

ON THE INSIDE AND ON THE OUTSIDE

Interview #3

Friday, December 12, 2003

RITCHIE: We were talking before about the early 1980s. There's a book by one of Senator Baker's staff people, Jim Miller, called *Running in Place*.

GOLD: I remember him well.

RITCHIE: His argument was that the Senate was not an institution that moved quickly because of its procedural history, and that someone like Howard Baker, for all of his ambitions, and for all the drive behind him, had to keep running just as fast as he could just to run in place, that it was hard to develop an aggressive agenda, given the circumstances of the institution. Was that a fair assessment, as far as you were concerned, from your procedural point of view?

GOLD: Well, Howard Baker compared running the Senate to pushing a wet noodle. Or herding cats, that was his other famous line. The frustrations in terms of moving legislation are plain. They are as obvious today as they were when Jim wrote that book. I knew Jim extremely well, and I remember when he wrote that book. I think his observations are correct. The only thing I will say is that through it all, Howard Baker was able to achieve several landmark bills in his first year. He got a budget done in relatively quick order to revise the budget for the previous fiscal year. He rigged up a platform for budget reconciliation. He got the first major reconciliation bill accomplished. That's a more majoritarian process but nevertheless he was able to get it done without a very substantial majority, and he was able to put through the Reagan tax cuts. All of that had happened by August. So he moved early, and he moved aggressively, and did pass what I think was significant, landmark legislation.

RITCHIE: Senator Baker had a reputation for being a middle-of-the-road Republican, a moderate Republican. More conservative as Hugh Scott but not as conservative as some of the other senators in his party. Did he feel pressure from within the Republican caucus to be tougher against the Democrats and more aggressive in promoting the Reagan program?

GOLD: I'm certain that there were people who thought that by temperament he was ill-suited to be leader, because he was not partisan enough. But proportionally in the caucus, that would represent a fringe. He was on the whole as great a consensus builder and bridge builder as you could have had in the leadership. There may have been conservatives who felt that he was too soft, particularly after the Panama Canal votes that he helped engineer in 1978, and so therefore they may have distrusted him. But I think that for the most part they understood he was someone they could talk to, and there was never a rebellion planned against him. He never had a challenge to his leadership from anybody. He could talk as well to the people like Javits, Chafee, Weicker, as readily as he could talk to Armstrong, McClure, and Helms. He sat astride both wings of the party with pretty great success.

Baker had, in my view, wonderful instincts. He understood how far he could and should push people. Therefore, he emerged as a) a successful leader and b) a beloved leader.

RITCHIE: The Republicans are different from the Democrats in the sense that the Democrats, until recently, organized everything around their floor leader. Traditionally, their floor leader was also chairman of the conference and chairman of the policy committee, and there was no other center of power. Republicans have always had a separate floor leader, conference chairman, and policy committee chairman. Were those other two bodies ever competitive with Baker in terms of designing the agenda?

GOLD: I wouldn't say so. I actually think they were relatively passive. I don't say honorific, but I think passive. You raised a moment ago the issue about Reagan and the Reagan agenda, and how aggressive Baker was in pushing the Reagan agenda. Baker, of course, had run against Reagan for the Republican nomination in 1980. He was not seen as a Reagan man at the time of the election. Reagan also had a close personal friend in the Senate, Paul Laxalt of Nevada, who could have been thought to be the administration messenger. If you talk about competing centers of power, a potential competing center of power would have been Laxalt, because he would have been seen as the administration's ally whereas Baker could have been outside that circle. But that was not the case. It wasn't the case because Baker made a commitment to Reagan and to others that he would be the president's point man in the Senate. So there was not any light between Baker's agenda and the president's agenda. Baker did not have an independent agenda. The budget cuts that we passed were the ones that the administration proposed, for the most part. The tax cuts that we passed were the ones that the administration proposed, for the most part.

