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Chairman Wexler, Ranking Member Gallegly, Members of this Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the recent U.S.-Russia Summit in Moscow and its implications for the bilateral relationship, global and regional security challenges, and American national interests. I have long been a teacher, scholar, and analyst of Russian foreign and security relations, but preparing for and participating in the Moscow summit was my first opportunity to contribute to the practical policy work of developing and implementing America’s strategy for working with Russia where possible in order to protect and advance American national interests. I am privileged to be asked to report on the results of the Summit and answer your questions.

When Vice President Biden declared in February at the Munich Wehrkunde conference that “It’s time to press the reset button,” he set in motion a process of working to create a better foundation for pragmatic cooperation in areas where the U.S. and Russia agree, as well as structures to address our differences where we do not. Simply declaring the reset itself did not create a more pragmatic relationship: it created an atmosphere in which laying the foundation would be possible in order to better secure American interests. His statement was followed by an intensive and productive series of meetings at the highest levels, including between President Obama and President Medvedev in London in April, as well as numerous working level bilateral meetings.

The Moscow Summit was therefore the first opportunity to test whether the reset of U.S.-Russia relations could produce pragmatic results, and it did. It was a test of whether the U.S. and Russia can work together to address core defense and security challenges, including strategic arms reductions, Afghanistan, proliferation of dangerous technologies, military relations, and missile defense – and the results were strikingly positive. At the same time, the discussions highlighted and did not shy from important security issues on which the U.S. and Russia are far from agreement, including Georgia’s security and territorial integrity, NATO’s role in European security, and conventional arms control in Europe. But the fact of those disagreements cannot be avoided, and the summit provided an opportunity for President Obama to re-affirm American policies and commitments directly to the Russian leadership.

In my testimony today, I would like to highlight the specific agreements, areas of productive discussion, and our plans to advance in these areas of progress after the summit. I will also address the challenges where the U.S. and Russia did not agree, making clear that our work now will also focus on securing our relationships and interests even as we continue to seek dialogue and improved understandings with Russia.

### **Summit successes in defense and security relations**

The summit was thus successful beyond expectations, and most notably in the area of defense and security. Of the 8 agreements and statements signed at the Moscow summit, 7 addressed defense and security

challenges. Beyond the specific agreements, the success is measured in the pattern of pragmatic negotiations and constructive discussion, before and during the summit. The ongoing test of the reset will be whether Russia will continue to engage in the pragmatic cooperation and serious negotiations we have seen in the past months.

#### AFGHANISTAN AND THE MILITARY TRANSIT AGREEMENT

President Medvedev has stated on numerous occasions that Afghanistan is a Russian-American common cause. Earlier this year, we began to transit non-military goods through Russia, using a NATO-Russia arrangement. At the April meeting in London, President Medvedev offered to allow transit of military material through Russia as well. After weeks of intensive and constructive negotiations, Bill Burns, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, and Foreign Minister Lavrov signed a bilateral agreement which will allow transit of lethal materiel and personnel through Russian airspace. The agreement permits up to 4,500 military and unlimited commercial flights. It will save the United States as much as \$133 million over the use of other routes, allows us to diversify our supply lines, and reduces transit times and fuel usage. This route will be in addition to others we already use in the region, multiplying our options and increasing our flexibility. We will continue to use all available routes to Afghanistan and not become overly dependent on any one of them. We hope to start utilizing the agreement as soon as it enters into force, on or about September 6, 60 days from the date of signing.

The lethal transit agreement is part of a broader improvement in U.S.-Russian cooperation on Afghanistan, as reflected in a joint statement issued at the summit. In Moscow, the U.S. delegation had the opportunity to view a training center at Domodedovo, where Afghan police officers had been trained through the NATO-Russia Council Counter-Narcotics Project. We are thinking together about how to go forward with future counternarcotics cooperation.

