TERRORISM
AND THE SECURITY OF
AMERICA’S
POWER PLANTS:
A
PUBLIC HEALTH PERSPECTIVE
Contact:
317 East 64th Street
New York, NY 10021
Tel: 212-535-9707
Fax: 212-535-7488
Email: iredlener@montefiore.org
Irwin Redlener, M.D.
President, The Children’s
Hospital at Montefiore
&
President, The Children’s
Health Fund
Testimony before the
Committee on Environment and Public Works
United States Senate
Re: The Nuclear Security Act
June 5, 2002
Thank you, Chairman Jeffords, Ranking Member Smith
and members of the Committee, for the opportunity to testify this morning. I am Dr. Irwin Redlener, a pediatrician and
president of the Children’s Health Fund headquartered in New York and the new
Children’s Hospital at Montefiore Medical Center in the Bronx. I have had a career in public health and health
services delivery spanning more than three decades. However, allow me to share some background information with
respect to my role in the matters before the Committee today.
First, on September 11, 2001 I dispatched two mobile
medical units from our New York programs to lower Manhattan to participate in
the enormous emergency medical response to the terrorist attacks at the World
Trade Center. We also assisted in a
number of additional ways in the immediate aftermath in terms of medical
services and continue to provide mental health support to families and children
throughout the City who have been affected by the attacks.
In addition, with a colleague who heads the Center
for Pediatric Emergency Medicine at the New York University Medical Center, Dr.
George Foltin, I established the New York City Task Force on Pediatric Disaster
Preparedness in December. I am also a
founding member of the Task Force on Terrorism of the American Academy of
Pediatrics. Over the last eight months
I have been working to ensure that federal efforts designed to improve
preparedness for terrorist attacks include specific provisions to ensure the
safety of children.
In New York City I have had regular contact, formal
and informal, with City and private sector officials responsible for disaster
response. Since October of last year I
have had continuous contact with federal officials regarding various issues
with respect to homeland security. These
issues have included my ongoing concerns regarding the security of nuclear power
plants in general and the Indian Point nuclear power plants in particular. Finally, during the 1980s, I was
significantly involved in the analysis of Crisis Relocation Planning, the
response proposed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency, to the threat of
large-scale nuclear attack on the United States.
The September 11 attacks on the United States have
had remarkable consequences for Americans and for American society. In a real sense, on a beautiful day this
past September, we were both invaded and profoundly shaken as a nation. For generations we have had a sense of
detachment from the grim realities which plague so many parts of the world,
where uncertainty and terror play out in daily life and the public
consciousness is always aware, on some level, of the potential for deadly
large-scale violence. Less than two
dozen violent and suicidal fanatics, connected to a diffusive and elusive
global network of terror, has essentially ended the American reverie of
protected isolation.
The cliché is that this is a “new world”, and,
indeed, it is. How we respond, what
plans we make, how we adjust ourselves psychologically, what resources we
ultimately bring to bear and how we reorganize our government systems and
agencies to prevent, mitigate or reduce the impact of on-going terrorism in the
United States remain open questions.
We will see conflicts between civil rights and
necessary intelligence gathering capability; we’ll struggle with interagency
communications and rivalries over areas of responsibility and control. And there will be major debates over how to
prioritize and balance the response to terrorism against the ongoing societal
concerns which pre-date September 11, 2001.
However, no matter how these debates unfold, it is
clear that the perceptions of risk, vulnerability and homeland security must
rapidly evolve and adapt to the new realities of a nation targeted by smart,
committed agents of terror. There are,
needless to say, a myriad of complex issues to be covered under the rubrics of
the war against terrorism and the effort to enhance the security of the United
States. One of these areas, the subject
of this morning’s hearings, concerns the potential risks and vulnerabilities of
the 103 nuclear power plants currently operating throughout the country. Unfortunately, I also need to add that
children, the elderly and the infirm bear a disproportionately high burden of
vulnerability to consequences of and reactions to a successful terrorist attack
on a nuclear power plant.
Although the possibility of a catastrophic event
occurring at a nuclear power plant as a result of accident, natural disaster or
deliberate act of terrorism has always been on the table, the events of
September 11 demand a re-examination of all aspects of the vulnerability and
security of the nation’s nuclear facilities.
