

An Analysis of the President's Budgetary Proposals for Fiscal Year 2004

March 2003

Notes

Unless otherwise indicated, the years referred to in this report are fiscal years.

Numbers in the text and tables may not add up to totals because of rounding.

The cover photo of the Main Treasury Building was taken by Binh Thai.

CONTENTS

Changes to CBO's Baseline	3
Overview of CBO's Baseline Outlook	3
The Omnibus Appropriation Act	3
Technical Changes to the Baseline	5
	5
Differences from the Administration's	
Current-Services Baseline	6
Differences in Projections of Revenues	6
Differences in Projections of Outlays	7
The President's Budgetary Policies	7
Policy Proposals Affecting Revenues	7
Policy Proposals Affecting Discretionary Spending	10
Policy Proposals Affecting Mandatory Spending	11
Differences Between CBO's and the Administration's Estimates	14
CBO's and the Administration's Economic Assumptions	15
The Potential Macroeconomic Effects of the President's	

Budgetary Proposals (forthcoming)

TABLES

1.	Comparison of Projected Deficits and Surpluses in CBO's Baseline and in CBO's Estimate of the President's Budget	17
2.	CBO's Estimate of the President's Budget for 2004	18
3.	Changes in CBO's Baseline Projections of the Deficit or Surplus Since January 2003	19
4.	CBO's Baseline Budget Projections	20
5.	CBO's Baseline Projections of Federal Interest Outlays and Federal Debt	21
6.	Comparison of CBO's March 2003 Baseline and the Administration's February 2003 Current-Services Baseline	22
7.	Sources of Differences Between CBO's and the Administration's Estimates of the President's Budget	24
8.	CBO's Estimate of the Effect of the President's Budgetary Proposals	25
9.	Comparison of Discretionary Budget Authority Enacted for 2003 and the President's Request for 2004, by Budget Function	27
10	Discretionary Spending Under the President's Budget and CBO's Baseline	28
11.	Comparison of CBO's and the Administration's Estimates of the Effect of the President's Budgetary Proposals	29
12.	Comparison of CBO's, the Administration's, and Private-Sector Economic Projections for Calendar Years 2003 Through 2008	31
BOXES		
1.	An Estimate of the Costs of a Potential Conflict with Iraq	4
2	Requested Funding for Homeland Security	12

An Analysis of the President's Budgetary Proposals for Fiscal Year 2004: An Interim Report

t the request of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), with contributions from the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT), has prepared this analysis of the President's budgetary proposals for fiscal year 2004. CBO estimates that under the President's proposals, the deficit in 2003 and 2004 would rise to \$287 billion and \$338 billion, respectively (see Tables 1 and 2 on pages 17 and 18). For 2003, revenues would remain nearly unchanged from 2002, while outlays would increase by 6.6 percent under the President's plan. The following year, revenues would grow by 2.7 percent, while outlays would climb by 4.8 percent. As a share of the economy, revenues would dip below 17 percent in 2004 and outlays would reach nearly 20 percent, thereby producing a total budget deficit equal to 3 percent of gross domestic product (GDP).

Under the President's plan, over the 2004-2013 period, revenues would grow at an average annual rate of 6.1 percent, while the growth in outlays would slow to an average annual rate of 4.9 percent. Over those 10 years, under the President's policies deficits would persist but slowly decline, totaling roughly \$1.8 trillion. However, annual deficits would be small as a percentage of the economy—less than 2 percent in most years.

In a departure from the practice of recent years, the Administration has submitted year-by-year estimates of its budgetary proposals for a five-year period instead of a 10-year period. Since the mid-1990s, lawmakers generally have used the 10-year period as the basis for making baseline budget projections and for measuring the costs of legislative proposals. But citing the uncertainty of making budget projections and estimates, especially in later years,

the Administration has not provided annual estimates for fiscal years after 2008. CBO has documented the uncertainty involved in budget projections and estimates, ¹ but in preparing this report, it has continued recent practice and has provided year-by-year estimates of the President's proposals for the 2009-2013 period.²

Overall, CBO's estimates of the President's budgetary proposals are similar to those of the Administration. For the 2004-2008 period, CBO estimates a cumulative deficit of \$1.2 trillion under the President's policies; the Administration estimates \$1.1 trillion.

Constructed according to rules specified in law and intended to serve as a neutral benchmark, baseline projections estimate what the future path of spending and revenues would be if current laws and economic assumptions remained unchanged. In conjunction with its annual analysis of the President's budget, CBO has updated its

^{1.} See Congressional Budget Office, *The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2004-2013* (January 2003), Chapter 5.

^{2.} Although the President's budget does not provide year-by-year estimates of spending and revenues after 2008, it specifies a total effect from changes in tax and mandatory spending laws for the entire 10-year period. However, the budget specifies proposed levels of discretionary spending—generally provided one year at a time in appropriation acts—only through 2008. Thus, CBO estimated discretionary outlays for the 2009-2013 period by projecting the discretionary budget authority recommended by the President for 2008, with adjustments for inflation.

10-year baseline projections that it published in January.³ CBO's revised baseline reflects the projected effects of increased spending resulting from the omnibus appropriation act for 2003 (Public Law 108-7), which was enacted in February; technical revisions that reduce estimates of federal revenues in the near term; other information that has become available since January; and associated increases in debt-service costs. The economic assumptions that underlie this baseline are unchanged from those for the previous projections.

CBO's revised baseline, which follows a pattern that is similar to its January projections, shows a deficit of \$200 billion for 2004. Baseline deficits drop steadily thereafter and yield to small but growing surpluses after 2007. Under current laws and policies, over the 2004-2008 period, deficits would total about \$360 billion—averaging 0.6 percent of GDP over that period. Steadily mounting surpluses in later years would produce a cumulative surplus of almost \$900 billion for the 10-year period from 2004 to 2013. That projected surplus relies heavily on the assumed expiration at the end of 2010 of the tax cuts enacted in the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA); that assumption, which is required by law, contributes about \$600 billion to the projection of the cumulative surplus.

CBO estimates that the President's budget would increase deficits (or eliminate surpluses) relative to CBO's baseline in all years of the 10-year period. Those differences (including associated debt-service costs) sum to about \$800 billion for the first five years and about \$2.7 trillion for all 10 years. Nevertheless, CBO estimates that under the President's budget, deficits would decline in most years. As a percentage of GDP, the deficit under the President's policies is projected to fall to 0.6 percent in 2013. Under such a scenario, debt held by the public would remain roughly near its current share of the economy throughout the period (though nearly twice the level in CBO's baseline by the end of 2013).

Excluding debt service, about two-thirds of the increase in deficits under the President's budget (relative to the baseline) would be caused by reductions in revenues. The President proposes tax policies that would lower receipts by about \$1.5 trillion between 2004 and 2013. About 40 percent of that drop in revenues would occur from 2011 to 2013 as a result of the President's proposal to permanently extend provisions of EGTRRA that expire at the end of 2010. Another 15 percent of the total decrease in revenues would occur in 2004 and 2005, largely from proposals to enact new tax cuts and to accelerate certain tax cuts that are scheduled to go into effect in later years. Nonetheless, cumulative revenues under the President's budget would represent 18.3 percent of total GDP for the 10-year projection period—about the historical average for federal revenues since World War II.

CBO estimates that on the spending side, the President's budget would increase outlays by \$725 billion (excluding debt service) for the 2004-2013 period relative to CBO's baseline. More than 85 percent of that total would come from the President's proposals to change various mandatory spending programs, the largest of which is his proposal to reform Medicare—estimated by the Administration to increase outlays by about \$400 billion for the 10year period. (CBO cannot estimate the cost of that proposal because the details are not yet available.) The President's proposals for programs funded by discretionary appropriations, as extrapolated by CBO beyond 2008, would increase outlays by \$104 billion over the next 10 years relative to CBO's baseline. Defense outlays would rise by \$211 billion and nondefense outlays would drop by \$108 billion under the President's budget. Total spending under the President's budget would average 19.6 percent of GDP for the 2004-2013 period, CBO estimates—about the same share as in 2002.

In this report, CBO has estimated the President's budgetary proposals using traditional conventions and prac-

^{3.} See Congressional Budget Office, *The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2004-2013.*

^{4.} For proposals that would amend the Internal Revenue Code, CBO is required by law to use estimates provided by the Joint Committee on Taxation. For those estimates, see Joint Committee on Taxation, Estimated Budget Effects of the Revenue Provisions Contained in the President's Fiscal Year 2004 Budget Proposal, JCX-15-03 (March 4, 2003).

^{5.} See Congressional Budget Office, *The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2004-2013*, p. 49.

tices. Those conventions, however, do not include the proposals' possible macroeconomic effects. ⁶ CBO's analysis of the proposals' broad economic and budgetary impacts—including macroeconomic effects—has not yet been completed but will be released as part of a final version of this report. In that analysis, CBO will provide a range of estimates, using a variety of models and assumptions, of the potential economic and budgetary impacts of the President's proposals.

CBO's baseline projections and its reestimate of the President's budgetary proposals are subject to uncertainty. Neither of those estimates include the potential costs of a military conflict with Iraq and its aftermath, which could add tens of billions of dollars in spending this year and could have large effects on the budget in future years (see Box 1). Nor do those estimates include other possible demands on the budget, such as additional spending that may be necessary to respond to terrorist attacks or other contingencies. Furthermore, changes in economic growth from projected levels or changes in other economic factors also would affect the budget, especially federal revenues.

Changes to CBO's Baseline

Both CBO and the Administration construct baseline budget projections according to rules set forth in law, primarily the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 and the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974. In general, those laws instruct CBO and the Office of Management and Budget to project federal spending and revenues under current laws and policies. As a result, baselines are not intended to be predictions of future outcomes; rather, they serve as neutral benchmarks that lawmakers can use to gauge the effects of spending or revenue proposals, such as those in the President's budget.

Compared with its January projection, CBO's updated estimate of the deficit for 2003 under current law has grown by \$47 billion (*see Table 3*). Almost two-thirds of

that change stems from lower projected revenues, reflecting weakness in collections to date. For the 2004-2013 period, CBO has reduced its projection of the cumulative surplus by \$446 billion, nearly three-quarters of which derives from enactment of the omnibus appropriation act in February.

Overview of CBO's Baseline Outlook

CBO estimates that in the absence of additional spending or tax legislation, the deficit will grow from \$158 billion in 2002 to \$246 billion in 2003 (see Table 4). Although that amount would be one of the largest deficits recorded in dollar terms, at 2.3 percent of GDP, it would be well below the share of the economy that deficits accounted for in the 1980s through the mid-1990s. As a share of GDP, deficits peaked at 6 percent in 1983. If current laws and policies remained unchanged, CBO projects, deficits would decline after 2003 and switch to surpluses in 2008. Over the 2004-2008 period, the cumulative deficit would total \$362 billion—more than double CBO's previous projection. For the full 10-year projection period, CBO estimates a cumulative surplus of \$891 billion.

The surpluses that are projected to emerge in 2008 mount steadily and accelerate after 2010, when the EGTRRA tax cuts are scheduled to expire. Because of that assumed expiration and because projections are most uncertain in the later years of the projection period, the 10-year figure should be interpreted cautiously: surpluses projected for the last three years of the period total \$1.1 trillion, whereas the preceding seven years show a cumulative deficit.

At the end of 2002, debt held by the public totaled \$3.5 trillion, or 34 percent of GDP (*see Table 5*). Under CBO's baseline projections, such debt declines steadily after 2007, dropping to \$3 trillion (17 percent of GDP) by the end of 2013. However, just past the 10-year baseline period loom significant strains on the budget that will intensify as the baby-boom generation ages and that may require significant increases in federal borrowing.

The Omnibus Appropriation Act

In CBO's baseline, the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution for 2003 (also known as the omnibus appro-

^{6.} For a discussion of the President's proposals that could promote economic growth, see Office of Management and Budget, *Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 2004*, pages 21-24.