So Baker was not an independent power center from Reagan, and Laxalt was not an independent power center from Baker. Because Baker was loyal to Reagan and faithful to that agenda, and because we worked very closely with the administration, Laxalt never emerged as a competing power center and the conservatives never sought to oust Baker with somebody else. I think they understood that they would be hard pressed to find somebody who was more faithful to the president's agenda than Howard Baker was, and who still had the capacity to speak to all wings of the party and to speak across the aisle.

RITCHIE: Skipping a little ahead, because I know that you left the Senate in '82, but Senator Baker announced his retirement in 1984. I think everyone considered him a successful majority leader, and he seemed to enjoy the institution enormously. Do you have any sense as to why he decided to leave in '84?

GOLD: I don't know that I could add much to what he publicly said. He had worked as a trial lawyer for eighteen years prior to coming to Congress, and then he came to the Senate and did that for eighteen years. I think he felt as though it was a relative complete moment in his life and it was time to move beyond it. He had done what he could do here. He had wanted to be a leader, had served four years as minority leader, had served four years as majority leader. What more was he going to accomplish over what he had already accomplished? I think he was interested in some different challenges. He never intended to make the Senate an entire career. He always spoke in terms of the citizen legislators, that is, people who came out of a different walk of life, serve in the Senate, were not career legislators, and ultimately went to do other things. In some fashion, those people would be more reflective of the American people than would be just a professional or a career politician who starts early in life and does nothing but legislate through his life.

He also, of course, had presidential ambitions, had run for president in 1980, knew that he was not going to run in '84, but he entertained the possibility of running later on in '88. To preserve the possibility of doing that, he thought that maybe having an ability to be a candidate without being shackled by the Senate schedule would be reasonable. So I think it's a combination, not of being burned out over the Senate, because I think he loved the Senate still, but feeling as though he had accomplished what he could accomplish, that it was time to move along, to be the citizen legislator he had talked about, and preserve the chance to do something different in his life, including the possibility of running for president. All of those reasons.

RITCHIE: In the nineteenth century, a senator like Henry Clay would tend to leave the Senate a year or two before running for president, partly to distance himself from some of the controversies of the time and to be the citizen candidate. It's difficult for senators to run for president given the demands on their time, and it's especially difficult if you're the leader and you're expected to be there, keeping things moving.

GOLD: Well, Baker ran for president as a leader but not for a long time. He finished third in a couple of early primaries and that was essentially enough. He never had to make a choice of resigning as [Bob] Dole did later from the Senate altogether or just resigning from the leadership as a lesser move. The Senate is a notoriously bad place to run for president for the reasons that you cite, the schedule, but also the fact that you're on record on all kinds, and you are on record because your opponents want to put you on record on issues. Somebody offers a nongermane amendment on some controversial topic and you've got to take a position. If you are running as a governor, if you are running as a private citizen, you could avoid a lot of that, and blur those issues. I think Baker welcomed the opportunity to be free of those responsibilities and to look ahead and see whether or not the presidency was possible for him.

RITCHIE: He also had the potential threat of an Al Gore campaign in Tennessee. Gore was a congressman at the time with higher ambitions. Was that a fight that would have been too bruising for him at that stage that he wanted to avoid?

GOLD: My strong impression is that he would have beaten Al Gore, if Al Gore had made that run. And my strong impression is that if Baker had not announced his retirement, Al Gore would not have made that run. I always held Baker responsible for Al Gore!

RITCHIE: Tennessee is quite an amazing state for the people it sends to Washington—they've been all over the map!

GOLD: That's the truth.

RITCHIE: You decided to leave the Senate before that, however, in '82. You alluded to some the reasons earlier, but I wondered if you could tell me what was it in '82 that finally made you decide to step away?

GOLD: Well, I can start by telling you what it was not. It was not any disaffection from the Senate. It was not being burned out with the Senate. In later years, when I was in the private sector, people would ask me when I thought was a good time for them to leave. I said, "Leave it when you love it." Because if you intend to come back and try to work with it, for example as a lobbyist, or as a scholar, it's good to care a lot about the institution. It tends to leaven your judgment about how you might proceed with the institution. I certainly loved it when I left it, and never fell out of love with it.

