Written Testimony of
Jack Skolds
Chief Nuclear Officer
Exelon Nuclear
Before the
Committee on Environment and Public Works
United States Senate
Nuclear Power Plant Security Legislation
June 5, 2002
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee: I am Jack
Skolds, Chief Nuclear Officer for Exelon Nuclear, the nuclear division of
Exelon Generation Company. Exelon
Generation is a wholly owned subsidiary of Exelon Corporation, which was formed
in 2000 by the merger of Unicom Corporation of Chicago and PECO Energy Company
of Philadelphia. Exelon Generation
currently owns and operates approximately 37,000 megawatts of diversified
electrical generation, including 17 nuclear reactors that generate 16,970 megawatts
of electricity. Exelon is the largest
nuclear generation operator in the country with approximately 20% of the
nation’s nuclear generation capacity, and the third largest private nuclear
operator in the world. We also own 50%
of AmerGen Energy, which is a partnership with British Energy of Edinburgh,
Scotland. AmerGen owns three of the 17
units in the Exelon fleet, with plants in Illinois, New Jersey and
Pennsylvania.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today to discuss legislative proposals addressing several important security
issues at commercial nuclear power plants.
I would also thank several members of the committee
for their efforts to investigate the issue of nuclear plant security
first-hand. Senators Graham, Clinton,
Corzine, Smith, Voinovich and Specter have all toured nuclear power plants to
receive briefings on plant security since September 11, as have several of the
committee’s staff members. In fact,
Senator Specter has toured three of the five nuclear power plants in
Pennsylvania, including two Exelon facilities.
My testimony today will focus on three areas:
First, I will address legislative proposals pending
before the Senate on nuclear plant security.
Second, I will provide the Committee with an
overview of nuclear plant security.
Third, I will provide the Committee with
recommendations regarding actions the Federal government can take to address
nuclear plant security issues in the post-September 11th
environment.
Before addressing these issues, however, let me make
a few preliminary comments.
Let me begin by assuring the Committee that the
nuclear power industry is absolutely committed to ensuring that our plants are
operated safely and that all necessary steps are taken to protect the health
and safety of the public and our employees.
No one has a greater interest in protecting the safety and security of
nuclear plants than the owners and operators of those facilities.
In addition, it is important for the Committee to
understand that commercial nuclear power plants are the most well-protected
industrial facilities in the United States today. In fact, many businesses are turning to the nuclear industry as a
model for providing security and emergency planning at their industrial
complexes.
Finally, as the United States acts to strengthen
homeland security in light of new threats to the nation’s security, it is
imperative that Federal, state, and local officials work cooperatively with
nuclear plant operators to build upon the solid foundation of emergency
response capabilities that existed prior to September 11th.
The Committee’s letter of invitation requested
comments on two legislative proposals pending before the Senate: S. 1586, “a
bill to amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to authorize the carrying of firearms
by employees of licensees, and for other purposes” and S. 1746, “a bill to
amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to strengthen security at sensitive nuclear
facilities.” My comments will address
these bills, as well as H.R. 2983, legislation to reauthorize the
Price-Anderson Act of 1954, which was passed by the U.S. House of
Representatives and which is awaiting action by the Senate.
S. 1586, introduced by Senator Jim Inhofe, amends the Atomic Energy Act to authorize NRC licensee employees to carry firearms, provides limited arrest authority to such employees, and establishes a fine or imprisonment for the sabotage of commercial nuclear facilities. These provisions were submitted to Congress by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission several years ago and were approved by the Senate during the 106th Congress as part of S. 1627, the NRC Fairness in Funding Act of 2000, and as part of separate appropriations legislation.
The nuclear industry testified in support of the
provisions as part of its testimony on S. 1627 during the 106th
Congress, though some NRC licensees have recently expressed concern about the
possible legal implications of providing wide-ranging arrest authority to
private security forces. The industry
stands ready to work with the Committee to resolve these concerns.
S. 1746, introduced by Senator Harry Reid and other members of the Committee, makes sweeping changes in the manner in which security at commercial nuclear facilities is addressed. Unfortunately, S. 1746 puts the proverbial cart before the horse by mandating radical legislative solutions to issues that have not been identified as problems.
Section 3 would substitute a statutorily-mandated
design basis threat for that developed by the independent Nuclear Regulatory
Commission and would federalize security at commercial nuclear power plants by
establishing a nuclear security force within the NRC and by requiring the
Commission to develop a security plan for each of the nation’s sensitive
nuclear facilities. Section 3 also
levies a tax on sensitive nuclear facilities to fund a newly created Nuclear
Security Fund within the Treasury to pay for these massive and sweeping new
federal responsibilities.
