

**NEW DIRECTION OR OLD PATH?
CARIBBEAN BASIN SECURITY INITIATIVE (CBSI)**

HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
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NEW DIRECTION OR OLD PATH? CARIBBEAN BASIN SECURITY INITIATIVE (CBSI)

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 9, 2009

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:18 p.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Eliot L. Engel (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. ENGEL. The hearing is called to order. Before I begin, I want to acknowledge a number of distinguished ambassadors from the Caribbean, and we thank them for coming here today from Antigua and Barbuda, Ambassador Deborah Mae Lovell. If I mispronounce anything, please forgive me. From the Bahamas, Ambassador Cornelius Alvin Smith. From Barbados, Ambassador John Ernest Beale. From Guyana, Ambassador Barney Karran. From Jamaica, Ambassador Anthony Smith Rowe Johnson. From St. Lucia, Dr. Michael Louis. And from Trinidad and Tobago, Ambassador Dr. Glynda Patricia Morean-Phillip.

So I thank all of you for coming. It is quite an honor to have you here and of course you are always welcome. I hope I didn't butcher anybody's name too badly.

So the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere will come to order. I am pleased to welcome you to today's hearing on the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative and to welcome Ms. Julissa Reynoso, the new deputy assistant secretary of state for the Caribbean, Central American and Cuban Affairs to what is I hope her first of many appearances before this committee. And Ms. Reynoso comes from the Bronx, as I do. So we have something in common. And I am sure your Bronx roots will help lay the groundwork for a great working relationship with this subcommittee. I know you are just a little bit smarter than most people because you come from the Bronx.

Ms. REYNOSO. That is right.

Mr. ENGEL. So today's hearing provides an excellent opportunity to highlight the security concerns of the Caribbean. So often the region's problems get overlooked except as a vacation spot or when there is a crisis.

As chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, the Caribbean has been a high priority for me, and I have been a strong proponent of making sure the Caribbean is at the top of the U.S. foreign policy agenda. Not only do I have many constituents in my congressional district of Caribbean

heritage, including many from Jamaica, Haiti and the Dominican Republic, and as I mentioned, my district is in the Bronx in New York and Westchester County and Rockland County, but I firmly believe that a strong bond with our friends in the Caribbean benefits the entire region. I was proud to lead the official congressional delegation to the Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago in April, and since I have been chairman we have been to Trinidad twice. In Trinidad at the Summit of the Americas I met with the leaders of most of the Caribbean nations one-to-one with my delegation, a very, very good exchange of views and ideas.

I strongly support President Obama's initiative to strengthen cooperation on security with our neighbors in the Caribbean, and above all, I agree with his message that we need to listen to our Caribbean friends, and build on their strengths in areas they see as important. This is precisely what we must do to bolster the security of our Caribbean neighbors, enhance what works while creating new avenues for partnership. I know that security is the top concern of many Caribbean leaders and we must not delay. Prime Minister Manning of Trinidad and Tobago expressed to me personally a strong willingness to deepen security cooperation with the United States and hoped that resources and attention from Washington would follow our positive rhetoric.

Now is the time for us to increase security assistance to the small and vulnerable countries of the Caribbean. What we need is an approach to security in the Caribbean that is cooperative, sustained, and well-resourced while working in coordination with existing efforts in the Western Hemisphere, like the Merida Initiative and the Andean Counterdrug Initiative, or ACI.

According to statistics released by the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime and Interpol in 2007, the overall Caribbean murder rate of 30 per 100,000 is higher than that of any other region in the world. Aside from the human toll that crime has on society, it also acts as a barrier to development and investment, directing more resources to security and away from social improvement, thus fueling a vicious cycle that only encourages more crime.

I saw this during a recent congressional delegation to Jamaica, a country with an alarmingly high murder rate. In my meeting with Prime Minister Golding, he stressed to me that 90 percent of the illegal guns confiscated in Jamaica come from the United States. President Calderon of Mexico reported similarly alarming trends. It is for this reason the United States needs to ratify the Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials. This treaty, which has been negotiated but not yet ratified by the Senate, is called the CIFTA treaty. It has been stalled in the Senate and it directly targets illegal arms smuggling, an issue of great consequence for the Caribbean and the rest of the hemisphere.

Ever since becoming chairman of this subcommittee, I have been increasingly concerned about the effectiveness of U.S. counter-narcotics efforts in the Americas. We must not only work with our partners in the region to stem the supply of illicit drugs, but we must increase efforts to reduce demand here in the United States

at home. Most importantly, we must figure out what works and what does not.

I am therefore pleased that just yesterday the House of Representatives passed my bill to create a Western Hemisphere drug policy commission to evaluate the U.S. counternarcotics strategy in the hemisphere. It is my hope that the work of this commission will support our efforts to work with CARICOM on the scourge of drugs. And I might add that I was delighted to have as a strong supporter and sponsor of this legislation our ranking member, Mr. Mack. And I want to again—I did it yesterday but I want to publicly thank him for his support. This was truly a bipartisan bill and passed the House with voice vote. So thank you, Mr. Mack.

I also believe that we need to take a holistic view of the entire region when we begin implementing CBSI. I am very concerned that if we don't act quickly to bolster our friends in the Caribbean, the positive impact of the Merida Initiative in Mexico and Central America may push the drug trade further into the Caribbean and increase the already alarming rates of violence.

In implementing CBSI we need to make sure our approach with the Merida Initiative and the Andean Counterdrug Initiative work together to combat the drug trade and insecurity throughout the region. It makes little sense for all three efforts to work in the Western Hemisphere without proper coordination. That is why I have added a section to legislation which has passed the House establishing a coordinator with State Department for the Merida Initiative. I am calling for an executive branch coordinator at the State Department to oversee and manage our counternarcotics programs in the Americas.

Since CBSI was announced at the summit last April there have been three meetings held on this initiative. Initial United States-Caribbean meetings were held in Suriname, Barbados, and the Dominican Republic in 2009, and a ministerial meeting is expected to take place in Washington in early 2010 in which a political declaration, action plan, and framework for the CBSI will be adopted. We must quickly move forward on this initiative and produce more detailed planning on the shape of CBSI. I also think that at next year's meeting in Washington that President Obama should meet with the Caribbean leaders. This meeting would not only demonstrate support for CBSI, but it would go a long way toward showing our Caribbean friends that the United States stands shoulder to shoulder on the challenges we face together.

I would like to commend President Obama for announcing \$45 million of initial funding for CBSI when he was at the Summit of the Americas. However, I am disappointed to learn that only \$37 million will be appropriated. I believe we have to fund the remaining \$8 million to meet this important obligation to the Caribbean. It is hard to generalize about a diverse region about the Caribbean, but we can all agree that insecurity is a common threat to every nation in the region. These threats, drugs, gangs, violent crime, criminal organizations, and even natural disasters are magnified by the poverty, corruption, and limited opportunities. What is most important is that through CBSI, the United States demonstrates to the nations of the Caribbean that we will listen to your concerns about your security, learn from your experiences, and respond tan-

gibly, effectively, and cooperatively to the situation you face every day. We cannot tell you what the problem is. We want to hear from you and learn from you what the problem is.

While it is hard for any program to be an absolute solution to all the significant security problems found in the region, I think CBSI is a good step in the right direction, and I am looking forward to learning more about the initiative today.

With that, I would like to call on the ranking member, Mr. Mack, for his opening statement.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Engel follows:]

**Opening Statement
Chairman Eliot L. Engel**

House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere

New Direction or Old Path? Caribbean Basin Security Initiative

December 9, 2009

I am pleased to welcome you to today's hearing on the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative and to welcome Julissa Reynoso, the new Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Caribbean, Central American, and Cuban Affairs, to what I hope is her first of many appearances before this Subcommittee. I am also sure your Bronx roots will help lay the ground for a great working relationship with this Subcommittee.

Today's hearing provides an excellent opportunity to highlight the security concerns of the Caribbean. So often, the region's problems get overlooked except as a vacation spot or when there is a crisis.

As Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, the Caribbean has been a high priority for me, and I have been a strong proponent of making sure the Caribbean is at the top of the U.S. foreign policy agenda. Not only do I have many constituents in my congressional district of Caribbean heritage, including many from Jamaica, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic, but I firmly believe that a strong bond with our friends in the Caribbean benefits the entire region.

I was proud to lead the official Congressional delegation to the Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago in April, where I met with the leaders of most of the Caribbean nations. I strongly support President Obama's initiative to strengthen cooperation on security with our neighbors in the Caribbean. Above all, I agreed with his message that we need to listen to our Caribbean friends build on their strengths in areas they see as important.

That is precisely what we must do to bolster the security of our Caribbean neighbors – enhance what works while creating new avenues for partnership. I know that security is the top concern of many Caribbean leaders, and we must not delay. Prime Minister Manning of Trinidad and Tobago expressed to me a strong willingness to deepen security cooperation with the United States and hoped that resources and attention from Washington, DC would follow our positive rhetoric. Now is the time for us to increase security assistance to the small and vulnerable countries of the Caribbean. What we need is an approach to security in the Caribbean that is cooperative, sustained, and well-resourced while working in coordination with existing efforts in the Western Hemisphere, like the Merida Initiative and the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI).

According to statistics released by the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime and Interpol in 2007, the overall Caribbean murder rate of 30 per 100,000 is higher than that of any other region of the world. Aside from the human toll that crime has on society, it also acts as a barrier to development and investment, directing more resources to security and away from social improvement, thus fueling a vicious cycle that only encourages more crime.

I saw this during a recent congressional delegation to Jamaica – a country with an alarmingly high murder rate. In my meeting with Prime Minister Golding, he stressed that 90% of the illegal guns confiscated in Jamaica come from the United States. President Calderon of Mexico reported similarly alarming trends. It is for this reason that the U.S. needs to ratify the Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials. This treaty has been stalled in the Senate and directly targets illegal arms smuggling -- an issue of great consequence for the Caribbean and the rest of the hemisphere.

Ever since becoming Chairman of this Subcommittee, I have become increasingly concerned about the effectiveness of U.S. counternarcotics efforts in the Americas. We must not only work with our partners in the region to stem the supply of illicit drugs, but we must increase efforts to reduce demand here, at home. Most importantly, we must figure out what works and what does not. I am, therefore, pleased that just yesterday, the House of Representatives passed my bill to create a Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission to evaluate the U.S. counter-narcotics strategy in the hemisphere. It is my hope that the work of this Commission will support our efforts to work with CARICOM nations on the scourge of drugs.

I also believe that we need to take a holistic view of the entire region when we begin implementing CBSI. I am very concerned that if we do not act quickly to bolster our friends in the Caribbean, the positive impact of the Merida Initiative in Mexico and Central America will push the drug trade further into the Caribbean and increase the already alarming rates of violence.

In implementing CBSI, we need to make sure our approaches with the Merida Initiative and the Andean Counterdrug Initiative work together to combat the drug trade and insecurity throughout the region. It makes little sense for all three efforts to work in the Western Hemisphere without coordination. This is why I have added a section to legislation which has passed that House establishing a Coordinator at the State Department for the Merida Initiative and I am calling for an executive branch coordinator at the State Department to oversee and manage our counternarcotics programs in the Americas.

Since CBSI was announced at the Summit last April, there have been three meetings held on this initiative. Initial U.S.-Caribbean meetings were held in Suriname, Barbados, and the Dominican Republic in 2009, and a ministerial meeting is expected to take place in Washington in early 2010 at which a political declaration, action plan, and

framework for the CBSI will be adopted. We must quickly move forward on this initiative and produce more detailed planning on the shape of CBSI. I also think that at next year's meeting in Washington for President Obama should meet with the Caribbean leaders. This meeting would not only demonstrate support for CBSI, be it would go a long way toward showing our Caribbean friends that the United States stands shoulder to shoulder on the challenges we face together.

I would like to commend President Obama for announcing \$45 million of initial funding for CBSI when he was at the Summit of the Americas. However, I am disappointed to learn that only \$37 million will be appropriated. I believe we have to find the remaining \$8 million to meet this important obligation to the Caribbean.

It's hard to generalize about a diverse region like the Caribbean, but we all can agree that insecurity is a common threat to every nation in the region. These threats - drugs, gangs, violent crime, criminal organizations, and even natural disasters - are magnified by poverty, corruption and limited opportunities. What is most important is that, through CBSI, the United States demonstrates to the nations of the Caribbean that we will listen to your concerns about your security, learn from your experiences, and respond tangibly, effectively, and cooperatively to the situation you face everyday.

While it is hard for any program to be an absolute solution to all the significant security problems found in the region, I think CBSI is a good step in the right direction, and I am looking forward to learning more about the initiative today.

Mr. MACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you for holding this hearing today. It has been a pleasure to serve on this committee and to serve with you and your leadership in the hemisphere. We work well together, and we agree on a lot. Not on everything, but the things that we don't agree on we have been able to talk about and to work on together. So I appreciate your leadership.

I would also like to thank our witnesses for being here today. I would especially like to thank Steve Johnson for coming today as well. I know that he has a very tight schedule and he might have to leave before we get to him, but I believe that it is important that we hear his perspective.

Before we begin, Mr. Chairman, I would like to touch on something that happened in Honduras yesterday. As some of you already know, Honduras' top fighter against narcotrafficking was brutally assassinated. Like the Caribbean, Central America is fighting hard against narcotraffickers, and this is just another example of what we are facing: Cowardly thugs who will stop at nothing to weaken governments and terrorize the people. This is also a reminder to us all that the Obama administration must restore military cooperation with the Hondurans. They are flying blind in a tough fight against narcoterrorists, and the one country that could help them defeat the drug traffickers continues to stand while the innocent are killed.

Mr. Chairman, the nations of the Caribbean are instrumental in our fight against narcotrafficking. My own State of Florida has firsthand experience with the repercussions of a violent Caribbean. In the 1980s drugs were flown from South America through the Caribbean with a destination point in Florida, creating great havoc across the streets of south Florida. History seems to be repeating itself. While narcotraffickers moved to Central America and Mexico in the 1990s, we have seen a shift due to the Mexican President Caldern's tenacity. As Mexico works hard to defeat narcotraffickers, a balloon-like effect is triggered and trafficking is now originating in South America, cutting through the Caribbean and either heading to North Africa, Europe, or Florida. And as if a rising storm was approaching the islands of the Caribbean, we must make sure that these nations are prepared, Mr. Chairman. If we do not, this problem will not only affect the lives of the Caribbean people, but it will also affect the lives of thousands of Floridians and Americans across our great Nation.

We have all seen the effects. High murder rates, increased air smuggling from Venezuela, overburdened prosecutors and judges, dead bodies in the canals and straits of the Caribbean. In fact, when looking at the statistics, it seems as if the battle between David and Goliath is occurring in the Caribbean nations. To add insult to injury, Venezuela's leader Hugo Chavez has become a co-conspirator in this fight. Unlike President Caldern of Mexico, President Uribe of Colombia, both of whom deserve great recognition for their efforts, Hugo Chavez has ceded his airspace to thousands of drug-smuggling flights. Not only that, Hugo Chavez and his family have become partners in the narco business, taking a once proud nation to what now looks more like an abyss.

As we address the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, we must take a close look at some very important issues. For instance, do the Caribbean nations have the capacity to absorb the help they need? Is the new funding under the CBSI really new or will it simply replace old projects? How dangerous is it that some of the very countries that might be included in the CBSI are the ones that belong to ALBA, an organization that is led by Hugo Chavez? Although we might have our own views on what should be done in the Caribbean, what have those nations said they would like to see done?

As we hear from our panel today, these are some of the points that I would like to address. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, this is an important hearing, and I think it has a huge impact on the United States and certainly our friends and neighbors in the Caribbean. Thank you.

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Mack. I want to acknowledge the Ambassador of St. Vincent and the Grenadines, La Celia A. Prince, who just walked in. I was in her lovely country several months ago, as was Mr. Meeks.

So I call on Mr. Meeks for an opening statement.

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your hard work and a hearty hello to our great friends, the ambassadors from all throughout the Caribbean. As I heard the chairman say, I was pleased to be at the most recent Summit of the Americas, where President Obama announced the creation of the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative. I in fact just recently returned from a trip to Haiti, where I saw firsthand the critical need for this kind of focus. When I pushed to have Haiti and the Dominican Republic inserted in the Merida Initiative, it was a step I hope in the direction of a broader coordination with the region. It is gratifying to see this initiative now on the horizon.

I am certain that today our witnesses will lay out all of the many reasons why there is a critical need to work more closely in partnership with our Caribbean neighbors on issues of security. But I also hope to hear today not just about the numbers and crime and narcotics trade but also about the link it bears to economic development. I believe deeply that these are critically linked issues.

Entrenched to poverty feeds the kinds of security questions we will consider today. We cannot consider security without discussing a comprehensive approach to addressing barriers to development. While poverty in the Caribbean has declined in the past, it remains high and many of the region's impressive social gains are at risk of eroding. Unemployment, particularly of youth, is a major issue, and there is a growing concern about recent increases in crime and violence across the region.

I know that CBSI includes a component focused on social progress, and I hope our witnesses can expound on ways to ensure that this is, indeed, an effective aspect of the initiative.

There is no doubt that the Caribbean countries face unique development challenges arising from their small size, proximity to drug production, vulnerability to natural disasters and economic volatility. As globalization has become the reality, they continue to confront a changing international paradigm with a significant

transformation and the production structure of most economies away from traditional agriculture.

Despite all these challenges, until the recent global financial crisis, the Caribbean continued to see a sustained growth in per capita incomes, with most of them becoming middle-income countries and achieving high levels of human development. These achievements were complemented and enhanced by several small and deliberate moves in early targeting of universal primary education, strong traditions of democratic participation and political stability for many countries, and a significant degree of regional integration despite significant differences and economic and social characteristics. Yet the Caribbean still struggles to reach its potential and the reality of the drug trade and crime overtaking of even the Caribbean's highest income countries puts the region at a comparative disadvantage in achieving international competitiveness.

Unfortunately, it has been the case that just when many Caribbean nations find their footing in an industry and trade deepens in a positive direction, the rules change or the extra help isn't provided to help sustain this advantage. Clearly we need to do a better job of helping advance trade and development. In such an environment business as usual no longer will suffice neither for the individual countries nor our own country's sluggish efforts toward the region.

Adapting to the demands of this new world will require a much greater focus on sustaining and improving growth and competitiveness. When all is said and done, nothing matters if the people of the Caribbean do not feel the impact of the democracies. It is easy to turn to a life of crime, as there is no other way to put food on the table. We cannot decouple security and social well-being. We never have and we never will.

So I look forward to hearing from our witnesses that will be testifying later today, listening and learning and working together with my friends from the Caribbean.

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Meeks, and we welcome Mr. Delahunt here. I would like to invite him, if he would like, to make a statement.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And again, welcome to the CARICOM and representatives of the nations in the Caribbean. I know you and other members of the subcommittee give them high regard, as do I. I want to extend a personal welcome to them.

Let me be brief since I am not a member of the committee, but let me associate myself with the remarks of the vice chair, Mr. Meeks, and let me commend the passage of your legislation and also the work of Mr. Mack and his sponsorship that creates a commission. I think there has to be a sustained review in real-time in terms of all of the issues impacting security in the Caribbean and neighboring countries. I think it really makes sense. Well done.

With that, I yield back.

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Delahunt. And now it is my honor once again to welcome Ms. Julissa Reynoso, who is the deputy assistant secretary of state for Caribbean, Central American and Cuban Affairs. She has a wonderful resume. I won't read it all because it would take too long. But she is an attorney by trade and

prior to joining the U.S. State Department practiced law in New York, focusing on international arbitration and antitrust law. She has a wonderful record, a fellow at New York University School of Law and Columbia Law School, and I saw the University of Cambridge in the U.K. and J.D. from Columbia University School of Law, and you clerked for a Federal judge. And I could go on and on, but we really want to hear from you, and we welcome you and we are all ears.

STATEMENT OF MS. JULISSA REYNOSO, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Ms. REYNOSO. Thank you, Chairman and Ranking Member Mack, members of the committee. I am honored to appear before this subcommittee today so soon after taking up my new duties as the deputy assistant secretary responsible for Central American, Caribbean, and Cuban affairs.

If it is acceptable to you, Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to make a brief statement so I have more time to address any questions the committee may have and submit my full statement for the record.

Mr. ENGEL. Without objection, so moved.

Ms. REYNOSO. Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, CBSI, embodies a new approach and a tangible commitment, greater shared security throughout the Caribbean. We have achieved effective partnerships with Mexico, Colombia, and Central America. It is time for the Caribbean, the heart of key trafficking routes, to become part of this broader network of cooperation to protect our peoples and institutions. Stemming the flow of narcotics remains forefront in our national interests.

Most of the drugs coming into the United States pass through Central America and Mexico. We expect, however, that as the Merida Initiative makes progress in Mesoamerica there will be a “balloon effect” in the Caribbean. Governments in the region are, however, hampered by a lack of human, technical, and physical capacity. They cannot keep pace with cash flush transnational criminal networks.

The danger of increased trafficking and negative spillover effects are too great to ignore. The question is not should the United States take action but how best to do so in partnership with our Caribbean allies and other international partners.

A defining purpose of our policy in the Western Hemisphere is to build effective partnerships to better develop, mobilize, supply, and sustain the capacity of the region to accomplish shared objectives. In the security sector, this is reflected in a commitment to advance citizen safety. Insecurity is a widespread concern in the region, and it is felt by people in many different ways. By grounding our efforts in “citizen safety” we are underscoring that at heart all of our various concerns boil down to the safety of human beings. It is an effective way to link our specific concerns with the related concerns of people throughout the region.

Although the nature of security challenges faced by countries in the region varies, they are increasingly interconnected. Hence, our responses must be coordinated and integrated. We have to effi-

ciently mobilize the efforts of all our agencies and partners to meet their goals in the most cost-effective way possible. A one-size-fits-all approach to the hemisphere won't work. Instead, we are implementing distinct tailored initiatives that address the differing circumstances prevalent in different subregions, and ensuring they join up seamlessly.

Mr. Chairman, I thought it might be useful to briefly highlight the trajectory that has brought us to this point. Work on CBSI began in earnest following unprecedented efforts by Caribbean countries, the United States, and international partners to provide security for the 2007 Cricket World Cup. That year Caribbean and United States leaders adopted the CARICOM-U.S. Initiative to combat illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons. In April 2008 Caribbean leaders agreed to develop a regional security strategy and plan of action, focused on strengthening institutional and operational cooperation throughout the region and with international partners. We seized the opportunity presented by their initiative to foster a greater security partnership with them.

At the Government of Trinidad and Tobago's request for security assistance at the April Summit of the Americas presented another opportunity to advance our cooperative efforts. These examples demonstrate the confluence of events surrounding the genesis of this partnership.

It is worth noting the United States' successful engagement in these efforts was due to extraordinary cooperation, coordination among U.S. agencies, agencies that continue to play active roles in these new partnerships.

President Obama recognized the need for deeper security cooperation with the Caribbean in the beginning of his administration. When he met with leaders from the hemisphere at the Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago, he announced an investment toward this effort, the Fiscal Year 2010 request of \$45 million for CBSI pending congressional approval.

We recognize that difficult economic times require difficult economic choices. We are planning programs based on realistic budget appraisals, keeping in mind the United States cannot bear all the cost. We understand that the conference report includes \$37 million for CBSI, and we are optimistic that Congress will pass it in the coming week.

We are pleased the Congress recognizes the importance of partnering with the Caribbean States on security. We look forward to working with you on further developing the CBSI. Since April, the State Department has led interagency teams to meet with Caribbean partners on three occasions in a consultative process to plan a bold initiative built on the fundamental premise of shared responsibility and unity of purpose. Together, we have developed a common regional strategy, an operational framework, and a comprehensive needs assessment that identifies the challenges, available resources, and institutions to address them and what would be required to sustain a long-term approach, focusing on three strategic objectives: One, substantially reducing illicit trafficking; two, advance public safety and security; and three, promote social justice. Assistant Secretary of State Arturo Valenzuela, responsible for managing the development and implementation of our hemispheric

security partnerships, will host the inaugural Caribbean-U.S. Security Cooperation Dialogue in early 2010. He will subsequently meet with his counterparts on an annual basis to review progress made in implementing CBSI and developing this partnership.