I left it fundamentally for two reasons. One was purely economic. We had had a baby in the fall of 1980, my savings therefore were starting to dwindle. My wife was out of the workforce, so we didn't have two incomes, and she wanted to stay home with our son. Each month, our savings became smaller and smaller, and finally I got to the point that I couldn't manage any longer just on a Senate salary. I was making a good salary for the Senate at that point, but there was no relief from the salary cap. I had no prospect therefore of improving my position economically no matter what I did. Then, on top of that, a floor schedule is a difficult schedule for anybody with a family. I would say that one committee leaves, having done their work, and the next committee comes with their work. The first committee is then relieved of the responsibility to be on the floor, but the leadership staff never is. Every bill becomes your bill, once that bill is on the floor. So the hours are predicably longer and harder than in most other venues where there is a little bit more ebb and flow in the process, depending on a hearing schedule or a mark-up schedule or a floor schedule.

The hours became difficult in light of the changes in my family circumstances. So the pressure of that and the economic pressure combined signaled to me that it was time to leave if I had a reasonable opportunity out there. And I had several, so I chose one of them. Moreover, I felt that if I didn't leave then, which was in April of 1982, I would have to stay through the entire Congress, because at some point you shouldn't be leaving just before the election cycle. And then of course I didn't know that Howard Baker was going to retire in '84, so I thought he might run for reelection, and I thought also I should not leave in the Congress of his reelection. If I were going to depart, I should do it early enough in 1982 so as not to implicate that election cycle, and certainly not to get into the following election cycle, which I thought would be his cycle. That's why I left when I did.

RITCHIE: Had you groomed any kind of a successor at that point?

GOLD: I gave him six weeks' notice with a view to grooming somebody to do a particular specialized job, which was to be the floor procedure person. They gave me no one to groom, so I groomed not a soul. I always thought that you could draw one of two conclusions from that: either you were irrelevant or you were irreplaceable. Whatever it was, there was no grooming and when I left the functions that I had were divided among other people and the Senate continued to function just as well.

RITCHIE: You had already published a little book on procedures at that point, hadn't you? [*Senate Procedure and Practice: An Introductory Manual* (1981)]

GOLD: A little manual on Senate floor procedure. It's very emblematic, by the way, of Howard Baker that he allowed me to put that out under my own name. Many members would not have the ego for that and would require that the document be published under their name, with the staffer who did it getting little to no credit, probably anonymity. But if it would be useful to senators, and to staff, he was very happy for me to do it, and never attempted to get in the way of the material being published under my own name. I published it for the first time as a government employee and published it seven times afterwards in the private sector, always at my own expense. I never charged anyone for that document. I just gave it away the first time, and I gave it away every time after that.

RITCHIE: Were you called on to come back to do any other consulting on legislative procedures, or in terms of the seminars that you've been giving?

GOLD: Very often. Over the years, I would come up and give programs to eight or ten different offices or committees during the course of the year, every year since I left. Also I published that manual and made distribution on that, or would get telephone calls as time would go along. So I thought that was a reasonably good pace, frankly, until I came back in this calendar year. In this calendar year I've done almost eighty of those seminars. It's different when you're doing it from the inside, when you're doing it with the imprimatur of the leader, but even so I never found too much reluctance for people taking assistance even if it came from somebody who had an interest in legislation, because I was very careful to separate whatever lobbying responsibilities I had for clients from the responsibilities I had from an academic piece of work for the Senate offices. We never had a conflict or a problem with it, and I did it on a very bipartisan basis when I was in the private sector as well, not just for Republicans.

RITCHIE: Have you found any individual senator who is more interested than others in mastering this?

GOLD: Well, in the current crop of senators, the one that I would say is most interested is Lamar Alexander. He organized a number of freshmen to sit down with me, early in the year. We had five different breakfast meetings where we would go through aspects of Senate floor process. Then later in the year, the majority leader organized additional seminars for senators and Alexander attended every one of those. I think that he understands better than most how important procedure can be to the achievement of legislative objectives. He has wanted to be a good scholar of the Senate and be a credit to the institution from the beginning, and I think he's done a lot.