#### MILITARY-TO-MILITARY COOPERATION

Good relations between militaries form a sound building block for good relations between countries and we are working with the Russian MOD and General Staff to improve on the military-to-military programs we had before they were suspended as a result of the war in Georgia. During the summit, Admiral Mullen and General Makarov signed a new Framework on Military-to-Military Cooperation. This Framework will change the nature of the relationship, which will be based on principles of pragmatism, parity, reciprocity, balance, and synchronization with NATO. The Framework establishes conditions that will raise military cooperation to a new qualitative level and deepen mutual understanding between our respective armed forces.

We have agreed on a work plan which will include nearly 20 exchanges and operational events before the end of the year, including a strategic discussion between the U.S. Joint Staff and the Russian General Staff, orientation for Russian military cadets at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, planning for a joint exercise to respond to a hijacked aircraft in national and international airspace, visit of the faculty of the Russian Combined Arms Academy to the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center at Ft. Leavenworth, and a naval war game conducted by the Kuznetsov Naval Academy and the U.S. Naval War College. In addition, the U.S. European Command and the Russian Ministry of Defense have agreed to meet to plan a robust and more ambitious work plan for 2010.

#### POW-MIA COMMISSION AGREEMENT

The U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs is meant to serve as the forum through which both nations seek to determine the fates of their missing servicemen. The Russian side has not participated in the commission in recent years. However, at the summit, with an exchange of diplomatic notes, the U.S. and

Russia renewed the work of the Commission, reaffirming the importance of it as a forum through which both nations seek to determine the fates of their missing servicemen.

## START AND STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS

The Summit also resulted in the Joint Understanding on the basic framework for the START Follow-on treaty, a central security issue in our bilateral relationship, but one with implications for global security as well. In Moscow, the Presidents agreed to a limit in the range of 500-1100 strategic delivery vehicles and 1500-1675 of their associated warheads within seven years of the Treaty's entry into force, compared to the maximum level allowable under the expiring START Treaty's 1600 launch vehicles and the Moscow Treaty's 2200 warheads. It is important to note that these ranges will not necessarily be included in the final text of the Treaty; they are the subject of continuing negotiations. In addition:

- The treaty will combine the predictability of START and the flexibility of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT – the Moscow Treaty), borrowing from the best elements of START on definitions, data exchanges, notifications, eliminations, inspections and verification procedures, as well as confidence building and transparency measures.
- The Treaty will be in effect for ten years, unless it is superseded before that time by a subsequent treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive arms.
- The Presidents also agreed to direct their negotiators to finish work on the treaty soon so that they may sign and submit it for ratification in their respective countries.

In his speech to graduates of Moscow's New Economic School, President Obama reiterated America's commitment "to stopping nuclear proliferation, and ultimately seeking a world without nuclear weapons." The steps initiated at this month's summit represent an important demonstration of U.S. and Russian leadership fulfilling their obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and contribute to a successful 2010 NPT Review Conference.

## MISSILE DEFENSE

While we made progress on START and nuclear security, missile defense remains a difficult issue. Nevertheless, we were able to make some progress in laying the groundwork for cooperation in future.

At the Summit, President Medvedev agreed to conduct a Joint Ballistic Missile Threat Assessment, which will be primarily focused on Iran and North Korea. We hope that the Threat Assessment will offer an effective venue in which to discuss and explain our respective viewpoints. The first meeting of the Joint Threat Assessment will be conducted in Moscow at the end of this month.

To develop more effective technical cooperation, we have also pledged to redouble our efforts to open the long-planned Joint Data Exchange Center in Moscow. This center will allow us to share missile launch data with each other and will reduce or even eliminate the chances for an inadvertent launch due to misunderstandings over a test launch or other benign missile launch. We believe that through this center we could also exchange data from third country launches, information that would be of obvious benefit to both parties.

