From January 1996 until I retired from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) at the end of November 1998, I served IS Chief of the Domestic Terrorism/Counterterrorism Planning Section of the National Security Division. In this capacity I was responsible for national oversight and management of several important programs to include Domestic Terrorism Operations, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Operations, WMD Domestic Preparedness, Special Events Management, and Civil Aviation Security.
In December 1997 the FBI became aware, through the Chemical Emergency Preparedness ant Prevention Office of the EPA that Section 112(r) of the "Clean Air Act of 1990" required the publishing of regulations focusing on the prevention of chemical accidents In an effort to comply with these regulations the EPA proposed to distribute Risk Management Plans (RMP) via the Internet and CD-ROM These plans would include for each facility history of accidental releases, an off-site consequence analysis (OCA); a prevention program inclusive of company operating procedures, employee training, hazard evaluation and emergency response programs to ensure that either facility employees or public responders were prepared to deal with any accidents that might occur and thus minimize the consequences.
A number of meetings with representatives of the law enforcement and intelligence communities were held during 1997 and 1998 to discuss "security concerns" relating to the making available of all RMP data relating to the approximately 66,000 chemical sites within the United States. The proposed EPA electronic distribution plans were discussed with these agencies. The plans would allow users to initiate Internet searches by facility namer area of the country, zip code, city, county, and state A modified search by chemical type would allow a person using the EPA web site, to choose a portion of a city by zipcode and tailor an attack by searching for certain chemicals. A search of this nature could be accomplished from anywhere in the world. Additionally. no record of such a query would be made. Further searches could be tailored to developing information regarding chemical companies' mitigation and safeguarding capabilities.
Of greatest concern to the law enforcement and intelligence communities was the possible Internet dissemination of Worst Case and Alternate Worst Case Scenarios as set forth in the OCA. Using the Internet a terrorist, criminal or disgruntled employee could identify these scenarios and fine tune an attack by selecting "worst case scenarios'' at facilities that were within or adjacent to large civilian or military communities.
Based upon the above meetings a number of interagency recommendations were developed and provided to EPA in a letter dated October 30, 1998. The leper recorded interagency agreement that OCA data not be included in RMP information distributed via the Internet. Other data elements would be accessible to the public on the Internet. EPA agreed to work with stakeholder groups to identify meaningful approaches to make appropriate OCA information available to the local community. To ensure that State and local government agencies have access to all national RMP dam it was recommended that SPA use a "closed system' restricted to state and local government agencies. This system should use secure password protection and sanction technology.
It was believed that the creation of a CD-ROM encompassing EPA's RMP database could be accomplished. However, the FBI recommended that EPA not include facility identification and contact information on the CD-ROM. This allows legitimate information retrieval for analysis, however removes the ability of criminals and terrorists to use this information for targeting purposes.
Mr. Chairman, at the time the above letter was prepared both the Department of Justice, and the EPA Legal Counsel advised the FBI that the current Freedom of Formation Act requires that EPA provide the complete RMP information including the worst case scenarios to a requester. This is a potential problem. If this information is obtained arid posted on private Internet sites the responsible steps taken by the FBI, EPA and its interagency partners would be negated. This is a concern that I hope you can address in an expeditious fashion.
The FBI and its interagency partners have worked hard to strike a reasoned balance to insure public dissemination of important information. In early February, Attorney General Janet Reno and FBI Director Louis Freeh appeared before the United States Senate Subcommittee for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and Slate, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies of the Committee on Appropriations. Director Freeh gave an excellent overview of both the international and domestic terrorism threats we face at the present time and into the future He also spoke about a number of high profile investigations that have occurred in the last several months. One key point that the Director made was that " Terrorists, both abroad and at home, are using technology to protect their operations from being discovered and thwart the efforts of law enforcement to detect, prevent, and investigate such acts." Computer technology is and will be a terrorist tool. I believe that the actions taken to prevent the widespread Internet dissemination of "worst case" sensitive chemical facility information was both prudent and necessary.
This concludes my remarks. Thank you.