RITCHIE: When you left in '82 you went to Gray & Company first, right?

GOLD: Correct.

RITCHIE: What exactly was Gray & Company and what did you do for them?

GOLD: Gray & Company was an amalgamation of a lobbying shop and a public relations firm. Bob Gray had been secretary to the cabinet under Dwight Eisenhower and he was then head of the Washington office of Hill & Knowlton, and a very close friend and adviser to Ronald Reagan. In fact, he was the chairman of Reagan's inaugural committee in 1981. So when Reagan came to office, then Gray saw an opportunity to do very, very well, and he left Hill & Knowlton and opened up Gray & Company. As I mentioned, part of that was just to do legislative work, and part of it was to do public relations work. Clients strode through that door because he was about as close to Reagan as you could get in early 1981.

The job that I had at Gray was simply a lobbying job. When I left, actually, I didn't make that much more money than I made when I was here. The only difference was I was out from under that cap and had the potential to make additional income. I came from the Hill with no clients, which was quite natural, and didn't really know where I was going to find clients. Gray was an unusual place in the sense that most lobbying shops would require or at least necessitate a lobbyist also being involved in business development. In Gray's operation, the lobbying shop itself was perhaps seven or eight people. But they had an entire group of people who were there to do nothing but business development. So lobbyists in that

firm, unlike most firms, did not have the responsibility of developing business. They could simply service the business that was developed by others. That was something that I didn't pay a lot of attention to when I decided where I was going to go, but actually I thought it was very important once I got going. I did not have to do much business development at all.

I started out the first day with a client that had come in the door recently and someone had just assigned to me. It was pretty well that way for the two years and three months that I spent with Gray & Company.

RITCHIE: What kind of clients would you have?

GOLD: The first client that I had was a company that was concerned with maritime issues, a topic of which I initially knew nothing. But I actually learned a great lesson very early in that representation. This client was interested in getting a number of senators to send a letter to the secretary of defense. The client had offices in a lot of places, although in many instances those were one or two person offices, but nonetheless they had a presence in many states, one of which was Oregon. I went to Mark Hatfield's office as my first appointment, because I thought: "Well, this will be an easy one to start with. I'll get my feet wet doing this and move out from there." The person in Mark Hatfield's office who was handling the issue was unsympathetic to the position of this client. She just couldn't see Hatfield writing that letter. So I said, "Well, let me come back to you." I went to the others. Every other person signed it, maybe nine or ten members. After I had everybody else's signature, I came back to her and asked again. Once again, she said she didn't think it was meritorious, even though everybody else had signed the letter, but invited me in a nice way to appeal her to the senator if I wished.

I thought about it very briefly and decided not to appeal, because after all, it would have been one more signature on a letter. Eleven signatures wouldn't have been more persuasive than ten. But I would have put him in a difficult position, and I would have put her in a difficult position. I'm not saying that I would *never* appeal a staff judgment to a member, but I would do it when I absolutely had to, and in that case I didn't. I decided the better part of valor was not to take it any further, and actually it was probably one of the better decisions I ever made.

In the course of getting business contacts handed to me at Gray & Company, there were two that were of particular note. One of them was the government of Turkey, which was extremely interesting and very appealing to me just as a matter of intellectual interest. Turkey is a NATO ally, and the government of Turkey at the time was extremely pro-American, and so their interests, as far as I was concerned, were much aligned with this country's. We would push for military and economic assistance to Turkey, and it was our responsibility in assisting the embassy. We went up against the Greek lobby. Greece was also a NATO ally, but you would never know it. I can remember that the Papandreou government in Greece was very anti-American. It was as anti-American as it was possible to be while remaining a NATO ally. Yet they had the politics in favor of them because the Greek-American community was extremely active politically and much better organized than the Turkish community was. I spoke once to a Pan-Hellenic lobbyist who said to me, "Well, you have the policy and we have the politics." It made for a very interesting tug of war that tended to come out okay for both sides, but not without a little stress. So I loved doing work for Turkey.

