a result of it, to have that sort of a comment coming out of the local press and from liberal quarters really irritated me no end. But you don't fight with the press in this city. I really got very angry with Common

Cause, when it took much the same tact, and was blithely going along assuming that they had solved the problems of fair elections by getting a campaign contributions law passed. [John] Gardner later came to my office with Phil Hart, they wanted to use my office for a private meeting. I thought he looked a little sheepish after some of the things he said about the secretary of the Senate, without even knowing me. But that's the way we got the campaign contributions law underway.

What came next was the immediate desire to set up a commission to enforce the law. Well, having had one election's experience with the law, I thought we ought to be very careful about moving beyond it, until we knew a lot more about how it was going to work. I knew that from the first election we had learned something, that it had had very little significance in terms of the control of contributions. My view was that we should concentrate on disclosure, continue to concentrate on effective ways of disclosure, how far you should go with disclosure, which ways you ought to go, what requirements you ought to put on people in terms of keeping records. Both from the point of view of trying not to discourage volunteer action in election and from the point of view of seeing from whence the funds were flowing into campaigns. But there was a great impatience in the name of reform, they wanted to go immediately to a commission. I testified against that at the Rules Committee. I guess Howard Cannon was presiding at the time.

I urged them to take an intermediary step, which would link the Comptroller General, the secretary of the Senate, and the Clerk of the House into a committee that would then try to work out and supervise the elections, all three elections. This got nowhere. They were ready to go for a commission, and they went for a commission. The Clerk of the House and I became ex officio members of the commission, without a vote. This was what was going to lead up eventually to *Buckley v. Valeo*, the court case.

I attended maybe the first dozen meetings of the commission, tried to stress the same points on where I felt the need was, but by this time the law also included trying to put limitations on funds. I designated Harriet Robnett to represent me on the commission. She was a lawyer and I thought I ought to have a lawyer there on a full-time basis. I sold the commission Lan Potter as their best bet for executive director, and they took him. From that time on my own interest in the work of the commission declined. I thought they went off the deep end in those early decisions. They antagonized a lot of members who would otherwise have been rather sympathetic to the purposes of the commission. But it was, again, one of those things beyond control and it was going to go through its own irresistible logic. It was interesting that later, I guess, not more than three or four years ago, I met Joe Biden in Hawaii. We were there on a conference and we were talking about the law. He was running at the time, and he

was complaining about the damn Federal Elections Commission and the law on campaign contributions. I said, "Well, you know, Joe, at the time I urged the Senate to go slower, not to go that whole route without knowing more, that in the name of reform they were risking some awfully bad crimes, but nobody paid any attention to my testimony." He said, "I know, I was one of them." I said, "Yeah, everything was reform, and a lot of crimes have been committed in that name."

On the *Buckley v. Valeo* case, I really have no great insights except that I was sued, in my capacity as the administering officer for the Senate elections, by [James] Buckley, who was a candidate, I think, for the Senate, and by Gene McCarthy, who joined Buckley in the suit, and two or three others who felt that this was an infringement on certain of their constitutional rights. Harriet Robnett said, "Long after you'll be forgotten as secretary of the Senate, you'll be remembered for this case, because it's going to be a very important one." It was out of my hands from the very beginning. I had Neil Kennedy and Paul Treusch, keep an eye on the way it went, but they were not directly involved. The attorney general took on my defense and brought in Archibald Cox as the trial lawyer for it.

When the case came up for decision I wanted to go to the Supreme Court to hear it, and I found out you couldn't get in, that they were so crowded with lawyers. I said, "You mean I can't

get in to hear this case even though it's got my name on it?" So I called Warren Burger's office. I knew Burger and I knew his chief administrative officer at the time. I had to go through Burger's office in order to get a seat. I wanted to get Harriet Robnett to hear it too. We went over together. In a way, I guess Harriet was right. I've been approached many times, by lawyers especially, as a result of that case, wanting to know whether or not I was the Valeo in the case. So has my son.

RITCHIE: What was your reaction to the outcome of that case?

VALEO: It was a kind of mixed reaction. In a way I agreed with parts of the decision. I had some difficulties with others. I thought particularly the one of insistence upon the presidential appointing power applying in naming the commission I thought was a bad part of the decision. As it turned out, the president said he would appoint those recommended by the leaders of the two houses. I thought it was a kind of "how many angels on the head of the pin" on that point, because it did involve Senate elections and House elections, and I thought that both houses should have the right to be a participant in deciding how the elections were going to be run. That part of it I disagreed with.