Exelon is concerned about the imposition of a
statutorily-mandated design basis threat which prejudges the nature of the
design basis threat without a comprehensive review by the NRC in conjunction
with Federal intelligence and law enforcement agencies. If legislative action in this area is deemed
necessary, Congress should first direct the President to conduct a
comprehensive review with the various energy, intelligence and law enforcement
agencies of the various threats facing nuclear power plants. Once such a review is completed, the NRC
should be directed to adjust the design basis threat accordingly.
With regard to Federalization of nuclear plant
security forces, Exelon strongly opposes such a drastic and unjustified change
in security requirements. Security
forces at nuclear power plants are highly trained professionals. Substituting Federal employees to safeguard
sensitive nuclear facilities may actually degrade security. The background check requirements, hiring
qualifications, and training standards in the bill are actually less stringent
than those currently enforced by the NRC.
Federalizing the nuclear security forces would also
eliminate some of the best candidates for nuclear security forces by
effectively barring recipients of Federal pensions from serving as Federal
employees. Some of the current members
of nuclear security forces are military retirees who would be forced to choose
between resigning their position or giving up their Federal pensions. In addition, nuclear power plant security
forces work in an integrated manner with plant operators during a security
event to coordinate responses to security threats. Integrated command and control of plant security forces and plant
operations personnel is essential to assure the protection of public health and
safety. Finally, Federalizing nuclear
security forces would fundamentally change the mission of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission. Hiring,
training, and managing a security force of 7,000 employees would be a massive
undertaking and might well detract from the Commission’s core mission of
assuring that plants are operated in a manner that protects the public health
and safety. It also places the NRC in
an active role in day to day operations at the nation’s nuclear power plants –
a dramatic reversal of the efforts the Congress, the executive branch, the
Commission, and the industry have made over the past 30 years to ensure the NRC
is a regulator, not an operator.
Similarly, requiring the NRC to develop security
plans for each of the nation’s sensitive nuclear facilities within 180 days would
be a significant task that would result in an unnecessary – and perhaps
dangerous – diversion of Commission resources.
The NRC currently has detailed regulations governing security
requirements at plants, and plant personnel can best handle the coordination of
plant security forces with state and local law enforcement officials. As with federalization of nuclear plant
security forces, requiring a federally-developed security plan for several
dozen sites is unnecessary given the complete lack of evidence that the current
system is deficient.
Finally, a tax on nuclear plant operators would fund
a new and unnecessary Federal bureaucracy and would be unparalleled in the
private sector. Simply put, the tax
would fund an activity that is currently being effectively managed by the
private industry. In addition, the tax
potentially would force nuclear power plant customers to inappropriately fund
national defense activities and would likely result in some nuclear plants
subsidizing the cost of security at other plants.
Section 4 establishes an Operation Safeguards and
Response Unit at the NRC. The existing
NRC Operational Safeguards and Response Evaluations (OSRE) program has been
applied and interpreted in an inconsistent and at times arbitrary manner. Anti-nuclear groups and the NRC have at
times inaccurately characterized licensee performance under the existing OSRE
program by claiming that licensees have “failed” a significant portion of
force-on-force drills.
It is important to note that the OSRE program
evaluates plant security, and not plant safety. Given the ability of plant operators to safely shut down an
operating reactor in a matter of seconds, OSRE drills alone are not an accurate
reflection of plant safety.
The NRC has been striving to develop a more
objective methodology for determining the ability of nuclear plants to respond
to design basis threats. The program would potentially result in more frequent
force on force drills than in the past. The Commission has also moved to enhance
its organizational structure with respect to security by creating a new office
dealing with security policies and programs.
Senator Reid’s legislation seeks to address problems
with the current program by mandating a highly-prescriptive program that could
prevent the Commission from establishing a more effective and more appropriate
program to evaluate the performance of plant security forces.
Section 4 also inappropriately expands the emergency
planning zone around sensitive nuclear facilities from a 10-mile radius to a
50-mile radius. There has been no
evidence to suggest that such a radical change in the current regulatory system
is warranted to protect public health and safety. Extending the 10-mile emergency planning zone to a 50-mile
radius would require planners to address an area of 7,857 square miles (as
opposed to the current emergency planning zone which encompasses 315 square
miles). Such an expansion would only
serve to diffuse the resources available to and distract the personnel responsible
for emergency planning from focusing on enhancing planning that may have been
ignored in other sectors prior to 9/11 and from continuing to ensure current
planning is satisfactory. Again, absent
compelling evidence on the need to undertake such a massive effort, Congress
should defer to the NRC, FEMA, and EPA in determining the appropriate radius
for emergency planning purposes.