We envision CBSI as a multi-year, multifaceted security partnership, one which will require sustained resources and political will to succeed. CBSI, like Merida, and other hemispheric partnerships, will mature at its own pace and with its own particular needs and benefits. We have to build into it from the start the sort of flexibility that will let us adjust programs and shift our focus for regional capacity strengths.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I would like to reiterate an important element of this partnership, our close ties to the Caribbean. Caribbean Americans have built lives throughout the United States enriching our society and communities. Through CBSI we can provide the next coming generations of Caribbeans in America the safety and security to which they are inalienably entitled to.

Thank you, and I look forward to answering any questions you may have today.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Reynoso follows:]

Julissa Reynoso
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U.S. Department of State

Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee Subcommittee on Western
Hemisphere Affairs
December 9, 2009

Thank you Chairman Engel, Ranking Member Mack, Members of the Committee. I am honored to appear before this Subcommittee today having recently assumed my responsibilities as the Deputy Assistant Secretary for WHA in charge of Central American, Caribbean and Cuban Affairs. I am pleased that the Subcommittee has requested this hearing to discuss one of the Administration's priorities in the Americas – the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative or CBSI – which President Obama highlighted earlier this year at the Summit of the Americas.

CBSI embodies an approach, and a tangible commitment, to greater shared security throughout the Caribbean. This initiative will help the Caribbean nations address a wide spectrum of issues affecting the safety of our citizens, across a 15-nation region with which we share close historical and cultural ties. In fostering healthier, more resilient and safer communities among our neighbors, we also foster the conditions for sustained growth, democracy and political stability, all important elements contributing to the security and prosperity of the United States.

Our efforts with the countries of the Caribbean arise in the context of our effective partnerships with Mexico, Colombia, and Central America. Success in one area cannot simply mean moving the problem to another. It is thus critical that the Caribbean—the heart of key trafficking routes, and an area with which we have such important human and economic links—also be part of this broader network of cooperation that helps protect all of our peoples and institutions.

Citizen Safety

A defining purpose of our policy in the Western Hemisphere is to build effective partnerships—partnerships that can better develop, mobilize, apply, and sustain the capacity of the region to accomplish our shared objectives. In the security sector, this is reflected in a commitment to advance **citizen safety**.

By talking about citizen safety we recognize that while security is a key priority throughout the region, people perceive security in localized, personal ways. In short, security concerns ultimately boil down to care about the safety of human beings—whether in our country, or anywhere else in the region.

Thinking about the issue this way also makes it easier to understand something fundamental to the wide partnerships we want to build: while the security challenges in this region vary from country to country, they are increasingly interconnected. If they aren't addressed in a coordinated, integrated fashion, with a whole-of-government approach, progress in one area may be more than offset by losses in another.

We cannot take, however, a “one size fits all” approach to the hemisphere. Instead, we are implementing distinct, tailored initiatives to address the different circumstances prevalent in different sub-regions. By keeping these initiatives separate but coordinated, we will ensure that the individuals responsible for developing and implementing our programs have the regional expertise required to succeed, we will avoid a focus on the more prominent countries at the expense of other important partners, and we will ensure that these initiatives are both complementary and knit together into a seamless hemispheric approach.

Threats and Challenges

Stemming the flow of narcotics remains forefront in our national interest. The majority of drugs transiting the Caribbean flow to the United States through Hispaniola and Jamaica. Granted that most of the drugs coming into the United States now pass through Central America and Mexico, as the Merida Initiative makes progress in Mesoamerica, we anticipate that traffickers will seek more reliable smuggling routes in the Caribbean – a concern shared by many in Congress. The situation in Haiti is of particular concern. More so than other governments in the region, the Haitian government lacks the capacity to counter international criminal organizations or fully adjudicate the crimes. As a result, the destabilizing effects, both internally and regionally, of trafficking and related corruption are significant.

In this region, vulnerable nations are already buffeted by narcotics-driven crime waves. According to a joint UN/World Bank Report released in 2007, “murder rates in the Caribbean are higher than in any other region of the world, and assault rates are significantly above the world average. Narcotics trafficking is at the core of these high rates.” The study confirmed what our Caribbean partners and

embassies have long claimed – that “narcotics-trafficking diverts criminal justice resources from other important activities, increases and embeds violence, undermines social cohesion and contributes to the widespread availability of firearms in the region.” This problem will likely worsen as more trafficking routes are pushed into the Caribbean.

Caribbean leaders’ efforts to work with us on counternarcotics and counterterrorism issues are hampered by a lack of human, technical, and physical capacity. Porous land, air, and maritime borders and limited domain awareness challenge poorly-resourced law enforcement agencies; many governments cannot keep pace with cash-flush transnational criminal networks. Caribbean governments share our commitment to democratic principles and norms. Protecting the region’s democratic institutions will remain a hallmark of CBSI and our security partnership.

Violent crime throughout the region also directly threatens American citizens; an estimated 6 million American citizens visit the Caribbean annually. Unfortunately, as reported by the New York Times last week, visitors to the region are increasingly becoming victims of crime. In short, the threats are real and immediate, only a short distance from our shores.

The danger of increased trafficking and negative spillover effects are too great to ignore. If the problem is not addressed now, traffickers will continue to expand operations throughout the region by exploiting these vulnerable transit routes, undermining local governments and increasing the likelihood of political instability. The question is not *should* the United States take action but *how* best to do so in partnership with our Caribbean allies and other international partners.

Foundation and New Opportunities

Mr. Chairman, I thought it might be useful to recap the origins of this new partnership and the opportunities that opened before us over the past two years. Work on CBSI began in earnest following unprecedented efforts by Caribbean countries, the United States and international partners to provide security for the 2007 Cricket World Cup -- that year’s largest international sporting event held in ten countries throughout the Caribbean. At the time, Caribbean partners highlighted the importance of the Advance Passenger Information system (APIS) and Advance Cargo Information System (ACIS), which were developed in coordination with the Department of Homeland Security for the Cup and continue to provide useful border security screening.

In December of 2007, Caribbean and U.S. leaders adopted a common strategy to tackle illicit trafficking in arms entitled the CARICOM-U.S. Initiative to Combat Illicit Trafficking in Small Arms and Light Weapons. Since then, all Caribbean nations except Haiti have become end-users of the ATF “e-Trace” program which has expanded our cooperative efforts to address trafficking. The USG is currently exploring ways to develop other joint automated law enforcement systems.

In April 2008, in response to a rising wave of domestic violent crime, Caribbean leaders agreed in the Caribbean Declaration of Crime and Violence to develop a regional security strategy and plan of action that focused on strengthening both institutional and operational cooperation throughout the region and externally with international partners. We seized the opportunity presented by their initiative to investigate ways in which we could foster a stronger security partnership with the Caribbean – one which builds upon existing law enforcement, defense, and development assistance programs developed over the years. In coordination with our embassies in the region and our U.S. interagency colleagues, we began taking stock of the threats and vulnerabilities as well as the region’s existing capacities.

Caribbean nations themselves began ratifying a series of institutional arrangements such as the Caribbean Regional Maritime Agreement which will allow greater maritime interdiction cooperation throughout the basin. Some governments began developing procurement strategies after having identified specific capabilities required to strengthen their law enforcement and defense systems.

Preparations for the April Summit of the Americas presented another opportunity to advance our cooperative efforts, when the government of Trinidad and Tobago asked for assistance in securing the Summit. Caribbean partners provided law enforcement personnel and the Canadian government provided significant logistical support. The U.S. Department of Defense, Coast Guard and FBI provided maritime and air defense capabilities, maritime security and bomb detection support, respectively.

The U.S. Agency for International Development’s longstanding efforts to cooperate with regional governments to ensure citizen safety in the region have laid the groundwork for future institutional strengthening and community resilience-building. The regional Caribbean Youth Empowerment Program provides young male school leavers aged 17-25 – a group at high risk of involvement in crime and violence – with the skills they need to enter the working world and promote positive change in their communities. Also, the Community

Empowerment and Transformation project in Jamaica brings together community members, authorities and civil society to improve citizen security through dialogue, police training, economic opportunities for community members and other activities. It is a valuable example of the kind of work that can be scaled up to the regional level.”

I mention these examples and agencies to demonstrate not only the extraordinary confluence of events surrounding the genesis of this partnership, but also to illustrate how many U.S. agencies have been and continue to play active roles in this new partnership. These examples of activities and interaction serve as a foundation and prelude toward what we can achieve with greater resources.

Launching CBSI

President Obama recognized the need for deeper security cooperation with the Caribbean from the beginning of his administration. When he met with leaders from the hemisphere at the Fifth Summit of the Americas in Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, he announced an investment toward this effort; the FY 2010 request of \$45 million for CBSI, if approved by Congress, will be our first installment in support of this. Of course, the U.S. effort could never be successful without a healthy collaboration and consultation between the Department of State, other implementing Departments and Agencies, and Congress. In the case of CBSI, the President’s initial commitment announced at the Summit of the Americas, along with support expressed by Congress, has spurred unprecedented cooperation and collaboration with and among our Caribbean partners.

Following the April Summit, the State Department led interagency teams to meet with our Caribbean partners on three different occasions in a consultative process to plan a bold initiative built on the fundamental premise of shared responsibility and unity of purpose. Together, we have already developed a common regional strategy and operational framework and a *comprehensive* needs assessment which identifies the challenges, available resources and institutions to address them, and what will be required to sustain a long-term approach focusing on three strategic objectives -- *Substantially Reduce Illicit Trafficking, Advance Public Safety and Security, and Promote Social Justice*.

More than technical, financial and program assistance, our CBSI activities will reflect a unique mix of institutional and operational partnerships. At this stage of CBSI development, the U.S. and our Caribbean partners have outlined the scope of

operational capabilities required to develop a sustained campaign against regional crime and violence.

Next Steps

Assistant Secretary of State Arturo Valenzuela is actively involved managing the development and implementation of all our hemispheric security partnerships. Right now, he is preparing to host the inaugural Caribbean-U.S. Security Cooperation Dialogue in early 2010, officially launching this important partnership with his Caribbean counterparts. Ideally, he would subsequently meet with his counterparts on an annual basis to review progress made in implementing CBSI and developing this partnership.

We envision CBSI as a multi-year, multi-faceted security partnership – one which may require sustained resources and continued political will to succeed. As I mentioned, Caribbean leaders have already agreed to an integrated approach to regional security; as such, our approach must be specific to the Caribbean but sufficiently flexible to achieve our shared objectives.

We recognize that difficult economic times require difficult economic choices. The President's FY 2010 request of \$45 million represents an investment needed to achieve sustained progress in each strategic objective. We are planning programs based on realistic budget appraisals, and keeping in mind that the United States cannot bear all the costs. Regardless, with this investment we hope to address the most pressing security threats in the region by building on existing partnerships in consultation with our Caribbean partners. We understand that the conference report includes \$37m for CBSI and we are optimistic that Congress will pass it in the coming week. We are pleased that Congress recognizes the importance of partnering with the Caribbean states on security. We look forward to working with you on further developing CBSI.

In his speech at the Summit of the Americas, President Obama said, "And let me add that I recognize that the problem will not simply be solved by law enforcement if we're not also dealing with our responsibilities in the United States. And that's why we will take aggressive action to reduce our demand for drugs, and to stop the flow of guns and bulk cash south across our borders." As in the Merida Initiative and our partnership with Colombia, a guiding principle of CBSI is that our security concerns are shared and so must be the responsibility to address these challenges. With your support, CBSI will reflect a two-way commitment where our investment in resources is matched by our partners in terms of political will and resources.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I would like to reiterate an important element of this partnership – our close ties to the Caribbean. Ten percent of the foreign-born population in the United States has roots in the Caribbean. Many of you know this because of the vibrant diaspora communities in your constituencies. And these communities are not limited to one or two states. Caribbean-Americans have built lives throughout the United States, enriching our society and communities. I myself am Caribbean-American and have the privilege to serve our country like other Americans of Caribbean descent including Attorney General Eric Holder and former Secretary of State Colin Powell. Together, through greater security and safety cooperation with the people and governments of the Caribbean, we can provide the next coming generations of Caribbeans and Americans the safety and security they are inalienably entitled to.

Thank you and I look forward to answering any questions you may have.

Mr. ENGEL. Well, thank you very much, Madam Secretary. I am going to ask a couple of quick questions. You may have heard that the bells have gone off. We have a series of votes. So I am going to try to ask some quick questions and see if we can wrap it up so we can then go to vote and then come back after the vote for the second panel.

As you mentioned, and as I mentioned, the Foreign Operations appropriations bill will fund CBSI for \$37 million instead of the \$45 million in initial funding which President Obama announced. I find this disappointing. I have conveyed that disappointment because I think we need to meet our commitments to our friends in the Caribbean.

Will the State Department reprogram funds in order to reach the \$45 million in order to fully fund CBSI? That can be done, and I will certainly support reprogramming funds to make this important commitment if it is done.

Ms. REYNOSO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the question. We just learned of the \$37 million as of last night. So at this point we are at the point of assessing if that is—if we can work with the programs we already have in mind and look at the budget we already developed. So the answer to your question is, we are still trying to figure out internally whether we will need to proceed with reallocation.

Mr. ENGEL. Could you please take back that that would be my strong recommendation, and you certainly would have my strong support. If you were able to do that, I would appreciate that.

Let me ask you, this is also a quick question. When the Merida Initiative was first announced, Congress was told that it was a 3-year program, and now we are talking about a second phase of Merida beyond the 3-year period. And this makes sense to me, but it would be helpful for Congress to know from the start the length of any security assistance program announced by the administra-

tion. So let me ask you, how long do you envision CBSI to be? Is this a one-time appropriation or a multi-year program?

Ms. REYNOSO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As of right now, we are not certain how many years CBSI will take. We are committed to setting forth a strong foundation and hence the request for the funds. We know that it will likely be a multi-year program, but we are not certain as to how many years that will be since as of today we haven't officially launched the initiative. So as things are rolled out, assessed, how long each portion of the initiative will need in order for it to be fully developed and implemented.

Mr. ENGEL. Let me ask you this final question from me. How would you compare CBSI to the Third Border Initiative, which was implemented by the Bush administration? How is the focus, implementation, or resource allocation different in CBSI than in previous efforts? And let me combine that with, are projects similar to those once funded under the Third Border Initiative still funded by USAID's Caribbean regional program or other spigots of U.S. assistance to the region? And how will you ensure that CBSI is not forgotten in a few years as was the case with the Third Border Initiative?

I know those are a bunch of questions but they are all related.

Ms. REYNOSO. I will try to answer, and please let me know if I don't answer completely, Mr. Chairman. The Third Border Initiative, from my understanding, was a program designed to strengthen the capabilities of Caribbean institutions. We believe that the Third Border Initiative, or TBI, as it is known, was a predecessor to what we are now deeming CBSI. CBSI is an initiative that really came from our Caribbean partners as they organize and coordinate amongst themselves and came to us with an initiative that we believe is much more comprehensive and integrated than TBI. The major difference in my mind is the fact that the Caribbean nations themselves and Caribbean partners were able to coordinate and orchestrate this initiative, CBSI, as opposed to the TBI initiative, which wasn't as integrated and comprehensive as what we are proposing here.

Mr. ENGEL. All right. Thank you.

Mr. Mack.

Mr. MACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for your testimony today. You and I both talked about the balloon effect when it comes to drugs and the flow of drugs. Now that Mexico is working so hard to try to stop the flow of drugs and the drug cartels in their country we see this now moving back toward Central America, South America, and certainly there is a concern that where those drugs are going and whether it is to Europe, Africa, or the Caribbean, I would like to get your thoughts on what can we do to put pressure on Hugo Chavez to stop allowing Venezuelan airspace to be used for the delivery of drugs, to transport drugs through Venezuelan airspace. And specifically, will you be an advocate with the administration to ensure that we have a policy that doesn't allow Hugo Chavez to continue to use his airspace as a way to let drugs go through his country that ultimately will affect the Caribbean and the United States? And also what is what your thoughts are since the United States has cut off aid to Honduras. We have seen drug trafficking increase in Honduras. Again, will

you be an advocate to restore aid to Honduras so we can continue our partnership to stop the drug trade from moving through Honduras?

So if you could answer those two questions, I would appreciate it.

Ms. REYNOSO. Thank you, Congressman. On the question about Venezuela, Venezuela is not a member obviously of the CBSI initiative. The Caribbean nations have come to us of their own will, have not asked Venezuela to be a part of this initiative.

Mr. MACK. If I may, but you would agree that Venezuela—when you talk about the balloon effect that it is Venezuela's airspace that these drugs are moving through that ultimately do come into the Caribbean. So I don't know that you can separate the two issues. You have got to look at how are some of these drugs getting into the Caribbean in the first place? And if we know that they are coming through Venezuela, then certainly it would be in your interest and in our interest and in the administration's interest to do something about that.

Ms. REYNOSO. Yes, Congressman Mack. My colleagues at the State Department who are more familiar with the situation in Venezuela than perhaps I am have clearly indicated that we keenly promote that Venezuela, along with any other nations in the region, the Caribbean basin, do whatever they can to prevent the trafficking of illegal drugs either through air or through the maritime capacity.

So I hear what you are saying, but I guess I agree that we have already indicated to the Venezuelans that that is something that we need their cooperation with.

Mr. MACK. Well, I would suggest then that you might want to refocus on that issue because not only is Venezuela and Hugo Chavez not helping in stopping the drug flow but Hugo Chavez is actually helping, and we need to have a strong policy that says we are not going to stand for this. When he kicks out the DEA and others, clearly that is a sign that he doesn't want to have a partnership in stopping the drug flow, and he is a part of the problem.

Mr. ENGEL. I think we are going to hold it here. I am going to have to ask you to wait. I thought we were finished before. I know we will still have some questions. I know Mr. Meeks and Mr. Delahunt had some questions and Mr. Mack perhaps. We will go vote. There will be a series of three votes. So we should be back here in about 20, 25 minutes. We are in recess.

Ms. REYNOSO. Thank you.

[Recess.]

Mr. ENGEL. The hearing will reconvene.

Let me ask one or two questions before I turn to Mr. Delahunt, who I know has some questions.

Congress expanded the Merida Initiative to cover Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Does this mean that CBSI will exclude Haiti and the Dominican Republic, or are both countries eligible for funding under both efforts?

Ms. REYNOSO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Yes, Merida included funding for the entire island of Hispaniola, the Dominican Republic and Haiti. But we believe at this point, given the fact that the Dominican Republic and Haiti are integral

parts of the Caribbean, that it is the best fit for them and they have themselves acknowledged as such, it is the best fit for them to be part of CBSI. And so we have been working with both the Dominican Republic and Haiti throughout the process in evaluating the CBSI Initiative. So they will be part of that initiative and no longer part of Merida.

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you.

There have been existing bilateral efforts between the United States and various Caribbean countries to work on the issue of security and drug trafficking, and there have already been meetings in Suriname and Barbados to prepare for the CBSI. Could you comment on the state of existing cooperation and your views of areas that need to be strengthened in developing this Caribbean Basin Security Initiative? How does it compare with the support provided by the Department of Defense and of the U.S. agencies in the region?

Ms. REYNOSO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

We have had several meetings already with our Caribbean partners, and of course, we have also met internally with other agencies—the Department of Defense, Justice, Homeland Security and USAID, and within State, the U.S. State Department internally as well to assess where we should go with the initiative. At this point we have come up with preliminary assessments of our objectives.

And our objectives are, one, they are to reduce illicit trafficking. Secondly, to advance public safety and security. And thirdly, to promote social justice.

We have preliminary documents that deal with the assessments and also a preliminary framework agreement and a plan of action that we are evaluating. And the goal is in early 2010 to have a meeting with our Caribbean partners which assistant secretary Arturo Valenzuela will chair, along with his counterparts in the Caribbean, whereby we will look at the documents and formalize and finalize them and officially launch the initiative.

Mr. ENGEL. Let me ask you, based on what you just said, could you evaluate the progress made in the working group meetings made in Suriname and Barbados, and what is the next step for CBSI since the ministerial was moved to 2010, and what do you envision to be the main challenges in launching the CBSI?

Ms. REYNOSO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

We have received documents and assessments from our partners, and we ourselves have done our own evaluations internally, and we believe we are at a point where we can officially launch the initiative early next year.

In terms of our obstacles, we will continue monitoring the initiative and the rollout of the initiative. So we note that, of course, we will be mindful of how we roll out the initiative.

Mr. ENGEL. What countries seem particularly interested in working with the United States on CBSI?

Ms. REYNOSO. Well, at this point, Mr. Chairman, we have been working effectively with all of the members of the catanb plus the Dominican Republic. So indeed we think we have been working effectively with all of the Caribbean nations.

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. When we broke for the votes, Mr. Mack was in the middle of a series of questions, so I would like to turn the floor over to him.

Mr. MACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

We were having a discussion about Venezuela and the drug trafficking through Venezuelan air space, and we also touched on Honduras. I think we both expressed ourselves well about Venezuela, unless you have anything to add to that.

Ms. REYNOSO. Just one thing. On the Venezuela question, I wanted to make clear that since our ambassador returned to Caracas, one of the primary objectives of our mission there is talking with the Venezuelans on counternarcotics and counterterrorism. So these are strategic parts of our policy at this point.

Mr. MACK. Well, I hope we are successful because right now I don't think Hugo Chavez has any intentions of standing with the United States and stopping the drug trafficking through Venezuela. It is a shame.

We talked a little bit about Honduras and whether or not you would be an advocate for the return of aid and support to Honduras. Since the United States has stopped aid and helping with drug trafficking issues, we have seen an increase in drug flows into Honduras, and so I would like to see if you would like to comment on that.

Ms. REYNOSO. Thank you for the question, Mr. Congressman.

Our goal is to work with Honduras as soon as we can. At this point we do not believe and we do not think that they have restored democratic order and we have been working with Honduras to get to that point.

Mr. MACK. They are one country that has actually stood up and defended its freedom and democracy and because of their actions, democracy is alive and well and strong in Honduras, and I think they have proved to the world, by having this last election and by their actions, that democracy is alive and well. And I would suggest that a message to the Honduran people is that we support them in their continued effort to support their democracy. They have done nothing but defend their constitution and it is something that we should celebrate instead of pulling aid that ultimately has helped the increase of drug flow in Honduras.

Just a couple of days ago we saw the top drug fighter in Honduras be assassinated. So I think the U.S. policy is wrong and we need to quickly show the Honduran people that we support them. I want to move on from that because I am a supporter of what we are trying to do in the Caribbean, and I signed a letter with the chairman about full funding and I think it is vitally important, but I have a few other questions.

Some have said in Central America some of the reasons some of the money wasn't able or the aid wasn't able—it took so long to get out because they weren't ready or capable of receiving it. Do you believe that the Caribbean countries are ready?

Ms. REYNOSO. Thank you for the question, Congressman.

Based on the ongoing conversations and dialogues we have had with our Caribbean partners over the last several years, and the assessments that they themselves have conducted and we ourselves have also conducted in cooperation with other agencies, we do be-

lieve that our Caribbean partners are ready to work with us and cooperate with us in the rollout of this initiative.

Mr. MACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. Mr. Delahunt.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think I heard the ranking member reference the fact that there has been an increase, I think he might have used the words “dramatic increase” in Honduras since the coup. I don’t know where he secures that particular information, but from your knowledge has there been a dramatic increase since the coup that occurred I think in July to now, is there any data that indicates that there has been such an increase or a spike up that you are aware of?

Ms. REYNOSO. Congressman, thank you for the question.

I do not have an answer to your question. I am not aware of that, but I am happy to go back and research that.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I would be interested because in such a relatively short period of time, that information would be made available.

I don’t want to spend too much time on Honduras.

Mr. MACK. Would the gentleman yield on that point?

Mr. DELAHUNT. Of course.

Mr. MACK. This is information I obtained when I took my trip to Honduras and spoke to members of our military in Honduras.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Reclaiming my time, when did you take your trip?

Mr. MACK. And by the way, I never called it a coup.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I know you didn’t call it a coup. I’m calling it a coup. You took your trip in August?

Mr. MACK. I took my trip in August, and they already saw an increase.

Mr. DELAHUNT. In 6 weeks they saw an increase?

Mr. MACK. Yes. That is from our military mouth.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I find that rather stunning that our military could find in a 6-week period of time, when we were not there, that kind of a dramatic increase. But you and I should have a conversation about that, and you can educate me.

Mr. MACK. I would be happy to.

Mr. DELAHUNT. But I find that remarkable. I find that stunning that we have that kind of information available. But let me get back to the Caribbean.

