It is an honor for me to appear before you to answer questions by which you may assess my capability to continue to serve as the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (Board or CSB). I am further honored that it was Senator Robert C. Byrd, who first recommended me for this position. Humbled as I am that the President of the United States has placed faith in me by again submitting my nomination to you for confirmation, I want to assure you that I will continue to dedicate myself to working as a partner with Congress in fulfilling the Board's mandate. My goal is to continue to build a 21st Century model of good government.
I have been allowed to serve as Chairman of the Board for only a short period of time. During this startup phase, however, much has been accomplished for which I am extremely proud. There is much, much more work to do. Although this has not been easy and many challenges lie ahead, I look forward to the opportunity to meet these challenges if confirmed for a second term. Further, if the Committee would entertain engaging its oversight function, I would readily participate in the opportunity to explore various issues and challenges relative to chemical safety. In so doing, my approaches to implementation of Congress' intent could be aired with those who were directly involved in creating the Board's statutory authorities and, indeed, its very existence.
A SHORT TENURE
In its short 21-month history, the Board has undertaken several major investigations as much to learn and exercise various approaches to conducting investigative work as to determine cause. These activities have helped to chart the course and protocols for how investigations and safety programs will be structured in the future. Just last week I chaired a public inquiry into a tragic, fatal incident which not only cost human lives but also raised serious economic concerns for its impact on the community, state and Nation through loss of production. Exercises such as this one have allowed the Board to explore various mechanisms to achieve its safety mission and fully assess the potential impact of our important work.
When I appeared before you last, there was no Board. There existed only a statute, three nominees and the concept of a new agency to perform a new and necessary function. For the past two years I have guided the Board as it moved from concept to concrete. On January 5, 1998, our initial staff of 4, including one other Board member and me, opened our doors for business in 4 small offices. By May of last year, we had hired additional staff and outgrown that space, necessitating a move to the space we now occupy. Today, the Board has 4 members and 22 full-time staff.
If there has ever been a truly "from-the-ground-up' development of a federal agency, the Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board is it. After nearly 21 months in existence, the Board could still be called a virtual agency. We exist in temporary space, rent our furniture, borrow technical expertise from other federal agencies and outsource the majority of our administrative functions. When the members of the House Appropriations subcommittee wished me "good luck" at my first appropriations hearing in early February 1998, none of us knew the extent of luck I would need. Still, in spite of the hurdles, in 21 months we have done what almost no one in government can remember happening: we created a federal agency from scratch. Beginning with an exhaustive search, we determined there is no manual, book or "how to" guide for new agencies. Today, we could write one. Fortunately for me and the other Board members, we attracted a handful of seasoned, senior federal employees to the staff. These employees were able to compliment the experience that I and several other members brought from outside the government.
Together, we took a business-like approach to this daunting task, following a plan and operating philosophy reflecting our belief that Congress expects government in the 21st Century to be lean, accountable and service oriented. We carefully reviewed not only the statute authorizing the Board but its extensive legislative history as well. In developing the agency, we made every attempt to reflect the Congress' charge to build on capabilities within the government. As the Board continues to evolve in concert with this mandate, we have signed interagency agreements and contracts to better utilize federal resources that are already in place.
MANY ACCOMPLISHMENTS
Although we might be a virtual agency, our impact has been anything but virtual. Three days after opening our doors we initiated our first investigation that culminated in a report containing recommendations subsequently adopted and codified in state statute. We have issued reports on three chemical incidents, which caused 7 deaths and 14 injuries. The average time for completion of these reports was less than 12 months from the date of the incident or about one report for every seven months of our existence.
These reports made a total of 28 recommendations to 13 different entities. The first report, involving the Sierra Chemical Company, resulted in the State of Nevada enacting legislation incorporating CSB's recommendations addressing bilingual training requirements, increased frequency of inspections of explosives manufacturing facilities, and piecemeal payment for workers in that industry. Recipients of recommendations resulting from the other 2 investigations (involving Union Carbide Corporation and Herrig Brothers Inc.) have implemented a number of the recommendations and have notified the CSB that they are considering how to best address the remaining ones. The CSB is currently investigating an additional 8 major chemical incidents. These incidents, which occurred in 7 different states, caused 33 deaths and approximately 50 injuries.
The CSB has produced investigation reports that are being widely circulated and have been used nationally and internationally by stakeholders for a variety of chemical safety purposes not originally envisioned. Two examples include: use of a report by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms to train its agents on how to conduct investigations; use of a report by the Safety Officer with the Hagerman, Idaho Fire Protection District to direct relocation of a potentially dangerous 14,000-gallon propane tank.