I knew the minute that they took off the limitations on personal expenditures that you were setting up a Senate of millionaires, or people who could rely on other people's money for their

support. There would be no other way to run for the Senate. I thought that was a disaster in terms of what it would do to the Senate, and it is. The Senate has become much too much a money place. But I'm not a lawyer and I don't know the refinements of the law that the justices were reasoning from. I was a little hard pressed to see how putting a limitation on how much you could spend was an infringement on your right of free speech. But that was one of the findings.

RITCHIE: Did you have any dealings with Senator Buckley during the case?

VALEO: No, I sent him an autographed copy of the decision. I got two or three from the Court. I had them bound up and I sent him an autographed copy and got back a nice letter from him.

RITCHIE: Well, your names will be linked together in constitutional history.

VALEO: Yes. I guess he had autographed one for me, to what he called a "good loser," or something to that effect.

RITCHIE: There are a couple of other questions about the structure of the office of the secretary that I was interested in. Going back to the question of patronage, and Darrell's role in all of this. He had been secretary of the Patronage Committee

under Carl Hayden, and now he became your assistant secretary, a new office that had always been chief clerk before.

VALEO: Yes, I had forgotten, but that's right. So he knew where the patronage spots were, and he knew how to handle that. I left it very much to him.

RITCHIE: I was wondering what you saw as his role, and how it changed from chief clerk to assistant secretary. What was involved in all of that?

VALEO: Well, what I found when I went into the office—I knew that I was not going to sever my connections with Mansfield, that the two were interrelated. And I knew that I would be probably over in Mansfield's office as much as I was in the secretary's office on a variety of matters, especially foreign affairs and Senate problems. So I knew I had to have somebody I could rely on really to run the internal workings of the secretary's office. And I knew Darrell could do that. I felt that chief clerk did not fully describe what he was doing. The job had become an essentially administrative one. He wasn't a chief clerk, in the sense of sitting on the floor and acting as the clerk for the proceedings. Emery Frazier used to like to do that. He hated to give up his reading functions on the floor, even when he became secretary of the Senate. But Darrell had no great love for that sort of thing, so I thought the job would be

more properly described as assistant secretary. I thought it would also begin to get people thinking in the direction of an administrative structure for Senate staff that would be a little less chaotic than that which had existed. Those were some of the reasons. I think Darrell appreciated the title and preferred it to chief clerk.

We brought Marilyn Courtot in at that time to do a lot of both the remodeling of the office structure and also to help with the preparations for appearances before the Appropriations Committee. She drew more and more responsibilities from Darrell directly. Although she was attached to me as consultant, she was subordinate to Darrell in terms of the operations of the office. He grumbled at first. He didn't like the idea of having a woman working so closely with him, I think, it was not a customary thing. But he got awfully used to her after a while and eventually became very dependent on her, as I did too, and as all subsequent people until the present secretary did. Again, I didn't know what her politics were. She came from South Jersey, I think, and that would probably make her a Republican. But it didn't really disturb me. She knew what she was doing, and she knew the machines, which I think was very critical because much of the processing was then shifting over to computers.

She studied the Senate Library, and we redid the library, gave it added function. There had been constant threats to abolish the library, and we were trying to save it by giving it more useful functions than it had had before. That's when they put those computers up in the library. We redid the Documents Room. We had to start the Office of Public Records, largely because of the campaign contributions law. I understand since then there have been other functions added to that.

The Documents Room was another real classic in terms of the Senate's use of patronage to run things. There was a chap in charge and he and an associate ran it all out of their heads for the longest time. One of them, I think, died from a heart attack, and the other one was left in charge. He was an old scoundrel from somewhere, I don't know where exactly. But Darrell would come in periodically and say, "We've got to really do something with this guy. We've got to fire him. He's never there." On one occasion someone found a basket full of requests from various Senate offices that had just been thrown in a pile and nothing had been done on them for weeks, and there was drinking and gambling and that sort of thing. He said, "We've got to get rid of him." I said, "Okay, Darrell, write up the papers. We'll get rid of him." And he'd come back a day later and say, "Well, let's give him another chance." I said, "What's the matter? I thought you'd made up your mind." "Well, he said, he's just been to see his

doctor, and he's got cancer, and he's not going to live very long." And of course the fellow's probably still living and going on! But Darrell was very soft-hearted, and so was I when it came to personnel questions. Eventually we did have to fire him. We got Burl Hays there, and Burl proved to be very effective in the job, especially after Marilyn Courtot set up the procedures to simplify the operation of that office. It became much more useful. The library became much more useful too.