Section 5 directs the Commission to establish a
stockpile of potassium iodide tablets and to develop plans for the prompt distribution
of potassium iodide tablets within a 50-mile radius of all sensitive nuclear
facilities. The NRC, in conjunction
with the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Health and Human
Services, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, has recommended that
potassium iodide be made available at the request of state governments for
distribution within the 10-mile emergency planning zone around commercial
nuclear power plants. There is no
scientific basis for expanding the distribution of potassium iodide to an area
within 50 miles of a sensitive nuclear facility.
Section 6 of the legislation directs the Commission
to request assistance from Governors and the President in the event of war or
other national emergency. While such
assistance may be appropriate in the event of war or other national emergency,
the Commission is not barred under current law from requesting such
assistance. In addition, as the
Commission stated in its review of the legislation, such assistance may not be
appropriate in all circumstances and could divert resources from more
vulnerable parts of the nation’s infrastructure.
H.R. 2983, which was passed by the U.S. House by
voice vote last year, includes an amendment by Representative Ed Markey to
address the nuclear security issue.
Under the Markey amendment, the President is directed to conduct a study
to identify the types of threats that pose an appreciable risk to NRC licensed
facilities. The legislation includes a
number of issues to be considered during this study, including each of the
issues enumerated in Section 3 of S. 1746.
The President is also required to classify each type of threat as being
the responsibility of the Federal government or of NRC licensees.
Exelon strongly supports the Markey amendment as an
appropriate first step in identifying what additional changes may be necessary
to protect commercial nuclear facilities in he aftermath of September 11th. The amendment allows the White House to tap
all Federal intelligence and law enforcement resources to assess the nature of
the threats that are faced by commercial nuclear facilities. The amendment also directs the White House
to clearly delineate between threats against which licensees must defend and
threats against which law enforcement officials and the Federal government must
defend. Only after such an assessment
is conducted can Congress make a well-informed decision regarding what
additional resources and requirements are necessary to protect commercial
nuclear facilities.
Protection of public health and safety requires both
the safe operation of nuclear plants and the physical protection of the plant
against potential threats.
The industry today is operating the nation’s 103
nuclear reactors more efficiently and safely than ever before. The average capacity factor for nuclear
plants reached an all-time high of 91 percent in 2001 according to preliminary
data from the Nuclear Energy Institute, while the industrial safety accident
rate for nuclear plants in 2000 was a record-low 0.26, compared to an average
accident rate in the manufacturing sector of 4.0.
As another measure of safety, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission monitors the number of “significant events” at each nuclear reactor
(broadly defines as occurrences that challenge a plant safety system). The average number of significant events per
unit has declined from 2.37 per year in 1985 to 0.03 per year in 2000, the
latest year for which data is available.
Nuclear power today provides 20 percent of the
nation’s electricity each year, and it does so without emitting any of the
pollutants associated with acid rain or global warming. In fact, nuclear power has played a major role
in allowing many regions of the country come into compliance with Clean Air Act
requirements.
The industry’s commitment to safety also extends to
plant security. In fact, commercial
nuclear power plants are regarded by many to be the most well protected
industrial facilities in the United States today. Indeed, many other industries are turning to the nuclear industry
as a model for providing security at a variety of commercial facilities. For example, in addition to unique physical
protections employed at commercial nuclear facilities, the nuclear industry is
alone among critical infrastructure industries in using the Federal Bureau of
Investigations to run criminal background checks on applicants for positions at
sensitive facilities.
Existing Federal statutes and regulations provide
strict standards requiring licensees to take actions necessary to protect the
public health and safety. NRC
requirements and industry programs are predicated on the need to protect the
public from the possibility of exposure to radioactive release caused by acts
of sabotage.
The current design basis threat – the threat against
which a plant licensee must be able to protect – assumes a suicidal,
well-trained paramilitary force, armed with automatic weapons and explosives,
that is intent on forcing its way into a nuclear power plant to commit
radiological sabotage. The design basis
threat also assumes that the attackers will have insider knowledge of plant
systems and plant security plans and even insider assistance.
This assumed threat forms the basis for security
response plans and training drills.