The CSB has garnered positive support from stakeholders as a result of its investigations and the resultant reports. For example, the Herrig Brothers report was widely praised by the fire and emergency response communities. As a result of its reports, the CSB has been repeatedly asked to give presentations to various groups, including the National Governors' Association.
At the Senate's behest, the CSB produced a major report on chemical safety preparedness as related to the Y2K computer issue. In connection with this report, the CSB hosted the first chemical industry workshop on the Y2K problem and its effect on chemical safety. The workshop involved national experts from industry, labor unions, and government agencies.
The CSB has developed a mechanism to provide the federal government its first ever look at the magnitude of reported chemical incidents in the United States. Although other agencies have suggested this was not possible or feasible, the CSB consolidated information from 5 key databases maintained by other federal agencies on reported chemical incidents. The CSB is now in a position to begin to answer the question of "how big is the problem?" and, "what impact are federal agencies having on reducing the number and severity of chemical incidents?" This work also has given the CSB valuable information for use in deciding how to regulate the reporting of chemical accidents at the law requires us to do.
MUCH MORE TO DO
The CSB is today functioning though a still-developing organization that has implemented mission-critical programs as well as addressed government-wide administrative requirements. It has relied on its business plan and operating philosophy to build what is coming to be recognized as an atypical government agency.
It may seem we've come a long way in 21 months. But, I can tell the Committee today something I only suspected when I was confirmed in 1994. Collectively, we have a long, long, long way to go to achieve what the Congress directed in 1990 be done. What I also now recognize and have begun to experience over the past 21 months is the enormous number of hurdles or obstacles that are placed, either deliberately or by chance, before us. We now have a better handle on the magnitude of the problem of reported chemical accidents based on our study of the government's own records. We know there are an average of 60,000 events annually involving accidental releases of chemicals, but we don't know why they occur. We know there are many federal laws and regulations in place to prevent chemical incidents, but we don't know how effective they are. We know on average 256 people die in the United States each year in chemical accidents, but we don't know causes of these fatalities. We know that the United States has the greatest safety system of standards, rules, technology and worker training in the world, but we don't know what the system's failures are or its most basic trends.
The Board has begun and will continue to work on a variety of fronts to seek answers to these questions. Some have intimated that the Board should only conduct accident investigations as the sole source of these answers. This is errant thinking for two reasons. First, the Congress directed the Board to work with a variety of stakeholders and use a variety of mechanisms to gather, assess, and communicate safety information. Second, if the Board were to rely on its own investigations as the sole source of information, it would take either decades of work to build an "information trust" (database) or enormous numbers of taxpayer dollars to collect information in a more rapid fashion, or both. While no one would question that the central mission of the Board must be accident investigation, the Agency cannot and will not make a major contribution to chemical safety without use of other mechanisms for enhancing safety. By assessing the existing government databases and providing advances, communications, and tools to industry, policy makers and others exploring chemical safety, the Board will further expedite progress in chemical safety at a lower cost to the government.
While the CSB's partners are making a significant contribution, the government must bear certain unavoidable costs for independent investigations. With its current resources and small staff, the Board is challenged to conduct enough quality investigations to make a significant contribution to the national "safety system". Certainly, individual cases and issues are being addressed. However, given the sheer numbers, the technical complexity and the resources required for each case, direct incident investigation cannot be the sole approach. Should the Board conduct more investigations than it currently does? Yes. Without question, the Board has only begun to look at the variety, characteristics and distribution of chemical accidents in American commercial and industrial facilities. As our resources grow, so too, will the investigative workload.
I submitted an original business plan to the Congress in late 1997 which projected a phased approach to enhancing the Board's investigative capacity. While it ambitiously called for a number of investigations during the start-up years, the plan also recognized it would take both infrastructure development and increased resources to produce timely, credible and accurate investigation reports. Only now does the Board have a fledgling infrastructure in place. With 22 staff members, the Board is poised to add staff and move ahead with focused investigations. My initial projections for both agency accomplishments and investigative products were predicated on building an infrastructure to support the investigative function. Again, I look forward to the opportunity to discuss accomplishments to date and a strategic plan with the Committee.