I noted that the President indicated that he was open to having dialogue with Cuba on a variety of different issues, including the issue of drugs. I also note in the most recent State Department narcotics control strategy review, there is a statement that says the Government of Cuba regularly detects and monitors suspect vessels and aircraft in its territorial waters and air space. In cases likely to involve narcotic trafficking, it regularly provides detection information to the United States Coast Guard. Have we dealt with the Cuban Government in terms of the issue of drugs?

Ms. REYNOSO. Thank you for the question, Congressman.

We do cooperate with the Cubans on the issue of maritime Coast Guard in particular. To my knowledge, we have not had formal conversations on this issue with them. But we do understand that Cuba, like the rest of the Caribbean nations, is very concerned with the trafficking that is occurring throughout the Caribbean.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I guess my point is that if we are concerned about drugs coming into this country, does it make sense to include Cuba in the effort to reduce the in-flow of narcotics, illegal narcotics to this country?

Ms. REYNOSO. At this point, Congressman, specifically with respect to CBSI, the Caribbean, our Caribbean partners and we as their partner have not found it opportune to bring Cuba into the discussion.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I guess what I am saying, Madam Secretary, has the Caribbean community been surveyed? Have each of the countries, many of who, have ambassadors present in this room now, have they been inquired as to whether it makes sense in terms of the flow of illegal narcotics into the United States, to incorporate and develop a collaborative effort with the Cuban Government that according to the information that our State Department presents, has been extremely cooperative. In fact, in February, the Cubans notified the Coast Guard and it resulted in a joint multinational interception of significant drugs with a successful prosecution.

And, in fact, the individuals were sent on to Columbia and then extradited back into the United States and are being prosecuted. How can we have a Caribbean drug Security Initiative with a focus on drugs if we don't include the Cubans?

Ms. REYNOSO. Thank you, Mr. Congressman.

We, again, as you noted, we do have cooperation, ongoing cooperation with the Cubans on coastal issues. And it is to my knowledge an effective collaboration. Of course, many of our Caribbean partners have relationships, in fact, all of them have place of diplomatic relationships with Cuba, and they do have cooperation narcotics and other forms of illegal activity. So there is an ongoing battle internally in the Caribbean in terms of the cooperation with Cuba. But with respect to this particular initiative, Cuba is not a member or part of this initiative.

Mr. DELAHUNT. What I am saying, Madam Secretary, and I appreciate your answer, there is an opportunity that I think exists at this point in time to bring Cuba into this particular effort to make it, I think it was the chair of the committee who said we must take a holistic view. I think we have to take a larger geographical view in terms of maritime interdiction that puts aside the politics. Because if we are really concerned about drugs, attempting to do this without Cuban engagement makes no sense. And actually, that was an observation that was made by the former commander of SOUTHCOM, the retired General Hill, who indicated there is no reason not to bring Cuba into this equation to help our own national security interests and obviously that of the Cubans.

So I would commend and recommend that you go back, speak to the Secretary and discuss this issue because otherwise we are doing a disservice, I believe, in terms of what I know is our efforts to work with our Caribbean partners in an effort to reduce that drug trafficking that everybody is concerned about.

Ms. REYNOSO. Thank you. Thank you, Congressman.

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Delahunt.

Mr. Meeks.

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to talk about the Caribbean as the first part of my questions. As I stated in some

of my opening remarks, I know that CBSI is supposed to be broader than say the Plan Colombia or the Merida Initiative was in that some of the funds should be able to be utilized for natural disasters, mitigation and recovery, and a full range of projects yet to be determined.

If I understand it correctly, it is being drafted in broader terms. Moreover, we have individuals like the Department of Defense, the U.S. Coast Guard, the Drug Enforcement Administration, who also provide support for counternarcotics and security-related activities in a number of Caribbean countries that traditionally have not been counted as foreign aid, and so it doesn't go against money as foreign aid.

And several United States agencies have supported port security improvements in the Caribbean in recent years, and several Caribbean ports participated in the Container Security Initiative of the Department of Homeland Security and megaports initiative with the Department of Energy. As a result, it is often difficult to get an accurate sense on how much support the United States is providing a particular country in the Caribbean or to the subregion as a whole. That being said, it seems to me it is unclear whether the programs to be funded under CBSI are ones that might have been funded anyway through an existing program under USAID's Caribbean regional program or the State Department's Western Hemisphere regional program.

So I am trying to see, number one, are these things that were funded before? Is the CBSI going to be an addition thereto? Are we reducing some of the other money coming from other places, so we know what we are doing there? And also, what is also key, when you talk about all of these other agencies, and we had the problem here in America when we talked about homeland security, is the harmonization of all of these agencies within the United States Government so they can support the Caribbean? How do we know what the one hand is doing as opposed to the other so it is better coordinated so there is good outcome?

Or has there been any talk about harmonization, and dealing with trade capacity, if there is no harmonization there is a problem. We don't get the results that we are looking for or the best bang for the money. Let me just ask those questions. Can you tell me where the harmonization is? Can you tell me whether or not they take away from some of the things we are already doing, if you know?

Ms. REYNOSO. Thank you, Congressman.

The initiative aims to do something different from the prior initiatives that we have had in the region on security, and that is coordinate in an integrated way with the different security ministries and the defense sector with all of the countries of the Catacomb and the Dominican Republic. It is much more exhaustive than prior initiatives and events that we have had on the security side with our Caribbean partners. It involves many more countries and it is much more elaborate.

Also, as opposed to prior initiatives, and again, I can't go into detail as to each one of those initiatives because I don't have all of the information, but broadly speaking, as opposed to other specific initiatives, this initiative was really spearheaded by the Caribbean

itself, by our Caribbean partners. They were the ones that started the discussion internally and then came to us with a vision that we ended up sharing with them.

As to the point on the coordination with the agencies, we have been in continuous communication with the different agencies in the U.S. Government, and this is something that we take very seriously and that we think at this point we are doing effectively.

Mr. MEEKS. That is my concern. I want to make sure that it is clearly defined so we understand what the harmonization is, because oftentimes I hear about harmonization, but when we go to follow-up, what has taken place, there seems to be something missing.

So I hope at some point, especially as we get toward funding, we become clear on how we are harmonizing, and that there is the active and continued participation of the Caribbean governments that we are all sitting down at the same table, and making sure that we are moving in the same direction and not one going one way or the other.

Let me ask quickly in that same vein, because this is supposed to be broader, when I talked to the distinguished diplomats sitting in the front row, one of the questions that often comes up is the question of deportees. I am wondering within this initiative, they talk about whether or not there is some kind of reentry program or something of that nature in regards to the deportees because we just send them and let them out and it has such a negative impact on drugs and other criminal activity.

So within the CBSI, is there anything specific that we are looking at that can help with the deportees that we are sending back?

Ms. REYNOSO. Thank you, Congressman.

With respect to the issue of criminal deportees, we understand our Caribbean partners have shared concern on that issue. We believe that CBSI, because it is so integrated and comprehensive, and because the relevant agencies of the respective Caribbean nations will be involved in a continuous dialogue, will serve as a platform for the Nations to talk about and assess how best to handle and integrate these citizens of their countries.

Mr. MEEKS. But just be aware if we are trying to combat the transshipment of drugs, et cetera, we cannot, you know, just leave these countries where a lot of these individuals who get access here and learn their skills here and then go back to—are deported back to the Caribbean islands and then they start their own enterprises, we have to make sure that we are focused at the CBSI at least plays a role in trying to address that situation also.

Without that, as I said in my opening statement, because we also have to figure out the lengths to the economic development of these countries. And to consider one without the other, I think we are spinning wheels. I think that is why the CBSI money should be broadly utilized and the coordination and harmonization is extremely important, and listening to the leadership in the Caribbean is extremely important.

Ms. REYNOSO. Congressman, on the issue of the economic justice and social justice issues, which you care so much about and I do as well, of course, part of our agenda and part of the agenda of the Caribbean nations is assessing how best to deal with the root cause

of the problems, as you stated. Therefore, it is, of course, a major priority throughout our development of the initiatives as we roll these programs out to deal with the social justice issues, with the justice reform and other root cause problems that will tackle the issues before they actually become criminal issues.

Mr. MEEKS. Lastly, and I just can't refrain, my good friend, the ranking member, let me just say in listening to a lot of your questioning, we can't have a policy I think that is just built on a one-legged stool. And Venezuela, everything focused on Venezuela, we are dealing with a one-legged stool. I have yet to see a stool that stands on one leg. I think we need to broaden it. Just quickly, I went to do some minimal research in talking to some of our folks, and I know that there is questions because of that whole area of the borders and the drugs, transshipments of the drugs going from various countries to others, and I am told there are at least 242 illegal runways, we need to prevent criminal groups from using running strips and they have seized airplanes and they have seized over 1,100 kilograms of cocaine in recent operations.

I think we need to take regional approaches, as we are doing in the Caribbean. If we are really going to fight drugs, we need regional approaches. And, yes, get everybody working together and make some improvements. We digressed from 2005, but we need to pick that up and move forward with that.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. ENGEL. I am going to give the ranking member a chance to answer if he wants to.

Mr. MACK. I welcome the debate on this issue because I think it is important to the discussion. I obviously have a different opinion. I believe that Hugo Chavez is not an honest broker, not a partner and, in fact, is using this drug trade to destabilize the region for his own benefit. I think it is very dangerous and we can have differences of agreement on that. Thank you for the opportunity to respond, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. Madam Secretary, thank you so much for your testimony. I know this is your first time here since you are newly appointed but I am sure it will not be your last. I opened up by saying that I knew you had to be good because you are from the Bronx, but now I am really convinced.

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Chairman, as a New Yorker, I want to say welcome aboard. We are all very proud of you, and we know we will be working closely with you in the future. I stole my wife from the Bronx, so the Bronx can't be a bad place.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Chairman, the only problem with the Bronx is that is where the New York Yankees reside.

Mr. ENGEL. Someone once told me there is something called Red Sox Nation, but it is really confined to the nation of Massachusetts, whereas the Yankees are worldwide.

I want to tell Mr. Delahunt, when I have been to some the Caribbean nations, I have seen many, many average citizens wearing the New York Yankees hat, but I haven't seen any wearing the Boston Red Sox hat.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Chairman, I don't want to embarrass our guest from the Caribbean, but I dare say if we asked for a show

of hands, Red Sox Nation would far exceed anything that the rich, affluent Yankees of New York would be able to provide.

Mr. ENGEL. Well, I am going to end the hearing on one note and that was I just wanted Mr. Delahunt to know what a good time I had at the World Series this year. On that message, we will allow our secretary to go and call the second panel. Thank you very much.

I am now pleased to welcome our distinguished second panel: Dr. Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith, provost and senior vice president for academic affairs, York College, of the City University of New York. And I am a graduate of the City University of New York of Lehman College. He holds the rank of professor of political science and is a specialist on Caribbean and Inter-American security, drugs, crime and terrorism issues.

Dr. Anthony Maingot is a writer and scholar on Caribbean issues. He was previously a professor and dean of international affairs at Florida International University and has taught at the University of the West Indies and Yale University.

Stephen Johnson served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for Western Hemisphere Affairs from 2007 to 2009, in charge of U.S. Hemispheric Defense Policy and Security Relations. He is also previously appeared before this subcommittee. I want to welcome all three of you.

We are going to let Mr. Johnson go first because he has to leave, and we want to get the benefit of his testimony before he has to leave.

STATEMENT OF MR. STEPHEN JOHNSON (FORMER DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS)

Mr. JOHNSON. Chairman Engel, Ranking Member Mack, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you very, very much for your invitation to be here, and certainly my commendations for what they are worth for this enterprise, for directing your attention to the Caribbean and also congratulations are due for your initiative on Western Hemisphere drug policy.

I am delighted to be able to testify on this timely subject of the President's new Caribbean Basin Security Initiative. For the record, I would like to state that my views are my own and they don't reflect the U.S. Government or any entities or individuals with whom I consult.

In my experience as a foreign policy analyst and a former Department of Defense official, I have come to know the Caribbean as a complex region led by small governments that can be easily overwhelmed by big challenges. Today, those security challenges are local crime and transnational drug flows. To a lesser degree, the region is also a target of influence of other countries attempting to build alliances of their own, such as Venezuela, but those will only be successful if the United States ignores its friends in the region.

Our alliances with our Caribbean neighbors are key to the security of the southeastern maritime approach to the United States, small but significant trade relationships, the freedom of sea lanes leading to the Panama Canal and the safety of the region as a

major tourist destination. Friendly ties have evolved against a backdrop of past U.S. Intervention and questions over genuine interest. To strengthen security cooperation, we must keep promises that we have already made, build on relative strengths of each partner, and work smarter.

The Obama administration's Caribbean Basin Security Initiative is a great start. However, it should be a multi-year effort and, in my opinion, \$45 million may not be enough.

Overall, the region is complex and diverse. It covers a whole lot of water. Most governments celebrate free regular elections with the exception of Cuba and Haiti. Free economies range from the Dominican Republic with a \$44 billion gross domestic product to tiny Dominica with a \$364 million gross domestic product. The Bahamas rank as one of the top countries in the world of annual GDP per capita at \$30,700. Haiti is the poorest in the hemisphere with 80 percent of the population under the poverty line.

Capacities also vary toward cooperation on mutual interest. On one hand, the region benefits from a 15-member Caribbean community with five associates and 7 observers. The eastern Caribbean also hosts a 7 member regional security system. Yet, tiny eastern Caribbean countries have no tax base to maintain significant security operations. And Jamaica has the fourth highest per person debt burden in the world where the GDP to debt ratio stands at 128 percent. For the last 20 years, Haiti itself has been a security challenge.

The region's security environment is also troubling. Sandwiched between North and South America, and consisting mostly of open water, the Caribbean is a smugglers paradise. Haiti and the Dominican Republic have borne the brunt of most of the trafficking. The good news is only about 16 percent of the flow is moving through that region. But the bad news is that if Mexico and the Central American countries improve their interdiction capabilities under the Merida Initiative, as Secretary Reynoso stated, trafficking routes could likely shift east.

To the west, Jamaica has become the region's prime marijuana producer and exporter if we believe the State Department's annual INCSR report. Its homicide rate hovers close to 50 per 100,000 persons, rivaling Honduras, Venezuela and El Salvador. Trinidad and Tobago is not far behind. There the number of murders has risen from 118 in 2000 to 550 in 2008, or about 41 per 100,000 persons. In both cases there is a symbiotic relationship between smuggling and guns.

Since 9/11, port security has become increasingly important in the region. Caribbean ports feature cargo container storage, petroleum and liquefied natural gas facilities, and cruise ship terminals as the region is one of the top tourist destinations in the world.

Given the volume of maritime trade, infrastructure may be attractive targets for terrorist attacks. Finally, all Caribbean states except for Trinidad and Tobago are highly energy dependent, which raises costs for security operations and makes them subject to energy influence. Venezuela's President has persuaded 14 nations to join Petrocaribe, an energy aid program that offers petroleum at concessionary rates. Should United States retreat from commit-

ments or ignore friendly ties in the region, Caribbean loyalties could shift.

The administration's CBSI package represents continuity from the 1980s: The Caribbean Basin Initiative, the Clinton administration's Bridgetown Summit to the Bush administration's Third Border Initiative. In this case, continuity is a good thing. Moreover, it is a great thing. However, we should not fool ourselves that what is being contemplated under CBSI is enough. Haiti is still not a fully functioning state, and its weak law enforcement represents a security challenge. And many economies throughout the region are too small to face down international drug trafficking organizations, money laundering, human trafficking, and the potential for terrorism all by themselves.

We can work smarter building on what has worked in the past, like cooperative arrangements under the Joint Interagency Task Force South out of Key West, Florida; like Enduring Friendship, a program that SOUTHCOM has operated at about \$67 million for 3 years to provide go-fast boats to a number of Central American and Caribbean nations. It is still awaiting phase III which would address the eastern Caribbean countries.

In all of this we haven't even talk about the social programs that are needed to address such issues as gangs in Jamaica and in other countries. And we know that they have a large cost in terms of designing activities that will keep youth occupied in school and headed toward jobs. None of that is cheap. In sum, a \$45 million package may be helpful, but it will only buy three helicopters. And air and maritime equipment is only one of the components contemplated in CBSI.

Perhaps we cannot afford to do more now, but we must come up with a long term strategy to help our allies become more secure. Their safety and prosperity will only enhance our own.

I regret the fact that I won't be able to stay due to a previous commitment in the Capitol to answer any questions, but I will be happy to answer any questions submitted to me after the hearing and come back with any answers. Again, I consider this a great privilege to be able to testify before you, Mr. Chairman, and ranking member and distinguish members of the committee.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Johnson follows:]

Caribbean Basin Security Initiative:
Choosing the Right Course

Testimony of

Stephen C. Johnson

Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Western Hemisphere Affairs

Before the

House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere
Washington, D.C.

December 9, 2009

Stephen C. Johnson served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Western Hemisphere Affairs from January 10, 2007 until January 20, 2009. After leaving the Department of Defense he has done consulting work for the Project on National Security Reform, a Congressionally mandated program that has received a \$3.9 million grant for FY 2009. During fiscal 2009, Mr. Johnson received \$48,500 from that organization.

Mr. Johnson is testifying as an individual discussing his own independent views. They do not reflect any institutional position of the Project on National Security Reform, or the Department of Defense.

Chairman Engel, ranking member Mack, distinguished members of the Committee:

Thank you for inviting me to testify on this timely subject of supporting the President's new Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI). For the record, I would like to state that the views I express are entirely my own and do not represent the U.S. Government or any entities or individuals with whom I consult.

In my experience as a foreign policy analyst and as a former Defense Department official, I've come to know the Caribbean as a complex region, led by small governments easily overwhelmed by big challenges. Today, those security challenges are local crime, and transnational drug flows. To some degree, the region is also a target of influence for Venezuela's President who is attempting to build an anti-U.S. alliance built on petroleum aid. He will only be successful if we ignore the region.

Our alliances with Caribbean neighbors are key to the security of the southeastern maritime approach to the United States, small but significant trade partnerships, the freedom of sea lanes leading to the Panama Canal, and the safety of the region as a major tourist destination. Friendly ties have evolved against a backdrop of past intervention and questions over genuine interest. To strengthen security cooperation, we must keep promises we have already made, build on relative strengths of each partner, and work smarter. The Obama Administration's Caribbean Basin Security Initiative is a good start. However, it should be a multi-year effort and \$45 million may not be enough.

A Diverse Region—

The Caribbean comprises more than a million square miles of ocean and 13 island nations, 3 territories under colonial rule, all of whose inhabitants may speak any of five dominant languages. Most governments celebrate regular, free elections except Cuba and Haiti. Cuba and the Dominican Republic have the largest populations at about 11 million and 9 million respectively, while Dominica in the Eastern Caribbean has just 72,000. Free economies range from the Dominican Republic with a \$44 billion gross domestic product (GDP) to tiny Dominica with a \$364 million GDP, according to the CIA *World Factbook*. The Bahamas ranks among the top countries of the world in annual GDP per capita (\$30,700). Haiti is the most destitute in the hemisphere with 80 percent of the population under the poverty line.

Capacities vary toward cooperating on mutual interests. On one hand, the region benefits from a 15-member Caribbean Community comprised of most of the English-speaking nations (including South America's Suriname and Guyana), five associates, and seven observers. The eastern Caribbean also hosts a seven-member Regional Security System¹ organized to counter threats that might overwhelm individual states. Its strengths are joint planning, pooling personnel and equipment resources, and taking advantage of the economy of scale.

On the other, politics, economics, or special circumstances impose limits. Totalitarian Cuba does not formally work with neighboring democracies. Eastern Caribbean countries with populations equivalent to small American towns have no tax base to maintain significant security operations.

¹ Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines.

Surprisingly, Jamaica has the fourth highest per-person debt burden in the world where the GDP to debt ratio stands at 128 percent, imposing both limits and problems.² For the last 20 years, Haiti has been a security challenge in itself, lacking governing capacity and a functioning economy. Since 2004, some 8,000 UN peacekeepers have had to maintain public order following the exodus of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and the reconstitution of government. Many of its citizens continue to migrate to the Dominican Republic and elsewhere looking for work.

The Security Environment—

The present situation is troubling. Sandwiched between North and South America and consisting of mostly open water, the Caribbean is a smuggler's paradise. Haiti and the Dominican Republic are the most heavily impacted. According to the Joint Interagency Task Force-South, the majority of air tracks coming out of South America for the past three years begin in Venezuela and head straight for those two countries, some turning left to go on to Central America, others returning to South America. The "good" news is that only about 16 percent of the flow is moving through the Caribbean. About 70 percent now moves by boat up the Pacific Coast to Central America, the rest destined for Africa and Europe. But if Mexican and Central American interdiction capabilities improve under the Merida Initiative, routes will shift.

Traffickers favor Haiti because of weak law enforcement, plentiful volunteers who will set out in small boats to pick up floating packets in open waters, endemic corruption, and significant consumption habits. The Dominican Republic must deal with illegal Haitian migrants, a difficult coastline, and drug money that sustains corruption. While both governments are cooperative with U.S. counternarcotics efforts, they have limited resources. Haiti has a four-boat coast guard and limited fuel supplies. This year, the Dominican Republic purchased eight Super Tucano interdiction aircraft, but lacks sufficient night vision equipment and properly equipped long-range patrol craft.

To the west, Jamaica has become the region's prime marijuana producer and exporter, according to the U.S. State Department. Its homicide rate hovers close to 50 for every 100,000 persons, rivaling Honduras, Venezuela, and El Salvador. While its culture of violence may have roots in political conflict during the 1970s, territorial disputes over racketeering and drug sales now feed it. According to a 2008 Amnesty International report, "Gang leaders use the vacuum left by the absence of the state to control huge aspects of inner city people's lives—including the collection of 'taxes', allocation of jobs, distribution of food and the punishment of those who transgress gang rules." Trinidad and Tobago seems headed in a similar direction. There, the number of murders has risen from 118 in 2000 to 550 in 2008, or 41.1 per 100,000 persons.³ In both cases, the symbiotic relationship between smuggling and guns appears to be fueling violence.

Since 9/11, port security in neighboring countries has become a priority for the United States. Caribbean ports feature cargo container storage, petroleum and liquefied natural gas facilities, and cruise ship terminals, as the region is one of the top cruise ship destinations in the world. According to several U.S. government reports, port facilities are generally in compliance with a

² Minh H. Pham, "Why Jamaica needs a 'Kingston Club' - How to break the national debt squeeze," *The Gleaner*, April 5, 2009 at www.jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20090405/focus/focus4.html (December 7, 2009).

³ Source: "1994-2008 Crime Statistics," at www.tcrime.com/stats.php (December 8, 2009).

new international port security code that went into effect in 2004. However, there still is no way to inspect all cargo to reduce possible transshipments of weapons, drugs, and humans. And given the volume of Caribbean maritime trade, infrastructure may be attractive targets for a terrorist attack—especially the oil and gas transfer facilities in Trinidad and Tobago.

Finally, all Caribbean states except for Trinidad and Tobago are highly energy dependent, which raises costs for security operations and makes them subject to energy influence. Venezuela's president has persuaded 14 Caribbean nations to join PetroCaribe, an energy aid program that offers petroleum at concessionary rates. Venezuela reportedly supplies 190,000 barrels per day of oil to the region. Countries pay market prices for half of it within 90 days, and pay off the balance over 25 years at a low interest rate.⁴ Barbados and Trinidad, which has the majority of oil and natural gas reserves in the Caribbean, did not sign. But those that did are subject to shipment cutoffs if Venezuela's authoritarian president feels they are not loyal enough to him.

Record of Assistance—

For now, trade relations and a legacy of assistance from the United States, through disaster relief, development aid, and security assistance worth some \$3.2 billion since the 1980s, outweigh Venezuelan and other external influences.⁵ Significant measures include the Caribbean Basin Initiative in 1984 that instituted a series of trade preferences for many Caribbean and Central American countries. They also include more than \$1 billion in development assistance for Haiti following the 1994 U.S. intervention to restore the Aristide presidency. In 1997, President Bill Clinton participated in the first ever U.S. Caribbean Summit at Bridgetown, Barbados that committed to mutual efforts on fighting crime, corruption, drug trafficking, and weapons smuggling.

In 2001, the Bush Administration's Third Border Initiative tried to put some beef into the Bridgetown declaration. It called for \$20 million to fight HIV/AIDS, teacher training centers to boost skills and develop curricula to help Caribbean youths prepare for a globalized economy, increased funding for disaster preparedness, money to enhance aviation security, and better law enforcement cooperation to aid anti-money laundering operations, professional development of police and prosecutors, and anti-corruption training.