Simply put, what was improbable to the point of impossible, has become
possible. Assessment of risk and
specific planning scenarios need to evolve to new levels taking into account a
much more aggressive, educated, trained and organized terrorist for whom
capture or death is not a deterrent to action.
A medical analogy here would be the mutation of a
bacteriologic agent which becomes orders of magnitude more virulent and
simultaneously unresponsive to first-line antibiotics. Traditional approaches to prevention, early
identification and treatment would need to change dramatically. In effect, this is precisely what we are
dealing with in terms of necessary measures to secure and reduce the risk posed
by nuclear power facilities today in the United States. Acceptable risk and security measures
appropriate on September 10, became unacceptable and insecure on September 11.
The potential consequences of failing to do
everything possible to reduce or eliminate the population risks from acts of
terrorism carried out against nuclear facilities are extraordinary and
horrific. Attack scenarios well within
the realm of possibility for many nuclear facilities can have horrendous
consequences for populations in the vicinity of a nuclear plant. Immediate civilian fatalities can range from
a hundred or so to five thousand or more, depending on the extent of damage to
the reactor, its support systems and the spent fuel containment systems. Excess
cancers from radiation exposures can range into the tens of thousands. Moreover, nuclear terrorism is in a special
category of horror, evocative of the nightmare scenarios which first arose
during the height of the cold war.
Beyond the direct mortality and morbidity estimates,
verified by numerous studies of experts in and out of government, are layer
upon layer of unimaginable potential health and economic consequences from a
successful attack on a power plant.
Studies by independent physicists and organizations, including the
Brookhaven National Laboratories, have concluded that thousands of square miles
could be contaminated and uninhabitable for years or decades under a variety of
highly plausible attack scenarios. In
sum, the economic, psychological and societal consequences of such an event in
a major population center would be almost incalculable.
For all of these reasons, it is imperative that we
take necessary and prudent steps to reduce the likelihood of a successful act
of terrorism against a nuclear power facility.
There are two points which are, perhaps obvious, but worth stating:
First, to the very limits of our human limits,
intelligence capacity should be upgraded to the point where terrorist planning
can be disrupted prior to implementation.
And, second, a cogent case can be made for closing nuclear power plants
altogether, particularly those with inherent safety problems, those in highly
populated areas with inadequate evacuation plans or those with relatively
insufficient means of safeguarding spent fuel rods. The fact is that the Indian Point facility meets all three
criteria for closing, even though discontinuing energy production does not
fully eliminate the risk and even though there would be modest temporary
increases in energy costs in the region.
In my opinion, this is clearly a case in which the true risks to people
of continuing operations are far greater than the benefits, by any
measure.
Putting aside the question of plant decommissioning,
here are some actions that can be undertaken immediately:
1.
Security at nuclear plants
needs to be upgraded dramatically and immediately, commensurate with our new
and totally different understanding of the capacity and ferocity of terrorism
on American soil. The “design basis threats”
which used to be the standard scenarios for anti-terrorism planning need to be
upgraded, informed by the events of September 11, to include a whole new range
of potential actions for which security measures must anticipate, plan for and
test. Can we explain to our children
and grandchildren in Westchester County, New York why special U.S. military
forces, for instance are not guarding Indian Point? Incredibly, just six weeks ago the New York Post reported that a
journalist spent 20 minutes flying over the Indian Point facility. Can we explain why aircraft are not
forbidden to fly over the plant?
2. All spent fuel rods should be stored in
hardened, on-site, dry storage facilities, pending a more definitive solution
to the challenge of permanent storage.
Spent nuclear fuel rods in places like the Indian Point plant are kept
in deep water pools. Unlike the reactor
core itself, which is in a hardened containment structure, the spent fuel pool
is in an adjacent, comparatively lightweight structure. Many of these spent rod structures are
covered with nothing more than a corrugated steel roof. Moreover, the pools are now packed at high
density, so much so that spent fuel will ignite and burn if water, essential to
keeping the spent rods cool, is lost from the pool. This would release a massive amount of radioactive material to
the atmosphere. Dry storage can make
the spent fuel dramatically less vulnerable.