The Department is taking a comprehensive look at our plans for European BMD as a part of the ongoing Ballistic Missile Defense Review. Initial results will likely be available by the fall. We will look to the outcome of that process to guide our next steps. Our decisions on how to proceed with missile defense in Europe naturally will be dictated by our own national security interests, taking into account our security

commitments to friends and allies, by the nature of the threat, and by the cost and technical effectiveness of any proposed missile defense systems. But as we move forward, the steps initiated at the Moscow Summit will provide an excellent opportunity to engage Russia constructively on how the United States and Russia could cooperate in protecting our populations from nuclear and ballistic missile threats from Iran and elsewhere.

## NUCLEAR SECURITY COOPERATION

Another high-priority issue for the President at the Summit was ensuring the security of nuclear materials and facilities, and strengthening our cooperation with the Russians to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. President Obama and President Medvedev agreed to broaden cooperation to increase the level of security of nuclear facilities worldwide. We also remain committed to implementing the Plutonium Disposition Agreement, through which we will dispose of 34 metric tons each of weapons-grade plutonium. Both presidents emphasized the importance of dealing with the threat of nuclear proliferation and taking measures to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. We believe the Russians are open to more significant cooperation in this area as they share our goal of ensuring that additional countries in the Middle East and Asia do not seek nuclear weapons.

### **Recognizing Differences in Security Relations**

The Summit offered an opportunity for the U.S. to clearly affirm our commitment to the security and stability of countries throughout Europe and Eurasia. President Obama affirmed our commitment to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all countries -- naming particularly Georgia and Ukraine, and the right of all countries to choose membership in alliances -- including NATO. That the Russian leadership offered alternative views was not surprising, nor a measure of failure of the summit: it was a measure of how much work we have to do and how important it is for the U.S. government to commit to it.

## AFFIRMING SECURITY IN EUROPE AND EURASIA

We continue to support the sovereignty of all states regardless of geographic location. President Obama clearly and repeatedly made this point while in Moscow, in both public statements and private meetings. We do not accept zero-sum thinking regarding security in Europe and Eurasia, and we continue to believe that stable democracies on Russia's borders contribute to not only Europe's security, but to Russia's as well. In that vein, we stand by our commitment to continue to strongly support building partner capacity and establishing strong security cooperation programs with our partners in the region.

One of the clear areas of disagreement on security at the summit was Georgia. President Obama made clear during his meetings with President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin that U.S. support for Georgia's sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity is steadfast and unequivocal. This clear commitment was further reinforced last week with Vice President Biden's visit to Tbilisi, as well as to Kyiv where he stated, "We do not recognize -- and I want to reiterate it -- any spheres of influence. We do not recognize anyone else's right to dictate to you or any other country what alliance to belong to or what bilateral relationships you have."

The U.S. is building constructive defense relationships with countries throughout Europe and Eurasia. We are implementing the U.S.-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership, which seeks to deepen our strong legacy of bilateral cooperation in a wide array of areas, including defense. The U.S. will continue to support Georgia and will engage in security assistance to build Georgian capabilities for defense and for contributing to ISAF in Afghanistan. We regret that Russia blocked the extension of the OSCE's and UN mission in Georgia, and that we unfortunately could not come to agreement with Russia on international access for monitors in Georgia's separatist regions. However, we continue to believe that the need for international

monitoring is great, and we are working with European friends and partners to continue to engage and to impress upon Russia the importance of this effort in contributing to regional security. We must work with our international partners – including the UN, OSCE and EU - to improve the security and humanitarian situation throughout Georgia and to increase international access to the separatist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. We will maintain solidarity with the international community in refusing to recognize the independence of these separatist regions of Georgia. With our European allies, we also continue to press Russia to honor its commitments to the August 12 and September 8 Medvedev-Sarkozy ceasefire Agreements which call for Russia to withdraw troops to pre-war numbers and locations, and allows for international monitors in and around the separatist regions.