Box 1.

An Estimate of the Costs of a Potential Conflict with Iraq

Last September, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) was asked to gauge the costs of activities related to possible military operations in Iraq. In its response, CBO explained that estimates of the total cost of a military conflict with Iraq and its aftermath are highly uncertain. They depend on many factors that are unknown at this time, including the eventual size of the force that is deployed, the strategy to be used, the duration of the conflict, the number of casualties, the equipment lost, and the need for reconstructing Iraq's infrastructure.

In that previous analysis, CBO examined two possible force levels among the many that might be used to prosecute such a war. Today, it appears that the example emphasizing U.S. ground forces (as opposed to emphasizing air forces) is much closer in size and composition to the contingent that the U.S. military would employ for the war; in fact, the number of U.S. ground forces ordered to the Persian Gulf area now exceeds the levels that CBO assumed in its September 2002 estimate by one and one-third Army divisions and one Marine brigade. CBO has updated its cost estimate for the "heavy ground force" accordingly.

CBO now estimates that the incremental costs of deploying a heavy ground force to the Persian Gulf (that is, the costs that would be incurred beyond the amounts budgeted for routine operations) would be about \$14 billion; after that, the incremental costs of prosecuting a war in Iraq would reach just over \$10 billion during the first month of combat and subsequently fall to about \$8 billion a month—although CBO cannot estimate how long such a war

might last. After hostilities ended, the costs to return that force to home bases would be approximately \$9 billion, CBO estimates. Further, the incremental cost of an occupation following combat operations could vary from about \$1 billion to \$4 billion a month. CBO had no basis for estimating any costs for reconstruction or for foreign aid that the United States might choose to extend after a conflict had ended.

Regardless of the composition of the force used, multiple unknowns exist about how a conflict with Iraq might actually unfold. If the Iraqi leadership or selected elements of its military capitulated quickly, ground combat could be short, as in Operation Desert Storm. If urban fighting was protracted or Iraq used chemical or biological weapons against regional military or transportation facilities, the war could last longer. Given such uncertainty, CBO's estimates of the monthly costs of operations exclude expenditures for decontaminating areas or equipment affected by chemical or biological weapons.

A war with Iraq could lead to substantial costs in later years, but CBO did not include such costs either because their magnitude could not be assessed even roughly or because they depended on highly uncertain decisions about future policies. For example, the United States might leave troops or equipment in Iraq, which could require the construction of new military bases. Also, sustaining the occupation over time could require either increases in overall levels of active-duty and reserve forces or major changes in current policies on basing and deployment. Furthermore, the United States might provide Iraq with funds for humanitarian assistance and reconstruction, and it might provide substantial aid to allies and other friendly nations in the region. Attaching estimates to any such costs would be quite speculative.

See Congressional Budget Office, Letter to the Honorable Kent Conrad and John M. Spratt, Jr., regarding estimated costs of a potential conflict with Iraq, September 30, 2002.

priation act) is projected to increase the deficit by \$14 billion in 2003 and to reduce the cumulative surplus by \$330 billion over the 2004-2013 period. Spending projected as a result of that legislation is estimated to add \$82 billion in debt-service costs over the 10 years.

When CBO prepared its January projections, only two of the 13 regular appropriation acts—those for defense and military construction—had been enacted for 2003. Programs and activities funded in the other 11 acts were operating under a temporary continuing resolution. However, the President and the Republican leadership had apparently agreed that regular appropriations for 2003 should total about \$751 billion in budget authority, so CBO adjusted its baseline to that level. The omnibus appropriation act, which was enacted on February 20, 2003, (for the fiscal year that began on October 1, 2002) consolidated the 11 outstanding appropriation bills into one and boosted total discretionary budget authority for 2003 to \$766 billion.

The \$15 billion increase in budget authority relative to CBO's January projections will add \$9 billion to discretionary outlays in 2003, CBO estimates. About two-thirds of that increase is for defense programs. As specified in the Deficit Control Act, CBO extrapolated the 2003 level of appropriations through 2013, which results in a cumulative increase in defense outlays of \$121 billion and an increase in nondefense outlays of \$78 billion over the projection period.

In addition to providing funding for discretionary programs, the omnibus legislation also boosted mandatory spending. Increased agricultural assistance will add \$3 billion to outlays in 2003. Higher payments to physicians for services that they provide to Medicare beneficiaries will add almost \$1 billion in outlays this year. The rates paid to those physicians were scheduled to drop by 4.4 percent on March 1, 2003, but based on a provision in the omnibus appropriation act, the Administration replaced the decrease with an increase of 1.6 percent. For 2004 through 2013, CBO estimates that the change in

rates for payments to physicians will boost Medicare spending by \$53 billion.

Technical Changes to the Baseline

Other changes in CBO's estimates have increased the projected deficit for 2003 by \$33 billion and reduced the cumulative surplus over the 2004-2013 period by \$116 billion. Most of those technical revisions to the baseline occur over the next three years and are concentrated on the revenue side of the budget.

The near-term outlook for revenues has dimmed a bit since CBO published its January projections. In light of recent data on withheld taxes, CBO has lowered its estimates of revenues by \$30 billion in 2003 and by more than \$60 billion over the 2004-2008 period. The largest changes, in 2003 and 2004, amount to about 1.5 percent of total projected revenues in those years.

On the basis of new information from the President's budget, from year-to-date data on spending and receipts, and from other sources, CBO has also made technical reestimates of outlays. Because of faster-than-expected defense spending on operations and maintenance—which funds such activities as maintaining a presence in Afghanistan, fighting the global war on terrorism, and building up forces for possible military operations in Iraq—CBO now anticipates discretionary outlays to be \$4 billion higher in 2003. CBO has also increased its estimate of Medicare outlays by \$3 billion, mostly because of higher-than-anticipated spending recorded since September.

Offsetting some of the additional spending for this year is a net reduction in the estimated subsidy cost for credit programs. The budget includes dozens of programs that either guarantee loans made by private financial institutions or provide direct loans to individuals or businesses. Accurately projecting loan repayments, defaults, and changes in interest rates over the life of credit programs is difficult, and errors are inevitable. In every year since

^{7.} See Congressional Budget Office, *The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2004-2013*, Box 1-1.

The estimated subsidy cost is defined as the net present value of a credit program over its full term, accounting for interest rate subsidies, fees, expected repayments, and anticipated defaults and recoveries.

1994, federal agencies have reestimated the cost of the credit subsidy for loans and guarantees that were made in previous years. Although the net budgetary impact of those changes is to reduce outlays by more than \$1 billion for 2003, some agencies have reported sizable reestimates to the Office of Management and Budget. For example, the Export-Import Bank plans a negative adjustment of more than \$3 billion, while the Department of Education's revision will boost outlays by almost \$2 billion.

The largest technical change that CBO made in its estimates of outlays over the 2004-2013 period (other than a change in debt-service costs) was a \$32 billion increase for Medicaid. CBO raised its projection because of such factors as higher spending on managed care, the enrollment of more children because of states' outreach efforts and the creation of the State Children's Health Insurance Program, and the approval of additional waivers that allow Medicaid programs to provide prescription drug benefits to low-income Medicare beneficiaries. In CBO's baseline, those increases are partly offset by lower spending to reflect efforts by states to address their difficult budgetary conditions by further restricting eligibility for Medicaid.

In addition, CBO upped its estimate of outlays for discretionary programs by \$11 billion over the 10-year period, largely on the basis of information reported in the President's budget. That amount includes a mix of small increases and decreases in spending that raise net outlays by about \$1 billion per year.

Partially offsetting those increases are revised estimates for Medicare, which reduce projected outlays by \$10 billion over the 2004-2013 period. On the basis of updated information, CBO reduced its projected rate of increase in per capita spending for hospice services and for services furnished by therapists, health centers, and hospital-based laboratories.

Under CBO's baseline, as a result of the technical revisions that decrease projections of revenues and increase estimates of outlays, the Treasury will need to borrow more than it otherwise would have over the 2004-2013 period. By CBO's estimate, such additional borrowing would raise net interest payments by \$39 billion over the decade.

Differences from the Administration's Current-Services Baseline

Both CBO and the Administration estimate that if current laws and policies remained in place, the budget would show a deficit for several years. The Administration projects a deficit of \$158 billion in 2004, turning into a small surplus in 2006; CBO projects the emergence of a surplus in 2008. For the five-year period from 2004 through 2008, CBO's projection of the cumulative deficit exceeds that of the Administration by \$248 billion (see Table 6).

Differences in Projections of Revenues

In projecting revenues, CBO's baseline over the period from 2004 through 2008 is very similar to the Administration's—higher by about 0.5 percent. That relatively small difference obscures some larger deviations in specific years. CBO's revenue baseline is higher than the Administration's by \$24 billion in 2003 then falls below the Administration's by \$30 billion by 2005. Thereafter, CBO's baseline projection gradually moves higher than the Administration's, with the difference reaching \$55 billion in 2008.

Differing economic projections explain most of the differences in the estimates of revenues. For 2003 and 2004, CBO forecasts a lower level of taxable income than the Administration does. Thereafter, CBO projects a higher level of income—resulting from higher estimates of corporate profits and nonwage personal income—thereby leading to the higher projection of revenues over the entire 2004-2008 period.

Offsetting some of that difference attributable to differing economic projections are technical estimating differences between CBO and the Administration—that is, differences in the estimated amount of revenue generated by a given macroeconomic projection. For 2003, CBO projects a total of \$34 billion in higher receipts from such technical factors. Much of that difference stems from the Administration's decision to reduce its estimate of revenues by \$25 billion (without allocating it to any specific revenue source) to reflect uncertainty. For 2005, CBO projects \$32 billion less in revenues than the Administration does because of technical estimating differences about such factors as the effects of the expiration of the

tax cuts for businesses enacted last year in the Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002 and assumptions about the permanence of the recent weakness in individual income tax receipts. For 2006 through 2008, the technical differences are much smaller.

Differences in Projections of Outlays

On the spending side of the budget, CBO's baseline for outlays is \$6 billion higher for 2003 than the Administration's. CBO's March baseline includes the additional funding provided in the omnibus appropriation legislation, which was enacted after the Administration completed its projections. In addition, CBO anticipates higher defense outlays than does the Administration. For mandatory spending, however, CBO's baseline is lower than the Administration's by \$8 billion primarily because of different estimates of outlays for Medicaid, refundable tax credits, and student loans. Because CBO projects lower enrollment in Medicaid, its estimates of spending for that program continue to be below the Administration's throughout the projection period.

Overall, for the 2004-2008 period, CBO's estimate of total outlays exceeds the Administration's by \$309 billion; discretionary spending accounts for about 70 percent of that difference. CBO's projections of discretionary spending are higher than the Administration's largely because CBO included the spending from the omnibus appropriation legislation, used a higher rate of inflation to project budget authority for spending not related to federal pay, and assumed a faster rate of spending for defense appropriations.

The remaining 30 percent of the difference in projected outlays over the five-year period stems mostly from divergent estimates for Social Security, Medicare, and net interest. Because CBO projects a higher consumer price index, automatic increases in benefits to Social Security recipients are higher in CBO's baseline than in the Administration's. CBO also estimates that real (inflationadjusted) benefits will grow more quickly and that retroactive disability income payments will be greater over the period. CBO's estimates for Medicare include the effect of the Administration's decision to boost the rates paid to participating physicians, while the Administration's estimates, which were prepared before that decision, do not. In addition, CBO anticipates higher Medicare

spending in 2003 and more rapid growth in that spending over the 2004-2008 period. Although CBO's estimates of net interest are lower than the Administration's in the near term (because of lower projections of interest rates and a different assumption about the mix of securities issued by the Treasury), they surpass the Administration's starting in 2005 (as CBO's projections of interest rates are then above those of the Administration).