These plans and drills are tested regularly by the NRC as part of their
Operational Safeguards Response Evaluation (OSRE). The OSRE program has also provided the industry with the
opportunity to identify areas where security can be improved and enhanced.
A number of defenses exist to counter such a threat. Nuclear plants, by their very design, provide a redundant set of physical barriers designed both to keep radiation and radioactive materials inside the plant and to keep intruders outside the plant. The reactor core is protected by a containment structure comprised of several feet of thick reinforced concrete walls, a steel liner, additional concrete walls within containment, and a several inches-thick high tensile steel reactor vessel. The metal cladding on the fuel itself also serves as an additional protective barrier. In addition, there are multiple systems of the safety equipment needed to safely shut down the reactor. This “defense in depth” design explains why the FBI considers nuclear plants to be “hardened targets.”
Nuclear plant sites have three distinct zones, each
of which has different levels of physical and human defenses. The first zone, called the “owner-controlled
area,” includes all of the property that is associated with the plant. The owner controlled area typically ranges
in size from several dozen to hundreds of acres of land and serves as an
effective buffer zone around the critical areas of the plant.
The second zone, the “protected area,” is a
physically enclosed area surrounding the plant into which access in
controlled. Physical barriers to
intrusion include barbed wire and razor wire fences, microwave and electronic
intrusion detection systems, closed circuit television systems, isolation
zones, extensive lighting, system monitoring by redundant alarm stations, and
vehicle barrier systems. Access to the
protected area is restricted to a select population of site personnel with a
need for entry.
To access the protected area, plant employees and
visitors must pass through a metal detector and an explosives detector. X-ray machines are also used to screen
material brought into the protected area by employees and visitors. In addition, employees must utilize a
hand-geometry device to confirm their identity before entering the protected
area.
The third zone, the “vital area,” includes those
areas within the protected area containing equipment essential for operating
the plant safely and successfully shutting down in the case of an event. Additional barriers are in place to protect
vital areas of the plant, including concrete floors, walls, and ceilings; steel
locked and alarmed doors; and key card access doors. Access to the vital area is even further restricted to a select
population of site personnel with a need for entry. These access lists are routinely reviewed to confirm the need for
access. The defensive contingency plans
used by security forces are geared towards protection of these critical areas.
In addition to the robust physical structures protecting the plant, licensees maintain a highly trained, well-equipped security force to guard each facility. Security personnel, many of whom have law enforcement or military experience, must undergo extensive background checks, including fingerprint submittal for an FBI criminal record check; physical and psychological testing and screening; credit and reference checks; education and work history verification; and routine drug and alcohol screening. The nuclear industry is unique among energy industries in having a cooperative relationship with the FBI to facilitate such criminal record checks.
In addition, security personnel are subject to
rigorous training requirements. Initial
nuclear security officer training includes a wide variety of topics, including
NRC requirements for nuclear facility physical security, recognition of
sabotage devices and equipment, contraband detection devices and operation,
firearms training and tactical response training. Annual supplemental training covers areas such as weapons
proficiency, physical readiness, stress fire course, force-on-force drills, and
table top drills. A significant amount
of annual training focuses on force-on-force training, which covers such topics
as threat assessment and tactical response, response force deployment and
interdiction, protection of specified vital equipment and protected areas,
multiple target acquisition and engagement, and the use of armored body
bunkers, ballistic shields, and other specialized security equipment.
As a further protection to the public, each nuclear
power plant has an extensive and well-honed emergency response organization and
systems in place to respond to and mitigate any emergency that arises. Emergency response plans are tightly
integrated with local, state and federal regulatory and emergency authorities
and undergo regular training and drilling.
The emergency planning zone includes an area within a 10-mile radius of the
plant, an area encompassing roughly 315 square miles. Since September 11, Exelon Nuclear has conducted security
briefings for state and local officials in each of the states in which we
operate to reinforce the coordination and response plans in the event of an
emergency.
Upon notification by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on September 11, all nuclear plants immediately increased their security to Level 3, the highest level of security maintained at commercial nuclear reactors. All U.S. commercial reactors remain at Level 3.
Since September 11, nuclear plants have also
extended the point of initial screening of people entering the plant site from
the protected area boundary to a point in the owner controlled area boundary. This initial screening includes an
identification check, confirmation of the purpose for entering the site, and a
thorough vehicle inspection for all visitors.