In Moscow, President Obama expressed U.S. support for Ukraine, an important strategic partner. He reiterated support for Ukraine's right to choose its own alliances based on its sovereign rights as an independent nation. As an active NATO partner participating in NATO-led operations in Afghanistan, Kosovo and Iraq, Ukraine has demonstrated its commitment to regional and global security. The Department of Defense is working hard with Ukraine to complete the reforms necessary to meet NATO standards. The Department will continue to support Ukraine's efforts to transform and re-structure its military into a modern, joint, professional and NATO-interoperable force.

#### NATO: CONTRIBUTIONS TO EUROPEAN AND GLOBAL SECURITY

We have a better foundation for working with Russia to address regional and global security concerns constructively with NATO, but we cannot be blind to the fact that we still have much work to do in convincing Russia to accept NATO's 21<sup>st</sup> century role and form. Considerable progress has been made: Russia clearly seeks to engage with NATO in the NATO-Russia Council and in NATO-Russia military-to-military cooperation. Russia's strong security concerns regarding Afghanistan and the instability, crime, and extremism that an unstable Afghanistan breeds have moved President Medvedev to a pragmatic cooperative stance, which we should build upon given NATO's mission in Afghanistan.

Allies are consulting with NATO partners, including Russia, as the Alliance develops its new Strategic Concept, and has already begun this process with a meeting on July 7<sup>th</sup> in Brussels. During a meeting on July 7, the Secretary General acknowledged the need for a new Strategic Concept to meet the demands of the 21<sup>st</sup> century and noted that NATO-Russian relations would be one of the topics in these discussions.

Yet despite these very promising developments, Russia continues to view NATO and NATO enlargement as a threat. We affirm the right of European countries to seek NATO membership and to be admitted to membership once they have satisfied NATO's own internal procedures and requirements for membership. We need to continue to engage in a frank discussion with Russians on the depth of the alliance's post-Cold War transformation and where we see the future of NATO-Russian relations.

#### CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL FOR SECURITY IN EUROPE

The Administration is concerned that, since 12 December 2007, Russia has continued unilateral "suspension" of its legal obligations under the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. Discussions in Moscow revealed diverging views of both the key problems with the existing CFE treaty and how to resolve them. There does appear to be interest, however, in continuing to seek a resolution. We have agreed to re-engage both bilaterally and multilaterally this fall on discussions to re-start conventional arms control in Europe.

The U.S. is committed to cooperative security and fulfillment of international agreements, as well as the importance of the confidence that results from military transparency and predictability. Because of this, the U.S. and NATO continue to fully implement the CFE Treaty. Additionally, the U.S. and NATO have offered

a set of constructive and forward-looking proposals for action on key issues, and are seeking to engage Russia in negotiations to bring Russia back into the conventional arms control regime in Europe. The U.S. continues to urge Russia to work cooperatively with the U.S. and other concerned CFE States Parties to reach agreement so that together we can preserve the benefits of a landmark regime.

### **III. Building on the foundation for pragmatic engagement and cooperation**

- After the summit, our task is to follow-up on the agreements reached, and continue to work with Russia and our allies in areas where we did not agree. The most promising mechanism for this work will be the Bilateral Presidential Commission that the presidents agreed to create. President Obama and President Medvedev will co-chair the Commission with Secretary of State Clinton and Foreign Minister Lavrov serving as coordinators. More structured relationships will help us to maintain momentum, focus on results, and avoid misunderstandings. Security related working groups and their co-chairs are: Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Security: Sergei V. Kiriyenko, Head of Rosatom, and Daniel Poneman, Deputy Secretary of Energy;
- Arms Control and International Security: Sergei A. Ryabkov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Ellen Tauscher, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs;
- Military-to-Military Relations: General of the Army Nikolai Makarov, Chief of the General Staff, and Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff;
- Foreign Policy and Fighting Terrorism: Sergei A. Ryabkov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, and William Burns, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs;
- Drug Trafficking: Viktor P. Ivanov, Director, Federal Drug Enforcement Service, and R. Gil Kerlikowske, Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy; and
- Cooperation in Prevention and Handling of Emergency Situations: Sergey K. Shoigu, Head of Emergency Situations Ministry, and Craig Fugate, Administrator, FEMA