Meanwhile, from 1999 to 2006, U.S. Southern Command ran a hugely popular program that sent a 50-year-old Coast Guard buoy tender, the *Gentian*, to the Caribbean to perform maintenance and help improve the operational capabilities of local marine services. Members of various Caribbean maritime services augmented the U.S. Coast Guard crew, making it a truly cooperative venture. In 2006, Southcom inaugurated *Operation Enduring Friendship*, a three-phase \$67 million program to help Central American and Caribbean states improve their maritime drug interdiction capabilities through a package of 60 mile-per-hour go-fast boats and maintenance training. The last phase in the Eastern Caribbean was due to begin this year.

⁴ Mark P. Sullivan, "Caribbean Region: Issues in U.S. Relations," *CRS Report for Congress*, Congressional Research Service, updated October 27, 2006, p. 17.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

In 2008, the Merida Initiative was modified to include \$5 million in counternarcotics assistance for Haiti and the Dominican Republic. As the Bush Administration left office, the State Department was leading an interagency effort to develop a Caribbean Regional Security Initiative as a complement to Merida.

Choosing the Right Course

In sum, U.S. engagement with Caribbean countries seems consistent with the perceived needs at the time but has lacked a comprehensive, long-range focus. During the 1980s, the priority was boosting trade to support friendly democracies. During the 1990s, it was helping to stabilize Haiti—a failed state. By the turn of the millennium, concerns over drug trafficking and security began to take over. Although Haiti is more stable today, it may not be self-governing for many years to come and thus may continue to be a hub of illicit activity. The Dominican Republic has often been affected by trouble next door and, until recently, had not the equipment nor political will to pursue drug traffickers on its side of the border. Jamaica faces high debt and thus has limited resources to reduce criminality and violence. Trinidad and Tobago have experienced similar spikes in violence, but have a better tax base to deal with it. Other islands are less impacted, but have economies too small to meet big challenges—all complex issues.

With that in mind, it only makes sense to keep promises such as those established at the Bridgetown Summit, build on relative strengths, and work smarter toward sustainable goals. Five recommendations come to mind:

First, the United States needs a Caribbean strategy to sort out what objectives are important, identify the best ways to leverage homegrown efforts, all within the context of what strengths we bring to the table and limitations we face in funding. The Obama Administration has suggested 1) assistance for air and maritime assets and command, control, and communications architecture; 2) assistance for social justice and economic development projects, with programs targeted at youth development and training; and 3) assistance for programs to enhance the rule of law and anti-crime efforts. All of this is needed, but there should be some consideration for Haiti's long-term needs and more planning detail to guide the development of legislation so that taxpayer money won't be wasted.

Second, we should not nickel and dime. Some \$3.2 billion over 25 years is insignificant compared to what the United States spends on security assistance in other parts of the world, especially the Middle East. While I don't recommend aid as a solution, the region's micro-budgets can't afford to spend much on counternarcotics, public safety, and port security. Drug trafficking is an estimated \$300 billion to \$400 billion-a-year global enterprise and knocking it down is expensive. Helicopters can run \$15 million apiece. Well-equipped patrol aircraft are substantially more. Aircraft and boats use lots of fuel, and that is costly.

Third, keep what works. While we can't bring back the old *Gentian* buoy tender, the U.S. Navy has an idea for a Global Fleet Station that would do the same thing, but with a faster, more capable vessel. *Operation Enduring Friendship* is already in motion, so completing Phase III for the Eastern Caribbean would be its logical conclusion. And to build on such existing mechanisms as the Eastern Caribbean's Regional Security System, the United States could help establish regional centers in different locations to supply aviation and maritime maintenance,

basic training, and special operations training. For instance, Jamaica has a military aviation school that could train some of the region's pilots.

Fourth, we should streamline funding and reporting requirements. A lesson from Merida is that when funding is cobbled together from various accounts, the strings attached to them get tangled. The biggest frustration for policymakers was how long it took to get approved and then how much time passed before assistance was delivered. While some of that probably cannot be avoided in this initiative, Congress and the White House should work toward developing a seamless national security budget that allows for interagency responses to what might be considered national missions—like helping Caribbean neighbors reduce transnational crime and violence.

Finally, we cannot ignore our neighbors' plight. Just as the United States launched the Caribbean Basin Initiative to spur business growth in the 1980s, a carefully crafted Caribbean Basin Security Initiative can help relieve the onslaught of transnational crime now and protect U.S. shores as well. If Washington were to retreat from such a challenge, considering past commitments and efforts to nurture solidarity, it might create space for others to fill, and make relations with governments like Venezuela more enticing.

Conclusion

Obviously the United States does not have unlimited funds or resources. Challenges beckon at home and far away in the Middle East. But attention is needed in our neighborhood. And without the cooperation of prosperous, secure allies, our own security could be put at risk.

Again Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to testify this distinguished Subcommittee.

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you very much, Mr. Johnson. We appreciate your coming and understand that you have to leave. You have been to this committee before so we do appreciate your expertise. Thank you very much Mr. Secretary. We look forward to having you in the future.

Dr. Griffith.

STATEMENT OF IVELAW LLOYD GRIFFITH, PH.D., PROVOST & SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT FOR ACADEMIC AFFAIRS, YORK COLLEGE, THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

Mr. GRIFFITH. Thank you. I want to begin by thanking you, Mr. Chairman, along with ranking member Connie Mack, and my own congressman and to say thanks to Mark and Julie who helped to facilitate the participation on my part this afternoon.

I have a longer statement of about 20 pages, and that is a short for a political scientist, as you know, but with your permission, I would like to enter that into the record and use a few minutes to share some observations based on the topic at hand.

Mr. ENGEL. Without objection, so ordered.

Mr. GRIFFITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to add my sentiments of congratulations to the committee for holding a hearing on the region, a region that often gets under the radar screen attention because it is a relatively peaceful region compared to other parts of the world. I view this hearing as much as anything else a reality check, a reality check on Caribbean security, a reality security on United States engagement with the Caribbean.

And as I think of reality checks, I am reminded of a statement made in 1936 by a British statesman, Anthony Eden, and he was

cautioning European colleagues about realities and what he said was this: There is nothing more dangerous than a foreign policy based on unreality.

What he was advocating, Mr. Chairman, is the importance of conducting situational analysis, situational assessments when one wants to pursue new policy or to redesign, revamp policy. I think it is arguable what Mr. Eden said foreign policy extends beyond foreign policy. One can make that same argument about defense policy and health policy, and certainly about security policy. I am delighted to be able to add my voice in this reality check that this committee is doing.

I thought maybe one contribution that I can make in helping the committee to undertake its reality check is to respond to three questions. The questions I have responded to extensively in the statement, but I will just tell you what the questions are and I will make a few observations on some of those questions.

I think it is important that in any reality check we be reminded about why the United States should care about what happens in the Caribbean. We shouldn't take for granted that we all appreciate and know what are the things, what are the interests, the intersection of interest between the United States and in the Caribbean.

So that is the first question in my written statement that I spend some time addressing, national interest.

I think it is important as well that in the reality check on the landscape we ask the question: What are the clear and present dangers facing the Caribbean in contemporary times? But going beyond that second question, vis-à-vis the proposal by President Obama on the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, I think it is important to ask the third question which is: What is the engagement backdrop against which this initiative comes? And what are some lessons learned from some recent engagements so as we go into this engagement we avoid those pitfalls. We don't want to make the same mistakes again.

So if you allow me, Mr. Chairman, I will make a few quick observations about what is the security landscape of the Caribbean, and what are some recommendations I might recommend and offer to you that as you contemplate implementing the initiative of this iteration, we keep in mind some lessons learned from particularly the third border initiative.

I think it is fair to say if you take a look at the landscape of the Caribbean, you will find two sets of security concerns. You will find in one basket some traditional security concerns, and the traditional security concerns revolve primarily around border and territorial disputes. We still have within the Caribbean Basin about 30 border and territorial disputes. The ones that are on the radar screen generally are the significant ones, so to speak, are the disputes between Venezuela and Guyana. Venezuela still has a claim for five-eighths of Guyana's 213,000 square kilometers.

There is a dispute still between Suriname and Guyana for 15,000 square kilometers on the eastern side of Guyana. And you probably know most well of the recent developments in the Guatemala-Belize dispute. I make these observations to say as we focus on the landscape, while we are going to be talking significantly and have

been talking more about the nontraditional threats, those traditional issues are still there.

Guyana and Suriname resolved before the International Tribunal of the World Court recently the maritime dispute, but there is still a land dispute there.

But if you were to make a comparative assessment of the relatively more significant present dangers of the traditional vis-à-vis the nontraditional, I think both analysts and statesmen in the Caribbean and the United States would contend, and I think correctly so, that it is the nontraditional issues that are the clear and present dangers, and I spend some time talking about them.

There is a dangerous Troika in that nontraditional basket, a Troika that includes drugs, a troika that includes crime, a Troika that includes arms smuggling and there is a certain synergy among and between them. They are not discrete silo elements in the nontraditional basket. Reality is that part of the difficulty of contending with each of those troikas has to do with the fact that each of those troikas is a multidimensional troika.

We often think of the drugs issue as a trafficking issue primarily, but it is not. There are still significant people within the Caribbean society who are addicted for a variety of reasons. Money laundering is still an issue for the Caribbean. And, therefore, I am reminding us as we think of any of the three most significant clear and present dangers, keep in mind that each of them is multidimensional. The reality is multidimensionality is there.

Much has been said about the connectivity among and between drugs and arms and crime. I spend some time in my written testimony explaining some of the contemporary realities, and we can come back and ask questions about that. But I want to shift in the time I have remaining, Mr. Chairman, to say a little bit about the security engagement backdrop against which this new initiative falls. In the paper testimony I offer three, but I want to confine my remarks to two recommendations of things you might take under advisement as we move into the realm of policy implementation.

There is a wide range of existing, as you know, bilateral and multilateral initiatives. I think we have seen the success of Operation Bahamas and Turks and Caicos which has been around since 1982. We have seen the relative success of Trade Winds, an annual exercise that goes beyond simply narcotics issues to a variety of other issues. And I think we also see the value of the Merida Initiative, and I was interested to hear that as the standing up of the CBSI comes into force, the Dominican Republic and Haiti will be moved away from the Merida Initiative into that. That is an interesting concept that I think we may want to talk about.

So we have an existing landscape and a variety of engagement initiatives, many of which are wonderful ways of combating the interdependent issues facing the region.

But as we move into this latest iteration with this new initiative, I think it behooves us to ask what are maybe one or two pitfalls of the third border initiative that this committee and the administration would be mindful to keep in mind as we move from design to implementation. This is what I want to offer as my two recommendations on the new initiative.


My first recommendation is to avoid what I call a low investment, low results approach. The third border initiative had, I think, two ingredients for a recipe of limited success. One, it was a minuscule funding package. Two, it had some broad and extensive expectations and mandates. I think it has got to be a coincidence between what was intended as an outcome and what is invested on the front end. And I would hope not only would this committee be willing, as I have heard the chairman and others say they were willing to do, ask for a full restoration of the full funding of \$45 million. But I think even at \$45 million, we are being looking at low investments. Low investments that can only maybe sometimes allow us to practice the science of muddling through without seeing significant outcomes discerned over time.

So my first recommendation is to avoid low investment approaches, whether by design or default. Go for the kinds of investments that can demonstrate outcomes of an appreciable kind.

My second recommendation is try to avoid, to use an adage from parts of the Caribbean, robbing Peter to pay Paul. Taking money from Trade Winds to be able to fund the current investments in the Caribbean Basin Initiative. I am thinking not only would it be valuable to embrace the new initiative in its entirety, but be mindful of the fact that there are lessons from the third border initiative that should inform how we go about pursuing this initiative.

Low investment is not the way I would recommend, and diminishing the current operations in OP VAT and Trade Winds would also not renoun to the advantage of the Caribbean or the United States.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Griffith follows:]



Congressional Testimony
of
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Professor of Political Science
Provost & Senior Vice President for Academic Affairs
York College of The City University of New York
before the
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere
of the
Committee on Foreign Affairs
U.S. House of Representatives
December 9, 2009.

“New Directions or Old Path? Caribbean Basin Security Initiative”

Introduction

Allow me, first, to thank Chairman Rep. Eliot L. Engel, ranking member Rep. Connie Mack, and Subcommittee members for the invitation to offer testimony today on the subject “New Directions or Old Path? New Caribbean Basin Security Initiative.” The Subcommittee is to be commended for holding this hearing on a region that often is under the radar screen because it is a comparatively low-investment zone of relative tranquility compared to other parts of the Western Hemisphere, not to speak of the rest of the world.

In many respects, this Hearing is a reality check on Caribbean security and United States security engagement with the region generally and the engagement by President Barack Obama’s administration that is predicated on his Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI). In thinking of reality checks I am reminded of a prophetic remark made during the 1930s by British Statesman Anthony Eden: “There’s nothing more dangerous than a foreign policy based on unreality.” Eden was positing the importance of conducting situational assessments before designing or redesigning foreign policy. Needless-to-say, the value of this advice extends beyond the foreign policy arena, to health, or education, or security policy. Moreover, the value goes beyond policy design to program delivery that flows from it.

My contribution to this Subcommittee’s reality check will take the form of a brief analysis wrapped around three questions, two of which address some of the core “What” and “How” concerns of the Subcommittee, and one of which allows the Subcommittee to be reminded of some critical “Why” matters. Indeed, we should entertain the reminders before proceeding to “What” and “How” considerations.

Thus, the three questions are:

1. Why should the United States worry about what happens in the Caribbean?
2. What are the clear and present dangers on the Caribbean security landscape, which threaten the security not only of the Caribbean but also the United States?
3. What is the engagement backdrop against which CBSI arrives and what are some factors that increase its prospects for enhancing regional security?

Question 1: The Matter of National Interests

There is an enduring feature to the wisdom of a foreign policy dictum adumbrated by Founding Father George Washington in 1778: “It is a maxim, founded on the universal experience of mankind, that no nation is to be trusted further than it is bound by its interests, and no prudent statesmen or politician will venture to depart from it.” He was referring to the centrality of national interest as the over-arching variable in the conduct of foreign policy by the United States. National interest still is the defining desideratum in the nation’s foreign and defense policy. So, with the Caribbean as it is with other areas of the world.

In relation to the Caribbean, the contemporary national interests of the United States revolve around one D and three Gs: Democracy, Geopolitics, Geonarcotics, and Geoeconomics. Several reasons oblige me to confine my remarks to the first three aspects. For a discussion of Geoeconomics, see Andrés Serbin, “The Geopolitical Context of the Caribbean Basin in the 1990s: Geoeconomic Reconfigurations and Political Transitions,” in Joseph Tulchin and Andrés Serbin, eds., *Cuba and the Caribbean*, Scholarly Resources, 1997; Ivelaw L. Griffith, “US Strategic Interests in Caribbean Security,” *Joint Force Quarterly*, Autumn 2000, 64-69; and Norman Girvan, “Agenda Setting and Regionalism in the Greater Caribbean: Responses to 9/11,” in Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith, ed., *Caribbean Security in the Age of Terror* (Ian Randle Publishers, 2004).

In his seminal book *The Paradox of American Power*, Dean Emeritus of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government and former Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph S. Nye, Jr. reminds us that “the promotion of democracy is also a national interest and a source of soft power” and that “the United States has both an ideological and a pragmatic interest in the promotion of democracy.” At the policy leadership level President Barack Obama defends and promotes democracy as a national interest. Quite importantly, he articulates democratic pursuits that go beyond electoral democracy, noting, for instance, in April 2009 in Strasbourg, France that “...obviously we should be promoting democracy everywhere we can. But democracy, a well-functioning society that promotes liberty and equality and fraternity, a well-functioning society does not just depend on going to the ballot box. It also means that you’re not going to be shaken down

by police because the police aren't getting properly paid. It also means that if you want to start a business, you don't have to pay a bribe.”

With some notable exceptions, such as Cuba and Haiti, the contemporary history of the Caribbean reveals the region to be a bastion of democracy both in terms of elections and in terms of press freedom, human rights protections, and other key democracy variables. Especially in the English-speaking Caribbean the endurance of democracy is partly due to the possession of strong “democratic assets,” compared to societies in other parts of the world with similar socio-economic profiles: their civil societies are relatively strong, traditions of free press are firmly established, labor unions, professional associations, and civic societies exist, and political parties are functional, although there are many funding and operational challenges. Political structures—essentially following the Parliamentary model of government—make law, execute policy, and render judicial decisions. Yet, United States democracy interests in the region relate not merely to the region's generally strong democracy profile, but also to the democracy dysfunctions to be found in the region, whether structural because of the design and operation of a political system, such as in Cuba, or functional because of corruption or administrative inefficiency, such as in Haiti and Guyana . The concern extends, as well, to the actual and potential deleterious impact on democratic governance of such things as corruption, poverty, drugs, and crime.

In relation to geopolitics, the strategic importance of the Caribbean is found in its resources, sea lanes, and security networks. The Caribbean Basin is the source of fuel and nonfuel minerals used in both the defense and civilian sectors. Of particular significance are petroleum and natural gas produced in Barbados, Colombia, Guatemala, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela. Moreover, although several territories in the area do not have energy resources, they offer invaluable refining and transshipment functions (Aruba, Bahamas, Curaçao, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Puerto Rico, St. Lucia, and U.S. Virgin Islands). Other mineral resources from the Caribbean include bauxite, gold, nickel, copper, cobalt, emeralds, and diamonds.

The Caribbean Basin has two of the world's major choke points, the Panama Canal and the Caribbean Sea. The former links the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and saves 8,000 miles and up to 30 days of steaming time. The canal has military and civilian value.

And while it is less important to the United States than it was three decades ago, other countries remain very dependent on it, and many, like Chile, Ecuador, and Japan, are strategically important to Washington. Once ships enter the Atlantic from the canal they must transit Caribbean passages en route to ports of call in the United States, Europe, and Africa. The Florida Strait, Mona Passage, Windward Passage, and Yucatan Channel are the principal lanes.

During much of the twentieth century, until the late 1990s, the United States maintained a considerable military presence throughout the Caribbean, mainly in Puerto Rico at the Atlantic threshold, in Panama at the southern rim, and in Cuba at Guantánamo on the northern perimeter. In 1990, for instance, there were 4,743 military and civilian personnel in Puerto Rico, 20,709 in Panama, and 3,401 in Cuba. Much has changed since 1990, requiring strategic redesign and force redeployment. Today Puerto Rico is home to fewer forces and U.S. Southern Command relocated from Panama to Miami in September 1997, leaving behind only small components. Between the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the September 11, 2001 (9-11) terrorist attack Guantánamo was considered as having little strategic value, serving essentially as a political outpost in the Hemisphere's last remaining communist bastion. But the importance of Guantánamo was dramatically altered with 9-11 and the housing of detainees accused of terrorism there, making it easy to forget that Guantánamo is essentially a military facility. The base has been operated by the United States since 1903, without an ending date for the American military presence there, at least as long as Washington continues to pay the lease.

As well, other Caribbean territories are also essential to the United States in terms of basing operations. These include the Bahamas, with the Atlantic Underwater Testing and Evaluation Center (AUTEK) in Andros Island. AUTEK is used to test new types of weaponry and is reputedly the Navy's premier east coast in-water test facility. It is affiliated with the NATO FORACS (Naval Forces Sensor and Weapon Accuracy Check Site) program and the eight participating NATO member nations: Canada, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Albeit small, there is an air operation at Coolidge in Antigua and Barbuda that dates to World War II, and Aruba and Curacao are among the Forward Operating Locations maintained

as part of the counter-narcotics effort. In the Greater Caribbean there also are base operations in Honduras, El Salvador,

In so far as Geonarcotics is concerned, the Caribbean lies at “the Vortex of the Americas;” it is a bridge or front between North and South America. This strategic importance was dramatized in geopolitical terms during the Cold War. However, the region’s strategic value lies not only in its geopolitical significance as viewed by state actors engaged in conflict and cooperation. Over recent decades the region also has been viewed as strategic by non-state drug actors, also with conflict and cooperation in mind, not in terms of geopolitics, but of geonarcotics.

I originated the concept Geonarcotics in the early 1990s. (See "From Cold War Geopolitics to Post-Cold War Geonarcotics," *International Journal* [Canada] Vol. 49, Winter 1993-94, 1-36, and the empirical study that applied the concept, *Drugs and Security in the Caribbean: Sovereignty Under Siege*, Penn State University Press, 1997). The concept suggests the dynamics of three factors besides drugs: geography, power, and politics. It posits, first, that the narcotics phenomenon is multidimensional, with four main problem areas (drug production, consumption-abuse, trafficking, and money-laundering); second, that these problem areas give rise to actual and potential threats to the security of states around the world; and third, that the drug operations and the activities they spawn precipitate both conflict and cooperation among various state and non-state actors in the international system.

Geography is a factor because of the global dispersion of drug operations, and because certain physical, social, and political geography features of many countries facilitate drug operations. Power involves the ability of individuals and groups to secure compliant action. In the drug world, this power is both state and non-state in origin, and in some cases non-state sources command relatively more power than states. Politics revolves around resource allocation in terms of the ability of power brokers to determine who gets what, how, and when. Since power in this milieu is not only state power, resource allocation is correspondingly not exclusively a function of state power-holders. Moreover, politics becomes perverted, and more perverted where it already was so.

The Geonarcotics milieu involves several state and non-state actors, which differ in how they affect and are affected by the various problems, and in their responses. Drug

operations generate two basic kinds of interactions: cooperation and conflict. These are bilateral and multilateral, and do not all involve force. Some involve non-military pressures, such as economic and political pressures by the United States against countries that it considers not proactive enough in fighting drugs. Some actors engage simultaneously in both cooperation and conflict. The relationships between the United States and Colombia and United States and Mexico over the last few decades, and between the United States and Jamaica and Barbados during the late 1990s, reveal this.

The Geonarcotics approach does not view the "war on drugs" purely as a military matter. Hence, the application of military measures alone is considered impractical. Moreover, international countermeasures are necessary, especially since all states—even rich and powerful ones—face resource constraints. However, collaboration among states may result in conflict over sovereignty and varying perceptions of the nature and severity of threats and, therefore, conflicts over appropriate responses. The Geonarcotics relationship between the Caribbean and the rest of the world, especially North America, perhaps, is best known in relation to drug trafficking. However, the relationship entails more than the movement of drugs from and through the region; involved also are: drug production, drug consumption and abuse, money laundering, organized crime, corruption, arms trafficking, and sovereignty conflicts, among other things.

It is useful to bear these core United States interests in mind as we discuss the nature of the Caribbean security challenges in the following section, as this will allow an appreciation of the necessity for engagement, which is the subject of the final section.

Question 2: The Regional Security Landscape

The region's security landscape is one with traditional and nontraditional security aspects. In the traditional area, border and territorial disputes constitute the main concern. There are nearly three dozen of these disputes within the Caribbean Basin. Both land and maritime controversies are involved. Although the term "border disputes" generally is used to refer to the controversies over land and sea, the disputes in which Caribbean states are involved are not all border disputes, which are controversies between and among states over the alignment of land or maritime boundaries. Some controversies, such as those between Venezuela and Guyana, and between Suriname and Guyana, are

really territorial disputes: controversies arising from claims to land or maritime territory. The most serious disputes in the region involve Venezuela and Guyana, Suriname and Guyana, and Belize and Guatemala. Some countries are involved in several disputes. For example, Guyana is facing a claim by Venezuela for the western five-eighths of its 214,970 km² territory, and one by Suriname for 15,000 km² to the east.

For the last several years in the Caribbean—and for good reason—statesmen and scholars have placed a higher premium on nontraditional security issues than on traditional ones because the latter present more clear and present dangers. The key headaches relate to drugs, crime and violence, and the illicit smuggling of weapons.

What generally is called “the drug problem” really is a multidimensional phenomenon. But the phenomenon does not constitute a security matter simply because of its multidimensionality. It presents threats to security essentially for four reasons. First, the operations have multiple consequences and implications—such as marked increases in crime, systemic or institutionalized corruption, and arms trafficking, among other things. Second, the operations and their consequences have increased in scope and gravity over the last few decades. Third, they affect agents and agencies of national security and good governance, in military, political, and economic ways. Fourth, the sovereignty of some countries is subject to infringement by the drug barons.