The other client relationship that proved to be exceptionally significant, and really in that case career changing, was to work on professional football. At the time, Al Davis had moved the Raiders from Oakland to Los Angeles and litigation had broken out between Davis and the NFL, which had been resolved in the district court in California and then ultimately in the Ninth Circuit for Davis, and the awarding of damages from the NFL. The NFL decided to pursue antitrust legislation in Congress that would have said that if owners denied somebody the right to move, that did not represent an antitrust conspiracy. The legislation was also retroactive in nature.

The NFL had hired a very great many prominent lobbyists to work on that legislation. Oakland hired Bob Gray. The account was assigned to me. The NFL lobbying effort was run by Paul Tagliabue, who was at that point a lawyer at Covington & Burling. Tagliabue understood how unwieldy the lobbying effort had become because so many people were hired. Sometimes he would have smaller core steering committee group meetings, and then sometimes he'd have a plenary meeting. He always made a point to include the Oakland representative in every one of those meetings because our interests and the League's interests although separate were also congruent. So I got to know him very well. We did not have a successful run at that legislation because it was offered in a second session of the Congress, and because it was also retroactive in nature, but nonetheless the working relationships that

were established there were extremely solid. The initial exposure to professional football was through Oakland, but that quickly turned into a contract with the National Football League itself, not in the context of Bob Gray, but in the firm I established with Howard Liebengood, who had been the Senate sergeant at arms. The firm was called Gold and Liebengood. The NFL, on the recommendation of Paul Tagliabue and Pete Rozelle, was a first-day client.

So I enjoyed the work for the Turks. I learned a lesson from the work on the maritime issue, but the true life-changing experience was the NFL. The NFL remained a client for twenty years in the private sector. One that was very interesting, remunerative, and was an association of which I was extremely proud.

RITCHIE: When you get a client like the Turkish government or the maritime industry, is it your job as lobbyist to do what they want you to do, or is it your job to tell them what's feasible to do, how you might go about it? In other words, is there an educational process in being a lobbyist?

GOLD: My definition of a lobbyist is less an advocate and more a translator. Obviously, you have to translate client interests to Congress. But you also have to translate the Congress' interests to the client, because if the client asks for something that is not politically feasible, what good does it do you to go to the Hill and vent those interests to an audience that has no care for what is being said. If the client has a confused message, if the client has an overambitious message, if the client has an unrealistic message, then in the end they're wasting their time on the Hill. The message has got to be developed in the context of realities.

The more simplistic view of lobbying would say that a client will tell you what to say and you go to the Hill and say it because you know such-and-such senator or this-or-that staffer, and you can get in the door and say it to people who would not otherwise receive the message from the client. I am confident that there are lobbyists who operate like that. But it seems to me that they're wasting the client's money. It is an aspect of doing this work, but I think not the greatest aspect. The greatest aspect would be to structure a message in a way that makes it politically achievable, and not ask members to do things that are unreasonable for them to do but rather to come to them with things that are achievable. That means you have to tell the client as much about the Congress as you have to tell the Congress about the client.

I will say to you that in twenty years of doing that work, I never had a client who shot the messenger. I would tell people as we would enter upon representation that we would not always tell them what they wanted to hear, but we would always tell them what we thought they ought to hear, and that one of the things that they were buying was enough of a knowledge of the people and rhythms of Congress that they could somehow get through the maze of the institution. And if it would be important for them to have that kind of information, as we thought it was, then we hoped to be the people they would hire. If they simply wanted somebody to just open a door, we were probably not the right people for them. You never know who hires you or doesn't hire you necessarily because of that message or what business went by the boards because you didn't fit the profile of the kind of lobbyist the client was looking for, but I have always thought that that's consistent with the responsibility to a client, and as I say, I never had anybody shoot the messenger.