Additional working groups will be added on an as needed basis. The commission will provide a structure for implementing agreements reached, monitoring progress in further negotiations, and laying the groundwork for seeking agreement and cooperation in additional areas:

- implementing agreements on military-to-military programs and joint threat assessment;
- discussion to advance cooperation on missile defense, and on defense technology cooperation;
- further negotiations on strategic and conventional arms control, and
- addressing the tough security questions such as counterterrorism and counter-piracy, while also seeking to narrow differences on the security of Russia's neighbors, frozen conflicts, and NATO enlargement.

In addition to this bilateral mechanism, the U.S. will be able to work through multilateral structures to address issues central to the U.S.-Russia relationship. With the agreement to re-start the NATO-Russia Council at the Corfu meeting of foreign ministers, the U.S. has an important forum for discussing European and global security challenges, as well as affirming our commitment to existing agreements and principles.

The Corfu meeting also affirmed a re-start in NATO-Russia military-to-military cooperation, providing an opportunity for deepening Russia's defense cooperation multilaterally as well as bilaterally.

The U.S. remains open to discussion on improving the broader European security architecture, an issue raised by President Medvedev, and confirmed during the OSCE informal ministerial at Corfu. One of the outstanding issues we face is the weakening of European security structures triggered by Russia's suspension of its implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. At the OSCE ministerial in Corfu, we discussed with our European friends and Allies and Russia ways to strengthen European security. We continue to welcome dialogue with Russia in the OSCE about its ideas for a new European security architecture, but we remain committed to working through and improving existing structures and mechanisms for joint cooperation on European security. The OSCE will serve as an important forum for such a discussion, as the sole multilateral organization in Europe that brings us all together on equal terms.

These discussions also provide the U.S. the opportunity to re-affirm NATO's role in European security in discussion with Russia so that its people and leaders can understand in practical terms NATO's missions, capabilities, and role in European and Eurasian stability and security.

Multilateral arms control is another opportunity to keep up the momentum achieved at the summit and to broaden the value of improvements in U.S.-Russian relations for European partners and allies. Russia is currently engaged in a serious effort in its own military reform, making this an important period for fully engaging Russia in transparency and negotiation mechanisms. With a pragmatic and constructive atmosphere established in our bilateral relationship, the U.S. can, as a result of the summit, work now for successes in multilateral forums in addressing issues where we have disagreed with Russia. In an atmosphere in which Russia no longer sees U.S. engagement and policies in zero-sum terms, countries throughout the region will be able to engage more productively with Russia and pursue their own global integration and security interests.

## **CONCLUSION**

We had an ambitious agenda for the Moscow Summit and while we did not achieve everything on the list with this first step, we made significant progress on a number of very important issues and achieved very real agreements in the defense and military spheres. The U.S. and Russia have a broad responsibility to work together in addressing global and regional security challenges. Many of these challenges were positively addressed at the summit, particularly Afghanistan, reductions in nuclear arms, and improving the capacity for military-to-military cooperation.

Others remain on the to-do list, including cooperation on missile defense and conventional arms control, but the summit revealed that both the U.S. and Russia accept the responsibility to seeking cooperation in these areas as well.

On the issue of sovereignty and the principles of international law that reinforce it in Europe and Eurasia, the discussions revealed that we remain far apart. This fact, however, will not lead the U.S. to neglect or reject its commitments, principles, and interests. Nor will this prevent us from implementing successful agreements with Russia and pursuing the very promising start established at the Summit for a boarder cooperative agenda. It is far better for our friends and partners in Europe and Eurasia if the U.S. can build on our summit success to seek progress on these tough security challenges.

Thank you for your time. I look forward to your questions, and to hearing your assessment of the summit and the way ahead.