Most Caribbean leaders once refused to acknowledge that their countries were facing a drug threat; they preferred to consider it either a South American or North American problem. But over the years the scope and severity of the threat increased and became patently obvious to observers within and outside the region they no longer were able to deny the existence of problems. Helping to make the matter a front-burner policy issue was the sobering assertion made by the West Indian Commission in 1992: “Nothing poses greater threats to civil society in Caricom countries than the drug problem; and nothing exemplifies the powerlessness of regional Governments more.” Thus, it was logical that at the December 1996 special Caricom drug summit, leaders would admit: “Narco-trafficking and its associated evils of money laundering, gun smuggling, corruption of public officials, criminality and drug abuse constitute the major security threat to the Caribbean today.” This sentiment again was espoused by regional leaders at the Caricom crime and security summit held in Trinidad and Tobago in April 2008.

Because of the overt and publicly discernable nature of drug smuggling, that aspect of the phenomenon gets more public press and government attention—in the United States, the Caribbean, and in Europe—than the other aspects. The most systematic and consistent reporting on drug operations is provided by the *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report* (INCSR), which is produced annually by the U.S. Department of State for reporting to Congress in accordance with the Foreign Assistance Act. There is no need here to cover the assessment provided there, but it is useful to offer a few vignettes from the INCSR for 2009.

In relation to the Bahamas

- In 2008, the Bahamas Defense Force Drug Enforcement Unit (DEU) cooperated closely with U.S. and foreign law enforcement agencies on drug investigations. Including OPBAT seizures, Bahamian authorities seized 1,878 kilograms of cocaine and some 2 metric tons of marijuana. The DEU arrested 1,030 persons on drug-related offenses and seized \$3.9 million in cash.
- The US welcomes the Bahamian government's strong commitment to joint counternarcotics efforts and to extradite drug traffickers to the U.S. Unfortunately, momentum in 2008 was hampered by an understaffed and underfunded Drug Secretariat and devastation by Hurricane Ike, especially in Great Inagua. Restarting and fully funding the National Drug Secretariat will greatly assist efforts to implement its 2004 National Anti-Drug Plan. The Bahamas can further enhance its drug control efforts by integrating Creole speakers into the DEU and by working with Haitian National Police officers to be stationed in Great Inagua to develop information on Haitian drug traffickers transiting the Bahamas.

As regards Belize

- Seizures through December 2008 include: 16.2kilograms of cocaine; 0.7 kg of crack cocaine; 275.5 kg of marijuana; 50,050 marijuana plants; 100,892 marijuana seeds; and minor quantities of other drugs. Narco-funds totaling \$112,510 were seized and law enforcement made 1,539 arrests in drug cases. It is difficult to obtain convictions on drug crimes because the Public Prosecutions office lacks staff, funds, and training.
- Belize needs to pass and implement pending legislation requesting wider authority regarding intelligence collection and electronic intercepts and a Chemical Precursors

Control Act with punitive sanctions. The government needs to adequately fund and train prosecutors in the Public Prosecutors office as well as police prosecutors in narcotics prosecutions. The US will assist Belize to improve its maritime interdiction capabilities through training, the construction of a Coast Guard forward operating base in the offshore islands, construction of a new Coast Guard headquarters building, and donation of equipment and boats through Enduring Friendship.

In relation to Cuba

- In all, between January and September 2008, Cuba seized 1.7 metric tons of narcotics (1,675.7 kilograms of marijuana and 46.8 kilograms of cocaine), and trace amounts of crack, hashish, and other forms of psychotropic substances. In comparison, in 2007, 2.6 metric tons were seized as a result of its various interdiction efforts. In April, Cuban authorities assisted Jamaican anti-drug personnel with the disruption of a marijuana trafficking network by providing real-time information, resulting in the detention of the traffickers, and the confiscation of a trafficking aircraft that contained a load of marijuana.
- From January through September 2008, 250 packets of narcotics washed-up along the Cuban coast, resulting in the collection of 1,682 kilograms (1,651 kilograms of marijuana and 31 kilograms of cocaine). Cuba's "Operation Hatchet," in its eighth year, is intended to disrupt maritime and air trafficking routes, recover washed-up narcotics, and deny drug smugglers shelter within the territory and waters of Cuba through vessel, aircraft, and radar surveillance by the Ministry of Interior's Border Guard and Ministry of Revolutionary Armed Forces. Operation Hatchet relies on shore-based patrols, visual and radar observation posts and the civilian fishing auxiliary force to report suspected contacts and contraband. Between January and September 2008, Cuban law enforcement authorities reported "real time" sighting of 35 go-fast vessels and 3 suspect aircraft transiting their airspace or territorial waters.

As to the Dominican Republic

- In 2008, Dominican law enforcement authorities seized approximately 2,415 kilograms (kg) of cocaine hydrochloride (HCl), 96 kg of heroin, 15,949 units of Ecstasy, and 219 kg of marijuana. The National Directorate of Drug Control (DNCD)

made 14,674 drug-related arrests in 2008, a 15 percent increase over 2007. Through joint operations targeting drug trafficking organizations transporting narcotic proceeds through the various ports of entry in the DR, the DNCD and Dominican Customs (DGA) seized over \$2 million in U.S. currency. When feasible, Customs and Border Control (CBP) Blackhawk helicopters based in Puerto Rico were dispatched to the Dominican Republic to pick-up a Dominican Tactical Response Team and then transported to interdict in-bound drug carrying aircraft as the drops were being made. As a result of these joint operations the DNCD seized over 1,463 kg of cocaine and several aircraft. This dependence on CBP assets from Puerto Rico is driven by the outdated Dominican helicopters and equipment which prevents robust interdiction efforts over open water. On November 13, 2008, DNCD seized over 1,400 kg of liquid cocaine that was contained inside shampoo bottles at the Port of Haina, Santo Domingo.

- The US will provide significant support in the coming year under the Merida Initiative—a partnership between the governments of the United States, Mexico, Central America, Haiti and the Dominican Republic to confront the violent national and transnational gangs and organized criminal and narcotics trafficking organizations that plague the entire region. The Merida Initiative will fund a variety of programs that will strengthen the institutional capabilities of participating governments by supporting efforts to investigate, sanction and prevent corruption within law enforcement agencies; facilitate the transfer of critical law enforcement investigative information within and between regional governments; and funding equipment purchases and training, among other things.

For Guyana

- In 2008, Guyanese law enforcement agencies seized 48 kilograms (kg) of cocaine, compared to 167 kg in 2007. This decrease was largely due to the lack of any seizures of more than a few kilograms, as well as to the effects of the recent personnel shifts within CANU. However, eradication of domestically grown marijuana increased sharply, with 34,000 kg identified and destroyed, compared to 15,280 kg in 2007. Criminal charges were filed against 473 individuals for activities related to the illicit trafficking or distribution. Guyana's counternarcotics activities have long been

encumbered by a British colonial-era legal system that does not reflect the needs of modern-day law enforcement. But in December, the government took a significant step forward by passing laws that permit plea bargaining, wiretapping, and the recording and storage of cell phone ownership data. In addition, at the end of 2008 the government was in the process of procuring new surveillance cameras for the country's international airport, after signing an inter-agency agreement that facilitates the sharing of airport surveillance footage among all relevant law enforcement bodies.

- News media routinely report on instances of corruption reaching to high levels of government that are not investigated and thus go unpunished. US government analysts believe drug trafficking organizations in Guyana continue to elude law enforcement agencies through bribes and coercion. Guyana is party to the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, but has yet to fully implement its provisions, such as seizure of property obtained through corruption. Guyana's uncontrolled borders and coastline allow unfettered drug transit. Light aircraft land at numerous isolated airstrips or make airdrops where operatives on the ground retrieve the drugs. Smugglers use small boats and freighters to enter Guyana's many remote but navigable rivers. Smugglers also take direct routes, such as driving or boating across the borders with Brazil, Suriname, and Venezuela. The Guyana Defense Force Coast Guard has no seaworthy vessels, as its lone patrol boat is currently in dry dock awaiting repairs. Law enforcement agencies are hamstrung by insufficient personnel budgets, and there are no routine patrols of the numerous land entry points on the 1,800 miles of border with Venezuela, Brazil, and Suriname.

In relation to Haiti

- Although President Rene Préval continued to urge strong action against drug trafficking and did not back away from his support for bilateral operations to arrest DEA-wanted fugitives for removal to the United States, the Government of Haiti overall made only modest advances in the fight against drug trafficking in 2008. But the HNP Financial Crimes Unit, BAFE, made great strides. In September 2008, the BAFE obtained forfeiture orders and seized two houses, one of which belonged to Jean Nesly Lucien, a former Director General of the HNP, and the other owned by Jean-Mary Celestin—both convicted in the U.S. on drug related charges. By year's

end, \$21 million in property and assets had been seized by the GOH. The BAFE is aggressively implementing a plan to use convictions in U.S. courts as the legal basis for asset forfeiture in Haiti. This would help overcome a significant deficiency of Haiti's current asset forfeiture regime which requires conviction of the trafficker in Haiti prior to forfeiture of assets.

- Haiti must continue the reform and expansion of the HNP and step up the reform of its judicial system as prerequisites for effective counternarcotics operations throughout the country. As well, the restoration of the rule of law, including reform of the judicial system, must receive greater support and be prioritized to prevent erosion of the gains of the HNP and to provide the security and stability Haiti needs to meet the economic, social and political development needs of the Haitian people. The US will provide significant support in the coming year under the Merida Initiative, which will fund a variety of programs that will strengthen the institutional capabilities of participating governments.

As regards Jamaica

- In 2008 Jamaica failed to pass and effectively implement key anti-crime, anti-corruption, anti-money laundering legislation. This included not establishing a new anti-corruption special prosecutor, not modifying the bail act, and not vigorously implementing the more expeditious seizure and forfeiture process that was enacted in 2007. Jamaica also did not enact the initiative to permit extended data-sharing between U.S. and Jamaican law enforcement on money laundering cases through the Financial Investigative Division (FID) Act. Additionally, Jamaica's national forensics laboratory has a backlog of cases due to understaffing and lack of resources. Jamaica is not in full compliance with the Egmont Group requirements. In 2008, the Ministry of National Security expanded its policy directorate in an effort to increase efficiency. In 2008, the government also expanded the vetting of senior police officers. This effort, along with other reforms mandated by the Police Strategic Review, should begin to turn around a police force that is plagued by corruption and inefficiencies. The US Container Security and MegaPorts (CSI) initiative began in late 2006. In 2008, construction began on a permanent facility for U.S. officers and their Jamaican

counterparts. Pervasive corruption at Kingston's container and bulk terminals continue to undermine the CSI team's activities.

- Despite death threats against several government ministers, in 2008, Jamaica extradited drug trafficker Norris Nembhard and five indicted co-conspirators to the U.S. for prosecution. The very successful Operation Kingfish, a multinational task force (Jamaica, the U.S., United Kingdom and Canada) to target high profile organized crime gangs, celebrated its fourth anniversary in 2008. The new Police Commissioner combined his National Intelligence Bureau with Kingfish and Special Branch in an effort to gain efficiency, and in 2009, Kingfish should return to its core mandate and prioritize the targeting of high-level criminals who command and control gangs in Jamaica.
- In 2008, Jamaica appointed a known reformer as the new Commissioner of Customs. Since his arrival a "no tolerance" policy against corruption has resulted in the removal or reassignment of a significant number of staff members and an increase in Custom's revenue by 25 percent. The new Commissioner intends to reinvigorate the Jamaican Custom's Contraband Enforcement Team (CET) which suffered for years under the previous Customs' leadership. Given that container traffic through the seaports is believed the primary method of transshipment of cocaine and cannabis it is critical to have a strong CET. In 2008, CET seized 168 kilograms (kg) of cocaine and 5,642 kg of cannabis at Jamaican air and seaports.

In June 2000, at a high-level policy meeting on criminal justice in Trinidad and Tobago, the country's Attorney General made the following declaration on behalf of the Caribbean: "There is a direct nexus between illegal drugs and crimes of violence, sex crimes, domestic violence, maltreatment of children by parents and other evils. ... Our citizens suffer from drug addiction, drug-related violence, and drug-related corruption of law enforcement and public officials. The drug lords have become a law unto themselves. ... Aside from the very visible decimation of our societies caused by drug addiction and drug-related violence, there is another insidious evil: money laundering. ... It changes democratic institutions, erodes the rule of law, and destroys civic order with impunity."

The statement by Attorney General Maharaj is still accurate almost a decade later. It points clearly to the nexus between drugs and crime. Indeed, crime is a component of the drug phenomenon. Crime could be viewed in several ways typologically. There are two basic categories of drug crimes: "enforcement" crimes, and "business" crimes. The former involves crimes among traffickers and between traffickers and civilians and police, triggered by traffickers' efforts to avoid arrest and prosecution. The latter category encompasses crimes committed as part of business disputes, and acquisitive crimes, such as robbery and extortion. Some analysts posit three types of crime: "consensual" ones, such as drug possession or trafficking; "expressive" ones, such as violence or assault; and "instrumental" or property crimes, examples being theft, burglary, and robbery.

Irrespective of the crime typology used, there is a wide range of drug-related criminal activity in the region. There is a local-global nexus in the region's drug-related crime, reflected in the fact that the crime is not all ad hoc, local crime; some of it is transnational and organized, extending beyond the region, to North America, Europe, and elsewhere. Violent crime dramatizes the quotidian experiences of individual and corporate citizens in the Caribbean, reaching almost pandemic proportions in parts of the region.

Indeed, the 2007 World Bank-United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime study reported that murder rates in the Caribbean—at 30 per 100,000 population annually—are higher than for any other region of the world and have risen in recent years for many Caribbean countries. That study provided credible evidence of the wide-ranging economic, social, institutional, and other negative impact crime is having on the societies and nations in the region. In fact, in addressing the 47th Annual general Meeting of the Jamaica Hotel and Tourist Association in June 2008, Jamaica's Tourism Minister Edmund Bartlett declared dramatically: "Crime, in my mind, is the single most debilitating factors, the one area that is worrying to me beyond anything else, and I must tell you that the fuel crisis is not as worrying to as crime. The turmoil in the aviation industry is not as worrying to me as crime."

Several things are noteworthy. First, murder, fraud, theft, and assault are precisely the crimes likely to be associated with drugs. Second, in a few countries, notably Jamaica, Puerto Rico, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Trinidad and Tobago,

there is clear evidence of a linkage. Finally, the countries with the high and progressive crime reports in the theft, homicide, and serious assault categories are the same ones that have featured prominently over the last two decades as centers of drug activity. These countries include the Bahamas, the Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Haiti, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Guyana. But there have been virtual crime sprees in some places, markedly in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago, with dramatic episodes of criminal temerity. These include attacks on police stations, kidnappings, and murder of law enforcement officials.

In relation to Guyana, one analyst in *Guyana Review* once noted the following: “Even to those untrained in the detection of patterns of criminal behavior, it now appears obvious that Guyana has transcended the bounds of ordinary banditry and is engulfed in a crime wave that suggests methodological planning, sinister motives, and the lethal means to stun the nation into a state of fear-induced vulnerability.” The sentencing in Brooklyn of Roger Khan in October 2009 to 40 years in prison for drug smuggling, illegal arms possession, and witness tampering and the conviction and sentencing in December 2009 of his attorney Robert Simels to 14 years for attempting to kill witnesses, the implication of police and army officers in a range of illegal activities, and torture by police are among troubling recent evidence of increased public insecurity, political mismanagement, and malfeasance by public security agents, which move Guyana dangerously close to the edge of the failed state precipice.

But it should be noted that the crime and violence—in Guyana and elsewhere—are not all drugs-driven; some derive from poverty, political discontent, and general social anomie. Further, the inability of governments to solve crimes and secure prosecutions, to provide functional equipment and training to law enforcement agencies, and to fill vacancies in all areas of the criminal justice system, among other things, both undermine the confidence of citizens in the state and emboldens the criminals. Some of the criminality is perpetrated by organized criminal gangs, of varying degrees of organization and strength, although not as structured and lethal as criminal gangs in Central America. Added to this is the availability of weapons, some due to illicit trafficking and some due to corrupt practices in police and defense forces and theft from public and private security establishments. One recent example of the latter was in

Trinidad and Tobago occurred on October 25, 2009 when armed gunmen robbed a private security company in Woodbrook of 15 fully-loaded weapons: 13 nine millimeter pistols, one .357 handgun, and one shotgun.

The place where the confluence of factors is most dramatized is Jamaica, which now has the dubious distinction of having the world's highest per capita murder rate.

Jamaica Constabulary Force data for the last 10 years show the severity of the matter:

2000	887
2001	1139
2002	1045
2003	975
2004	1471
2005	1674
2006	1340
2007	1583
2008	1618
2009	1549 (up to December 6, 2009)

Thus, Jamaica has had over 13,000 murders so far in a decade and, according to Jamaican Constabulary Force sources, 83 percent of the murders have been gun-related. Clearly, drugs and crime—as well as arms trafficking—are among the clear and present dangers facing the Caribbean. Understandably, too, these problems are not simply problems for the Caribbean. The problems of drugs, crime, and arms trafficking are transnational challenges; they are what former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan called “problems without passports.” Moreover, the geopolitical, geoeconomic, and other connections between the Caribbean and the United States make them shared problems.

Indeed, although he was referring to the entire Southern Command area of responsibility and not just the Caribbean, Admiral James Stavridis, until recently Commander of the US Southern Command, captured this security interdependence and the attendant engagement imperatives eloquently in delivering his 2007 Posture Statement before the House Armed Services Committee on March 21, 2007: “We at Southcom devote a considerable amount of energy to the study of the significant

challenges confronting the region—challenges such as crime, gangs, and illegal drug trafficking as primary examples. These challenges loom large for many nations in the region; they are transnational, adaptive, and insidious threats to those seeking peace and stability. By their nature these challenges cannot be countered by one nation alone. Therefore, they require cooperative solutions involving a unified, full spectrum governmental and international approach in order to best address them.”

Question 3: Engagement and Prospects for the CBSI

It is important to preface discussion on United States security engagement in the region with a comment on the subject of engagement generally.

The region’s security environment requires security cooperation with multidimensional, multi-agency, and multilevel features. The regional level is but one of several zones of engagement, which I call Multilateral Security Engagement Zones and define as geographic spaces for policy and operational collaboration and cooperation by state and non-state actors in relation to defense and security matters. In effect, the Zones exist at the sub-regional, regional, hemispheric, and international systemic levels. Although they are relatively discrete spaces, they are not exclusive spaces; they overlap. U.S. governmental agencies and U.S.-led networks play key roles in some regional and hemispheric engagements. So, too, do a few British, Dutch, and Canadian agencies.

It is in the context of this engagement imperative that the United States has worked bilaterally and multilaterally in the region over time. Expectedly, there is a mixed record of implementation and success of the various engagements. Although it is neither feasible nor desirable to evaluate all recent or existing engagements or even enumerate them, it is apposite to note that the new engagement framework—CBSI—is proposed against the backdrop of some valuable existing arrangements.

One such is OPBAT—Operation Bahamas and Turks and Caicos—which dates to 1982 and has become a very successful counter-narcotics operation. In the counter-narcotics realm there are several bilateral agreements, known formally as Cooperative Maritime Counternarcotics Agreements but referred to as “Shiprider” agreements, and there are several training and other programs managed by various Federal agencies.

In relation to broader security cooperation Tradewinds has become an important endeavor. It is an annual exercise conducted in the region with the aim of improving responses to regional security threats. The 2009 exercise was held in the Bahamas and the Dominican Republic and focused on maritime interdiction and search and rescue operations with an emphasis on command and control. It involved more than 400 exercise participants from the United States, Britain, and 15 Caribbean Basin nations. Another collaborative exercise is New Horizons. This year, for instance, some 650 United States military personnel visited Guyana for humanitarian and civic assistance exercises over a 75 day period; they built a new clinic, constructed one school and renovated another, while carrying out other civic projects.

The increased illegal arms smuggling has led to more countermeasures in that area, including agreements to provide eTrace. In 2009 alone agreements were signed between the United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) and relevant agencies in Trinidad and Tobago, Suriname, Guyana, and eight Eastern Caribbean nations. eTrace is a paperless firearm trace submission system that is accessible through a secure connection to the World Wide Web. This Internet application provides the necessary utilities for submitting, retrieving, storing and querying firearms trace-related information allowing for the systematic tracing of firearms recovered from crime scenes. Analysis of firearms trace data can assist in the identification of firearms trafficking patterns and geographic profiling for criminal hot spots and possible sources of illicit firearms.

This flurry of agreements builds on a broader accord signed in December 2007 between the United States and the Caricom countries regarding joint efforts to combat illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons. Ironically, the United States is one of the first two signatories—the other nation being Mexico—to the 1997 Inter American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and other Related Material, but it is yet to ratify the Convention. Noteworthy, though, is the fact that at the 2009 Summit of the Americas, President Obama committed to having ratification soon.

Also, of recent vogue is the Merida Initiative, which was announced in October 2007 and signed into law in June 2008. Initially a United States-Mexico-Central America

arrangement, it was expanded to include the Dominican Republic and Haiti given justifiable concerns that enhanced counter-narcotics operations in North and Central America will cause a shift of drug operations to the Caribbean. The Merida Initiative is envisioned as a three-year program. Congress approved \$465 million in the first year, which included \$400 million for Mexico and \$65 million for Central America, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti. For the second year, Congress approved \$300 million for Mexico and \$110 million for Central America, the Dominican Republic and Haiti. A FY09 supplemental appropriation is providing an additional \$420 million for Mexico; and \$450 million for Mexico, and \$100 million for Central America has been requested for FY10.

In March 2009 Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Shannon told the Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs of the House Committee on Appropriations the following: "The FY08 Supplemental, as approved, included \$2.5 million each for Haiti and the Dominican Republic. This was recognition by the Congress of the threat that drug trafficking through the Caribbean poses to the two countries of Hispaniola. We have begun a process of engagement with the other countries of the Caribbean which we hope will lead to a security dialogue and security cooperation program. We plan to hold initial technical discussions with Caribbean security representatives in May after the Summit of the Americas."

One recent security engagement framework was the Third Border Initiative (TBI). It was announced by President George W. Bush during the Third Summit of the Americas in Quebec City in April 2001, as a framework for structuring engagement across the broad spectrum of matters that affect the prosperity and well being of Caribbean nations and citizens. TBI, building on the May 1997 Bridgetown Partnership for Prosperity and Security, was touted as recognizing the special significance of the Caribbean to the United States. TBI was to focus US and Caribbean engagement through targeted programs. The initiative consisted of a package of programs to enhance diplomatic, economic, health, education, and law enforcement cooperation. Most significantly, it included increased funding to combat HIV/AIDS in the region.

In the aftermath of the September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, TBI expanded to focus on issues affecting U.S. homeland security in the areas of

administration of justice and security. Economic Support Funds (ESF) under the TBI have been used to help Caribbean airports modernize their safety and security regulations and oversight, which was viewed an important measure to improve the security of visiting Americans. TBI funds also were used to support border security such as the strengthening of immigration controls; to help Caribbean economies move toward greater competitiveness; and to support an improvement of environmental management. TBI funding amounted to \$3 million in FY2003, almost \$5 million in FY2004, and an estimated \$8.9 million in FY2005. The FY2006 request for the TBI was \$6 million and the request for FY 2007 was \$3 million. Overall, the combination of minuscule funding and broad mandates contributed to the TBI being one of the security engagement frameworks in which few people can take pride.

The new framework—CBSI—was first announced by President Barack Obama at the April 2009 Summit of the Americas in Trinidad. It proposes to “go beyond traditional patterns of bilateral relations and make important steps towards a more regionally-focused framework of cooperation, collaboration and partnership to effectively confront the challenges and maximize the available capabilities, capacity and resources within the partnership.” As the Obama Administration and this 111th Congress pursue this new framework, it is reasonable to expect that you would want to avoid some of the pitfalls of the TBI approach. In this respect I offer the following recommendations:

1. Avoid a low investment-low results approach, whether by default or design. In this respect it is worth mentioning that the \$45 million associated with CBSI is a paltry sum. And, if resource constraints do not permit increased funding, prudence would suggest having discrete as opposed to broad mandates and expectations. Moreover, in times of resource scarcity such as we now face, officials are tempted to pursue new efforts by cutting into existing operations, sometimes counterproductively so. One hopes that current engagements such as OPBAT, Tradewinds, and New Horizons do not become victims of new endeavors in the course of decision-making about resource acquisition and allocation.
2. Especially because of resource constraints, even with an investment of more than \$45 million, and in light of the interdependence and transnational aspects involved, pursue active inclusion of other nations with Caribbean interests. This

approach seems already in the cards given the following statement by Barbados embassy Chargé d'Affaires D. Brent Hardt at the August 13, 2009 meeting of the US-Caribbean Security Initiative Working Group in Barbados: "As we go forward, we would also like to give consideration to broadening this partnership to be inclusive of other traditional partners for both the U.S. and the Caribbean. Given the geography and interconnectedness of the Caribbean, we believe that the inclusion of other international partners will prove invaluable. We have advised our Canadian, French, British, and Dutch colleagues in Washington of this emerging initiative and its goals."

