>>> TABLE OF CONTENTS
Executive Summary............................................... 1
Results of Review.................................................. 2
Background........................................................... 6
Objective, Scope, and Methodology...................... 6
>>> Executive
Summary
Summary Results of Review
>
The U.S. House of
Representatives (House) Travel Program Coordinators need to monitor the travel
card program more closely to include using computer-assisted auditing
techniques to track trends, delinquency rates, suspensions, and cancellations.
>
The new Paylinks
System was not producing reports of terminated employees needed by the program
coordinators to ensure that accounts of employees who left the House were
closed timely.
>
The points of
contact in the task order were updated to reflect employees who had “official
authority” to represent the House to Citibank.
Report Recommendations Summary
The Chief
Administrative Officer should:
>
Transfer travel
card program responsibilities to one full-time employee dedicated to managing
the program.
>
Revise the Chief Administrative Officer’s (CAO’s) policies and procedures
to require monthly audits of travel card activity and report the results to the
CAO and Committee on House Administration (CHA) for corrective action.
>
Expedite the ability of Paylinks to produce monthly reports of terminated
House employees so travel card accounts can be closed timely.
>>> Results of Review
Finding 1: The House Travel Card Program Needs to Incorporate
Best Practices to Improve Program Management
Condition 1a: Only two part-time employees, totaling up to
.75 FTE, are assigned to the program; whereas the number of travel cards issued
to House Members and employees justifies a full-time travel card coordinator to
adequately manage the program.
Criteria: The Government Accountability Office’s (GAO’s) audit
report entitled “Control Weaknesses Leave Army Vulnerable to Potential Fraud
and Abuse”, dated July 17, 2002, states “agency program coordinators (APCs) who
have the key responsibility for managing and overseeing travel cardholders
activities are essentially set up to fail in their duties because they are
given substantial
Cause: The House has approximately 1,085 travel card
holders which creates a larger workload than two part-time coordinators can
adequately manage.
Effect: Without adequate resources assigned to the
travel card program, critical management such as canceling accounts for
terminated House employees and monitoring travel card activity can not be done
either timely or adequately.
Agreed Upon Action Plans to be Completed by CAO: The CAO will transfer travel card program
responsibilities to one full-time employee dedicated to manage the program by
June 1, 2006. In subsequent
conversations with the CAO the position will have adequate back-up to process
new card issuances and cancellations.
>>> Results of
Review
Finding
1: The House Travel Card Program Needs
to Incorporate Best Practices to Improve Program Management (continued)
Condition 1b: Travel card activity needs to be audited more closely
and more frequently to identify abuse in a timely manner.
Criteria: The Government Services Administration (GSA) SmartPay
Agency/Organization Program Coordinator’s (A/OPC) Survival Guide Best Practices
state in Chapter 3 that, “A/OPC are to use exception reports to detect misuse
of the travel card or unusual patterns in spending. A/OPCs are to review reports monthly and
track trends in delinquency rates and write-offs.” During the 2004 Smart Pay Conference, (August 23-26, 2004) a GSA Federal Supply Service Briefing stated that A/OPCs should separate
questionable transactions, look for patterns of suspicious behavior, and
Cause: Travel card
coordinators didn’t have the appropriate tools to monitor travel card use
either efficiently or effectively, and the CAO’s policies and procedures
establish only annual audits of travel card use on a sample basis; they also require
results to be reported only to the CAO.
Effect: Insufficient monitoring of travel card use
could lead to undetected travel card abuse, untimely detection and correction
of such abuse, and/or public embarrassment to the House if travel card abuse is
not detected and corrected in a timely manner.
Agreed
Upon Action Plans to be Completed by CAO: The CAO plans to revise the
current policies and procedures related to the program audits. The audits will include analysis of trends,
delinquency rates, suspensions, and cancellations, as well as identifying
questionable transactions to be reported to the CAO and CHA. The CAO had planned to revise the current
policies and procedures by April 1, 2006.
Presently, the CAO has revised this date to September 1, 2006 to allow
for the full time Travel Card Coordinator to test revised policies and
procedures.
>>>Results of Review
Finding 2: The
New Paylinks System Needs to Provide Termination Reports
Condition: Although the old payroll system provided reports of terminated employees used to close
accounts, such reports have not been produced by the Paylinks System.
Criteria: The CAO Travel Card Program policies and procedures
state that “the Human Resources payroll department will provide to the Program Coordinator,
no later than the 5th business day following the month just ended, a
list of staff terminating employment with the House during the month.” The Program Coordinator is responsible for
identifying cardholders who are no longer working for the House and advising
Citibank of any accounts that need to be cancelled.
Cause: The travel card program coordinators and the
Paylinks System contractors have not coordinated requirements in a timely
manner so that a program can be written to generate the reports needed by the Office
of Finance and Procurement.
Effect: Without the report of employees who have terminated
House employment, former House employees could continue to charge purchases to
open Citibank travel accounts.
Agreed Upon Actions Completed by the CAO: The CAO is currently receiving monthly
termination reports from Human Resources, and all reports are re-verified and travel
cards are cancelled accordingly.
>>> Results of Review
Finding 3: Update
Points of Contact in Citibank Task Order
Criteria: The
task order should be kept up to date so all parties to the contract agree who is
authorized to modify and make decisions concerning the task order.
Cause: The CAO was not aware the points of contact were out of date.
Effect: Should a question arise or a
modification is required for the task order by Citibank, no one named in the
contract would have “official authority” to take action.
Agreed Upon Action Plans Completed by the CAO: The CAO updated the points
of contact in the House task order for the Task Order Coordinator, House
Contracting Officer, and House Contract Administrator.
BACKGROUND
The House contract for travel
cards is linked to the GSA contract with Citibank. Travel cards are issued to Members and House
staff. Committees also use a travel card
account number (without the plastic card) to charge airline tickets and
sometimes lodging. Individual
cardholders are responsible for their own travel card. Travel cards are intended for official travel
expenses only, such as airline tickets, lodging, meals, rental cars, and gasoline. The limit for each Member is $20,000 (with
the exception of the Members from Guam and
OBJECTIVE
To evaluate the adequacy of
the House’s policies and procedures for ensuring the sound fiscal management
and programmatic integrity of the travel card program. However, our audit did not include a review of
travel card transactions to determine authorized use, accuracy, and timeliness
of payments.
SCOPE
Current policies and procedures
issued by the House covering the use of travel cards, the Citibank Master Contract,
and the House task order and modifications provided the basis for this audit.
METHODOLOGY
We conducted this review in
accordance with government auditing standards as implemented in the Office of