State police and, in some cases the National Guard, have augmented this
effort. In addition, armed patrols have
extended their patrols to include a larger portion of the owner-controlled
area. These patrols are coordinated
with onsite personnel to enhance detection and deter potential threats.
Given the uncertain nature of potential attacks,
Exelon Nuclear and other reactor operators took a variety or protective
measures in conjunction with NRC guidance.
These included actions to harden site access, increase security
resources, and improve operational readiness.
To harden site access, Exelon has:
·
established
armed owner control area checkpoints for all vehicles entering the site
·
implemented
additional vehicle pre-screening and control of all on-site deliveries upon
entry to the owner-controlled area
To increase security resources, Exelon has:
·
increased
the number of security officers
·
procured
additional weapons and upgraded armaments
·
added
armed security posts at key plant locations
To enhance operational readiness, Exelon has:
Since shortly after September 11, the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission has been engaged in a top-to-bottom review of the Design
Basis Threat to reevaluate its adequacy.
As an interim measure, the Commission issued Orders on February 25th
of that year which imposes significant additional requirements on licensees
pending the completion of a more comprehensive review of safeguards and
security program requirements.
While many of the specifics regarding the NRC Orders are classified as safeguards information and cannot be disclosed to the public, issues addressed by the Orders include security officer staffing levels, protection against potential vehicle and waterborne threats, protection of used fuel, enhanced access authorization controls, and mitigation efforts in the event of an attack.
As the United States acts to strengthen homeland defense in light of new threats to the nation’s security, it is imperative that Federal, state, and local officials work cooperatively with nuclear plant operators to build upon the solid foundation of emergency response capability that existed prior to September 11.
In particular, there are several steps that we
believe the Federal government should take to address security issues at
nuclear power plants.
·
There
must be a clearer delineation of responsibility between government and plant
licensees. Federal law currently
requires NRC licensees to protect against a variety of potential threats to
commercial nuclear power plants, but the law also considers many threats to be
outside the scope of licensee responsibility and instead relies on law
enforcement agencies and the military to protect against certain threats. Congress and the Administration must
determine where the line between licensee and government responsibility lies in
light of the new threats faced by nuclear power plants and other facilities
that make up the nation’s critical energy infrastructure.
·
There
must be improved communication and coordination among licensees and the various
Federal, state and local agencies involved in emergency response planning. The Federal government has a role in
financially supporting many of the actions necessary to accommodate this
improved communication and coordination.
·
The
Nuclear Regulatory Commission has incurred – and will continue to incur –
additional costs to address new security concerns. Congress should support the NRC’s request for additional funding
to support additional actions undertaken in support of homeland defense.
·
The
Nuclear Regulatory Commission should revise its protocol of threat levels to
conform with that used by the Office of Homeland Security.
·
In
determining the resources necessary to protect nuclear power plants, the
Federal government should consider the potential vulnerability of these plants
relative to other potential critical infrastructure targets and allocate
limited Federal resources to those facilities deemed to be most vulnerable to
terrorist attack.
The most pressing challenge facing Congress and other Federal policymakers is how to allocate responsibility for protecting the nation’s critical infrastructure against attacks by terrorists and other enemies of the state. Federal law currently requires Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensees to protect against a variety of potential threats to commercial nuclear power plants. Federal law considers many potential threats to be outside the scope of licensee responsibility and instead relies on law enforcement agencies and the military to protect against certain threats. The question facing Congress and the Administration is where the line between licensee and government responsibility lies in light of the new threats faced by nuclear power plants and other facilities that make up the nation’s critical energy infrastructure.
The events of September 11 have presented the nation
with a variety of new challenges. Protection of the country’s critical
infrastructure is among the most important of these challenges, but it is a
challenge that I am confident the nuclear energy industry can and will continue
to meet.
Exelon Nuclear fully supports the NRC’s efforts to conduct a top-to-bottom review of security requirements pertaining to nuclear facilities. We continue to assess security at our plants and have taken appropriate steps to increase security measures as a result of the heightened state of alert.
As Congress and the Administration debate what
changes in Federal law and policies are appropriate in the aftermath of the
September 11 attacks, strong consideration should be given to building upon the
existing regulatory system which distinguishes between threats for which
licensees are responsible and threats for which law enforcement and the
military are responsible.
As I mentioned earlier in my testimony, the House of
Representatives endorsed one such approach last year as part of H.R. 2983, the
Price-Anderson Amendments Act, which passed by the House by voice vote. The House legislation directs the President
to conduct an assessment of potential threats against nuclear facilities and to
classify each threat as one for which the Federal government should be
responsible or as one for which NRC licensees should be responsible. The measure also requires the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission to promulgate a rulemaking to ensure that licensees
address the threats identified in the report as a licensee responsibility.