3. Make special efforts to minimize administrative overhead involved in delivering programs under CSBI so that most of the investment gets to the region, thereby increasing the prospect of discernable results which could alter the region's security profile, benefiting both the region and the United States. As part of this effort new bureaucratic entities should not be created, and use should be made, as much as possible, of existing legal instruments to facilitate implementation rather than holding additional conferences or meeting to sign new agreements.

Mr. Chairman, let me, again, record my appreciation for the opportunity to contribute to this reality check as you ponder the "What" and "How" of the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative. I would like to leave you with some powerful advice from someone who once was on the frontlines of protecting American interests in the Caribbean. I refer to retired Vice Admiral James M. Loy of the U.S. Coast Guard and his words uttered at a Strategy Symposium hosted by Southcom and National Defense University in April 1996: "there are two strategies that prove effective—sustained efforts over time and flexible surprise tactics. Although our enemies are smart, well equipped, and elusive, they will opt for the path of least resistance. We must find ways to capitalize on that." Both the United States and the Caribbean would be beneficiaries of this advice were it to be followed in the course of pursuing this new security engagement framework proposed by the Obama Administration.

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you.
Dr. Maingot.

**STATEMENT OF ANTHONY P. MAINGOT, PH.D., PROFESSOR
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Mr. MAINGOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a privilege to be here.

I must tell you, this is a very unique country. I testified four times before the House without even being a U.S. citizen. I think it is perhaps the only country in the world where that takes place. I am now a U.S. citizen. But my concern is less with the drugs coming into the United States as it is with the drugs remaining in the Caribbean because the old notion that it is an American problem which you heard from island to island, they will tell you in Haiti, has turned out to be a very costly myth.

Every island now has a major problem of drug addiction which turns out to have two other impacts. Number one, it contributes to the Caribbean's HIV/AIDS crisis which is second only to central Africa. And two, it contributes to crime. And crime is really wracking these islands.

I submitted a paper, and just to show that sociologists are more verbose than political scientists, it is longer than Professor Griffith's paper. I submit it for the record.

I want to make several points. First, the allocation of what I thought was \$45 million for this initiative turns out now to be \$37 million; it is a drop in the bucket. If anybody believes that \$37 million, I don't care how parsed in bureaucratic terms, is going to make any difference in a region the size of the Mediterranean with the kind of problems that we have is dreaming. That is number one.

Number two, unless we solve two fundamental problems which directly relate to the Americans: Money laundering—which the banks on the border with Mexico and the banks in Miami have a great deal to do with—and the export of guns. Florida, the State where I live, has the laxest rules on gun sales. The coup d'etat which took place in Trinidad in 1990 was carried out with guns bought at a gun fair in Fort Lauderdale, 134 Israel rifles purchased with money taken in cash and taken to Trinidad. This flow of guns continues.

Third, the issue of deportees. It is simply grossly unfair to deport these people to the islands which have completely overcrowded jails. I think if I would use any part of this money, it would be to build additional jails on the islands in which you could house some of these deportees. Fourth, and very important is the whole geopolitical initiative. We cannot have a major geopolitical initiative in this without including every country in the Caribbean, including Cuba. Just look at the map. Look at the border of Cuba. Look at the countries it borders, and you will realize what every country in the Caribbean realizes—since they all have excellent relations with Cuba—that Cuba has to be an integral part of this anti-crime initiative.

Additionally, we cannot expect these islands to pick a fight with Mr. Hugo Chavez of Venezuela. They are all, with the exceptions

of Trinidad and Barbados, members of Petrocaribe. They are all beneficiaries of Operacion Milagro, which is the Cuban medical thing which is paid for by Venezuela. After all, we continue to buy oil from Venezuela. If we wanted to bring Chavez down, we would stop buying his oil. We are the only country that pays cash for the Venezuelan oil. Without our purchases, Chavez would have been finished a long time ago. How can we expect these small countries that are beneficiaries? So my recommendation is I understand fully the role of Venezuela.

I am from Trinidad. I have been by both of these rivers; I know the smuggling has been going on forever. We cannot expect these countries to take a stand vis-a-vis Mr. Chavez. We should keep our initiative on the Caribbean separate from our initiative in Colombia. It was a mismanaged public relations effort that the two were announced at the same time, the extension of the bases which are not American bases, they are Colombian bases.

Finally, the Caribbean also is seeing the reentry of the European powers. We are seeing the Dutch reinforce their marines in Curacao. I just visited one of their destroyers that was visiting Miami. They are now housing and we are renting space in both the airports in Curacao and Aruba. The Brits are coming back in. The French are reinforcing their forces not just in Martinique and Guadeloupe but fundamentally in Guyana where they have moved now, the French Foreign Legion where President Sarkozy has had two meetings with President Lula da Silva of Brazil because Brazil has two fundamental fronts. One is the south Atlantic where its oil is and the other is the Amazon. We have to bring all of these elements into the play, both in terms of effectives and intelligence if anything is going to be made from a true effort in the Caribbean.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Maingot follows:]

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Testimony, December 9, 2009

***“New Directions on Old Paths?
Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI)”***

**UNITED STATES CONGRESS
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere**

Introduction

When one thinks of the Caribbean it is difficult not to think of one of the most enduring enmities in international relations, the struggle between Cuba and the United States. Since 1959, Cuba actively sponsored guerrilla movements and the US sponsored dozens of covert operations against Fidel Castro and an open invasion by CIA-trained exiles, faced a potentially catastrophic nuclear stand-off, and stood helpless while Cuba unleashed on US shores a horde of refugees, some 20,000 of whom were criminals and inmates of mental asylums. The US fought a militarily incompetent battle against Cuban reservist workers in Grenada, contributed to the overthrow of Salvador Allende in Chile, helped track down Ché Guevarra in Bolivia, and trained Contras in Nicaragua. It has been a war, in and out of the shadows, so pervasive and challenging that it has engendered some of the classics in the study of foreign policy decision-making. Think of Irvin L. Janis, *Victims of Groupthink* (1962), of Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decisions* (1971), and John Lewis Gaddis' *Strategies of Containment* (1982).

These are the realities which put the study of US-Caribbean relations during the Cold War in a distinct category. These are no longer the realities of the contemporary Caribbean and the threats they pose to US national security and, even more so, to the security and good governance of the many small nations of the region. The necessary changes in the perceptions and definitions of national

security in the region have been slow in coming.¹ Today, every country in the Caribbean has normal relations with Cuba and nearly all are grateful for the presence of Cuban medical teams in their countries. Other than in Cuba, there are no overtly Marxist-Leninist (i.e., Communist) parties in office (or even as a significant opposition) anywhere in the region. This is not what threatens them. The threat is much more insidious because while it has a clear external dimension, it feeds and festers on the domestic corruption which has spawned native criminal gangs, many with real links to the global supply chains of the drug trade. New threats require new strategies if we are to first contain, and then substantially defeat these threats. The following security arrangements were certainly well-meaning but as the situations I describe here demonstrate, they have not been up to the intended tasks:

Chronology of Post-Cold War US-Caribbean Security Arrangements

- May 1997 Bridgetown, Barbados Partnership for Prosperity and Security – Third Border Initiative launched by President Bill Clinton
- April 2001 President George W. Bush – Third Summit of the Americas, Quebec, Canada
- January 2004 CARICOM, Dominican Republic and the USA pledge to strengthen the Third Border Initiative

Having said this, let us understand that not every Caribbean country is affected in the same way the levels of violence and corruption we describe. Indeed,

some are up to now relatively free from these scourges. Since it is one of my key contentions that there is a very close relationship between generalized (but especially governmental) corruption and violence,² let us distinguish cases.

States with Low levels of Corruption and Violence
(Using the 2009 Transparency International [IT] Ranking)

Countries with Low Corruption and virtually no societal violence

- Barbados [rank = 20 score = 7.4]
- St. Lucia [rank = 22 score = 7.1]
- St. Vincent [rank = 31 score = 6.5]
- Dominica [rank = 34 score = 6.0]

[Note: Costa Rica ranks 43 with a score of 5.1]

Countries with high levels of corruption and violence

- 1) Trinidad/Tobago [rank = 79 score = 3.6]
- 2) Dominican Rep. [rank = 99 score = 3.0]
- 3) Jamaica [rank = 99 score = 3.1]
- 4) Guyana [rank = 126 score = 2.6]
- 5) Venezuela [rank = 162 score = 1.9]
- 6) Haiti [rank = 168 score = 1.9]

It should be clearly understood that the IT ranking is based on perceptions; no names or specific cases are mentioned. IT, as I do, paints with a broad brush. However, since perceptions both reflect and engender realities, we will analyze five of these six cases as worrisome “hot spots” in the region. They have to be analyzed in terms of their individual characteristics and in terms of what they contribute to making the region the insecure area that it has become.

Since Venezuela has a 4,000 km coastline on the Caribbean and an additional 185 km on the Atlantic, it is a Caribbean country. We begin our analysis there.

Venezuela

Venezuela neither grows nor processes any significant amount of illicit drugs. Nor is there any evidence that the Venezuelan government, as distinct from individual members of that government, is itself benefitting from the drug trade. What is patently evident is that Venezuela is now a major transshipment country. According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), drug transshipments through Venezuela grew fourfold between 2004 and 2007, from 60 to 260 metric tons.³ Several factors explain this dramatic change:

- 1) The growing levels of corruption at all levels in the society. In his letter of presentation of a GAO Report, US Senator Richard Lugar describes a 2008 study by the office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) which designated three top officials who reported directly to President Hugo Chavez as “drug kingpins.”⁴ Corruption appears to be especially rampant among members of the national intelligence agency, National Guard, and Border Militia. The score of 1.9 and ranking at 162 (out of 180 countries) appear to be well deserved. Evidently, many and much can be bought in Venezuela.

2) The banning of US counter-narcotics effectiveness, from the DEA to over flights of US surveillance aircraft.

3) The fact that Venezuela's substantial purchases of armaments from Russia and China are meant to defend against a much-hyped conventional struggle with Colombia and/or the US rather than controlling the very large number of planes or fast boats which depart from Venezuela enroute to the islands and Central America.

This apparent loss of control over corrupt members of its military and police is incontrovertible. Much more speculative – but not for that less worrisome – is the ultimate goal of Venezuela's role as supporter of Iran and a group closely allied to it, the Hizbollah. Robert M. Morgenthau, the District Attorney of Manhattan, has alleged that this relationship leaves open “a window susceptible to money laundering by the Iranian government, the narcotics organizations with ties to corrupt elements in the Venezuelan government, and the terrorist organizations that Iran supports openly.”⁵ Critically important for the Caribbean is the presence of Hizbollah. Whether they are involved in the drug trade, as Morgenthau alleges, or not, they are definitely involved in collecting and laundering funds in the Caribbean. It is known that substantial numbers of Syrian-Lebanese in the region contribute to Hizbollah. The amounts coming from these Diasporas were recently revealed in the collapse of the Ponzi scheme run by Hizbollah-connected Salah

Ezzedine.⁶ Despite their vocal anti-Americanism, there is no evidence that any of these activities pose any immediate threat to the Caribbean region.

Haiti and the Dominican Republic

Neither corruption nor drug running is new to either Haiti or the Dominican Republic (DR). They survive and even flourish, regardless of who is in power. More recently, and directly related to the new permissiveness in Venezuela, there has been a dramatic increase of “suspicious” flights out of that country to these two countries which share an island. In 2008 there were 22 suspicious flights to Haiti and 70 to the DR. Interestingly enough, there were only 31 to Central America and Mexico.⁷ The number of flights to the DR indicates a very porous situation among state agencies as well as the long-standing and very well organized network of criminal gangs operating between Puerto Rico and the DR. But drug corruption is not the only type of corruption in either society. In the DR there have been a series of banking scandals of truly impressive proportions. First it was private banks, then, charges were leveled against officials of the Central Bank. As far as customs is concerned, a recently deceased Director of Customs referred to the customs and public administration in general as being in a putrid state [*“un estado de podredumbre.”*]⁸ All this has been grist for the mill of a very active press, both print and Television. This explains the explosion of anti-corruption groups in the civil society, viz., Alianza Dominicana contra la Corrupción, Fundación Justicia y

Transparencia, and the official Dirección Nacional de Persecución de la Corrupción Administrativa. At least there is public awareness of the situation. No such civil society agitation exists in Haiti. A little history will illustrate.⁹

By November 1988 Haitian army Colonel Jean-Claude Paul had become something of a household name in South Florida because of his indictment in a Miami court on drug smuggling charges. Paul was the closest thing to a General Noriega (of Panama) that Haiti had, and as such was no push-over. Then-President Leslie Manigat was counting on his support, so in return he defended him against the drug-running charges. Manigat would say that it was Paul's Haitian nationalism that antagonized the Americans.

Whoever may or may not have been involved in drugs in Haiti might be hard to discover. What is not hard to discern is the fact that Haiti had become – at least since 1983 according to the DEA – a major transshipment point for Colombian cocaine. President Jean-Claude Duvalier's brother-in-law was jailed in Puerto Rico, accused by the Carter administration of transporting drugs. Haiti did not become a major center of US concern, however, until 1987. By that year, the pressure was turned on President Manigat to rid his regime of one officer in particular, his loyal supporter, Colonel Paul. The Haitian situation had gone beyond personalities; it was now believed to involve systematic and well-organized links between the Colombian cartels and Haitian gangs operating in the

US, the Miami River appears to have been their main point of entry into the US. An analysis of Haitian vessel activity on the Miami River alone, according to a high US customs official, revealed that approximately 45 percent of the vessels, and 60 percent of the vessel agents were documented for alleged involvement in alien and narcotics smuggling activities. Several factors have to be taken into account:

- 1) Haiti's government and its law and order institutions have hardly ever governed outside the capital city, Port-au-Prince. This leaves some two dozen active ports virtually unsupervised. A 5,000-man police force is hardly sufficient in a country with 9 million people.

- 2) Haiti has the largest cabotage trade in the region; thousands of large and small sailing and motor vessels ply an active trade with the whole Bahamas Archipelago, up to Miami. There are well-organized Haitian gangs in both the Bahamas and Miami which insure that the supply chain remain intact and profitable.

- 3) The excellent job done by the 7,000-member MINUSTAH force is substantially geared towards keeping the peace in a few volatile cities and regions of the country. It is not a counter-narcotics force.

Jamaica

Jamaicans were not at all ready to conclude that John Issa, Chairman of the hotel chain, Super Clubs, was personally involved in the case of the 1,100 pounds of hash oil found in the water tank of his yacht, “My Zein.” What they did find objectionable was his claim that no one in Jamaica would believe that he was involved because,

... [I]t may sound arrogant, but my reputation is of being one of the businessmen in Jamaica with integrity. There are not many.¹⁰

Was Issa contributing to a “name-and-shame” trend? This came as the island was reeling from negative stories from the UK, the US and even Costa Rica. In the latter country a rash of killings by Jamaican gangs has led to new immigration controls on people from that island.¹¹ Other cases were agitating public opinion on the island:

1) The widely-rumored (later confirmed) unwillingness of the Prime Minister to respond to a request that a major “don” (Jamaican term for drug lord) of his constituency be extradited to the US.

2) The apparent demotion of a senior Acting Deputy Superintendent of Police following his confrontation with a Member of the House of Representatives who intervened to defend a constituent, a reputed “don,” against a Police anti-drug -trafficking action.

3) The resignation of the Minister of National Security, Colonel Trevor MacMillan. In February he had given an alarming account of the crime scene in Jamaica and elsewhere in the region. His words were stark: “terrifying,” “merciless killers,” frighteningly” increasing.

(4) The fact that more than 60 members of the Police Force were arrested for corruption and association with criminal gangs in the first 11 months of 2009.¹²

None of these four cases surprises Jamaicans in the know. As early as 1994, the courageous journalist Dawn Ritch of *The Jamaican Gleaner* was revealing the links between drug trafficking, crime and the political protection the “dons” received in what are known as “garrison” constituencies. It all began in the 1970s. Ritch listed virtually every electoral constituency on the island, the name of the representative from that constituency and the “posses” (gangs) which controlled them.¹³ Both constituencies represented in the 2009 incidents mentioned above figured prominently in Ritch’s analysis. And, yet, the paradox is that Jamaica has a functioning democratic system. Note the following apparently contradictory statements in the World Bank’s *Country Study on Jamaica* (2004):

(1) Jamaica has a strong democracy, high caliber bureaucracy and good regulatory framework.

(2) Jamaica has one of the highest rates of violent crime in the world, but a relatively low rate of property crime. In 2000 the recorded intentional homicide

rate was 33 per 100,000 inhabitants, lower only than Colombia (63) and South Africa (52). (p. 115).

In fact, Jamaica's murder rate is 30 times that of Britain. Although the figures show Jamaica to be, comparatively, a good performer in terms of Bureaucracy Quality and Infrastructure, there is disagreement on that. "In Jamaica", says a more recent World Bank study, "the government is considered to be bureaucratic and inefficient in providing services, particularly in the branch offices of the customs and licensing agencies."¹⁴ Where there is no disagreement is on the high incidence of corruption and on the fact that Jamaica fails terribly in the area of homicides and in the costs it imposes on businesses (viz., in lost production and in disincentives to investment). The World Bank calculates that the economic cost of crime in 2001 was 3.7% of G.D.P. And, yet, that island of 11,000 sq. km has fairly sizable national security and justice systems. In 2000 the Ministry of National Security and Justice received 5.1% of the total budget to sustain the following forces:

- Police and Correctional Services (+/- 5,000).
- Jamaican Defence Force (2,500).
- National Reserve Force (1,000).
- Jamaican Constabulary Force (8,500).

To this list should be added the 14,198 private security guards who (in 1999) worked for 298 security companies. There is an official “Private Security Regulation Authority” which registers and trains this private force.¹⁵

The crucial element here is that public corruption and organized crime are not recent situations, which makes short-term solutions all the more difficult. Since the unique nexus between politics, drugs and arms smuggling, and organized crime goes back several decades, an accommodation of sorts has been reached between the politicians and the gangs. There are no equivalent cases of such early origins elsewhere in the region. Already by 1977 a major study noted that the “size of the ganja industry and the corruption and vested interests which relate to it” help to explain part of the political and criminal violence which has occurred in Jamaica since the early 1970s.

It is notorious that it has taken Jamaican civil society and academia a long time to mobilize against the drug trade, corruption and their links to the political system. It was long assumed that, to the extent that there was a mafia, it was the Colombian one and that this was a concern for the United States. Now there is ample awareness that Jamaica has its own mafias, making profitable links with the Colombians or anyone else who will enrich their coffers, and that they pose real threats to the economy and political system. It is true that the island has made significant strides through an initiative known as “Kingfisher” in stopping the

“fast” boats coming from San Andres (Colombia) and small planes coming from Venezuela. Yet, enough gets through and Jamaica produces enough marijuana to supply a very large domestic and even larger international market. In Jamaica the imperative to localize control (and profits) has real strength.

Three dimensions of crime in Jamaica go a long way to explain a situation in which the state is perceived as unable to maintain law and order:

(1) The entrenched presence of organized crime gangs (yardies or posses) in narcotics, extortion, arms trafficking, all having close ties with criminals in metropolitan countries, have allowed them to be highly adaptive. Many of them had been deported to Jamaica from the US, Canada and the UK where they had been involved in typical organized crime misdeeds: drug offenses, illegal possession of firearms, fraud/false documents. A more recent criminal modality is kidnapping of well-to-do Jamaicans. Again, the complaint from the police is that they are “not exposed to enough training in kidnapping situations.”¹⁶

(2) The low level of public trust in the reliability of the police force. Aside from accusations of individual police corruption, there is a deeply-entrenched belief that the police are gratuitously brutal and trigger-happy. It is undoubtedly true as the news media editorialized, that the “tight lips” attitude of people in the very insecure parts of Kingston “cripples” crime fighting efforts.¹⁷ It is equally true, however, that there is a historical reason for such attitudes. In 1998

police were involved in 151 of the 169 “fatal shootings” (defined as committed by persons with gun permits) while 10 were committed by private guards, the rest by private citizens. Things have not improved much since.

(3) The sense that both the police and the court system exercise weak controls over public and private corruption. It is a universal fact that given the cyclical, and rotating, nature of political office holders, societies tend to have short memories about corruption. It is also a result of a situation recently highlighted by the generally-praised former Minister of National Security, Dr. Peter Phillips: the increasing sophistication and internationalization of corrupt criminal schemes and the inability of the legal system to keep up with these. He points out that the island passed the Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) allowing forfeiture of illegally acquired wealth in 2006 but it has seldom been successfully utilized. “It is a new law,” says one of the island’s top criminal defense attorneys, “and the cases take time to prepare.”¹⁸ It is this which explains the frustration of a Peter Phillips who suggests something which Jamaicans are not prone to vent in public. This national inadequacy, he said, is going to require that you work closely with your international partners, with forensic accounting, “and the tracing of property, even into foreign jurisdictions. That also requires [political] will....”

We conclude by again quoting from the 2004 World Bank Jamaica Country Study: “...very poor rule of law and crime negates the positive elements in the

business environment.”¹⁹ This point is not lost on an important team of young criminologists at the University of the West Indies who assert that,

Crime has imposed a significant developmental cost on the society. It has a negative effect on the development of human capital, introduces inefficiencies into the economy, undermines the work ethic, diverts resources from investment to crime management and imposes costs in other ways. It has, of course, also had some positive linkage effects, such as the growth of the private security “industry.”²⁰

Trinidad and Tobago

Across the Caribbean, in Trinidad, crime is so out of control that there are now “advisories” as to which streets **in the city** are not safe to transit. The islanders are surprised and shocked to learn that their crime rate is higher than Jamaica’s.²¹ The 7,000-man strong Police Force and 3,000 Defence Force appear incapable of controlling law and order on the 5,000 sq. km. island. As a recent editorial in the *Trinidad Guardian* noted, with high-powered rifles and machine guns in the hands of the criminal gangs,” the Besson Street Police seem helpless to restore law and order.”²² This has led to a new cross-class, cross-race alliance of citizens in Port-of-Spain and elsewhere who are critical of government inaction and who demand, as the *Trinidad Guardian* editorialized, “Shape Up or Ship Out, Mr. Mayor.”²³ It is not just kidnappings, extortion and assaults in broad daylight, it is also terrorist bombs and arson. By April, 2009, the same Prime Minister and

the same Minister of National Security were again promising a “new” crime plan. The island’s National Security Council said the Minister “was still reviewing it.”²⁴ Meanwhile, the Prime Minister was telling the general Assembly of the United Nations that the rate of crime was due to the removal of the preferential markets for sugar and bananas by the EU,²⁵ as if the oil and gas-rich island produced much of either. Similarly, the Attorney General blamed the rise in crime among young males to the “influx of women” into the teaching profession.²⁶ Clearly, there is a complete disconnect between the political leadership and the dramatic changes in the nature of the society. Since you cannot use a constant (i.e., the political system) to explain a variable (i.e., exploding crime rates), it is evident that it is not the political system which causes the latter.

While civil society was mobilizing and merchants – as occurred in Kingston, Jamaica – were threatening to close down the city, this exchange between the press and Prime Minister Patrick Manning took place:

Asked about the US Federal Bureau of Investigations’ involvement in the investigation [of terrorist bombings], Manning said the police had a free hand to seek assistance from whomever they wished. “I am not myself aware that they have gone to the FBI. They very well might have. I do not know.”²⁷

What could be wrong with the Prime Minister saying that he had asked for help from the FBI? Can it be that the Prime Minister of a sovereign country – who

had just presided over an emergency meeting of his cabinet – was not aware that a foreign intelligence service was actively involved in a national crisis? This is especially of concern since no one on the island doubted that the situation was grave and that the state appeared incapable of controlling it.