RITCHIE: Given that you were an expert in procedure, were you able to assist in terms of drawing up strategies for proponents on Capitol Hill to get something through that would be useful to a client?

GOLD: When you started asking that question, I started to blurt out an answer which would be the wrong answer in light of the question you asked. The question I thought you were going to ask is: Given that you are an expert in procedure, did you use procedural expertise very much? And the answer was no. Often it is not called for and that tends to be something that is much more important and valuable inside the Senate than it is coming from outside to the Senate. I don't say it was never useful, it sometimes was. In one client representation specifically, that was the core of the representation itself, procedural questions.

However, to go to the question you did ask, a knowledge of procedure would give you a sense of strategy and help to kind of guide people around the shoals and the pitfalls. We should approach it this way or that way, otherwise we're going to get in trouble. If done properly, the procedural questions never come up. I think that a knowledge of procedure is an important part of strategy development. If a lobbyist does not have that knowledge, they would emphasize what they did have, which might be a relationship or two here or there, but if you have procedural background I think you can construct strategy in ways that people who don't know it cannot. So, yes, I think it's been important, even though sometimes it hasn't been obvious or visible.

RITCHIE: I've talked to former senators who have gone into lobbying and they say something to the effect that the single best asset they have is that when they go to see somebody they usually get seen by that person.

GOLD: True.

RITCHIE: Although not having been a senator, you were very well known to the senators at the time. How much of an advantage is that, if people will at least give you some time up here?

GOLD: There's a cacophony of voices trying to be heard here, and they all cannot be heard. Who will be heard? I think that sort of access is important. It can be overstated in the sense that the ability to get in the door does not necessarily mean you are going to get somebody to agree with your position, as in the example of Hatfield's office on the maritime question. I got in the door. I got an appointment. I got a second appointment. But they didn't agree with our position. I think that the importance of getting in the door can be overstated if people don't understand that access gives you a hearing but doesn't necessarily give you an ally. But many people cannot get in the door. Many people cannot get their phone call returned at some critical moment when there's a stack of messages on the desk and the staffer is just beleaguered. Who is he going to call back? I'm not just talking about member access, I'm talking about staff access. Who are they going to call back? If it's you, because they know you, or they like you, or you helped them in some fashion, or they respect you, well then that's something that is very important for clients, as long as perspective is attached to this, which is an opportunity to be heard but not necessarily a guarantee of an ally.

RITCHIE: You spent a decade up here before you became a lobbyist. Does Congress look any different once you've stepped out of it, looking back? From the perspective of somebody trying to get it to do something from the outside, as opposed to somebody on the inside?

GOLD: It's far more frustrating on the outside getting it to operate. I remember coming up to Congress maybe a week after I had left the government. I was in the Senate Reception Room. I was looking for somebody. Had anybody seen this staffer? Yes, they said, he's on the floor. Then all of a sudden I realized: I can't go on the floor anymore. I had gone from having complete access as a leadership staffer to walk through any door at anytime

without sign up procedures or special passes or anything of that sort, with as free an access as a member himself, to having no access, in the flash of a moment. All of a sudden realizing that I wasn't speaking for Howard Baker anymore. I didn't have anybody who had a voting interest in Congress that would cause people to have to listen to me. What do they care about that maritime client? What do they care about the Turkish government in many cases, which doesn't have a constituent relationship with anybody?

It takes a little while to get used to that. On the inside, you are able to massage the process, on the outside you find a much harder road. I can tell you that in the last Congress I felt that the Republicans were not being aggressive enough on the floor. It seemed as though every time I turned on the television I would see [Paul] Sarbanes, or [Paul] Wellstone, or Dorgan, or Durbin, or Harry Reid, and Republicans seemed missing. I thought they were making poor use of the floor as a bully pulpit, and I wanted to do something about it. So I talked to a friend of mine in the leadership and that resulted in another meeting of the leadership with some additional staff people. I was able to make a case there and then after [Jim] Jeffords switched I was called in by Senator [Trent] Lott to talk to the Republican leadership about minority rights. I was able to make another case there. I thought those arguments were important and persuasive, and nothing much happened.