The President's Budgetary Policies

Overall, CBO's and the Administration's estimates of the President's budget are similar (*see Table 7*). Both anticipate that deficits will peak in 2004: CBO projects a deficit of \$338 billion that year and the Administration, one of \$307 billion. For the 2004-2008 period, CBO projects a cumulative deficit of \$1.2 trillion; the Administration estimates a deficit of \$1.1 trillion. Beyond 2008, under the President's proposals, the deficit would decline in most years, reaching a low of \$102 billion in 2013, CBO estimates. The Administration did not provide such estimates beyond 2008.

Policy Proposals Affecting Revenues

The President's budget proposes several changes to tax law that would significantly reduce revenues over the next decade. His proposals include an economic growth package, the extension of a number of expiring tax provisions, a variety of new tax incentives, a few simplifications of the tax code, and miscellaneous changes in the administration of taxes and other items. Many of the proposals to spur growth and extensions of expiring provisions relate to features of the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001.

CBO and the Joint Committee on Taxation estimate that the proposals would reduce revenues by \$35 billion and increase outlays by \$4 billion—through their effects on refundable credits—in 2003 (see Table 8). For the 2004-2013 period, CBO and the JCT anticipate that the proposals would reduce revenues by \$1.5 trillion and increase outlays by \$96 billion. As a share of projected gross domestic product, the revenue reductions would average 1.0 percent over the 10-year period, with the largest reductions occurring in the final three years. A few of the proposed changes would increase revenues, contributing \$3 billion over 10 years.

Proposals accelerating and making permanent the changes in EGTRRA account for about 55 percent of the revenue reductions in the package. A proposal to eliminate the double taxation of dividends constitutes an additional 27 percent. The most significant proposals are these:

Extend EGTRRA's Expiring Provisions. Currently, all provisions of EGTRRA still in effect on December 31, 2010, are set to expire the following day. The President's proposal would permanently extend all of those provisions, which include reductions in the marginal income tax rate, the child tax credit, relief from the so-called marriage penalty, education incentives, the repeal of the estate tax and associated modifications of gift and other taxes, retirement income provisions, and other incentives. The total reduction in revenues during the 10-year period would be \$602 billion, and the increase in outlays would be \$22 billion. In all cases save one, the reductions in revenues would occur after 2010. In the case of estate taxes, some revenue effects would occur shortly following the provision's passage, as taxpayers altered their estate planning in the expectation of the permanent repeal of the taxes.

Exclude Dividends from Double Taxation. Currently, income from corporate activity is subject to being taxed twice, once under the corporate income tax and then again when taxpayers receive dividends or realize capital gains on their corporate stock. Under the President's proposal, taxpayers would be able to exclude from their individual income tax liability dividends on which corporate taxes had already been paid. Additionally, shareholders would receive an increase in their cost basis for tax purposes for amounts of corporate earnings not distributed as dividends but on which corporate taxes had been paid (thereby reducing capital gains liability upon realization). The proposal, which would become effective for corporate distributions beginning January 1, 2003, is estimated to reduce revenues by nearly \$8 billion in 2003 and by \$388 billion over the 2004-2013 period.

Accelerate Individual Income Tax Cuts Scheduled Under EGTRRA. Currently under EGTRRA, an expansion of the 10 percent tax bracket is scheduled to take place in 2008, a reduction in tax rates is scheduled for 2006, an expansion of the 15 percent bracket and an increase

in the standard deduction for joint filers (the provisions addressing the marriage penalty) are set to phase in from 2005 to 2009, and an increase in the child tax credit is slated for 2010. The President proposes to make all of those features effective for tax year 2003 (and includes an advance payment, or "rebate," of the higher child tax credit). The JCT estimates that those provisions would reduce revenues by \$25 billion in 2003 and \$211 billion over the 2004-2013 period. They would also increase outlays for refundable credits by \$23 billion over the next decade. (For a more detailed discussion of this proposal's effect on outlays, see page 13.)

Permanently Extend the Research and Experimentation Tax Credit. Corporations can take a tax credit of 20 percent on certain research expenditures above a base amount. The credit is currently scheduled to expire on June 30, 2004, but the President proposes to make it permanent. The cost of doing so is estimated to be \$56 billion between 2004 and 2013.

Increase the Amount of the Alternative Minimum Tax Exemption. The alternative minimum tax (AMT) is a parallel income tax system with fewer exemptions, deductions, and rates than the regular income tax; taxpayers pay the greater of the regular tax or the AMT. Without changes in the AMT, many taxpayers would not receive the full benefits of the EGTRRA tax cut. Hence, EGTRRA provided for an increase in the AMT exemption but only through tax year 2004. The President proposes to increase the exemption under the AMT in 2003 and 2004 and to extend it through 2005. After that, the AMT would revert to its pre-EGTRRA form. The resulting loss of revenue is estimated to be \$1 billion in 2003, \$36 billion between 2004 and 2006, and nothing thereafter.

Increase Expensing Provisions for Small Businesses.

Businesses are currently permitted to expense (take the whole cost as a deduction in the first year instead of depreciating it over several years) up to \$25,000 of investment in certain equipment. The benefit is phased out at investment levels exceeding \$200,000. As part of his economic growth package, the President proposes to raise the amount permitted to \$75,000, allow expensing for certain computer software (for which it is currently disallowed), and raise the investment level at which the

benefit begins to phase out to \$325,000. The proposal would be effective retroactively to the beginning of calendar year 2003. The cost is estimated to be about \$1 billion in 2003 and \$27 billion from 2004 to 2013.

Allow an Above-the-Line Deduction for Long-Term Care Insurance. The costs of long-term health insurance are currently treated largely as other medical expenses are. Taxpayers can take a deduction from taxable income if they itemize deductions and have total medical expenditures exceeding 7.5 percent of their adjusted gross income (AGI). The proposal would permit a deduction of premiums for long-term health care insurance (up to current annual limits) regardless of whether taxpayers itemized and without any percentage floor. The provision would be phased in through 2007. The cost from 2004 through 2013 would be \$18 billion.

Allow Nonitemizers to Deduct Charitable Contributions. Taxpayers who itemize can currently reduce their taxable income by the amount of their charitable contributions. The President proposes to allow a deduction for nonitemizers (those who take the standard deduction) of up to \$250 for individuals and \$500 for joint filers for charitable contributions exceeding those amounts. The provision would become effective at the beginning of tax year 2003 and be indexed thereafter. The cost would be less than \$1 billion in the first year and \$15 billion over the 2004-2013 period.

Provide a Tax Credit for Developers of Affordable Single-Family Housing. The President proposes to create a new tax credit analogous to the existing low-income housing tax credit (LIHTC) for single-family homes. The LIHTC applies to low-income rental units; the single-family housing tax credit would apply to new or rehabilitated homes intended for eligible lower-income families. Like the LIHTC, the credit would be allocated to states and localities to be awarded to projects. Recapture rules would be implemented in the event that homes were resold to ineligible purchasers. Credit allocations would begin in calendar year 2004. The 2004-2013 cost would be nearly \$15 billion.

Provide a Refundable Tax Credit for Health Insurance.

The President proposes to create a refundable income tax credit for the cost of health insurance. The credit would

be worth up to \$1,000 per adult and \$500 per child (up to two children). It could cover a maximum of 90 percent of the cost of insurance for individual taxpayers with a modified adjusted gross income of \$15,000 and lesser amounts for individuals with higher income, phasing out completely at a modified AGI of \$30,000. It would become effective at the beginning of calendar year 2004. In total, the proposal would reduce revenues over the 2004-2013 period by \$13 billion and increase outlays by \$51 billion.

Expand Tax-Free Savings Plans. A variety of individual retirement accounts (IRAs) currently exist that can be used not only for retirement but for other purposes (such as education). The President proposes to unify many of those accounts into two tax-preferred savings vehicles—retirement savings accounts (RSAs) and lifetime savings accounts (LSAs)—and to expand their applicability.

For RSAs, individuals could contribute up to \$7,500 annually, and no income limits would apply. Contributions would be taxable, but all earnings on the accounts would accumulate tax free. Withdrawals without penalty could occur after age 58 or because of death or disability. Accounts currently held in Roth IRAs would become RSAs. Additionally, traditional IRAs and nondeductible IRAs could be converted into RSAs in the same way as they currently can be converted to Roth IRAs.

Individuals could also contribute up to \$7,500 annually to lifetime savings accounts with the same tax treatment as RSAs and, again, without limits based on income. However, withdrawals from LSAs could be taken for any purpose and at any age. Balances currently held in Archer medical savings accounts, Coverdell education savings accounts, and qualified state tuition plans could be converted into balances in LSAs.

Over the 2004-2013 period, the net revenue loss due to the expansion of tax-free savings plans would be nearly \$7 billion. However, there would be a net revenue gain of almost \$2 billion in 2003 and \$10 billion from 2004 through 2008. Revenue gains would occur from 2003 through 2007 because many of the current vehicles receiving favorable tax treatment collect contributions on a pretax basis. Contributions to the new vehicles, however, would be made on an after-tax basis. As a result, the

proposal would increase federal revenues at the time the contributions were made (but reduce revenues when withdrawals went untaxed later on).

Extend Nonrefundable Personal Tax Credits Against the AMT. Except under a temporary provision, individuals cannot take certain personal credits, such as the dependent care credit and HOPE Scholarship and lifetime learning credits, against their liability under the alternative minimum tax. The temporary provision, which permitted taxpayers to take the full amount of these credits against the AMT, was scheduled to expire in 2001. That provision has been extended through tax year 2003. The President proposes extending the exemption another two years through tax year 2005. The 2004-2006 revenue loss would be \$1 billion, and there would be no losses beyond 2006.

Other Proposals. The President also proposes a large number of additional tax changes, including a variety of additional incentives for charitable giving and health care; incentives related to education, energy, and the environment; additional simplification of the tax code; changes in tax administration; the extension of additional expiring provisions; and reform of unemployment compensation. Altogether, those provisions would reduce revenues by \$66 billion over the 2004-2013 period.

Policy Proposals Affecting Discretionary Spending

The President's budget would boost discretionary budget authority for fiscal year 2004 to \$787 billion, CBO estimates, a 2.7 percent increase over the \$766 billion enacted for 2003 (*see Table 9*). That increase would be smaller than the 4.2 percent jump in discretionary budget authority between 2002 and the current level for 2003. (The increase for 2003 may ultimately exceed 4.2 percent if the Congress provides additional funding for a possible war with Iraq and other needs.)

The President submitted his budget before the omnibus appropriation act was enacted. In the budget, the Administration assumed that appropriations for 2003 would total \$749 billion, nearly \$17 billion less than the level contained in the act. Starting from that base of \$749 billion, the request for 2004 sought an increase of 4.4

percent in discretionary budget authority. From 2004 through 2008, the President would increase discretionary budget authority by an average annual rate of 4.7 percent for defense activities and 2.3 percent a year for nondefense programs. In CBO's baseline over that same period, which assumes that discretionary spending grows at specified rates of inflation, budget authority for both defense and nondefense programs rises at an average annual rate of 2.6 percent.

If no further legislation is enacted that affects spending in 2003, CBO anticipates that discretionary outlays will total \$805 billion this year. Under the President's budget, discretionary outlays would rise to \$836 billion next year and to \$922 billion by 2008 (see Table 10).

National Defense. The President's budget for 2004 would continue the upward trend in defense spending that began in the mid-1990s but at a slower pace than in recent years. The proposed budget would add \$8 billion in discretionary budget authority for defense programs—an increase of 2 percent over the amount currently appropriated for 2003. By comparison, increases in budget authority averaged about \$30 billion a year over the past three years. CBO estimates that the \$8 billion increase—along with spending from budget authority previously provided—would boost defense outlays for 2004 by \$14 billion over CBO's estimated level for 2003.