This appeared to be especially the case of the long-standing – and, so far – futile efforts to bring a dangerous group to heel. The case of the militant Black Muslim group Jamaat al Muslimeen and its leader, Yasin Abu Bakr (née Lennox Phillips) has to stand as one of the most outrageous cases of justice denied in modern Caribbean history. In 1990 Bakr led 114 of his followers (some trained in Libya) in an attempted *coup d'etat* which killed 24 people including a Member of Parliament, and caused some TT\$ 150 million in property damage. Charged with murder, treason and a slew of other offences, the Muslimeen group not only received amnesty but sued the state and were awarded TT\$ 2.1 million in damages. As of Fall, 2009 the following has transpired:

1) Abu Bakr has filed an affidavit claiming that in 2002 he had a political arrangement with the party then as now in power (the People's National Movement – PNM) to exchange favors.²⁸

2) The BBC reported that the Jamaat not only had links to criminal gangs, but also with Muslim extremists abroad.²⁹

The feeling is that the situations which led to the coup attempts of 1970 and 1990 have not been brought under control and have been left to simmer barely under the surface. The arrests for illegal weapons purchases in the US of some who were involved in both 1970 (as Marxists) and 1990 (this time as radical Muslims) are constant reminders of this. Quite evidently, the citizens of Trinidad and Tobago are faced with a scourge of criminal gangs as well as a criminal gang of converts to Islam. It is also quite evident the island's authorities appear incapable of bringing either under control.

Conclusions

After being in denial for too long, Caribbean societies are now fully aware of three indispensable realities:

- 1) There is no such thing as being “merely a stepping stone” route to the US. The drug trade eventually poisons every society along the way creating a veritable region-wide “culture area” of drugs.³⁰
- 2) There is a close link between traditional, general corruption and the corruption which allows organized crime to operate with virtual impunity.
- 3) Even as these small states do not have the law enforcement capacity to deal with these new threats to their national security, issues of sovereignty, nationalism and saving face are often obstacles to seeking external assistance.

Being largely tourist economies, there is a strong instinct to sweep bad news under the carpet.

Recommendations

There is much the US can do at home and so avoid accusations of perpetuating US hegemonic inclinations under a different, i.e., war on drugs, guise.

1) Speed up the allocation of US\$ 1.4 billion offered to Mexico under the Merida Initiative as well as the US\$ 45 to the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative. It is disheartening to read that only 2 percent of the amount pledged has been disbursed.³¹

2) Monitor and attempt to control two critical aspects of the international criminal enterprises: money laundering through US banks and the sale and export of small arms. The weapons used by the Jamaat al Muslimeen in their murderous attempted *coup d'etat* in 1990 were purchased at a gun show in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida.

3) Even as the US Supreme Court ruled in December, 2006 that the Federal Government could not deport people for drug misdemeanors, the US naturally has a sovereign right to deport criminal aliens. However, much closer coordination with island authorities is in order. The US might even consider alleviating the horrendous overcrowding in Caribbean jails by funding the building of jails for dangerous criminal deportees.

4) Keep the geopolitical initiatives in the Caribbean such as the Supplemental Agreement for Cooperation with Colombia over bases and jousting with President Hugo Chávez and Cuba separate from the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative. These small Caribbean nations have excellent relations with Cuba and Venezuela. There is not a single case of one of their systems switching to a Cuban or “Bolivarian” type of regime. What threatens these nations is the drug-related criminality, in its domestic and international dimensions. This is what the US should concentrate on. In the Caribbean, US and regional security will probably best be enhanced by a substantial build up of the US Coast Guard, its naval and airborne branches.

Finally, the time might be ripe to initiate a true US-Europe-Caribbean concert similar to what existed in the post World War II period (the Caribbean Commission). The new involvement of the British, Dutch and French in the region warrants a more concerted effort at sharing not just patrols but also intelligence. This might well mean some concessions on the part of the US on its traditional regional dominance and on the part of the islands of some sovereignty, but the situation is urgent enough to make such concessions not just realistic but quite indispensable.³²

ENDNOTES

¹ For an early analysis of the changing perspectives on security by regional leaders, see Anthony P. Maingot, "Some Perspectives on Security by Governing Elites in the English-Speaking Caribbean," (Clarendon McKenna College: Keck Center for International Strategic Studies, 1985).

² See, Anthony P. Maingot, "Challenges of the Corruption-Violence Link," in Ivelaw Griffith (ed.), *Caribbean Security in the Age of Terror* (Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers, 2004), pp. 129-153.

³ US Government Accountability Office, "Drug Control: US Counter-Narcotics Cooperation with Venezuela has Declined," Report to Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate 111th Congress (Washington D.C., July 2009).

⁴ Dick Lugar, letter of submission of GAO Report, 7-20-09.

⁵ See Robert M. Morgenthau, "The Emerging Axis of Iran and Venezuela," *The Wall Street Journal*, September 8, 2009.

⁶ See Terry Biedermann, "Trail of Destruction," *Financial Times Wealth* (Winter 2009), pp. 12-16.

⁷ GAO Report, p.10.

⁸ Cited in *Listin Diario*, December 6, 2009, p.10.

⁹ Further on this in Anthony P. Maingot, *The United States and the Caribbean* (London: Macmillan, 1994), pp. 204-227.

¹⁰ *Jamaica Observer*, November 29, 2009, p. 2.

¹¹ See, "Exporting Shame," *Jamaica Gleaner*, December 1, 2009; "PM Brushes Aside Tarnished Reputation Claim," *Jamaica Gleaner On Line*, October 14, 2009; "Have we no Shame," *Jamaica Gleaner On Line*, September 25, 2009; "Caribbean Strikes Back at UK Portrayal of Jamaica," *The Gleaner*, July 7, 2009.

¹² See *Jamaica Information Service*, May 22, 2009; *Jamaica Observer*, December 4, 2009; *The Gleaner*, December 4, 2009.

¹³ Dawn Ritch, *The Jamaican Weekly Gleaner*, November 25 to December 1, 1994, p. 6.

¹⁴ World Bank, *A Time to Choose: Caribbean Development in the 21st Century* (2005), p. 53.

¹⁵ Source: Planning Institute of Jamaica, *Economic and Social Survey, 1999*, p. 23. 2.

¹⁶ *Jamaica Observer*, 9-28-09.

¹⁷ *Jamaican Gleaner*, October 4, 2009.

¹⁸ *Jamaican Gleaner*, October 4, 2009.

¹⁹ World Bank, *Jamaica Country Study* (2004), p. 118.

²⁰ Alfred Francis, Godfrey Gibbison, Anthony Herriott and Claremont Kirton, *Crime and Development, The Jamaican Experience* (Kingston: ISER, 2009), p. 68.

²¹ *The Nation*, May 23, 2009.

²² *Trinidad Guardian* February 2, 2009.

²³ www.guardian.com July 19, 2005.

²⁴ www.nationnews.com/print, May 23, 2009.

²⁵ *Trinidad Express*, September 27, 2009.

²⁶ *Trinidad Express*, November 12, 2009.

²⁷ www.guardian.com July 15, 2005.

²⁸ See “Bakr allegations demand clarification,” Editorial, *The Trinidad Guardian*, September 14, 2009.

²⁹ BBC News, "Profile: Jamaat al Muslimeen," (June 3, 2007) at <http://news.bbc.co.uk>

³⁰ On this see, Anthony P. Maingot, "The Decentralization Imperative in Caribbean Criminal Enterprises," in Tom Farer (ed.), *Transnational Criminal Enterprise in the Americas* (New York: Routledge, 1999), pp. 143-170.

³¹ *The New York Times*, December 4, 2009, p. 17.

³² On this see, Anthony P. Maingot, "Modifying Traditional Hegemony and Sovereignty in the Caribbean," in Jorge I. Dominguez and Rafael Fernández de Castro (ed.), *Contemporary Inter-American Relations* (New York: Routledge, forthcoming).

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you very much.

Let me ask a question about the deportees, Dr. Maingot, since you mentioned them. One of my colleagues mentioned it before. Whenever I go to any of the Caribbean countries, the deportees is always a question that comes up. What should the United States, you mentioned the building of jails, some of the money would go to the building of jails in your testimony. But what is the actual impact of the increased deportations? What programs do the different nations have to deal with the reintegration of the deportees and should we be involved in them? Are there other countries that also send criminal deportees back in the Caribbean and what do they do with them?

Mr. MAINGOT. Britain sends and Canada sends. But the French, I don't think so because the French territories are départements d'outre-mer, Overseas Departments of France, so there is no question of deportation there.

In terms of Canada, the U.K. and the United States.

Now, as you go island to island, there is really controversy whether the deportees are a major part of the crime problem.

I, frankly, doubt that they are a major part of the crime, but they are in the consciousness of the citizens of these islands. For instance, in the Dominican Republic, the so-called Dominicoyorks, the guys who are deported from your State, New York, they are feared. In Haiti, they are feared because they are part of the gangs that exist in Haiti, in the Bahamas and in Miami where the Haitian gangs are very well organized. So it varies from one zone to the other.

Now in Trinidad, my island, there is a whole section a whole neighborhood of deportees but there is no evidence that they are a major part of the crime wave that we are experiencing. Our murder rate now is higher than Jamaica's, if you can believe that. And Jamaica's is 30 times that of Britain. So you know we have a serious problem. Now Trinidad of course is 9 miles off of Venezuela

and the planes and the boats are coming in all the time. They are bringing in weapons and bringing in drugs. So the question of the deportees, frankly, I don't think there is any solid evidence that they are a major part of the problem.

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. Let me ask Dr. Griffith. What countries in the Caribbean face the greatest security threat from drug trafficking? And what measures and approaches are these measures taking to deal with the high levels of violence? And what should we do with all of that? How is the CBSI looked upon in the Caribbean by the leaders of the Caribbean?

Mr. GRIFFITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the question. Maybe I can respond to the last question first. I think there is a view within the Caribbean, as best as I can tell, that this new initiative is welcome and it is welcome not only because it is coming at the time of resource deficiency and the part of continuing resource deficiency on the part of Caribbean countries. It is coming because any and all of the problems based in the Caribbean countries are not amenable to any individual country solution, even if they had the resources. Even if the United States had all the resources invests, the nature of the problems is transnational. They are not amenable to one country resolution.

Having said that, I think there are degrees of difficulty on the part of countries in the Caribbean. The crime problem is a significant problem for Jamaica. It is a significant problem for Guyana. It is a significant problem for Trinidad and Tobago, but it is also important to recognize that not all the crime in any individual Caribbean countries or across the region are related to drugs. Some of the crime in many parts of the region as is true in other parts of the world have to do with poverty and people pushing the envelope for survival. Some of the crime has to do with social enemy. When people are hungry, they sometimes take it out on their spouses.

When husbands can't provide food for the families, they take out on the kids. So you are seeing some of the criminality that is really social enemy caught up in a larger wave of drugs-driven crime. And I think it is important to recognize that all the crime in the Caribbean, as is true in other parts of the world, is not crime related to drugs. But the availability of weapons complicates and facilitates that criminality. The inability of the government to provide training adequately, to provide equipment. There are many parts of the Caribbean when you call the police, they ask, can you come and get me. I was in Trinidad last week, 1,400 people short in the police force. This was announced by the commissioner of police who was acting.

So you ask the question, what are the capability resources on the part of the societies in the region to deal with it? The fact that not only the good guys know that the police don't have the resources, the bad guys know as well. So therefore they are emboldened. It is a question of degree across the region. It is not amenable to any one country resolution.

Mr. ENGEL. So a lack of 1,400 police; it is due to lack of resources?

Mr. GRIFFITH. As well, I think, it is not simply a lack of resources. It is a combination of resources and management. The irony of Trinidad and Tobago is that it is the wealthiest of the

countries in the Caribbean but you have got some also management issues. You have got corruption issues. You have got a variety of issues complicating the ability of the law enforcement and different forces to really make a dent on the criminality in the individual country and in the subregion itself.

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. Mr. Mack.

Mr. MACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I first want to, if I could, Dr. Maingot, I would like to respond to your statement about we should not be asking the members of the countries in the Caribbean to take on Hugo Chavez. I agree with you. That is something the United States should do. We should take a stand when it comes to Hugo Chavez. And I wanted to ask you a question. You had talked about the French and the Dutch, I think, and their involvement. If you could quickly kind of talk about what they are doing. And the second part of my question to both of you is what would be the consequences if the U.S. did nothing?

I think both of you had indicated that you thought the resources that are putting forward are a drop in the bucket or you know indicate that it is not enough. What would you do to enhance it? Where would you go with it? What would the number be? What would the other resources be that you would think would be needed to carry out this initiative?

Mr. MAINGOT. Well, there is a very interesting phenomenon taking place in the Caribbean where issues of sovereignty, sensitivity, saving face—after all, these are tourist economies. The last thing in the world you ever want to hear about is a shark attack. We don't have any sharks in the Caribbean. They are all friendly sharks supposedly or crime because it directly affects the tourist industry. Jamaica is facing this in a major way right now. One of the interesting things that is occurring is the invitation of, for instance, of retired members of the British Scotland Yard special branch. We see them now in island after island.

In fact, one of the most successful anti-drug programs in Jamaica, the Kingfish program, which was to stop the fast boats coming in from San Andrés Providencia, which are the Colombian islands which are within reach of these fast boats, is led by an Englishman. And we see that now with the Dutch Marines in the Netherlands and in the Netherlands Antilles. I went to high school in Kurasawa, a Dutch high school. And the last thing in the world that Kurasalenos ever wanted to know was, Dutch coming in. Now they welcome them.

And with the Brits, we see the way the Brits acted in the case of the British Virgin Islands where they closed down the government and they returned to crown colony. So what we are seeing in the Caribbean is a re-entry of the European imperial powers, if you want, invited by us. And I think we could get a lot of lessons in terms of how they interact with the islands from the Europeans. I think we have got to do that rather than going off like lonesome cowboys, thinking that the Caribbean is still our area of "can do," which it always has been. But that is over. It is too complicated.

Every island, as we saw in the case of Grenada—look, there is a case taking place in Dominica right now. They have an election coming up. Somebody mentioned the amount of Dominica's gross domestic product. The amount of money being spent in Dominica

for these elections is nearly \$9 million U.S. Where is this money coming from? And this is what we are seeing in island after island. The amount of money is ratcheting up—and you mustn't think that corruption is only at the lowest levels. Corruption in the Caribbean is at the highest levels of society, the highest levels of the society.

Mr. MACK. Dr. Maingot, if I could, because I only have 1 minute left. I would like, Dr. Griffith, if you could talk a little bit about what happens if we do nothing? And then on the other side of that question is, what do you think we need to do to enhance it and to make sure that we are successful?

Mr. GRIFFITH. If nothing happens, several consequences will result. I will give you five or six of them. Consequence number one, an increase of crime that scares tourists away, affecting tourism which is the bread and butter for most countries in the Caribbean. And this is even for a country like Jamaica that has bauxite, even for a country like the Dominican Republic that has minerals, even for a country like Trinidad and Tobago that has oil, tourism is a critical variable. Crime would have an impact not only on tourism that will undermine economic stability. It will have a deleterious effect on foreign investment.

Foreign investors do not want to go into an insecure opportunity environment because the amount of things it is going to increase the cost to do business. One of the phenomena we are seeing in the Caribbean—and it started with anglophone Caribbean in Trinidad—is a dramatic increase in private security partly because government forces, public citizens aren't able to do their job, people are now turning to it. If the foreign investor has to come and invest in private security just to have a sense of peace of mind, it will add to the cost of doing business. It will also be a disincentive.

So I think those are critical aspects of what are likely to happen. When you have an increased amount of crime, given the Internet that we have got, given the linkages between the United States and the Caribbean and the rest of the world, you are going to find increasing networks. Many people from the Caribbean are deported from the United States. What happens? They end up right back in the United States. There is a case where a guy was deported 13 times. Why? There is a network of document falsifications. So there is, beyond the criminal act, other illegal entities, other illegal activities like document falsification which are going to complicate the ability of the society as to the way they do business.

But I will tell you what else would happen if nothing else happens on the part of the United States of foreign investment. Other societies globally are going to try to fill the void. We saw it happening with China 5 or 6 years ago, and China is now in many parts of the Caribbean in significant ways. I was in Guyana last week, and I was surprised that there were two massive complexes. They said what are they doing here? The Chinese are going to be coming back more significantly. You are going to be finding it with the absence of an American inclusiveness the willingness of Hugo Chavez to be a little more bold and to push the envelope of engagement.

That would be deleterious to American geopolitical interests, but I think you are also likely to find that it may be an opportunity for other countries, some of whom would like to get a piece of the

Caribbean action. Russia is a significant investor and there is nothing wrong with foreign investment from Russian. In Guyana in the mining operation in the bauxite operation, the coal operation in Suriname, there are other players who are going to seize the opportunity where the United States will either stagnate its engagement or not to increase its engagement.

Let me spend 1 minute, Mr. Chairman, in responding to the other part of the question. What should the investment be? I say start with \$100 million. Start with \$100 million with the recognition that none of these problems is amenable to a short-term fix. Give it a 6-year duration. Make that two phases but critically do something else. Reduce the administrative costs of managing these programs. The reality is, in very many occasions, so much of the money does not get to the region because of administrative overheads, the way in which things are managed. One of the things I argued in the statement is, please don't create a new bureaucracy. Creating new bureaucracies are going to divest the sufficiency of funds for things to actually happen in the region.

So limit administrative overhead. Keep few conferences. Use existing instruments rather than having another conference of signed documents. Focus on the deliverables getting to the region to make a difference but do not think that these things are amenable to short quick fixes.

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. Mr. Meeks.

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me first, at the outset, acknowledge the presence, sitting in the audience, of Mr. Earl Simon who is a good friend and working hard at York College, and clearly, Dr. Griffith, we are proud of you. Your college sits in the heart of the Sixth Congressional District of New York. We like to say it is the brain of the district, and I think Dr. Griffith is exhibiting that today. We are proud of you and your work at York College.

So I just want to make sure that is clearly on the record. I also want to thank both of you for your testimony. I think that it has been quite excellent and enlightening, and I look forward to working more closely with you, with my friends, the diplomats from the Caribbean as we move forward. I know that the number one economy maker in the Caribbean is tourism.

But second to tourism, tell me, where is the violence? Because I think that both of have you indicated to me, unless we have some real economic development, unless people are able to have some money in their pockets to provide for their families, there is no way you are really going to reduce crime.

So we have got to create jobs. The other way that we have to justify, to be quite honest with you, some of the expenditures that we give in aid, et cetera, to some of the American citizens, we have got to show that there is some kind of relationship to the United States and the effect of it. What other industries would you say are being affected by drugs and/or crime in the Caribbean that we should have a focus on so that we can try to make sure that we have some development in creating opportunities? I was wondering if there have been any studies to quantify the economic impact and insecurity in other areas. I know tourism is number one, but other than tourism also.

Mr. GRIFFITH. Thank you, Congressman, for kind sentiments and endorsement for the work we are doing at York, which is a value not only to Queens, but to the entire New York City. There is a reality in many parts of the Caribbean where agriculture is a significant player and it is a significant player in the eastern Caribbean. It is a significant player in Jamaica. Agriculture is a significant player in Guyana. Part of that reality is a reality where in recent times but not only in recent times, the global impact is making it difficult for agricultural businessmen to make profits. One of the interesting outcomes of that is—and I know for a fact in Guyana—is that people have been shifting from agriculture to drugs. Why plant rice or bananas where you have got investments to make in having those products come to market when there is a low investment in marijuana? The point is then that the production of illegal substances—and again, production is a reality of the narcotics phenomenon. It is not simply trafficking, money laundering use. There is legal production in many parts of the Caribbean. To the extent that one produces more marijuana and less rice or less bananas, you are affecting the capability of the society as a whole but you are affecting the earning power of decent citizens to do their job in credible ways.

I wrote a book in 1997 called *Drugs and Security in the Caribbean: Sovereignty Under Siege*. I will be happy to send you a copy. And I spent part of that study making an estimate of some of the economic and social policy consequences of crime and drugs, consequences that have to do with a more significant need for investment. Jamaica had a reality, I think, in the year 1994, that it spent more money on national security and crime than it spent on education. What crime and drugs do is they skew the allocation of resources to social products. You have got to invest more in fighting crime. You have less to invest in education in potable water in housing.

So the reality of drugs has a multidimensional impact on society not only in focusing, shifting away from one area of the economy, maybe agriculture to something that is legal because it is more profitable. But it also impacts the availability of resources on the part of the government to be able to do things that are really in the interest of the people whether those things are education, whether those things are health or other things. I would be happy to send you a copy of that.

Mr. MACK. Let me just ask Mr. Maingot one question. That is simply, what do you see as the biggest challenges that we face in implementing CBSI, other than, I know, dollars? I heard that. But what is the biggest challenge you think in actually having an implementation that would be effective?

Mr. MAINGOT. The biggest challenge is that the forces of law and order in much of the Caribbean have lost all legitimacy. People do not believe in the police anymore. My paper is full of evidence from Trinidad. The exception is Barbados. But Barbados is the model for the rest of the Caribbean if we could only look at ourselves instead of going off to Singapore all the time to find a model. Barbados is the developed country of the third world, and they have no major natural resources. It is all based on education. And that is where we have to go because services are the only route we can go be-

cause we are a high wage region and we cannot compete with Mexico, much less with China.

We have to go with services but services require technical education. The biggest challenge we are going to face is the fact that the forces of law and order, you go to Jamaica and you sense it. It is called the tight lips culture. Nobody wants to testify against anybody. Nobody in Trinidad wants to testify against anybody. The police is completely distrusted, and that is the biggest challenge we have, that the local forces—because we can't go there and do it. We can't put boots on the ground. That, to me, is the biggest. And if we had more time, we would look at Jamaica as a case which really exemplifies what many of us could become where the drug dons rule, and that is why some of them cannot be extradited because if they are ever extradited, the people would come into the street and they would stop. They would stop that government.

There are big extradition cases going on right now, which is the talk in Jamaica, why is it that they are not extradited? They cannot because what has happened is the patronage that the politicians used to give out of their pockets or out of their collections have now been jacked up by the patrons given by the drug people. There is no competition, which makes the political system more or less captive of the drug money.

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. Mr. Delahunt.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to agree with an observation by Dr. Griffith, and then I want to ask Mr. Maingot some questions. I can't agree more that we have to deal with what the realities are. I would submit that realities have to be fact-based to begin with and to rely on assumptions or opinions or platitudes gets us in trouble. I can't agree more. That is why we have to really examine the facts. Let's start with facts.

Dr. Maingot, you made a statement about who has a higher rate of homicide than Jamaica?

Mr. MAINGOT. Trinidad and Tobago.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Trinidad and Tobago.

Mr. MAINGOT. And we have one-fifth the population of Jamaica.

Mr. DELAHUNT. In Trinidad?

Mr. MAINGOT. Yeah, 1.2 million.

Mr. DELAHUNT. And you indicated the most significant problem facing these countries is confidence in law enforcement because of the level of drugs.

Mr. MAINGOT. Absolutely.

Mr. DELAHUNT. We heard a lot about Hugo Chavez today. Is he responsible for that lack of confidence in the police in Trinidad and Tobago?

Mr. MAINGOT. Well, there is no doubt that Venezuela is the big exporter of drugs. Oh, massive. Air and boat. Of course, 90 percent of the drugs—Venezuela doesn't produce or manufacture drugs. Ninety percent come from Colombia. My opinion, and I put it in the paper—is that Mr. Chavez has lost control over his forces of law and order. The level of corruption in the Venezuelan Guardia Nacional especially is total. He also has some people pretty close to him that are benefiting from the trade. Whether Mr. Chavez has a design to undermine these countries, I doubt that very much. I have very serious doubts about that thesis.

Mr. DELAHUNT. All right. Let me get back to my original line of questioning, and you referenced the two about does it make sense to look at the Caribbean area in terms of security, specifically in terms of dealing with the interdiction of drugs without implicating Cuba into the equation?

Mr. MAINGOT. It makes no sense at all.

Mr. DELAHUNT. It is dumb, is that basically what you are saying?

Mr. MAINGOT. Exactly. By the way, Cuba has an incipient drug problem. My last trip there, I was astonished to hear drug talk. [Speaking Spanish.] Let's go and take a snort of a line. That is drug talk that you hear in Miami, well, other places.