Money is the only barrier to moving rapidly to hardened, dry storage of
the used fuel.
3.
There needs to be a
top-to-bottom revision and upgrading of the emergency planning process, with
active federal oversight. Planning for evacuation in
densely populated areas is extremely difficult. The grossly inadequate emergency evacuation planning process
around.
4.
The Indian Point facility is a case in point. Spontaneous, uncontrolled evacuation in time of crisis, as
happened at Three Mile Island, could quickly result in chaos and paralysis of
egress. Permanent relocation for
evacuees in the event of substantial ground contamination would be an
extraordinary challenge.
Reuniting school children and children in day care
with their parents in the current plans are dependent upon wildly unrealistic
expectations with respect to the likely behavior of school bus drivers,
emergency officials and parents. Plans
are extremely insufficient regarding the size and scope of the area which would
need evacuation in a nuclear emergency.
The same could be said regarding what to do with senior citizens,
hospitalized or disabled individuals and those who refuse to leave. The entire notion of evacuation planning is
so massive, complex and resource intense that it is unfair and unreasonable to
expect this to happen, if it can happen at all, without extensive and revised
preparations and a strong role for the federal government. A recent Marist Institute survey on the
subject of evacuation planning revealed that more than 75% of residents living
within 10 miles of Indian Point do not believe that the current evacuation plan
is workable. Only a very small percentage
of people even within a 10 mile radius of the plant know where the reception
centers are located. Chaos would ensue
under any attempt to evacuate the area in the event of a terrorist nuclear
incident at Indian Point since 60% of people within 50 miles of the plant, well
beyond the planning zone, would attempt to evacuate. We have every reason to be concerned that people within the 10
mile evacuation zone would, in fact, not be able to leave because of road and
transportation congestion caused by people in large numbers outside the 10 mile
range attempting to leave as quickly as possible.
5.
Potassium iodide should be
acquired and distributed on a “point of use” basis for a minimum of 50 miles
radius from all nuclear power plants. Radioactive
iodine, I-131, is released from reactor explosions and, if inhaled or ingested
in sufficient quantities, can cause high rates of thyroid cancer in
children. If the proper dose of
potassium iodide (KI) is given prior to or within two hours of exposure to
I-131, this particular outcome, that is excess thyroid cancers, can be almost
entirely prevented.
Because the window of opportunity to have this
beneficial effect of KI is very narrow, it is not sufficient to have the drug
only at central distribution points. It
must be available at home, in schools and in day care centers. In addition, there must be a major public
education campaign to inform people about the benefits of having KI ready for
administration, especially to children and pregnant women. It also must be pointed out that KI is not
a “radiation pill.” It will do nothing
for any other consequence of exposure to cesium-137 or other isotopes. It is also essential that proper measures be
taken by government to ensure that food and water available for ingestion by
children not have evidence of I-131 or other harmful radiation by-products such
as Strontium-90.
These four steps would, in my estimation, be appropriate initial measures to prevent and/or ameliorate a terrorist attack on any one of the nation’s nuclear power facility. As a physician and public health professional, as a resident of a community with the least safe nuclear power plant in the nation – one which has 21 million people living with 50 miles of the facility, I urge you to strongly consider these recommendations and move forward as quickly as possible.
I also recognize that this is just the beginning and
nothing more than a component – albeit a very important component – of a much
larger agenda. Even in the nuclear
arena, there are many other concerns beyond nuclear plant security. The Federation of American Scientists and
the Health Physics Society have begun to raise important concerns about the
status of so-called “sealed” and “orphan” sources of radioactive materials used
in health care and many other industries.
Management control, security and oversight of these materials is
variable to the extreme. Stolen radioactive
materials can be used to make simple and potentially deadly “dirty bombs”
which, if nothing else, have the capability of rendering large land areas
uninhabitable.
Again, I thank you for the opportunity to offer
testimony at his hearing. I deeply
respect the responsibility you and your colleagues have in this time of
enormous uncertainty and danger. On
behalf of my colleagues in health care and public health I wish you strength
and courage to do what needs to get done to safeguard all Americans from every
form of terror.
Thank you.