The 2004 request would increase funding for pay raises and other benefits for service members (by almost \$4 billion), the development of new weapon systems (by \$4 billion), and defense programs within the Department of

This calculation uses the Administration's estimate of budget authority for 2004 (\$782 billion). This number differs from CBO's estimate of discretionary budget authority for 2004 because of the level of advance appropriations contained in the omnibus legislation and other technical estimating differences between the Administration and CBO.

^{10.} The Administration's budget assumed discretionary budget authority of \$382 billion for defense programs in 2003; that figure did not include the effects of the omnibus legislation (which provided an additional \$10 billion in budget authority for defense). If measured relative to that base of \$382 billion, the request for 2004 sought an \$18 billion increase in budget authority for defense—an increase of 4.7 percent.

Energy and various other agencies (by \$2 billion). The Administration also proposes to reduce funding from the levels appropriated for 2003 for operations and maintenance and revolving funds (by almost \$1 billion) and for military construction and family housing (by \$1 billion). The 2004 request for the military personnel and operations and maintenance accounts does not include explicit funding for continuing the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan and prosecuting the war on terrorism and does not account for possible military operations in Iraq. (Nor does the funding appropriated for 2003 for defense explicitly include much of the money needed to conduct those operations in this fiscal year.) According to public statements by officials of the Department of Defense, the Administration will instead rely on supplemental appropriations to provide funding for those missions. After accounting for those activities, the increases in funding for defense for 2003 and 2004 may substantially exceed the levels witnessed in recent years.

For 2005 through 2008, the President's budget envisions an average annual rate of growth of 4.7 percent in budget authority for national defense, although that growth does not include funding for continued antiterrorism activities or for dealing with the aftermath of a possible war with Iraq.

Nondefense Programs. The President is proposing for 2004 a 3.5 percent increase in appropriations for nondefense discretionary activities above the level enacted for 2003, CBO estimates, including funds for the new Department of Homeland Security (see Box 2). With those funds excluded, the growth rate for nondefense budget authority for 2004 would drop to 2.2 percent.

Among the budget functions that would receive the largest increases are community and regional development, which would receive a boost in funding of over 21 percent to increase grants to first responders—which include firefighters and state and local law enforcement personnel—and to cover payments for disaster relief (activities that both now fall within the jurisdiction of the new Department of Homeland Security). In addition, international affairs would receive an increase of almost 13 percent in 2004. The President proposes to use that money to create the Millennium Challenge Account (which is designed to provide assistance to countries that

follow sound economic and social policies), increase military and economic assistance to certain states in the Middle East and South Asia, and pay for reconstruction programs in Afghanistan. Education, training, employment and social services would receive more than a 6 percent increase, with much of that going for increases in elementary, secondary, and postsecondary educational activities.11

By contrast, the President seeks to reduce funding for some budget functions below what has been enacted for 2003. Included in that group is the administration of justice, which would receive a cut of 5.8 percent, accomplished in part by reducing funding for the Department of Justice's grants to states (by \$1.8 billion) and reducing election reform grants to states (by \$1.5 billion). Natural resources and the environment would receive 4.4 percent less than in 2003 and agriculture would receive 7.6 percent less.

Policy Proposals Affecting Mandatory Spending

The President's proposals would add \$621 billion to mandatory spending over the 2004-2013 period, CBO estimates. Proposals involving Medicare and Medicaid would account for 75 percent of that increase (see Table 8).

Medicare. The President's budget proposes an allowance of \$400 billion for an initiative to modernize Medicare that would restructure aspects of the program and provide coverage for outpatient prescription drugs. The Administration estimates that the initiative would cost a total of \$400 billion through 2013; however, the budget does not provide sufficient details for CBO to make its own estimate.

Medicaid and the State Children's Health Insurance **Program.** The President's budget contains a proposal that would allow states to voluntarily convert their federal funding for Medicaid and the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) into block grants. The grants, called State Health Care Partnership Allotments,

^{11.} About half of the increase—\$2.3 billion—has already been provided by advance appropriations in the omnibus appropriation legislation.

Box 2.

Requested Funding for Homeland Security

For 2004, the President has requested about \$35 billion in net discretionary budget authority for homeland security. About 55 percent of that amount (\$19 billion) would go to the new Department of Homeland Security and the balance (\$16 billion) would go to other departments and agencies that also have responsibilities for homeland security.²

In total, the President requested about \$27 billion in net discretionary budget authority for the Department

- 1. That figure, which reflects estimates by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), includes about \$3 billion in offsetting fees for the Transportation Security Administration and the Department of State. In addition, according to OMB's estimates, about \$3 billion in mandatory spending would go toward homeland security, much of that offset by receipts. Total gross budget authority in 2004 for homeland security would thus be \$41 billion.
- 2. The Administration's definition of homeland security activities is not limited to those of the Department of Homeland Security. For a complete discussion of that definition, see Office of Management and Budget, Annual Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism (June 2002), available at www.whitehouse.gov/omb/ legislative/combating_terrorism06-2002.pdf.

of Homeland Security, but only about \$19 billion of that amount would provide funding for activities that fall within the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB's) definition of homeland security. The \$19 billion would fund activities such as those of the Transportation Security Agency (\$2.3 billion) and border enforcement and protection activities previously performed by the Customs Service and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (\$7 billion). It also includes about \$3.5 billion for the Department of Homeland Security's Office of Domestic Preparedness to provide state and local governments with grants and training to improve the ability of first responders (police, firefighters, and other emergency personnel) to address terrorist attacks. (The remaining \$8 billion of the \$27 billion requested for the Department of Homeland Security would go to activities such as maritime safety and immigration services. Such activities are not included in the \$35 billion total for homeland security because they are outside of OMB's definition.)

Of the \$16 billion for homeland security activities performed by other departments and agencies, almost \$7 billion would go to the Department of Defense,

would be based on spending levels in 2002 and would grow each year thereafter. States that participated would enjoy much broader flexibility in providing health benefits than current law allows, particularly for beneficiaries who currently are covered at the states' discretion. (States that did not participate would be unaffected by the proposal.) The Administration anticipates that states accounting for half of total Medicaid and SCHIP spending would choose the block grant option.

Again, the President's budget did not provide enough details for CBO to provide an independent estimate of federal outlays for that proposal. Key features of the proposal that have not been specified include the exact method that would be used to calculate the base amount for the block grants, the rates at which they would grow in later years, and the degree of additional flexibility that would be given to participating states. Therefore, in preparing this report, CBO incorporated the Administration's estimate of Medicaid and SCHIP spending for states assumed to choose the block grants. Because the budget does not display projections of Medicaid or SCHIP spending for the 2009-2013 period, CBO projected spending for those years by taking the Administration's projections for 2008 and inflating them using the annual growth rates for Medicaid and SCHIP incorporated into CBO's baseline.

CBO used the Administration's estimate of total spending for Medicaid and SCHIP in evaluating the proposal; however, underlying differences in baseline spending projections between CBO and the Administration lead to very different estimates of the proposal. CBO estimates that, relative to what spending would be if current laws

Box 2.

Continued

another \$4 billion would go to the Department of Health and Human Services, and \$2 billion would go to the Department of Justice.

The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) cannot compare the Administration's total request for homeland security for 2004 with amounts appropriated for 2003 because the Administration has not finished reviewing the enacted spending levels to identify which funding falls within its definition of homeland security. When compared with the \$29 billion in funding enacted for fiscal year 2002, however, the \$35 billion request represents a 20 percent increase over the two-year period.

The President is proposing a number of new programs for homeland security. The largest is Project BioShield, which would, among other things, create incentives to increase research for new vaccines. The President is requesting permanent, indefinite funding authority to enable the government to purchase vaccines as soon as they are demonstrated to be safe and effective. The Administration estimates that this proposal would require about \$890 million in mandatory budget authority in 2004 and would cost about \$3 billion over the 2004-2008 period, but the President's budget did not provide enough details about this proposal for CBO to provide an independent estimate.

The Administration also proposes to increase funding for a number of existing programs. In particular, the President would increase funding for the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate of the Department of Homeland Security by about \$650 million to allow the organization to assess the vulnerability of critical infrastructure, such as power plants, dams, and bridges.

In certain instances, the President's request for 2004 represents a decrease from 2003 levels. For example, although the Administration currently estimates that about \$9 billion in funding was enacted in 2003 for the Department of Defense's homeland security activities, the President proposes to reduce that amount to about \$7 billion in 2004, because significant purchases of force protection equipment in 2003 would not be repeated in 2004.

and policies remained unchanged, the proposal would increase the federal government's outlays for Medicaid and SCHIP by \$38 billion over the 2004-2008 period and by \$73 billion over the 2004-2013 period. By contrast, the Administration estimates that the proposal would cost the federal government \$9 billion over the 2004-2008 period and save \$0.1 billion over the 2004-2013 period. CBO expects lower spending under current law than does the Administration; thus, the shift to block grants at the amounts estimated in the budget by the Administration (and used by CBO) would result in a larger increase in spending relative to CBO's baseline projections.

In addition, several other much smaller proposals affecting Medicaid and SCHIP would increase outlays by about \$1.5 billion from 2004 to 2008 and decrease total outlays by about \$1 billion from 2004 to 2013, CBO estimates.

Refundable Tax Credits. The Administration's tax proposals would add an estimated \$96 billion to outlays over the 2004-2013 period because a number of the proposals involve refundable tax credits (see the discussion of the proposals affecting revenues for further description of the proposed changes, pages 8 and 9). In particular, the President proposes to accelerate an expansion of the child tax credit and make it permanent, to extend the expansion of the earned income tax credit enacted in 2001, and to introduce two new refundable tax credits (one for health insurance and another for education). Accelerating the child tax credit and other tax relief so that they applied in 2003 would increase outlays by \$4 billion in that year and \$23 billion from 2004 through 2010, JCT estimates. Permanently extending EGTRRA would increase spending on those two credits by about \$22 billion from 2011 through 2013. The health insurance credit would add \$23 billion to outlays over the 2005-2008 period and \$51 billion through 2013.

Postal Service. Under the President's budget, changes would be made to the way the U.S. Postal Service finances retirement benefits for many of its current and former employees. ¹² The Office of Personnel Management projects that under current law, the Postal Service will eventually overfund its pension obligations for its workers by as much as \$71 billion. Under the proposal, the Postal Service's payments to the retirement fund would decline by about \$3 billion to \$5 billion a year.

The budgetary impacts would flow from two aspects of the proposed change: the loss of receipts to the Civil Service Retirement System trust fund (which is on-budget) and the response of the Postal Service (whose net cash flow is classified as off-budget) to a sizable reduction in one of its major expenses. CBO estimates that the total budgetary effect of the proposal (that is, combining both on-budget and off-budget impacts) would be a cost of nearly \$38 billion over the 2004-2013 period, as the result of lower postage rates and additional spending by the Postal Service for operations, capital investments, or both.

Customs User Fees. Under current law, customs user fees expire on September 30, 2003. The President has proposed extending those fees, which CBO estimates would increase offsetting receipts by \$18 billion over the 2004-2013 period.

Other Initiatives. The President has proposed that states, rather than the federal government, pay the administrative costs of running their unemployment compensation programs. Under that proposal, states would be expected to fund those activities on their own, probably through their employment taxes. (Receipts and outlays from state accounts for employment taxes are included in the federal budget.) CBO estimates that the proposal would add about \$17 billion to mandatory spending over the 2004-

2013 period. At the same time, discretionary appropriations for those activities would be reduced by similar amounts.

The President has also requested \$3.6 billion for 2003 to enable states to create personal reemployment accounts. Under that proposal, states could provide individuals who were likely to exhaust their regular unemployment benefits with bonuses of up to \$3,000 to be used toward the costs of job training or overcoming other barriers to employment. If individuals were reemployed within a certain period of time without spending the entire benefit, they could keep the remainder. CBO estimates that the bulk of the requested funds would be spent in 2004.