RITCHIE: During the period you were secretary the whole operation of the secretary of the Senate really modernized for the first time. How much of that was just from your looking around and saying, "This has got to change?" Or did you feel pressure from the institution? Were senators complaining?

VALEO: No, this was all my own doing, really. If you didn't have somebody do it from inside, it would never have been done from the outside. It's interesting, senators were not complainers. Very few knew about the secretary's office. I daresay even today there would be very few who know just precisely what the secretary's office does.

There were some other interesting experiences in that office. Back on the campaign contributions law and the making of enemies: one of the procedures which we had established, or that Lan had devised and I had certainly agreed with, was that if there were a

complaint against a candidate during the process of an election, that we would give out no information on the complaint until we had a chance to study its validity, whether there was any basis or likelihood that it would be referred to the attorney general. If it were not going to be, we would simply not release any information on it. This proved to be a mistake, but at the time it was designed to protect candidates from frivolous complaints. It made me my first enemy in the Senate, who was Senator Howard Metzenbaum, who was running against [John] Glenn in a primary in Ohio at that time. Glenn had filed with us some charge about Metzenbaum violating the campaign contributions law and, unknown to us, also released it to the press in Ohio.

Metzenbaum called me and asked me what the charges were. He asked me if I had received the charges. I said yes, I had, and they were under study. He said, "What are they?" I said, "Well, I'm sorry, I can't give you that information now." He said, "What do you mean you can't give it to me? He's making statements all over the state about my violations. You mean I can't see what the charges are?" I said, "Not until I've had a chance to study them to find out if there is any validity in them. In the absence of that we have a regulation which was designed primarily to protect people in your situation." He said, "Well, you're not protecting me in this process!" I said, "That may be the case, but I can't change the regulation in the middle of a dispute." By this time I

had made my enemy number one. I realized later that this was not the right thing to do, and we did change the regulation, but I didn't want to do it in the middle of a dispute.

When he came to the Senate he was very angry with me for a long time. It brought on a head-on discussion of the whole campaign contributions law and the way I was enforcing it. There was a luncheon going on of the Democratic Campaign Committee in the Senate, and I was not there. Mansfield called me and said, "Do you have some problems with Metzenbaum?" I said yeah. He said, "You'd better come down, the whole thing is being rehashed down here." So I went down. There was one other person who was also complaining about some other matter that I had to resist. I can't remember now what was involved in it but I had refused to ease up on enforcement at his request. I was not going to put off the operations of the law simply because I'd been asked to do it by a Democratic senator. I explained to Metzenbaum what had happened in his situation with Glenn. I agreed that he had a right to be aggrieved by what had happened, but I had no alternative at that time. It was in the middle of a dispute and I couldn't change the regulation under pressure. There was no way I could do that. I had changed the regulation as soon as I discovered its effect—it didn't help him, that's true, I said, but that's one of the things that sometimes happens. He was much better in his relationship with me after that.

Then I read off the list of principles under which I had had the regulations designed for enforcement. One member said, "We're not going to treat the other side the same as we treat ourselves!" I said, "Well, it's the law, and I'm not going to do it any other way." I had some support. I got support from Edmund Muskie and two or three other people immediately on it, and it stood. I guess Lloyd Bentsen was the one who gave me a problem with that at that point. But I couldn't see myself doing it any other way. I knew Mansfield wouldn't want me to do it any other way. At one point I had the Democratic National Committee chairman, who later was the trade representative for Carter, a well known figure, a Texan

RITCHIE: Oh, Strauss.

VALEO: Yes, Bob Strauss came in on another matter, appealing for a matter involving another member. I told him the way we were enforcing the law, and there was just no other way we could do it. I think I gave him another week, or something, but that I would have done for anyone. He said, "Can you give me a little more time. I'm representing him and I need some time." I said, "Sure, we can give you more time. We can give you a week more," or something like that. But I wouldn't go any further than that. And I would have done that for a Republican, it wouldn't have made any difference. Mansfield called me in at the time Strauss came and he said, "Strauss is in there, and he's got a problem. I

don't want you do anything that conflicts with the way you think the law ought to be enforced. But see if you can help him in some way." Sure, I'd be glad to do that for anyone. So I had the full backing of Mansfield. I could not have done it that way otherwise. And I guess if there had been any other majority leader I would have probably quit right at that point. This was I guess in '73, '74, somewhere in that period.

