Foreign Aid and the Fights Against Terrorism and Proliferation: Leveraging Foreign Aid to Achieve U.S. Policy Goals

I have called for hearings to consider how U.S. aid for counterterrorism and nonproliferation can be made more effective, and to discuss how foreign aid programs generally, especially large, government-to-government security assistance programs, can be better leveraged to help the United States achieve its foreign policy objectives. We also need to ensure that when we spend money on foreign programs, we do not fund the other side in the War on Terrorism. We need to ensure we are working with groups that are truly opposed to terrorism and that espouse views consistent with our objectives.

Now, I am a strong supporter of foreign aid. I have voted for every foreign assistance bill since coming to Congress, and have sought every year to increase the amount we spend on foreign assistance and foreign affairs programs generally – the so called “Function 150” in our budget.

I approach these hearings with the following points of view: that foreign assistance, including humanitarian and developmental assistance, plays a critical role in our foreign policy. While I would support them simply because it is the right thing to do, I also support strong foreign aid budgets because foreign assistance can effectively alleviate many of the underlying problems that lead to foreign policy problems for the United States. Foreign aid is also a powerful weapon in the war of ideas – nothing burnishes our image abroad better than saving lives, and improving healthcare, education and infrastructure in developing countries. It is in our national security interest to provide foreign aid.

Foreign assistance funding rose from $15 billion in FY1999 to a request of $26 billion for FY2009. I would point out that this figure is perhaps an understatement of our expenditure on foreign assistance, because it excludes a number of military efforts that are humanitarian in nature.

Indeed, much of our traditional foreign aid has been “militarized” if you will, run out of the Pentagon, not the State Department or USAID. This is an area I know we will examine in this hearing; the full committee will be looking at this issue as well in more depth in the fall.

Politicians often pay a heavy price for supporting foreign aid; in contrast, it is rare for a Congressman to pay a price for voting against a foreign aid bill. When our foreign aid funds the other side in the War on Terrorism – it not only wastes scarce dollars and provides aid to the enemy, but also make it more difficult to support any foreign aid.

I invited Steven Emerson to testify on the hearings second panel. He has detailed incidents over the past several years where the State Department and other agencies have provided support to groups that espouse the very ideology we confront today. It is critical that the officials that administer our foreign programs exercise due diligence. Much of what he has uncovered could have been discovered with a Google search.

The overwhelming majority of NGOs, including Islamic NGOs, does excellent work and is not connected to terrorism or Islamist ideology, or otherwise hostile to the United States. But for the good of our foreign programs, the State Department needs to do a better job vetting those who receive US assistance or participate in U.S, government programs.

The largest example of this problem is not with the State Department, however. It is with the World Bank. Unfortunately, we do not have them at the hearing here. I personally asked President Zoellick to hold an extraordinary board meeting about stopping aid to Iran. We will not. And, there has been no serious commitment to condition U.S. financial support on the cessation of World Bank aid to Iran. However, the U.S. was willing to call out a full court press to save Wolfowitz’ job in the face of his personal improprieties.

I now turn briefly to the topics we will discuss in our first panel, namely State Department efforts to support nonproliferation and counterterrorism programs.

Nonproliferation Programs

Currently, the total budget of the United States for nonproliferation and threat reduction programs is $1.2 billion per year, just under one twentieth of the total Foreign Assistance budget, or an amount equal to our combined foreign assistance totals to Colombia and Jordan. While the amount spent outside of the Former Soviet Union is growing, the bulk of this money is still under the jurisdiction of the Defense Department, under the Cooperative Threat Reduction program for the former Soviet Union, and related Energy Department programs. Comparatively small amounts of money are administered through the State Department’s programs, though the State Department, as the lead foreign affairs agency, is instrumental in coordination and facilitation of other agency efforts.

Central to the efforts at the State Department are the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund. The Proliferation Security Initiative is a partnership of 15 core countries and some 60 lesser members, mostly U.S. allies that have agreed on an ad-hoc basis to attempt to restrict the cross-border flow nuclear, biological and chemical weapon technology. The Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund, designed to “rapidly respond” to emerging proliferation threats, has worked mostly in the former Soviet Union, but also notably in Libya. It has the distinct advantage of having broad “notwithstanding” authority – meaning it can operate anywhere in the world regardless of our political relations with a given country. It has therefore been instrumental in efforts to shut down North Korea’s nuclear program.

Counterterrorism Assistance

The question of what constitutes counterterrorism assistance itself is an open question. According the Bush Administration, the provision of F-16 fighter plane upgrades for Pakistan is critical counterterrorism assistance. I do not think the Taliban or al Qaeda have MiGs yet. Any security assistance can be deemed a counterterrorism expenditure, perhaps, during the Global War on Terror.

But for our purposes, we focused primarily on programs managed by the State Department, those being: the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program (ATA); Counterterrorism Finance (CTF); a border control assistance programs known as TIP/PISCES [pronounced like the zodiac sign]; and the Counterterrorism Engagement Program (CTE); as well as the State Department’s role in coordination of counterterrorism strategy government-wide.

Factoring Nonproliferation and Counterterrorism in aid decisions

We have a tendency to compartmentalize our government functions. Various policy areas and geographic regions are often atomized in the State Department and other bureaucracies. Bureaucracies have bureaus; they push their prerogatives and defend their turf to the expense of others. However, supporting countries that help us in efforts to combat terrorism and stop proliferation should be a factor in foreign aid decisions, especially, as noted, when we look at large non-humanitarian aid programs. In other words, the terrorism and nonproliferation bureaus should be consulted when it comes to major aid decisions

 

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