The President's budget proposes to open a portion of the coastal plain of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge to oil and gas leasing and development. By CBO's estimate, leasing sales from such a program would generate receipts (net of payments to Alaska) totaling \$2 billion over the 2006-2008 period.

The President's budget includes four legislative proposals that would affect offsetting receipts from licenses awarded by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) for use of the electromagnetic spectrum. The proposals would impose new fees on licenses used for analog television broadcasts and on licenses awarded by methods other than auctions, allow certain agencies to spend some auction receipts without further appropriations, and extend the FCC's authority to conduct auctions beyond 2007. Overall, CBO estimates that implementing those proposals could increase net outlays by \$5 billion over the next five years (largely because some auctions would be delayed) but would reduce outlays by more than \$2 billion over the 10 years from 2004 to 2013.

Differences Between CBO's and the Administration's Estimates

The differences between the Administration's estimates and the JCT and CBO's estimates of the proposals in the President's budget affecting revenues are relatively small through 2008 compared with the total costs of the proposals, although the differences increase in later years. According to the JCT and CBO's estimates, the proposals would reduce revenues by \$13 billion more than the Administration projects for the 2004-2008 period (see

See Congressional Budget Office, Letter to the Honorable Jim Nussle, Chairman, House Budget Committee, regarding the proposal to reduce payments by the Postal Service to the Civil Service Retirement System, January 27, 2003.

Table 11). The JCT and CBO estimate greater reductions in revenues than the Administration does for several provisions, most notably for the increase in expensing for small businesses (\$7 billion less in revenues); the dividend exclusion (\$6 billion less); and the acceleration of the EGTRRA tax cuts (\$5 billion less). The JCT and CBO also estimate a smaller increase in revenues from the expansion of tax-free savings accounts (\$4 billion less). In the other direction, the JCT and CBO expect smaller net reductions in revenues from the two provisions affecting the AMT (\$17 billion more) and the research and experimentation tax credit (\$4 billion more).

For the 2004-2013 period, the JCT and CBO estimate revenue losses that exceed the Administration's estimate by \$148 billion. The largest differences are from the proposals to extend the EGTRRA tax cuts (\$103 billion) and to provide a dividend exclusion (\$28 billion).

On the outlay side, a number of significant differences exist between CBO's and the Administration's estimates of the President's proposals. The largest differences occur in estimates of discretionary spending; however, the variation almost entirely reflects underlying differences in baselines rather than different assumptions about the effects of the President's request. CBO's baseline for discretionary spending is higher than the Administration's because CBO incorporated the effects of the omnibus appropriation act (which was enacted after the Administration had released its budget) and because of other, technical factors. As a result, although the Administration estimated that its policies would raise discretionary outlays by \$218 billion between 2004 and 2008 compared with its own baseline, when measured against CBO's baseline such spending is only \$7 billion higher over those five years.

For mandatory outlays, CBO estimates that the President's proposals would increase spending by \$239 billion over the 2004-2008 period—or by roughly \$30 billion more than the Administration estimated for the proposals. Most of that difference results from the proposal to allow states to convert their funding for Medicaid and SCHIP into block grants. CBO's estimate of the impact of that proposal is \$29 billion higher than the Administration's because CBO measured the cost against a lower baseline estimate of spending.

Another significant estimating difference between CBO and the Administration involves the President's proposal to reduce the Postal Service's payments to the Civil Service Retirement System. The Administration assumes that the Postal Service would initially use all of the realized savings to pay off its debt (which has no net budgetary impact), while CBO assumes that most of the funds would be used for capital projects and other operating costs or to postpone postal rate increases. Over the 2003-2008 period, the difference would amount to \$8 billion in outlays. For the proposal to create personal reemployment accounts, CBO's and the Administration's estimates of total outlays for those accounts are the same (\$3.6 billion) but CBO expects that the accounts would take longer to set up than does the Administration; consequently, CBO anticipates that all of the outlays would occur in 2004 and 2005, while the Administration expects significant outlays in 2003.

Other major differences involve the effects of certain tax proposals on outlays. Because the JCT and CBO assume lower participation than the Administration does for the refundable health tax credits, CBO expects the proposal to increase outlays by \$37 billion less over the 2004-2013 period than the Administration does. In addition, the JCT and CBO expect the refundable child tax credit to increase outlays by \$4 billion less than the Administration does. Finally, the Administration anticipates that holding lease sales for the right to develop oil and gas resources in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge would generate gross receipts from bonus bids totaling \$2.6 billion over the next five years. In contrast, CBO estimates that receipts from such sales would total over \$4 billion (half of which would go to the state of Alaska).

CBO's and the Administration's Economic Assumptions

Because the Administration's economic forecast assumes larger tax bases for 2003 and 2004, it generates higher estimates of revenues for this year and the next; however, the opposite is true in subsequent years, when CBO's economic projections generate higher estimates of revenues. For the early years of the 10-year projection period, the Administration's forecast of wages and salaries plus profits—the income categories that have the largest effect on revenue projections—is greater than CBO's, but that difference is reversed during 2005. That pattern is largely the result of the difference between the Administration's and CBO's forecasts for the GDP price index. The Administration's forecast has consistently faster growth of real GDP than CBO's. However, because the Administration's forecast for growth of the GDP price index is more than 0.2 percentage points lower than CBO's, the Administration's projection of nominal GDP begins to fall significantly below CBO's during 2004 (see Table 12).

That pattern is reinforced by differences in the projected relationship of the major tax bases to GDP. The Administration assumes that the total share of income going to wages and salaries plus profits is higher than CBO does through 2005 and slightly lower thereafter.

However, there are two aspects of the Administration's projections that partially offset the pattern in the latter years. The expectations for interest rates and unemployment are significantly lower than CBO's, particularly

after 2004. The Administration's projection of the unemployment rate averages 0.2 percentage points below CBO's from 2003 through 2008; its projection of three-month Treasury bill rates averages 70 basis points below CBO's projection for 2005 through 2008. Those differences reduce the projected cost of servicing the national debt and the costs associated with unemployment.

As noted earlier, the Administration's proposals could affect the economy, which in turn would influence their budgetary impacts. This analysis, however, adheres to the convention of excluding any such dynamic macroeconomic effects in its economic and budgetary estimates. Information about those economic effects of the Administration's proposals is important, however. To help better inform the Congress, CBO is preparing a macroeconomic analysis of the Administration's proposals, which will be released in the final version of this report. That analysis will use various models and assumptions to indicate the range of potential economic and budgetary impacts of the President's proposals.

Table 1. Comparison of Projected Deficits and Surpluses in CBO's Baseline and in CBO's Estimate of the President's Budget

(In billions of dollars) Total, Total, Actual 2004-2004-2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2008 2013 CBO's Estimate of the President's Budget -429 -404 -416 -424 On-Budget Deficit (-) -452 -512 -464 -421 -427 -458 -434 -2,225 -317 -4,389 Off-Budget Surplus 250 286 304 318 160 165 174 194 211 231 268 331 1,061 2,569 Total Deficit (-) -158 -287 -338 -270 -218 -173 -166 -153 -141 -154 -106 -102 -1,164 -1,820 **CBO's Baseline** On-Budget Deficit (-) -317 -408 -269 -240 -207 -190 -1,423 or Surplus -373 -317-224 -73 88 128 -1.678 Off-Budget Surplus 160 163 173 195 212 231 250 268 286 304 318 331 1,061 2,568 Total Deficit (-) or Surplus -158 -246 -200 -123 -57 -9 27 61 96 231 405 459 -362 891 Difference (President's budget minus baseline) On-Budget Deficit or Surplus 0 -43 -139 -146 -160 -164 -192 -237 -385 -511 -561 -802 -2,711Off-Budget Surplus 0 3 <u>-1</u> _1 -41 -147 -161 -164 -192 -385 -511 -561 **Total Deficit or Surplus** 0 -138 -214 -237 -802 -2,710 Memorandum: Total Deficit (-) or Surplus as a Percentage of GDP CBO's estimate of the President's budget -1.5 -2.7 -3.0 -2.3 -1.7 -1.3 -1.2 -1.0 -0.9 -0.9 -0.6 -0.6 -1.8 -1.3 CBO's baseline -1.5-2.3 -1.8 -1.0-0.5-0.10.2 0.4 0.6 1.4 2.4 2.6 -0.6 0.6 Debt Held by the Public as a Percentage of GDP CBO's estimate of the President's budget 34.3 35.8 36.9 37.437.3 36.8 36.2 35.434.6 34.0 33.1 32.2 n.a. n.a. 16.8 CBO's baseline 34.3 35.5 34.7 31.9 30.2 28.3 26.3 20.3 35.5 33.5 23.7 n.a. n.a.

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: * = between -\$500 million and \$500 million; n.a. = not applicable.

Table 2.

CBO's Estimate of the President's Budget for 2004

						0								
	Actual 2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	Total, 2004- 2008	Total, 2004- 2013
					In Bil	lions of	Dollars							
Revenues On-budget Off-budget	1,338 515	1,325 	1,349 558	1,512 588	1,654 <u>619</u>	1,782 651	1,889 685	2,000 	2,112 <u>756</u>	2,216 	2,343 830	2,480 <u>870</u>	8,186 3,101	19,338 <u>7,067</u>
Total	1,853	1,856	1,907	2,100	2,273	2,433	2,573	2,720	2,868	3,008	3,173	3,350	11,287	26,405
Outlays Discretionary spending Mandatory spending Net interest	734 1,106 <u>171</u>	805 1,183 <u>155</u>	836 1,243 <u>166</u>	849 1,310 210	867 1,387 <u>237</u>	889 1,466 <u>252</u>	922 1,552 <u>265</u>	952 1,645 <u>275</u>	980 1,742 <u>287</u>	1,011 1,855 <u>295</u>	1,031 1,944 <u>303</u>	1,064 2,079 <u>310</u>	4,363 6,958 1,130	9,402 16,223 2,599
Total On-budget Off-budget	2,011 1,655 356	2,143 1,776 367	2,245 1,861 384	2,370 1,976 394	2,491 2,083 408	2,606 2,186 420	2,739 2,305 434	2,873 2,422 451	3,009 2,539 469	3,162 2,673 488	3,279 2,767 512	3,452 2,914 538	12,451 10,411 2,040	28,225 23,726 4,499
Deficit (-) or Surplus On-budget Off-budget	-317 _160	-452 _165	-512 _ <u>174</u>	-464 _194	-429 211	-404 	-416 250	-421 _268	-427 	-458 _304	-424 _318	-434 _331	-2,225 1,061	-4,389 2,569
Total	-158	-287	-338	-270	-218	-173	-166	-153	-141	-154	-106	-102	-1,164	-1,820
Debt Held by the Public	3,540	3,852	4,178	4,460	4,691	4,875	5,051	5,213	5,362	5,524	5,636	5,744	n.a.	n.a.
Memorandum:														
Gross Domestic Product	10,337	10,756	11,309	11,934	12,582	13,263	13,972	14,712	15,480	16,250	17,013	17,851	n.a.	n.a.
_					As a Pe	ercentage	e of GDP							
Revenues On-budget Off-budget Total	12.9 <u>5.0</u> 17.9	12.3 4.9 17.3	11.9 <u>4.9</u> 16.9	12.7 <u>4.9</u> 17.6	13.1 4.9 18.1	13.4 4.9 18.3	13.5 4.9 18.4	13.6 4.9 18.5	13.6 4.9 18.5	13.6 4.9 18.5	13.8 4.9 18.6	13.9 4.9 18.8	13.0 <u>4.9</u> 17.9	13.4 4.9 18.3
Outlays	,			,		0							,	
Discretionary spending Mandatory spending Net interest	7.1 10.7 <u>1.7</u>	7.5 11.0 <u>1.4</u>	7.4 11.0 <u>1.5</u>	7.1 11.0 <u>1.8</u>	6.9 11.0 <u>1.9</u>	6.7 11.1 <u>1.9</u>	6.6 11.1 <u>1.9</u>	6.5 11.2 <u>1.9</u>	6.3 11.3 <u>1.9</u>	6.2 11.4 <u>1.8</u>	6.1 11.4 <u>1.8</u>	6.0 11.6 <u>1.7</u>	6.9 11.0 <u>1.8</u>	6.5 11.2 <u>1.8</u>
Total	19.5	19.9	19.9	19.9	19.8	19.6	19.6	19.5	19.4	19.5	19.3	19.3	19.7	19.6
On-budget Off-budget	16.0 3.4	16.5 3.4	16.5 3.4	16.6 3.3	16.6 3.2	16.5 3.2	16.5 3.1	16.5 3.1	16.4 3.0	16.5 3.0	16.3	16.3 3.0	16.5 3.2	16.4 3.1
Deficit (-) or Surplus	27-		27-	270	· · ·	• •	27-	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •			2,4	2,74	· · ·	J
On-budget Off-budget	-3.1 1.5	-4.2 1.5	-4.5 1.5	-3.9 <u>1.6</u>	-3.4 1.7	-3.0 <u>1.7</u>	-3.0 <u>1.8</u>	-2.9 <u>1.8</u>	-2.8 <u>1.8</u>	-2.8 <u>1.9</u>	-2.5 <u>1.9</u>	-2.4 <u>1.9</u>	-3.5 <u>1.7</u>	-3.0 <u>1.8</u>
Total	-1.5	-2.7	-3.0	-2.3	-1.7	-1.3	-1.2	-1.0	-0.9	-0.9	-0.6	-0.6	-1.8	-1.3
Debt Held by the Public	34.3	35.8	36.9	37.4	37.3	36.8	36.2	35.4	34.6	34.0	33.1	32.2	n.a.	n.a.