RITCHIE: It sounds as if the secretary of the Senate has to walk a fine line between partisanship and nonpartisanship. You were elected by the majority but were supposed to administer the Senate as a whole.

VALEO: Yes, and I personally feel I was successful in doing that. I never had any serious complaints from the Republican side that there was any partisanship in the way the Senate was administered. Quite the contrary, I had a lot of praise from the Republican side. That's precisely the role of the secretary. You don't cease to be a member of your own party, but you cannot treat the Senate institutionally except as a concept that's without party in the way you provide services to members. That was also one of the premises under which I took the job as secretary. I defined the job to myself in those terms. But bear in mind that the secretary's job is not officially defined anywhere, and much depends upon the relationship between the secretary and the leadership. Hildenbrand had a good relationship with Baker. I,

of course, had a good relationship with Mansfield, and both of us were reflecting basically the qualities that were in that leadership. My impression is that Kimmitt had no relationship to speak of with Robert Byrd, and I don't know what Coe's relationship is with Dole. But this can have a great effect on the way the job is done, which argues very strongly for strengthening the second position in the secretary's office, because in a way, in terms of the internal operations of the secretary's office, the role of the assistant secretary is very critical. At least it was for me, and Hildenbrand told me it was the same thing for him, when he made Marilyn Courtot the assistant secretary. I don't know about the others.

RITCHIE: What is the relationship of the parliamentarian's office to the secretary?

VALEO: The parliamentarian is appointed by the secretary, usually with the concurrence of the leadership. In my case, it was left to me by Mansfield to make the decision. The problem was with Riddick, did I go into this in the previous meeting?

RITCHIE: You mentioned this.

VALEO: He never wanted to leave, but when he did finally leave, I told Mansfield I was thinking of appointing Murray Zweben. He wasn't that pleased, but he didn't have any alternatives, so we went ahead and did that.

RITCHIE: Why wasn't he pleased?

VALEO: Well, I don't know. He didn't like parliamentarians period. They always confused him, he thought, more than they helped him! I don't think he exempted Murray from that.

RITCHIE: The parliamentarian is supposed to be the Caesar's wife of the Senate, nonpartisan in making the rulings, and yet he's appointed by an officer who is elected by the majority. How do you assure that the parliamentarian's office will be exempt from partisan pressure?

VALEO: You elect a good majority leader!

RITCHIE: Did you ever feel any concern about that?

VALEO: No, I never had the problem. It was never raised with me on a partisan basis. If Mansfield had his irritations, with either Riddick or Zweben, it had nothing to do with politics. It was for strictly the substance of what they were giving him.

RITCHIE: The three elected staff officials of the Senate are the secretary, the sergeant at arms, and the chaplain. Somewhere in the late '60s you had some problems with the chaplain. There was a commission appointed on that. Do you know what the background to that was, that Senator Mansfield was becoming concerned with the chaplain and commissioned a study?

VALEO: I sort of vaguely remember that, but I don't think I got in the middle. I may have mentioned the last time that it had something to do with Mansfield wanting to downgrade that position after Frederick Brown Harris had made it a sort of political forum for a lot of unusual clergymen. Instead of just saying a prayer, he had got it involved in East-West politics and a few other things, and Mansfield did not appreciate that. Even though it did add some color to the Senate when you had an Eastern Orthodox priest appearing in full regalia.

RITCHIE: I came across a letter in your papers in the Library of Congress. Senator Mansfield wrote to someone who had complained that when all the Senate salaries were being increased, I think in 1970, the chaplain's salary was decreased. Senator Mansfield said he thought the salary was sufficient for a man who worked two minutes a day.

VALEO: That's about the way he felt about it, too! I guess it was Edward Elson that he had problems with. He didn't like Harris, particularly, but he sort of suffered Harris. But Elson he didn't like either. He always thought he was political. His big supporter, I think was Stennis. Stennis was the one who brought him in. I think he was Stennis' clergyman.

RITCHIE: I once went to Elson's church, and the flowers on the alter were in memory of Eisenhower and Dirksen, which I thought was probably a sign of the politics of the congregation.

VALEO: It's ironic, because Elson's brother was a Democrat; he worked for Hayden and then ran for the Senate out in Arizona.

RITCHIE: The other thing I wanted to ask was how you would describe the relationship between the secretary's office and the sergeant at arms' office?

VALEO: Well, the best way to get at that is to consider what happened on that Commission on the Reorganization of the Senate. Again, the relationships have varied. In that earlier period, when Joe Duke was sergeant at arms, and then after him that nice chap

RITCHIE: Bill Wannall?