I have emphasized that communication of results plays a pivotal role in the Board's effectiveness. Laws and regulations, while necessary, are not enough. Dry, technical reports placed on the government's shelves are not enough. In contrast, I have placed special emphasis on "plain English" communication. The effectiveness of all safety information rests on the commitment of industry leaders and facility operators to ensure that equipment functions properly, employees are well-trained and supervised, and well designed operating policies and procedures are established and followed. Only people can make those differences. But in order for people to take actions that do, indeed, make the desired difference, they must have factual, timely information made available to them. In recognition of this need, and to ensure that the work of the Board finds its way into the hands of those who bring about change, I have placed major emphasis on direct and rapid dissemination of the Board's findings and recommendations.
Effective communication is especially applicable to chemical workers. Adequate knowledge of chemical risks and proper equipment operation and maintenance will prevent accidents. Chemical workers are not dispensable, they are vital to the success of safe chemical management. The Board will continue to pay particular attention to worker safety.
In addition to worker and industrial communication, an equally important aspect is a focused effort on improving communication between government, industry and the public. Technical competence is often lost on the public due to the lack of appropriate communication skills. In my experience, the American people want to know what risk they face from chemicals in plain understandable terms. Likewise technical individuals often cannot comprehend the fears and concerns of a nontechnical public. While the very issues are technical in nature, they are also often steeped in basic miscommunication. The Board is already placing practical information and recommendations not only in the hands of regulators but also in the hands of the American people so that technical and nontechnical issues are clearly understood. In light of the positive response we routinely receive in this area, I remain convinced that communication programs are absolutely essential for the Board.
To fulfill our responsibilities, it is critical that the Board establish a collaborative relationship with many partners in chemical safety. Our website is continuously disseminating new information generated by our work so we can assist our stakeholders and they, in turn, can assist us. By adopting this partnership philosophy, the Board is leveraging the work of others as Congress encouraged us to do. This allows us to provide maximum benefits in the shortest time possible, and avoid duplicative or unnecessary operating and research expenditures.
CONTINUING THE CHALLENGE
Chemical safety is critical to the success of the chemical industry and the communities where chemical facilities are located. The work of this Board, therefore, is vitally important. Understanding the causes of serious chemical releases is necessary for release prevention efforts to be fully effective. My experience with the chemical industry and the affected public has been very positive. I am confident that I and the Board will continue to receive complete cooperation and assistance from all concerned groups, individuals, and government agencies as we continue to evolve as an organization and implement our statutory mission.
Clearly, I appear before you today because I want to continue in my current capacity. My plans for the direction of the Board remain quite straightforward. All activities must be conducted with chemical release prevention as the goal. The role of the Board in investigation is not to assign blame but is instead to provide a critical tool for accident prevention. While we, as well as other agencies, will try to anticipate all contingencies, it is impossible to prevent all chemical releases. Determining probable cause of chemical releases is important in order to identify, catalogue and correct previously unidentified problems. I have directed my staff to conduct as thorough investigations as available resources will allow and to focus their efforts on prevention of similar releases in the future. Prevention is a mission I've devoted my career to achieving. I feel very strongly that the Board should continue this pursuit.
COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT
Congress has set a formidable task before the Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board: to make the world of chemicals safer and the world safer from chemicals. If confirmed, I intend to continue devoting my energies to accomplishing that task. With your support, I am confident the Board members and staff already in place will be able to move our Nation toward this worthy goal, and, in the process, build on the emerging recognition and respect for the Board as a credible and competent chemical accident investigative agency.
I've now had nearly two years of experience working to implement the Congress' directives to the CSB contained in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. Today, I ask that the Committee consider in the near future a few minor modifications to the Board's statutory language in the interest of efficiency and cost effectiveness. I have shared my suggestions with Committee staff and vetted the concepts with several major stakeholders resulting in broad support for such modifications.
New agencies are not started everyday. It is my desire to keep the Congress directly and adequately informed of my agency's progress and development as a new component of the government. While you have entrusted that management charge to me over the past two years, I would welcome the opportunity to provide the Committee greater details, should the Committee confirm me for a second term. An oversight hearing or a meeting to discuss proposed statutory modifications would give all parties the opportunity to review the intent of Congress as we move forward to meet that intent.
If confirmed as Chairman, I intend to continue seeking the finest staff available to assure that the critical safety issues presented by the manufacture and use of chemicals in this country are properly evaluated, investigated and addressed. The President, Congress, the chemical industry, the chemical workers and the American public expect and deserve no less. I am honored to have been nominated by the President to continue this important work. I pledge to you my total dedication to successfully managing an efficient and effective agency.
Thank you for permitting me to address this Committee. I welcome the opportunity to answer any questions you may have and look forward to working with you in the future.