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: n.a. = not applicable.

Table 3.

Changes in CBO's Baseline Projections of the Deficit or Surplus Since January 2003

(In billions of dollars)

(III piniono oi donato)	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	Total, 2004- 2008	Total, 2004- 2013
Total Deficit (-) or Surplus as Projected in January 2003 ^a	-199	-145	-73	-16	26	65	103	140	277	451	508	-143	1,336
Changes to Revenue Projections (Technical)	-30	-30	-20	-10	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	-61	-63
Changes to Outlay Projections Legislative Discretionary Mandatory Debt service Subtotal, legislative	9 4 * 13	19 3 <u>1</u> 22	$ \begin{array}{c} 18 \\ 3 \\ \underline{2} \\ 24 \end{array} $	$ \begin{array}{r} 18 \\ 4 \\ \underline{4} \\ \underline{26} \end{array} $	19 5 <u>5</u> 29	$ \begin{array}{c} 19 \\ 6 \\ \underline{7} \\ 32 \end{array} $	20 7 <u>9</u> 35	20 6 <u>11</u> 37	21 6 <u>13</u> 39	21 5 <u>15</u> 41	$ \begin{array}{r} 22 \\ 4 \\ \underline{17} \\ 44 \end{array} $	93 22 <u>18</u> 134	198 50 <u>82</u> 330
Technical Discretionary Mandatory	4	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	6	11
Mandatory Medicaid Medicare Debt service Other Subtotal, mandatory	1 3 * - <u>-5</u>	2 1 1 <u>-4</u> 1	3 * 3 -1 5	2 -1 4 -1 4	3 -1 4 -2 4	3 -1 4 -2 4	3 -1 5 -2 5	4 -1 5 <u>-2</u> 6	4 -1 5 -2 6	4 -3 5 <u>-3</u> 3	4 -3 5 <u>-3</u> 4	13 -1 16 <u>-10</u> 18	32 -10 39 <u>-20</u> 42
Subtotal, technical	<u>3</u>	_2	<u>_6</u>	4	<u>_5</u>	<u>_6</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>_7</u>	<u>_7</u>	<u>4</u>	_5	24	<u>53</u>
Total Outlay Changes	17	25	29	31	35	38	42	44	46	45	48	157	383
Total Impact on the Surplus	-47	-55	-50	-41	-35	-38	-42	-45	-46	-46	-49	-218	-446
Total Deficit (-) or Surplus as Projected in March 2003	-246	-200	-123	-57	-9	27	61	96	231	405	459	-362	891
Memorandum: Total Legislative Changes Total Technical Changes	-14 -33	-22 -33	-24 -26	-26 -15	-29 -6	-32 -6	-35 -7	-37 -7	-39 -7	-41 -5	-44 -5	-134 -85	-330 -116

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: * = between -\$500 million and \$500 million.

a. Those projections incorporated the assumption that discretionary budget authority would total \$751 billion for 2003 and grow at the rate of inflation thereafter.

Table 4.

CBO's Baseline Budget Projections

	Actual 2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	Total, 2004- 2008	Total, 2004- 2013
					In Billi	ons of D	ollars							
Revenues		- (-	/						. //-				- /	
Individual income taxes	858	869	924	1,011	1,089	1,176	1,259	1,349	1,447	1,649	1,819	1,939	5,458	- /
Corporate income taxes Social insurance taxes	148 701	156 725	185 766	228 811	249 856	260 901	269 944	276 989	285 1,037	295 1,085	306 1,134	316 1,188	1,190 4,276	2,669 9,708
Other	146	<u>141</u>		<u>156</u>	165	168	<u> 176</u>	<u>184</u>	181		221	231	816	1,823
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	2,024	2,205	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	2,504	2,647	<u> </u>		3,220	3,479		11,741	
Total On-budget	1,853 1,338	1,891 1,360	1,466	1,617	2,360 1,741	1,853	1,963	2,798 2,078	2,949 2,193	2,427	2,650	2,804	8,640	,
Off-budget	515	532	558	588	619	651	685	719	756	792	830	870	3,101	7,067
Outlays														
Discretionary spending	734	805	837	854	868	886	911	936	961	991	1,011	1,043	4,356	9,299
Mandatory spending	1,106	1,177	1,223	1,277	1,332	1,403	1,484	1,575	1,670	1,782	1,861	1,993	6,720	15,602
Net interest	<u> 171</u>	<u>155</u>	<u>164</u>	<u>197</u>	<u>217</u>	224	226	225	222	215	201	<u>179</u>	1,027	2,069
Total	2,011	2,137	2,224	2,328	2,417	2,513	2,621	2,736	2,853	2,989	3,074		12,103	,
On-budget	1,655	1,768	1,839	1,935	2,010	2,093	2,187	2,285	2,383	2,500	2,562	2,677	10,063	
Off-budget	356	369	385	393	407	420	434	451	470	488	512	539	2,040	4,499
Deficit (-) or Surplus	217	400	272	217	260	2/0	22/	207	100	72	00	120	1 //22	1 670
On-budget Off-budget	-317 160	-408 _163	-373 173	-317 <u>195</u>	-269 <u>212</u>	-240 <u>231</u>	-224 250	-207 268	-190 <u>286</u>	-73 304	88 <u>318</u>	128 <u>331</u>	-1,423 1,061	-1,678 2,568
Total	-158	-246	-200	-123	<u>-57</u>	<u>251</u> -9	2 <u>7</u>	61	96	231	405	<u>351</u> 459	-362	2,508 891
Debt Held by the Public	3,540	3,816	4,013	4,142	4,212	4,233	4,217	4,165	4,077	3,854	3,456	3,003	n.a.	n.a.
	3,710	3,010	1,013	1,1 12	1,212	1,233	1,21/	1,10)	1,0//	5,071	3,170	3,003	π.α.	11.4.
Memorandum: Gross Domestic Product	10,337	10,756	11,309	11,934	12,582	13,263	13,972	14,712	15,480	16,250	17,013	17,851	n.a.	n.a.
	,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,	,	,- ,		As a Per			,.	- ,	, -	.,	., -		
Revenues						· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	01 021							
Individual income taxes	8.3	8.1	8.2	8.5	8.7	8.9	9.0	9.2	9.3	10.1	10.7	10.9	8.7	9.5
Corporate income taxes	1.4	1.5	1.6	1.9	2.0	2.0	1.9	1.9	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.9	1.8
Social insurance taxes	6.8	6.7	6.8	6.8	6.8	6.8	6.8	6.7	6.7	6.7	6.7	6.7	6.8	6.7
Other	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3
Total	17.9	17.6	17.9	18.5	18.8	18.9	18.9	19.0	19.0	19.8	20.5	20.6	18.6	19.3
On-budget	12.9	12.6	13.0	13.5	13.8	14.0	14.0	14.1	14.2	14.9	15.6	15.7	13.7	14.4
Off-budget	5.0	4.9	4.9	4.9	4.9	4.9	4.9	4.9	4.9	4.9	4.9	4.9	4.9	4.9
Outlays	7 1	7.5	7 4	7.0	6.0	67	6.5	6 4	6.0	6.1	5.0	5.0	6.0	6.4
Discretionary spending Mandatory spending	7.1 10.7	7.5 10.9	7.4 10.8	7.2 10.7	6.9 10.6	6.7 10.6	6.5 10.6	6.4 10.7	6.2 10.8	6.1 11.0	5.9 10.9	5.8 11.2	6.9 10.7	6.4 10.8
Net interest	10.7	10.9	1.4	1.6	10.0	10.0	1.6	10.7	10.8	11.0	10.9	1.0	1.6	1.4
Total On-budget	19.5 16.0	19.9 16.4	19.7 16.3	19.5 16.2	19.2 16.0	18.9 15.8	18.8 15.7	18.6 15.5	18.4 15.4	18.4 15.4	18.1 15.1	18.0 15.0	19.2 16.0	18.7 15.6
Off-budget	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.3	3.2	3.2	3.1	3.1	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.2	
Deficit (-) or Surplus	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.3	J.=	J	0.1	5.3	5.3	0.3	5.0	J.=	0.1
On-budget	-3.1	-3.8	-3.3	-2.7	-2.1	-1.8	-1.6	-1.4	-1.2	-0.4	0.5	0.7	-2.3	-1.2
	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.1 1.8	1.8	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.7	
Off-budget														
Off-budget Total	-1.5	-2.3	-1.8	-1.0	-0.5	-0.1	0.2	0.4	0.6	1.4	2.4	2.6	-0.6	0.6

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: n.a. = not applicable.

Table 5.

CBO's Baseline Projections of Federal Interest Outlays and Federal Debt

(In billions of dollars)

	Actual 2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	Total, 2004- 2008	Total, 2004- 2013
				Federa	l Intere	st Outla	ays							
Interest on the Public Debt (Gross interest) ^a	333	323	332	381	420	446	468	489	508	526	537	542	2,047	4,649
Interest Received by Trust Funds Social Security Other trust funds ^b Subtotal	-77 -76 -153	-84 -72 -156	-90 <u>-67</u> -157	-98 <u>-72</u> -169	-109 <u>-77</u> -185	-121 <u>-81</u> -203	-135 <u>-86</u> -221	-150 <u>-90</u> -241	-166 <u>-95</u> -261	-183 -100 -283	-201 -105 -306	-220 -111 -331	-553 -383 -936	-1,473 <u>-885</u> -2,358
Other Interest ^c	-8	-11	-11	-14	-16	-18	-20	-22	-24	-26	-29	-32	-80	-214
Investment Income ^d	_0	*	<u>-1</u>	<u>-1</u>	<u>-1</u>	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	4	-8
Total (Net interest)	171	155	164	197	217	224	226	225	222	215	201	179	1,027	2,069
				Federal	Debt, F	End of Y	'ear							
Debt Held by the Public	3,540	3,816	4,013	4,142	4,212	4,233	4,217	4,165	4,077	3,854	3,456	3,003	n.a.	n.a.
Debt Held by Government Accounts Social Security Other government accounts ^b	1,329 1,329	1,491 1,361	1,664 1,443	1,857 <u>1,543</u>	2,070 1,657	2,301 1,778	2,551 1,904	2,819 2,034	3,106 2,170	3,409 2,311	3,727 2,460	4,058 2,612	n.a. n.a.	n.a. n.a.
Total	2,658	2,851	3,107	3,400	3,727	4,079	4,455	4,854	5,276	5,721	6,187	6,671	n.a.	n.a.
Gross Federal Debt	6,198	6,667	7,119	7,542	7,939	8,312	8,672	9,018	9,353	9,575	9,643	9,673	n.a.	n.a.
Debt Subject to Limit ^e	6,161	6,645	7,097	7,520	7,917	8,289	8,650	8,996	9,330	9,551	9,619	9,649	n.a.	n.a.
Memorandum: Debt Held by the Public as a Percentage of GDP	34.3	35.5	35.5	34.7	33.5	31.9	30.2	28.3	26.3	23.7	20.3	16.8	n.a.	n.a.