Mr. DELAHUNT. You hear it in Miami, but you don't hear it—

Mr. MAINGOT. You hear it in Cuba now. The drugs are penetrating Cuba.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Well, no authoritarian state countenances drug use because it erodes the state. This is obviously, you know, describing Cuba as a democracy where there is freedom of travel, freedom of information, et cetera, that falls outside. How would you recommend—would you recommend to the United States Government that on the issue of drugs that it makes common sense to work with the Cuban Government? Where we have had a very positive experience—and maybe you can answer that, and then maybe you, Dr. Griffith.

Mr. MAINGOT. Congressman, I regard American policy toward Cuba as one of the most shortsighted policies. It is based on vindictiveness and punishment, not on serious geopolitical measures because the fact of the matter is, I am not advocating diplomatic relations. Cuba has over 300 political prisoners of—

Mr. DELAHUNT. What you are suggesting is that it is in our best interest to work on these particular interests. It is about our security?

Mr. MAINGOT. Lift the embargo. Our policy toward Cuba poisons our relations with the rest of Latin America. The silver bullet would be to remove that policy and we would be much better off.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Let me ask you this, do you think, given your experience—and Dr. Griffith, I would appreciate your response as well—do you think engagement on Cuba on these discrete, specific issues would be welcomed by the Caribbean community?

Mr. MAINGOT. Absolutely. That is my opinion.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Dr. Griffith?

Mr. GRIFFITH. One of the regional forums in the Caribbean that is part of the counter crime, counternarcotics enterprise is something called the Association of Caribbean Commissions of Police, and I regularly attended the meetings. And I remember when we met in the Cayman Islands in the 1990s. There was a concerted effort to reach out to Cuba because there was a coincidence of interest between the Caribbean and Cuba. The stumbling block was the United States that said, were you to reach out to Cuba, your funding on X, Y, and Z would be pulled. Cuba recognizes the drug problem is a transnational problem. Cuba recognizes that it has not only the addiction consequences but criminality consequences. Cuba is in the business of trying to survive dealing with this reality. I think it would make sense that absent diplomatic relations

being fully restored that there be selective and graduated collaboration.

It has been going on for more than a decade. I remember 1997, there was a ship called The Limerick. It left Colombia with drugs into Cuba. Cuba actually confiscated and turned the drugs over to the United States. Now the folks in Miami where I was living at the time were not very happy. The Cubans even sent people to Miami to testify. They are willing to engage.

Mr. DELAHUNT. But we had to be quiet about that. We had to do it in whispers.

Mr. GRIFFITH. Very much. All sorts of things had to be not said. I think it is the persistence of a foolhardy approach not to embrace the players, and Cuba has been willing. If you look at the allocation of funding from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime that has helped Caribbean countries and other countries over the years, Cuba is one of the biggest beneficiaries because they recognize they have a got a multitude of problems. They are domestic political realities to be contended with but I think notwithstanding those realities, it is in the Caribbean's national interest, it is the United States' national interest, it is in Cuba's national interest to have a coincidence of those interests that allows for a selective but graduated engagement on the business of drugs.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you. And maybe we can accomplish that if we do it in whispers. Thank you, and I yield back.

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. I don't know if that should be the last word, but it will be.

Mr. GRIFFITH. You are the chairman. You have the last word.

Mr. ENGEL. I want to thank our witnesses for the very excellent testimony. This is one of those hearings where you listen and you learn a lot, and it seems very easy to me that we need money to solve a problem. You can't just throw good money after bad. But if we are careful in how we spend it and what we use it for, it is clear to me that we can do some really good things with our neighbors in the Caribbean. I heard President Obama at the Summit of the Americas in Trinidad, and he was a rock star there. I told him when I saw him after that, "You were a rock star," because everyone hung on his every word.

And the words were very good. Now we have to make sure that the words are not just words and that we all, working together, make those words a reality because it has always occurred to me that while we do have pressing problems all around the world, the problems that we have at home are really the problems that we should take care of first.

When I talk about home, I mean, the Western Hemisphere and particularly since we have such a close relationship with our Caribbean friends, it is really very, very important to put our heads together and work again with them—not tell them but work with them in finding out what the best way to combat these problems. Because they are not just problems that affect the nations of the Caribbean. They affect the United States as well.

I always give this speech when I talk about Mexico but what is said about Mexico is the same thing for the Caribbean as well. When I sat with the Prime Minister of Jamaica and he gave me those statistics about how more than 90 percent of the guns com-

mitting crimes come from the United States, well, you know that is not just a Jamaican problem. It is a problem for the United States as well. So I thank our witnesses. Again, I thank all the distinguished ambassadors who came and stayed. Very impressive. I have to report back to your governments and say that they have appointed some good people in Washington. We are happy to have you.

And as always, you know that I always have an open door policy. I am happy to speak with any or all of my friends from the Caribbean any time you want to talk about it because it is a subject that is very, very important to me. So again, I thank you. I thank Mr. Mack, Mr. Meeks and Mr. Delahunt. The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 5:01 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Eliot L. Engel (D-NY), Chairman

December 7, 2009

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

You are respectfully requested to attend the following OPEN hearing of the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, to be held in Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building:

DATE: Wednesday, December 9, 2009
TIME: 2:00 p.m.
SUBJECT: New Direction or Old Path? Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI)

WITNESSES: **Panel I**

Ms. Julissa Reynoso
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs
U. S. Department of State

Panel II

Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith, Ph.D.
Provost & Senior Vice President for Academic Affairs
York College
The City University of New York

Anthony P. Maingot, Ph.D.
Professor Emeritus of Sociology
National Security Scholar-in-Residence
Florida International University

Mr. Stephen Johnson
*(Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Western Hemisphere Affairs)*

By Direction of the Chairman

The Committee on Foreign Affairs seeks to make its facilities accessible to persons with disabilities. If you are in need of special accommodations, please call 202/225-3021 at least four business days in advance of the event, whenever practicable. Questions with regard to special accommodations in general (including availability of Committee materials in alternative formats and assistive listening devices) may be directed to the Committee as noted above.

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

MINUTES OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON WHEM MEETING

Day Wednesday Date 12-09-09 Room 2172 RHOB

Starting Time 2:18 p.m. Ending Time 5:01 p.m.

Recesses 1 (2:57 to 3:30)

Presiding Member(s) Eliot L. Engel

CHECK ALL OF THE FOLLOWING THAT APPLY:

Open Session Electronically Recorded (taped)
 Executive (closed) Session Stenographic Record
 Televised

TITLE OF HEARING or BILLS FOR MARKUP: *(Include bill number(s) and title(s) of legislation.)*
"New Direction or Old Path? Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI)"

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:
Eliot L. Engel (D-NY), Connie Mack (R-FL), Gregory W. Meeks (D-NY), Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ)

NON-SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: *(Mark with an * if they are not Members of HIRC.)*
Bill Delahunt (D-MA)

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes No
(If "no", please list below and include title, agency, department, or organization.)


STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: *(List any statements submitted for the record.)*
Engel, Mack, Questions for the Record: Engel & Delahunt, Statement Provided by Caribbean-Central American Action

ACTIONS TAKEN DURING THE MARKUP: *(Attach copies of legislation and amendments.)*

RECORDED VOTES TAKEN (FOR MARKUP): *(Attach final vote tally sheet listing each member.)*

Subject	Yeas	Nays	Present	Not Voting

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE _____
 or
 TIME ADJOURNED 5:01 pm


 Subcommittee Staff Director

**The Honorable Connie Mack
Ranking Member
Western Hemisphere Subcommittee Hearing
New Direction or Old Path? Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI).
December 9, 2009**

I want to thank Chairman Engel for holding this hearing today. It has been a pleasure working with him on issues that are important to the hemisphere.

I would also like to thank our witnesses for being here. I especially would like to thank Steve Johnson for coming today. I know that he has a very tight schedule and might have to leave before we get to him, but I believe that it is very important that we hear his perspective.

Before we begin, Mr. Chairman, I would like to touch on something that happened in Honduras yesterday.

As some of you already know, Honduras' top fighter against narco-trafficking was brutally assassinated. Like the Caribbean, Central America is fighting hard against narco-traffickers and this is just another example of what we are facing – Cowardly thugs who will stop at nothing to weaken governments and terrorize the people.

This is also a reminder to us all that the Obama Administration must restore military cooperation with the Hondurans. They are flying blind in a tough fight against narco-terrorists and the one country that could help them defeat the drug traffickers continues to stand still while the innocent are killed.

Mr. Chairman, the nations of the Caribbean are instrumental in our fight against narco-trafficking. My own State of Florida has firsthand experience with the repercussions of a violent Caribbean. In the 1980's, drugs were flown from South America through the Caribbean with a destination point in Florida; creating great havoc across the streets of South Florida.

History seems to be repeating itself.

While narco-traffickers moved to Central America and Mexico in the 1990s, we have seen a shift due to Mexican President Calderon's tenacity.

As Mexico works hard to defeat narco-traffickers, a balloon like effect is triggered and trafficking is now originating in South America, cutting through the Caribbean and either heading to North Africa, Europe, or Florida. And as if a rising storm was approaching the islands of the Caribbean, we must make sure that these nations are prepared Mr. Chairman.

If we do not, this problem will not only affect the lives of the Caribbean people, but it will also affect the lives of thousands of Floridians and Americans across our great nation.

We have all seen the facts.

High murder rates; increased air smuggling from Venezuela; overburdened prosecutors and judges; dead bodies in the canals and straits of the Caribbean.

In fact, when looking at the statistics, it seems as if a battle between David and Goliath is occurring in the Caribbean nations.

To add insult to injury, Venezuelan leader Hugo Chavez has become a co-conspirator in this fight.

Unlike President Calderon in Mexico and President Uribe in Colombia, both of whom deserve great recognition for their efforts, Hugo Chavez has ceded his airspace to thousands of drug smuggling flights.

Not only that, Hugo Chavez and his family have become partners in the narco business, taking a once proud nation to the what now looks more like an abyss.

As we address the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, we must take a close look at some very key issues.

For instance:

Do the Caribbean nations have the capacity to absorb the help they need?

Is the new funding under the CBSI really new? Or will it simply replace old projects?

How dangerous is it that some of the very countries that might be included in the CBSI are the ones that belong to ALBA, an organization that is led by Hugo Chavez?

Although we might have our own views on what should be done in the Caribbean, what have those nations said they would like to see done?

As we hear from our panel today, these are some of the points that I would like to address.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Deputy Assistant Secretary by
Representative Eliot Engel (#1)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
December 9, 2009**

Question (A)

Will the State Department establish a Coordinator to oversee CBSI? If so, who will be the coordinator within State with specific daily responsibility (from which bureau/office/desk)? Would a CBSI coordinator oversee other State Bureaus and work with other agencies?

Answer

The Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, Office of Caribbean Affairs (WHA/CAR) has a two-person CBSI unit responsible for day-to-day interagency coordination, development, and implementation at the working level. WHA's Office of Policy Planning and Coordination (WHA/PPC) manages strategic planning and budgeting aspects of CBSI. CAR and PPC, as well as WHA's Senior Coordinator for Hemispheric Security, maintain routine contact with counterparts from other bureaus, agencies, embassies, and other foreign government representatives responsible for regional security issues.

This extensive coordination takes place under the overall authority and oversight of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Caribbean, the Assistant Secretary for WHA and, ultimately, the Secretary.

Question (B)

In what manner will CBSI be coordinated with other State bureaus expected to have a role such as INL or PM?

Answer

The CBSI unit in WHA/CAR works directly with counterparts in other bureaus on CBSI development and implementation. Both INL and PM have

already identified working level officers responsible for CBSI, and we maintain regular contact through formal and informal working groups.

Question (C)

How will CBSI be coordinated with other programs such as the Merida Initiative and the Andean Counterdrug Initiative since each covers different regions?

Answer

CBSI is designed to address the unique threats facing the Caribbean while complementing our ongoing efforts in Mexico, Central America, and South America. WHA will ensure that CBSI is seamlessly coordinated within the Bureau, the Department of State, and with other agencies and international partners. Each regional office within WHA has a working-level security partnership coordination mechanism (Merida Mexico, Central America, CBSI, and Colombia). Additionally, the bureau's Office of Policy Planning and Coordination (WHA/PPC) provides bureau-wide guidance and coordination for strategic planning and budgeting that will assist in policy development and implementation.

Additionally, coordination is facilitated by overlapping interagency working groups where many core participants are constant from agency to agency. In fact, our interagency colleagues who are involved in our partnerships with Colombia, Mexico, and Central America have begun outlining ways to build upon previous regional partnerships and implement new programs to bridge security relationships across each initiative recognizing both the political and geographic commonalities and differences inherent to each sub-region.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Deputy Assistant Secretary by
Representative Eliot Engel (#2)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
December 9, 2009**

Question

What is State's perspective on including non-independent countries in CBSI, especially since some of these countries like Aruba, the Netherlands Antilles, and the French Caribbean already engage in counterdrug cooperation with the United States? Could these non-independent countries be included in CBSI for planning/coordination purposes though not necessarily for direct assistance? To what extent are other countries from outside the region - such as Canada, the U.K. or France - interested in cooperating on CBSI? Is the U.S. encouraging such CBSI cooperation in order to maximize assistance?

Answer

We have reached out to various traditional Caribbean partners which maintain differing degrees of political involvement with Caribbean nations. These include: Canada, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, France, and Spain. All have expressed interest in being directly involved in CBSI. The extent of our shared efforts will be determined by the types and amount of resources each partner is able to provide. We also intend on building upon developed partnerships with dependencies like Aruba and the Netherland Antilles.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Deputy Assistant Secretary by
Representative Eliot Engel (#3)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
December 9, 2009**

Question

Is there any concern that countries like Venezuela may twist CBSI into some sort of threat in the same manner seen in the campaign against the U.S.-Colombia Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA)? What proactive steps can be taken along with our Caribbean partners to ensure an accurate perception of CBSI takes hold in the region?

Answer

Our partnership aims to curb illicit trafficking and advance citizen safety. These threats are common throughout the hemisphere. As with the Caribbean, Central America, Colombia, and Mexico, any partnership to reduce illicit trafficking is in the interest of the Venezuelan people who are increasingly affected by the violence associated with transnational criminal organizations operating in or around Venezuela. We will continue to promote a greater awareness of the interconnected and interrelated threats of illicit trafficking to citizens throughout the hemisphere.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Deputy Assistant Secretary by
Representative Eliot Engel (#4)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
December 9, 2009**

Question

The Foreign Operations appropriation bill requires \$21 million of the total \$37 million in initial funding be used for “social justice and education programs to include vocational training, workforce development and juvenile justice activities. Is the remaining \$16 million in funding sufficient to combat drug trafficking, enhance maritime security, increase institution building, and promote anti-corruption activities discussed in the three CBSI meetings in 2009? Will State reprogram \$8 million to meet the President’s request of \$45million?

Answer

CBSI represents a forward-looking approach to hemispheric threats associated with illicit trafficking. We aim to provide targeted support that will strengthen the Caribbean nations’ own efforts to proactively counter these threats jointly. This approach necessitates a significant USG capital investment in programs and partnerships which address the immediate causes of increasing violent crime throughout the region.

Our Caribbean partners are contributing resources to this effort. FY10 USG funding will leverage parallel investments made by Caribbean governments and communities, build upon previous and existing USG and Caribbean activities, and support lower cost programs to help Caribbean partners more effectively employ existing resources in a more coordinated fashion.

We are reviewing the recently passed appropriation bill’s funding levels and restrictions; however, the goals and strategy behind CBSI will not change. We look forward to briefing you or your staff on our programmatic intentions for FY10 once this review is complete.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Deputy Assistant Secretary by
Representative Eliot Engel (#5)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
December 9, 2009**

Question (A)

Please confirm whether Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Belize will fall under CBSI or the Merida Initiative or under both programs?

Answer

Moving forward, we view Haiti and the Dominican Republic as key partners in CBSI. While linguistic and cultural differences between these two countries and the rest of the Caribbean exist, the security of both countries is key to resolving the challenges facing the rest of the region. Belize is a member of CARICOM and is culturally linked to the Caribbean. However, it is inextricably linked to Central America because of geography. While it will be important for Belize to be part of the CBSI dialogue process, we believe Belize should continue to receive funding from Merida and not from CBSI.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Deputy Assistant Secretary by
Representative Eliot Engel (#5)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
December 9, 2009**

Question (B)

It has come to my attention that none of the money appropriated for Haiti under the Merida Initiative has been spent. Could the State Department provide details on the funding under the Merida Initiative to the Dominican Republic and Haiti? Specifically, could the appropriation, obligation, and expenditure dates for funds under the Merida Initiative be listed for each country? In addition, could a list be created of what has been expended in both countries and what is planned?

Answer

There has been significant activity in laying the groundwork for the effective coordination and disbursement of assistance under the Merida Initiative that is not reflected in the “expended funds” levels outlined below. Furthermore, significant program implementation is also underway that is not reflected in “expended funds” due to the nature of procurement, billing, invoicing, and reporting systems.

For the Dominican Republic (DR), Merida Projects are well underway. Significant strides have been made in the development and training of DR police, which have improved their capacity to combat the illicit trafficking of narcotics, firearms, explosives, and human beings. Merida funds have also been supporting the Judicial System which trains police, prosecutors and judges as they transition through the implementation of the new code of criminal procedures. \$781,117 has been committed or subobligated towards these projects.

Dominican Republic

- Appropriations FY2008: \$2.5M INCLE
- Obligation: \$2.5M, Letter of Agreement signed June 26, 2009
- Expenditures: \$54,662

- Appropriations FY2009: \$2.5M INCLE
- Obligation: \$0, INL is currently working on the obligating document for FY09 funds
- Expenditures: \$0

For Haiti, Merida projects are in the initial stages of implementation and no funds have been formally expended. The Letter of Agreement obligating FY2008 Merida funds was signed on April 30, 2009. Since then, significant energy has been put into reaching agreement with Haitian officials on the technical aspects of the Merida projects. For example, INL's Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) has established a working group within the Haitian National Police to ensure that the national communications capability we are planning to provide the HNP is fully integrated into the existing network in Port au Prince. Similarly, for the interdiction project, the NAS is working with architects from the government of Haiti and the UN to develop engineering drawings for the port facilities construction on Haiti's northern coast. We anticipate Haiti's FY08 Merida- funded projects will be fully implemented over the course of the next year. Specifically, once the ongoing Haiti security review process led by Counselor Cheryl Mills is complete, we intend to use remaining funds to support security programs identified by the review.

Haiti

- Appropriations FY2008: \$2.5M INCLE
- Obligation: \$2.5M, Letter of Agreement signed April 30, 2009
- Expenditures: \$0
- Appropriations FY2009: \$2.5M INCLE
- Obligation: \$0, INL is currently working on the obligating document for FY09 funds
- Expenditures: \$0

**Question for the Record Submitted to
Deputy Assistant Secretary by
Representative Bill Delahunt
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
December 9, 2009**

Mr. DelaHunt. Is there any data that indicates that there has been such an increase [in drug flows into Honduras since the coup] or a spike up that you are aware of?

Ms. Reynoso. The amount of narcotics being trafficked through Honduras remains unacceptably high, and we remain concerned about this problem. Even before the coup, trafficking through Honduras in 2009 was increasing; post-coup, the upward trend continued. With this increase in trafficking there has also been an accompanying increase in violent crime, including high-profile killings suspected to be related to the drug trade, such as the assassination of Honduras' National Director of Counternarcotics, General Aristides Gonzalez on December 8. The homicide rate in Honduras was 58 per 100,000 people in 2008, and UNDP predicts the rate will exceed 60 in 2009.

With our Honduran law enforcement counterparts, we continue to maintain productive information and intelligence exchanges in the fight against drug trafficking. We look forward to the restoration of democratic order in Honduras so that the full range of USG engagement with the Honduran government can move forward. Elsewhere in Central America, the United States continues to support counternarcotics operations.



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**Written Testimony of
Anton Edmunds
Executive Director and CEO, Caribbean Central American Action
Submitted to the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee
Committee on Foreign Affairs
United States House of Representatives
Hearing on: "New Direction or Old Path? Caribbean Basin Security
Initiative (CBSI)"
December 9, 2009**

Caribbean Central American Action (CCAA) appreciates the opportunity to submit testimony on behalf of our member companies regarding the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI).

CCAA is a non-governmental, charitable organization incorporated in 1980. CCAA's mission of ***Strengthening The Third Border***[®] is centered on promoting private sector-led sustainable economic development in Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) beneficiary countries by stimulating a constructive dialogue between the private and public sectors to improve the policy and regulatory environments for business on both the international and local level. CCAA is governed by an international Board of Trustees.

CCAA has long been concerned about the region being used as a shipment point for illicit contraband, and about the related increase in crime and violence that threaten the populations and stability of these important neighbors. Furthermore, over the past two decades the countries of the Caribbean have made tremendous advances in the areas of social and economic development and democracy, all of which threaten to be undermined by the very virulent problem of insecurity.

The CBSI can be a credible step in recognizing that a partnership with the countries of the Caribbean is fundamental for the United States' protection of its own borders. We would caution, however, that the \$45 million allocated so far should be viewed as a starting point, not an end unto itself. To cite some of the realities that must be taken into account:

1. Livelihoods are at risk: the Caribbean is a net importer of US goods and services. Crime and insecurity weaken the business sector; they increase the cost of doing business and often force small and medium enterprises to close.
2. Tourism, the lifeblood of the majority of the regional economies is at risk: a majority of US international travel is to the Caribbean and crime and insecurity destabilizes the industry.
3. Democracy is at risk: insecurity thrives in weak societies. Haiti is an example of how tens of millions of dollars have been invested to combat insecurity to give democracy a chance to take hold. We do not claim that the rest of the Caribbean is in immediate danger of becoming hostage to criminal elements that will require foreign military presence to remove. However strategic investment today, starting with the CBSI and moving forward is the best guarantee against having to make costly adjustments should crime get out of control.

Over the past decade this organization has focused attention on security in the Caribbean Basin, primarily in the area of maritime security as a critical link to securing the United States borders and ensuring the existence of a secure supply trade chain. We would like to state for the record that the Committee should consider assisting the region in its efforts to strengthen this important area.

Logistically, what we are talking about is a region 3 - 4 days steaming time from major U.S. ports/markets on the East and Gulf Coasts (NY/NJ, Norfolk, Jacksonville, Miami, Tampa, and Houston). Our concern continues to be the fact that there is no regional security framework to protect a region so important to us.

With approximately 90% of world trade moving in shipping containers and almost half of all incoming trade (by value) to the U.S. arriving by ship, the Caribbean serves as a major transshipment hub for the global movement of cargo. As mentioned prior, the countries within CARICOM themselves are largely dependent on trade with the United States and as with tourism, where 80 cents of every dollar spent in the region comes to the US, it should be noted that this is one of the few regions of the world where we enjoy a trade surplus.

The problem that exists in the region, which we at CCAA have tackled with some success, is the region's ability to implement systems to address security compliance concerns. Though we have supported the international framework involving the voluntary cooperation between the relevant government authorities and the shipping and port industries engaged in international trade to detect, deter and defuse security threats and implement preventative measures, we are faced today with the fact that there are many countries that are struggling to maintain that compliance, because they cannot afford it.

We must ensure that the CBSI and programs like it support Caribbean compliance with security requirements. This can help them and us address issues such as narcotics and

small arms trafficking. It is by building on our successes with these, our willing partners that we ensure a safe hemisphere.

Though we already support some of the countries of the region through initiatives such as the Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism (CTPAT), the Container screening initiative (CSI) and the Megaports Initiative, unfortunately, these programs leave most countries in the region out of the closed trading loop that characterizes US-Caribbean trading relations. Hopefully the CBSI will support expansion of elements of these programs to the smaller countries and be used to develop a common framework.

In closing, if we truly want to help this region, we must recognize it as a major transshipment center of global trade. We must see port and customs security as the “front door” to supply chain security and border control. We must also press for the development of a regional standard for this region consistent with global best practices. Ultimately we must invest in the development of a framework consistent with our own Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA). This can only be accomplished by conducting a holistic review of where our neighbors are in terms of current agreements/partnerships between nations with regard to security services or training.

To return to the fundamental question: is the CBSI a new direction or an old path? A regional approach is a solid new direction – cooperation and resources are essential to real solutions to a multi-level problem. To avoid going down an old path we would advise a multi-year program that meets the challenges on all fronts: transportation security, strengthening the criminal justice system, building and supporting enforcement capacity. To make a true difference there must be commitment, and an understanding that strengthening the Caribbean strengthens the United States.

Thank you.