VALEO: Bill Wannall. I can give you some background on that. Joe Duke was a difficult man, and it was strictly a patronage assignment place at that point when he ran it. The police were all patronage, the cleaning people, just about everybody in the building was patronage at that point. He'd been Hayden's person from Arizona. He had no trouble with Johnson as far as I know. He never really felt very comfortable with

Mansfield, but he went out of his way to be nice to Mansfield, in order, I think, to keep a relationship going. Physically, he gave out. He couldn't stand the pressures that he was getting and he left. Then Bob Dunphy became sergeant at arms for a few years. He gave out. Then Bill Wannall took the job. He had come to see me at an earlier time when he was the printing clerk. He was a very amiable, very obliging young fellow out of the GPO. I liked him. I had known him when I was on the Foreign Relations Committee staff and knew how he really went out of his way to deliver. He asked me whether or not I would recommend him for the job as assistant sergeant at arms.

Bob Dunphy had followed Joe Duke. He'd been assistant to Joe Duke. He came out of Massachusetts or Rhode Island, and Mansfield liked him. He knew how to handle Mansfield, so they got along well. When he became sergeant at arms, I helped to get Bill Wannall appointed as his assistant. Dunphy knew Wannall too, and was favorably disposed to him. Then Wannall was made sergeant at arms. Mansfield was not too happy with Wannall in that role. I liked him, I thought he had done a very effective job of providing services. Then there was pressure to get a job for Nordy Hoffmann and when Wannall left, Nordy Hoffman was brought in. He was strictly a political appointment in that job, the others were not. Wannall was not a politician, maybe Joe Duke was, I don't know. But it would have been a different kind of politics that I didn't

know much about. Nordy was easy for me to work with. He was feeling his way at the time. He knew that there was some eyebrows raised at his appointment.

When the Commission on the Reorganization of the Senate recommended a consolidation of virtually all Senate staff functions, as distinct from committee functions, under the secretary, I went to see Nordy. I said, "If you go along with this, Nordy, I'll promise to leave within a year or two, and you would certainly have the first shot at taking over at that point. I think this is important enough to warrant doing it that way." He was willing, he said, "but I'm afraid of Stan Kimmitt." I remember his saying that to me. I think Nordy would have gone with that, notwithstanding certain anxieties that he had, but Bill Cochrane on the Rules Committee resisted, very strongly. And I had lost the influence I had on the Rules Committee, which was through Senator Jordan, who had been Bill Cochrane's boss, but who was very fond of me and had a great trust in me. Having lost that influence, the Rules Committee was then under Howard Cannon of Nevada, whom I knew, but who was not disposed to treat me the same way.

RITCHIE: Why do you think that Cochrane opposed it?

VALEO: It's just a strictly jurisdictional thing. He thought that this would mean that the Rules Committee would lose a

lot of influence. That was what disturbed him. They didn't have an awful lot at that point, but they didn't want to lose what they had. Cochrane was a bureaucratic type who wanted to build up an empire, or at least hold the little empire that he had.

RITCHIE: Both the secretary and the sergeant at arms are elected, and so they are presumably independent, but is there any ranking? Is the secretary generally looked to first?

VALEO: It depends. If you're a policeman, you'd look to the sergeant at arms first; if you're a scholar you'd probably look to the secretary's office first. I don't know that you can really differentiate them in terms of rank. Since they're both elected by the Senate, they really are in the same rank, along with the chaplain, if you will.

RITCHIE: Is there a need for them to work in tandem?

VALEO: Not an awful lot of need. The only time that comes up is when you have ceremonials. They used to be handled strictly by the sergeant at arms but when I became secretary of the Senate, Mansfield wanted me always to be on hand with the sergeant at arms to greet the president when he came to the Congress in a ceremonial setting. He wanted it gradually eased away from the exclusive domain of the sergeant at arms. This again may have been a personal preference because he had a personal relationship with me that he didn't have with the sergeant at arms. That's why

I say you can't really define any of these jobs. It depends on who the majority leader is at the time. But what I was doing at that point, to move it in the way I thought it ought to go, was to work with both the majority leader and the minority leader. My working relationships with Scott were exceptionally good, partly because he was new, and partly because I liked him personally and he liked me personally. I think he trusted me not to do anything that would in any way dilute the rights of the minority. Quite the contrary, I would be very zealous in their protection.

End of Interview #11