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: n.a. = not applicable; * = between -\$500 million and zero.

a. Excludes interest costs of debt issued by agencies other than the Treasury (primarily the Tennessee Valley Authority).

b. Principally the Civil Service Retirement, Military Retirement, Medicare, and Unemployment Insurance Trust Funds.

c. Primarily interest on loans to the public.

d. Earnings on private investments by the National Railroad Retirement Investment Trust.

e. Differs from gross federal debt primarily because it excludes most debt issued by agencies other than the Treasury. The current debt limit is \$6,400 billion.

Table 6. Comparison of CBO's March 2003 Baseline and the Administration's **February 2003 Current-Services Baseline**

(In billions of dollars) Total, 2004-2004 2006 2003 2005 2007 2008 2008 CBO's March 2003 Baseline Revenues On-budget 1,360 1,466 1,617 1,741 1,963 8,640 1,853 Off-budget 532 558 588 619 651 685 3,101 1,891 2,024 2,205 2,360 2,504 2,647 **Total** 11,741 Outlays Discretionary 805 837 854 868 886 911 4,356 Mandatory 1,177 1,223 1,277 1,332 1,403 1,484 6,720 226 197 217 224 1,027 Net interest 155 164 2,224 2,621 2.137 2,328 2,417 2,513 12,103 Total On-budget 1,768 1,839 1,935 2,010 2,093 2,187 10,063 Off-budget 407 420 434 2,040 369 385 393 Deficit (-) or Surplus On-budget -408 -373 -317 -269 -240 -224 -1,423Off-budget 231 250 163 173 195 212 1,061 -246 -200 -9 Total -123 -57 **27** -362 Administration's February 2003 Current-Services Baseline Revenues 1,646 1,919 8,603 On-budget 1,335 1,475 1,738 1,825 Off-budget 532 556 _590 615 644 673 3,078 **Total** 1.867 2.031 2,235 2,352 2,469 2,593 11.681 **Outlays** Discretionary 785 795 813 825 843 862 4,138 Mandatory 1,185 1,221 1,269 1,318 1,387 1,465 6,660 Net interest _161 173 193 205 211 _214 996 2,131 2,189 2,276 2,348 2,440 2,541 11,794 **Total** On-budget 1.760 1.805 1.883 1.944 2.024 2.112 9,768 Off-budget 416 430 371 384 393 403 2,026 Deficit (-) or Surplus On-budget -425 -330 -237 -207 -199 -192 -1,166 Off-budget 160 172 <u>197</u> <u>211</u> <u>228</u> <u>243</u> 1,052 -264 -158 -40 29 51 -114 **Total** 5

(Continued)

Table 6.

Continued

(In billions of dollars)							
	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	Total, 2004- 2008
	Di	fference (CBC) minus Admi	nistration)			
Revenues		,		,			
On-budget	24	-9	-29	3	29	44	38
Off-budget	*	2	<u>-2</u>	$\underline{4}$	_7	<u>11</u>	<u>23</u>
Total	24	-7	-30	7	35	55	60
Outlays							
Discretionary	20	42	40	43	44	49	218
Mandatory	-8	2	8	14	16	19	60
Net interest	<u>-6</u>	<u>-10</u>	_3	<u>12</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>31</u>
Total	6	35	52	69	73	79	309
On-budget	8	34	51	65	69	75	295
Off-budget	-2	1	1	4	4	4	14
Deficit or Surplus							
On-budget	16	-42	-80	-62	-41	-31	-257
Off-budget	2	<u>1</u>	<u>-2</u>	*	_3	7	9
Total	18	-42	-82	-62	-38	-25	-248

 $Sources: \ \ Congressional \ Budget \ Office; \ Office \ of \ Management \ and \ Budget.$

Note: * = between zero and \$500 million.

Table 7.

Sources of Differences Between CBO's and the Administration's **Estimates of the President's Budget**

(In billions of dollars) Total, 2004-2003 2004 2006 2007 2005 2008 2008 **Administration's Estimate** -304 Deficit Under the President's Budget -307 -208 -201 -178 -190 -1,084 Sources of Differences Between CBO and the Administration Revenues **Baseline differences** 60 24 -7 -30 7 35 55 Policy differences -8 3 <u>-2</u> <u>-4</u> *-*5 <u>-13</u> **Total Revenue Differences 20** -15 -35 10 35 **52 47** Outlays Discretionary 13 17 -3 -3 -4 7 -1 Mandatory Baseline differences -8 2 8 14 19 60 17 Policy differences 7 3 <u>13</u> 4 4 3 30 -5 Subtotal, mandatory 9 21 18 21 21 90 Net interest <u>-6</u> <u>-10</u> 31 <u>6</u> 12 12 <u>11</u> **Total Outlay Differences** 3 16 26 **27 30** 28 128 18 -31 -62 24 -80 All Differences -17 6 **CBO's Estimate** Deficit Under the President's Budget -287 -338 -270 -218 -173 -166 -1,164 Memorandum: **Economic Differences** Revenues -10 -13 2 26 46 60 121 Outlays -1 <u>10</u> 23 <u> 29</u> <u>31</u> 93 -12 **Total** -9 -9 2 **17** 29 28 **Technical Differences** Revenues 30 -2 -16 -8 -11 Outlays 17 35 16 <u>-2</u> 3 4 **27** -11 -5 -108 **Total** -18 -53 -20

Sources: Congressional Budget Office; Joint Committee on Taxation.

Note: * = between -\$500 million and \$500 million.

Table 8.

CBO's Estimate of the Effect of the President's Budgetary Proposals

(In billions of dollars) Total, Total, 2004-2004-2011 2008 2003 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2012 2013 2013 2004 2005 Baseline Deficit (-) or Surplus as Projected in March 2003 by CBO -246 -200 -123-57 -9 27 61 96 231 405 459 -362 891 Effect of the President's Revenue Proposals Extend expiring EGTRRA provisions -602 -1 -1 -1 -2 -2 -2 -134 -224 -234-5 Provide dividend exclusion -8 -29 -39 -147 -23 -26 -32 -36 -44 -48 -52 -59 -388 -25 -78 -27 -19 -8 Accelerate individual income tax cuts -51 -15 -12 0 0 -190 -211 -1 -7 Extend experimentation credit 0 -1 -3 -4 -5 -7 -7 -8 -8 -19 -56 -6 Increase AMT exemption -9 -13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -36 -36 -1 Increase expensing for small businesses -1 -3 -3 -3 -3 -3 -3 -2 -2 -2 -2 -15 -27 Provide deduction for long-term care insurance 0 -1 -1 -2 -2 -2 -3 -3 -3 -4 -18 Provide charitable contribution deduction for nonitemizers -1 -1 -1 -1 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -7 -1 -15 Provide tax credit for affordable single-family housing 0 -1 -1 -2 -2 -3 -3 -3 -2 -15 Provide refundable health insurance credit 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -2 -2 -2 -5 -13 Expand tax-free savings 2 3 3 3 1 -2 -3 -4 -4 -5 10 -7 Extend AMT treatment of nonrefundable personal credits 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 Other proposals^a -5 -7 <u>-7</u> <u>-7</u> -7 <u>-7</u> -7 -6 -1 -7 -6 -32 <u>-66</u> -87 **Total Revenue Effect** -117 -105 -71 -74 -78 -81 -212 -307 -324 -454 -1,455 -35 Effect of the President's Outlay Proposals Discretionary spending Defense -1 8 13 22 28 32 34 36 38 44 211 <u>-7</u> -4 <u>-9</u> -1 -17 -11 -13 -16 -108 Nondefense 0 -10 -11 -14 <u>-37</u> -1 0 11 17 21 20 20 104 Subtotal, discretionary Mandatory spending Medicare^b 0 6 10 38 46 49 130 400 33 43 53 58 64 Medicaid and SCHIP^c 0 8 9 8 9 9 8 4 40 72 1 Health care tax credit 0 0 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 5 5 23 51 Earned income and child tax credits 1 5 4 4 4 4 2 11 11 17 45 Postal Service 15 38 3 3 3 5 Unemployment insurance 3 3 3 3 2 17 1 3 0 0 0 4 Reemployment benefits 0 3 0 0 0 0 Customs fees 0 -2 -2 -2 -2 -18 -2 -2 ANWR 0 0 0 -2 0 0 2 2 -1 -1 -3 5 -2 Spectrum auctions 11 17 Other 1 1 Subtotal, mandatory 20 239 621

(Continued)

-41

-287

-138

-338

-147

-270

Table 8.

Total Impact on the Surplus

Deficit Under the President's Proposals

Continued (In billions of dollars) Total, Total, 2004-2004-2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2008 2013 Net interest 3 13 <u>20</u> 28 39 <u>50</u> 65 80 102 131 103 530 **Total Outlay Effect** 6 21 42 74 93 118 136 156 205 237 173 348 1,255

Sources: Congressional Budget Office; Joint Committee on Taxation.

Notes: * = between -\$500 million and \$500 million; EGTRRA = Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001; AMT = alternative minimum tax; SCHIP = State Children's Health Insurance Program; ANWR = Arctic National Wildlife Refuge.

-161

-218

-164

-173

-192

-166

-214

-153

-237

-141

-385

-154

-511

-106

-561

-802 -2,710

-102 -1,164 -1,820

Estimates of most of the revenue proposals were provided by the Joint Committee on Taxation and are preliminary.

- a. Includes interaction effect from enacting all provisions together.
- b. CBO did not have enough detail to make an independent estimate of the allowance for modernizing Medicare. Instead, it used the estimate contained in the President's budget.
- c. CBO did not have enough detail to make an independent estimate of the proposal to allow states to convert their funding for Medicaid and SCHIP into a block grant. Instead, it calculated the cost of the proposal as the difference between the Administration's estimate of total spending for Medicaid and SCHIP (for states assumed to choose the grants) and CBO's baseline estimate.

