TESTIMONY OF THOMAS NATAN, RESEARCH DIRECTOR,
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL TRUST
BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CLEAN AIR, WETLANDS, PRIVATE PROPERTY, AND NUCLEAR SAFETY
UNITED STATES SENATE
March 16, 1999

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, my name is Thomas Natan, and I am the Research Director of the National Environmental Trust, a non-partisan, non-profit public interest organization that educates the public on environmental issues. I thank you for the opportunity to testify as a member of the environmental community concerning the EPA's Risk Management Plan Program under section 112(r) of the Clean Air Act. I am a chemical engineer by training, and have visited scores of industrial facilities, examining ways in which they can operate more efficiently and safely, as well as helping to interpret their environmental data for residents of surroundings convexities.

As the Committee is aware, in 1986, Congress enacted the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act. A principal feature of this legislation was the Toxics Release Inventory Program, or TRI. TRI has been credited by both environmentalists and industry alike for generating a climate that has resulted in dramatic decreases in toxic chemical emissions without the traditional constraints and costs of a command-and-control regulatory framework. A principal result of the public right-to-know program has been an incentive for enhanced environmental stewardship without the burdens of the command-and-control regulatory system.

The experience with complete and unimpeded public dissemination of TRI data in generating significant reductions in releases of toxic chemicals to the environment is relevant to the issue of public availability of Worst Case Scenario data. Like the 112(r) program, TRI merely requires reporting of information that companies already generate in the course of doing business. Public awareness -- generated from both local citizens and data analyses by environmental groups -- has led to a reduction in toxic chemical releases of 50 percent over the last 10 years, No further regulation was necessary to bring about these reductions. The enduring lesson of public access to information regarding toxic chemical risks f.acing communities is that real risk reduction can occur without the imposition of new and significant costs to our manufacturing sector. Another extremely import lesson that we can glean from the TRI processes that public access to toxic chemical release information alone can generate enormous risk reduction benefits. Also, for many workers at industrial facilities, TRI is their first opportunity to learn about chemicals used on the job - another unexpected benefit of complete access to information. All of these benefits can be enhanced further through public access to 112(r) data.

As the committee is aware, the intelligence community has raised concerns about the availability of Worst case scenario 112(r) data on the Internet. Even in the absence of Internet access to data, there are many ways in which the EPA, the intelligence community, and the chemical industry must work, both separately and together, to reduce hazards and potential risks to the American public from use of toxic chemicals at industrial facilities.

While a "read-only" CD-ROM has been proposed by EPA so a means of dissemination, the complete 112(r) data, there have not yet been enough details to determine if the CD-ROM will meet the need of a diverse public. To name just a few, this "public" includes citizens who vent to compare their local facility to others across the county in same industry workers at the facilities, for whom Worst Case Scenario data may be the best vehicle to learn about risks and hazards on the job; emergency responders, who will want to know if a particular plant meets the industry standard for safety; educators, who will want to teach students about best practices; and investors, who want to track the performance of all the facilities of a particular company.

Whether or not the Worse Case Scenario data are available on the Internet, EPA should establish specific public access services and mechanisms including;

--instituting a multilingual public "800" hot-line;

--dedicating liaisons to conduct data analyses, rank hazards, and respond to questions ;

--distributing complete 112(r) information through public libraries;

--providing service for information on specific facilities, using maps and mapping tools to clearly communication hazards;

--notifying communities of changes in potential risks from local facilities as shown by changes in 112(r) data or permit information; and

--providing links to other data collected by the Agency that will provide a context to evaluate the use of particular use of particular chemicals at individual facilities.

EPA also needs to take an active role in providing comparative analyses of data from facilities within particular injuries, to determine "best in class" practices as they currently exist. Similarly, EPA should provide analyses of uses of specific chemical across industries for some of the most hazardous substances. From the time the Agency receives the first 112(r) data, it should be creating guidance documents for locally impacted citizens and the general public on what the date mean and do not mean, as well as lists and explanations of supporting documentation that facilities should have on hand. As more years of data become available, the Agency can also publicize success stories of facilities that have significantly reduced their vulnerability zones.

To my knowledge, the review of Worst Case Scenario data by the FBI is the first time the FBI has reviewed chemical accident data reported by industrial facilities to determine the potential threat that on-site use of toxic chemicals pose to local communities.

This is true despite the fact that more than 10 years of chemical accident data have already been widely available. In my opinion, the most significant finding made by the FBI during its review of Worst Case Scenario data was that use of toxic chemicals at facilities poses an inherent risk to workers, neighboring properties, and surrounding communities. The FBI additionally found that making the public aware of chemical use risks over the Internet would amplify this inherent, pre-existing risk. In light of these findings, it is important to emphasize that the risks emanate from the toxic chemical use at facilities, not public awareness of those risks.

As I stated earlier, one of the benefits of public access of information about chemical use has been risk reduction. However, despite increasing public awareness and reducing risks, accidents still occur. Perhaps an example will help illustrate this point. Workers and neighbors of the Tosco refinery in Lehigh County, Pennsylvania experienced 13 serious chemical use accidents in the past 10 years. The frequency of accidents at the Tosco refinery demonstrates that it is chemical use that poses the risk, not public awareness of the risk. The interest of the environmental community is risk reduction. We believe that FBI can play a tremendous role in furthering society's goal of risk reduction. A comprehensive review by the FBI of security measures at facilitates using or producing large volumes of toxic chemicals would be a good start to reducing risks to citizens.

Further reviews could include risks generated by transporting chemicals to and from such facilities. The chemical industry has begun presenting Worst Case Scenario data for individual facilities to local citizens in Louisiana and Texas. Companies should go further and produce reports on their Worst Case Scenario data for all the facilities they own, enabling the public to see that they operate uniformly with regard to risk minimization. These reports should also publicize plans and goals for risk reduction, if they exist. The Chemical Manufacturer's Association's "Responsible Care" initiative is an example of ongoing efforts that could be augmented to explicitly address risk reduction in the context of Worst Case Scenario data. Finally, the chemical industry, the EPA, and the intelligence community should collaborate on a voluntary initiative to reduce risks with reasonable targets and dates. Although reducing hazards by using less toxic chemicals would be the most desirable way to accomplish risk reduction, a voluntary initiative could explore other common-sense risk reduction measures as well. Where reduction in use is impractical, such common-sense measures could include safer transportation, storage and handling of toxic chemicals. The Worst Case Scenario data provide an ideal vehicle for measuring progress for risk reduction efforts. It is important to emphasize that all of the stakeholders in this process have one common interest: risk reduction.

Whether you are the owner of a chemical plant, a worker, a neighbor, or a host community, everyone wants fewer accidents. I firmly believe that accident reduction and prevention was Congress' true intent in passing 112(r). Public access to 112(r) data will greatly enhance the likelihood that fewer accidents will occur. The question before the Committee today is how we can attain risk reduction while also providing public access to this important information. As I stated previously, EPA, the intelligence community, and the chemical industry all have vital roles to play in informing the public about risks and reducing those risks. Denying, or severely limiting, public access to the Worst Case Scenario 112(r) data does not relieve EPA, the intelligence community, or the chemical industry of their shared obligation to reduce risks.

Thank you again for the opportunity to address this committee. I would be happy to answer any questions the committee may have.