This year, particularly after the August recess, I felt as though the Democrats were again becoming much more aggressive in their use of the floor and that Republicans were poor in responding to them. So I had a meeting with some leadership staff and this time I was able to say: "The majority leader believes you should do x," as opposed to saying "I believe you should do x." And you know what? Pretty soon we had a program on the floor making very good use, I thought, of Morning Business time with senators coming to the floor and speaking, both in rebuttal to the Democratic message and also promoting in a proactive way our own message. I got Senator Frist's sign-off on that, of course. I didn't do that on my own, but he never had to do very much after that to get it implemented because I was able to implement it. It's a very good apples to apples comparison. The same sort of problem, the same recommended solutions, but in one case it doesn't work and in the other case it does, because in the one case you're outside the institution and the other case you're inside the institution. Even if you are knowledgeable about what levers to pull, coming from the outside it is often hard to get things done.

It occurs to me that both the Hill and the outside world have misperceptions about the other. Each of them thinks that they are more important to the work of the other than they really are. The outside world thinks that if they do x they really will affect what happens up here. The Hill thinks that what they do here matters immensely to the outside world. To some degree, both are right. But they are sort of like the circles on a MasterCard card. There is an overlap, but there are also areas that do not overlap. The outside matters less to the Hill than the outside thinks, and the Hill matters less to the outside than the Hill thinks. That's been one interesting lesson for having come back up here. When I was here before I never really had serious private sector experience. I had no foundation to know that. When I was outside, as the Hill experience receded in time, maybe this was also less obvious. But it's starkly obvious to me now. It's hard to influence the Hill from the outside for that reason. People here have an agenda and they may welcome support from the outside from time to time but for the most part they are the ones in charge.

RITCHIE: When you were here, in your first years on the staff, you worked for Republicans. When you left to become a lobbyist, did you continue to focus on Republican members or did you have to branch out and deal more with Democrats?

GOLD: I branched out. I did some of my best work, I felt, with Democratic members over those years. There are lobbyists who only will talk to their own people. If it's a Republican lobbyist he'll talk to Republican members, and if a Democrat needs to be talked to, well, he's got a partner and the partner can talk to the Democrats. My experience with this may not be typical, but I felt as though nobody who works in a member office can be nonpartisan. You're going to be one thing or you're going to be the other thing. You come from some partisan background if you've worked in that kind of a position. When you go outside, you're no longer in a partisan circumstance. You have to represent your client, just as you had to represent a member of the Senate. I worked a lot with Democrats. I mentioned that the procedures seminars were done on a bipartisan basis. The last procedure seminar that I did before I came back to work for Senator Frist was done for Senator [Maria] Cantwell. But that experience may not be typical.

RITCHIE: Any different working with Democrats than Republicans?

GOLD: No, not really. What I have found to be so, and this is not rocket science as far as I'm concerned, but if you really want to get something done in the Senate you're going

to have to find some bipartisan way to do it anyway, because if there's serious opposition from one party or the other, it's not going to happen. We would always look to find a Republican and a Democrat to be cosponsors of legislation. We found not only a need to work with members on both sides of the aisle but also a lot of satisfaction in doing it. It is a different circumstance when you are outside the partisan warfare. You get scholars, and you get statesmen, and you get knaves on both sides of the aisle, and you sort of know who they are. And you get members who have very able staff who can really assist you, and others who do not and whose promises aren't worth much. But there is not a partisan distinction there. You get really quality people on both sides, and people of not much quality on both sides.

RITCHIE: So much that goes on in the Senate often has to do with creative coalitions. To me the epitome was once there was a Wellstone-Helms Amendment.

GOLD: [Laughs] That's as creative as you get.

RITCHIE: Well, it is now about 11:30, did you want to stop at this point?

GOLD: Let's stop at this point.

RITCHIE: We're still only up to 1983, so we have a lot more territory to cover.

End of the Third Interview