Table 9. Comparison of Discretionary Budget Authority Enacted for 2003 and the President's Request for 2004, by Budget Function

(In billions of dollars) Increase or Decrease (-) 2003 2004 Billions of **Budget Function** Enacted Request **Dollars** Percent **Defense Discretionary** 392.1 400.1 7.9 2.0 Nondefense Discretionary International affairs 25.4 28.7 12.8 3.2 General science, space, and technology 23.0 23.5 0.4 1.8 3.7 0.5 Energy 3.2 15.2 Natural resources and environment 29.2 27.9 -1.3 -4.4 Agriculture 5.3 -0.4 -7.6 5.7 Commerce and housing credita 0.2 -0.5-0.6 n.a. **Transportation** 22.6 22.7 0.1 0.4Community and regional development 11.7 14.2 2.5 21.1 Education, training, employment, and social services 72.9 77.5 4.6 6.3 Health 49.6 49.5 0.2 0.3 Medicare (Administrative costs) 3.8 3.7 -0.1-1.6 45.8 Income security 44.01.8 4.1Social Security (Administrative costs) 3.8 4.3 0.411.7 Veterans benefits and services 26.5 28.2 1.6 6.1 Administration of justice 36.3 34.2 -2.1-5.8 General government 15.7 17.8 2.1 13.2 373.7 386.6 12.9 **Total Nondefense** 3.5 **Total Discretionary** 765.8 786.6 20.8 2.7 Memorandum: Department of Homeland Security 21.3 27.1 5.8 27.5 **Transportation Obligation Limitations** 41.3 39.6 -1.7 -4.1

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: n.a. = not applicable.

a. Includes certain receipts (such as those from loan guarantees made by the Federal Housing Administration's Mutual Mortgage Insurance Program) and other collections (such as those from the Securities and Exchange Commission) that are recorded as negative budget authority and outlays.

Table 10.

Discretionary Spending Under the President's Budget and CBO's Baseline

(In billions of dollars)

	Actual 2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	Total, 2004- 2008	Total, 2004- 2013
		СВО	's Estima	ate of Dis	scretiona	ıry Speno	ling Und	er the Pr	esident'	s Budget	a			
Budget Authority						16.								
Defense	361	392	400	419	440	460	480	493	507	521	536	550	2,199	4,807
Nondefense	<u>374</u>	<u>374</u>	<u>387</u>	<u>395</u>	<u>403</u>	<u>413</u>	<u>424</u>	<u>435</u>	<u>446</u>	<u>458</u>	469	482	<u>2,021</u>	<u>4,310</u>
Total	735	766	78 7	814	842	872	904	928	953	979	1,005	1,032	4,220	9,117
Outlays														
Defense	349	386	401	414	425	438	462	480	497	516	523	543	2,140	4,698
Nondefense	<u>385</u>	<u>418</u>	<u>435</u>	<u>436</u>	<u>441</u>	<u>451</u>	<u>460</u>	<u>472</u>	<u>484</u>	496	508	521	2,223	<u>4,705</u>
Total	734	805	836	849	867	889	922	952	980	1,011	1,031	1,064	4,363	9,402
				CBO's	Baseline	for Disc	retionar	y Spendi	ng					
Budget Authority														
Defense	361	392	402	412	423	434	446	459	471	485	498	512	2,117	4,543
Nondefense	<u>374</u>	<u>374</u>	<u>389</u>	<u>398</u>	<u>409</u>	<u>420</u>	<u>431</u>	<u>443</u>	<u>455</u>	<u>468</u>	<u>481</u>	<u>494</u>	<u>2,047</u>	<u>4,388</u>
Total	735	766	791	810	832	854	877	901	927	953	979	1,007	4,164	8,931
Outlays														
Defense	349	386	402	411	418	425	440	452	465	481	487	505	2,096	4,486
Nondefense	<u>385</u>	<u>418</u>	<u>436</u>	$\underline{442}$	<u>450</u>	<u>461</u>	<u>471</u>	<u>484</u>	<u>496</u>	<u>510</u>	524	538	2,260	4,812
Total	734	805	837	854	868	886	911	936	961	991	1,011	1,043	4,356	9,299

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: Discretionary outlays are usually higher than budget authority because of spending from the Highway Trust Fund and the Airport and Airways Trust Fund, which is subject to obligation limitations set in appropriation acts. The budget authority for such programs is provided in authorizing legislation and is not considered discretionary.

a. The President's budget specifies discretionary spending only through 2008. The numbers shown here for discretionary spending after 2008 under the President's budget are projections by CBO using its baseline rates of inflation.

Table 11. Comparison of CBO's and the Administration's Estimates of the Effect of the President's Budgetary Proposals (In billions of dollars)

(== 2==================================					Difference			
		BO		stration		dministration)		
	Total, 2004-2008	Total, 2004-2013	Total, 2004-2008	Total, 2004-2013	Total, 2004-2008	Total, 2004-2013		
Total Baseline Deficit (-) or Surplus								
as Projected in March 2003 by CBO	-362	891	-114	n.a.	-248	n.a.		
Effect of the President's Revenue Proposals								
Extend expiring EGTRRA provisions	-5	-602	-6	-498	1	-103		
Provide dividend exclusion	-147	-388	-140	-360	-6	-28		
Accelerate individual income tax cuts	-190	-211	-185	-214	-5	3		
Extend experimentation credit	-19	-56	-23	-68	4	12		
Increase AMT exemption	-36	-36	-26	-26	-10	-10		
Increase expensing for small businesses	-15	-27	-8	-15	-7	-13		
Provide deduction for long-term care insurance Provide charitable contribution deduction	-4	-18	-7	-28	2	10		
for nonitemizers	-7	-15	-6	-13	-1	-2		
Provide tax credit for affordable single-								
family housing	-2	-15	-2	-16	*	1		
Provide refundable health insurance credit	-5	-13	-3	-2	-2	-12		
Expand tax-free savings	10	-7	15	2	-4	-9		
Extend AMT treatment of nonrefundable								
personal credits	-1	-1	-18	-18	17	-17		
Other proposals ^a	<u>-32</u>	<u>-66</u>	<u>-32</u>	<u>-52</u>	<u>-1</u>	<u>-14</u>		
Total Revenue Effect	-454	-1,455	-441	-1,307	-13	-148		
Effect of the President's Outlay Proposals Discretionary spending								
Defense	44	211	111	n.a.	-67	n.a.		
Nondefense	<u>-37</u>	<u>-108</u>	<u>108</u>	n.a.	<u>-145</u>	n.a.		
Subtotal, discretionary	- <u></u> 7	$\frac{100}{104}$	$\frac{268}{218}$	n.a.	-211	n.a.		
Mandatory spending	,							
Medicare ^b	130	400	130	400	0	0		
Medicaid and SCHIP ^c	40	72	10	-3	30	75		
Health care tax credit	23	51	31	88	-7	-37		
Earned income and child tax credits	17	45	18	50	-1	-4		
Postal Service	15	38	9	31	6	7		
Unemployment insurance	2	17	$\overset{\circ}{2}$	17	*	*		
Reemployment benefits	$\frac{2}{4}$	4	$\frac{2}{2}$	2	2	2		
Customs fees	-8	-18	-8	-19	*	1		
ANWR (Net of payments to Alaska)	*	*	-1	-17	1	1		
Spectrum auctions	5	-2	5	-4	1	2		
Other			<u>11</u>	0	_			
Subtotal, mandatory	$\frac{9}{239}$	<u>15</u> 621	$\frac{11}{209}$	<u>8</u> 568	$\frac{-1}{30}$	<u>8</u> 54		
Net interest	103	<u>530</u>	102	n.a.	*	n.a.		
Total Outlay Effect	348	1,255	<u>102</u> 529		-181			
•				n.a.	-161 168	n.a.		
Total Impact on the Surplus	-802	-2,710	-970	n.a.		n.a.		
Total Deficit Under the President's Proposals	-1,164	-1,820	-1,084	n.a.	-80	n.a.		

(Continued)

Table 11.

Continued

(In billions of dollars)					Diffe	rence
	CI	80	Admini	stration	(CBO minus A	dministration)
	Total, 2004-2008	Total, 2004-2013	Total, 2004-2008	Total, 2004-2013	Total, 2004-2008	Total, 2004-2013
Memorandum: Economic Growth Package ^d Effect on revenues Effect on outlays	-388 22	-663 27	-359 20	-615 27	-28 1	-48 *

Sources: Congressional Budget Office; Joint Committee on Taxation; Office of Management and Budget.

Note: * = between -\$500 million and \$500 million; n.a. = not applicable; EGTRRA = Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001; AMT = alternative minimum tax; SCHIP = State Children's Health Insurance Program; ANWR = Arctic National Wildlife Refuge.

- a. Includes interaction effect from enacting all provisions together.
- b. CBO did not have enough detail to make an independent estimate of the allowance for modernizing Medicare. Instead, it used the estimate contained in the President's
- c. CBO did not have enough detail to make an independent estimate of the proposal to allow states to convert their funding for Medicaid and SCHIP into a block grant. Instead, it calculated the cost of the proposal as the difference between the Administration's estimate of total spending for Medicaid and SCHIP (for states assumed to choose the grants) and CBO's baseline estimate.
- d. Includes seven provisions affecting revenues: acceleration of the 10 percent individual income tax bracket expansion, acceleration of the reduction in individual income tax rates, acceleration of marriage-penalty relief, acceleration of the increase in the child tax credit, elimination of double taxation of corporate earnings, increase in expensing for small businesses, and provision of alternative minimum tax relief to individuals. Also includes two provisions affecting outlays: personal reemployment accounts and the refundable portion of the child tax credit.

Table 12. Comparison of CBO's, the Administration's, and Private-Sector Economic **Projections for Calendar Years 2003 Through 2008**

				Projected
	Estimate	Fore		Annual Average,
	2002	2003	2004	2005-2008
Nominal GDP (Billions of dollars)				
CBO	10,443	10,880	11,465	$14,154^{a}$
Administration	10,442	10,884	11,447	$13,919^{a}$
February <i>Blue Chip</i>	10,446	10,948	11,499	n.a.
Nominal GDP (Percentage change)				
СВО	3.6	4.2	5.4	5.4
Administration	3.6	4.2	5.2	5.0
February <i>Blue Chip</i>	3.6	4.5	5.6	n.a.
Real GDP (Percentage change)				
СВО	2.4	2.5	3.6	3.2
Administration	2.4	2.9	3.6	3.3
February <i>Blue Chip</i>	2.5	2.7	3.6	n.a.
GDP Price Index (Percentage change)				
СВО	1.1	1.6	1.7	2.1
Administration	1.1	1.3	1.5	1.7
February <i>Blue Chip</i>	1.1	1.7	1.9	n.a.
Consumer Price Index ^b (Percentage change)				
СВО	1.6	2.3	2.2	2.5
Administration	1.6	2.2	2.1	2.2
February <i>Blue Chip</i>	1.6	2.3	2.3	n.a.
Unemployment Rate (Percent)				
CBO	5.8	5.9	5.7	5.3
Administration	5.8	5.7	5.5	5.1
February <i>Blue Chip</i>	5.8	6.0	5.6	n.a

(Continued)

Table 12. **Continued**

	Estimate	Fore	oaet.	Projected Annual Average
	2002	2003	2004	2005-2008
Ten-Year Treasury Note Rate (Percent)				
СВО	4.6	4.4	5.2	5.8
Administration	4.6	4.2	5.0	5.5
February <i>Blue Chip</i>	4.6	4.3	5.2	n.a.
Tax Bases ^c (Percentage of GDP) Corporate book profits				
ĈBO	6.2	6.8	7.3	9.2
Administration	6.3	7.1	7.2	8.4
Wages and salaries				
СВО	48.1	48.1	48.1	48.0
Administration	48.1	48.5	48.7	48.7
Tax Bases ^c (Billions of dollars) Corporate book profits				
ĈBO	653	739	842	$1,267^{a}$
Administration	659	771	830	$1,120^{a}$
Wages and salaries				·
СВО	5,025	5,237	5,518	$6,782^{a}$
Administration	5,021	5,275	5,575	$6,757^{a}$

Sources: Congressional Budget Office; Office of Management and Budget; Aspen Publishers, Inc., Blue Chip Economic Indicators (February 10, 2003); Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; Federal Reserve Board; Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Notes: Percentage changes are year over year.

n.a. = not applicable.

a. Level in 2008.

b. The consumer price index for all urban consumers.

c. The Blue Chip survey does not include projections of tax bases.



This publication and others by CBO are available at the agency's Web site: www.cbo.gov