Exelon strongly supports the Price-Anderson
provisions as a reasoned approach to this very important issue. The Presidential study will allow the White
House to coordinate the efforts of a number of Federal agencies to conduct a
comprehensive threat assessment. Such
an approach will also allow personnel knowledgeable in security matters to make
decisions in coordination with intelligence officials to ensure that nuclear
facilities are treated in a manner consistent with the protection of other
critical infrastructure facilities.
The need for improved communication and coordination among licensees and Federal, state and local government agencies is perhaps best illustrated by an event at AmerGen’s Three Mile Island (TMI) plant last year. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission notified AmerGen on October 17, 2001, that the federal government had received information that it believed constituted a credible threat against the plant. A number of Federal agencies and organizations, including the NRC, the FBI, the FAA, and NORAD, were involved in the subsequent response to what was later determined not to be a credible threat.
Site personnel took immediate action to secure the
plant, which was in the midst of a maintenance and refueling outage. The company also requested – and received –
additional security assistance from the Pennsylvania State Police.
The “threat” against Three Mile Island showed that
the regulatory system currently in place can work effectively in response to a
potential threat. As the licensee,
AmerGen took immediate action to secure the site physically and called in
additional assistance from the law enforcement community, while the federal
government and the military took action to protect the plant against potential
threats that fell outside the design basis threat against which AmerGen is
responsible for defending.
At the same time, the TMI event also provided both
the industry and the government with some valuable “lessons learned,” including
the need to work more closely with Federal officials to clarify the nature of
threat information, the need to develop coordination procedures with multiple
Federal agencies, and the need to communicate effectively with local elected
officials and emergency services personnel.
The Commission took a step towards addressing some
of these issues earlier this year when it established an Office of Nuclear
Security and Incident Response to consolidate and streamline selected NRC
security, safeguards, and incident response responsibilities and resources. While this should address some coordination
and communications issues, other Federal agencies must engage in similar
efforts.
Finally, it is important that the NRC be integrated
into the intelligence community’s process for assessing and communicating
potential threats against commercial nuclear facilities and other NRC
licensees. Nuclear plant licensees are
highly dependent on receiving threat information from the NRC, so it is
essential that the Commission itself be fully integrated into the intelligence
community’s threat assessment process.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has incurred – and will continue to incur – additional costs to address new security concerns. While the Commission plans to reallocate existing resources to support the new Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response, the NRC’s mission with regard to security is likely to expand as the Federal government reassesses the responsibilities of various parties for providing nuclear security. NRC’s efforts should be coordinated with the broader efforts of the Office of Homeland Security. Congress should support the NRC’s request for additional funding to support additional actions undertaken in support of homeland defense.
As I noted earlier, the NRC currently uses a three level security classification system. Each of the nation’s 103 reactors have been at the top level, Level 3, since September 11 and the Commission has indicated that plants will remain at Level 3 for the foreseeable future. This situation begs the question of how meaningful the different security classifications are if the highest level of alert effectively becomes the only level of security. Given these concerns and the need for consistency in communicating the urgency of potential threats, the Commission should revise its protocol of security levels to conform to the five level classification system established by the Office of Homeland Security. Such a system would also allow the Commission and licensees to distinguish between the current generalized heightened state of alert and a more specific threat against a plant or plants.
As
the NRC develops a new security level classification, it should establish
security requirements that correspond appropriately to the various threat
levels. In essence, the Commission must
redefine the baseline security requirements for plants assuming a “green” alert
level where no threat exists. The
Commission should then require appropriate additional security requirements as
alert levels are upgraded. This will
allow plant operators and emergency response officials to develop readiness
levels commensurate with the threat level that exists.
In determining the resources necessary to protect nuclear power plants, the Federal government should consider the potential vulnerability of these plants relative to other potential critical infrastructure targets and allocate limited Federal resources to those facilities deemed to be most vulnerable to terrorist attack.
For example, some in Congress have advocated
federalizing nuclear plant security forces.
As I mentioned earlier in my testimony, the industry has a highly
trained force of security personnel guarding commercial nuclear plants. Replacing these forces with Federal
employees is unnecessary and would complicate the ability of licensees to
coordinate the response of plant and security personnel in the event of a
terrorist attack. Federalizing nuclear
security forces would also unnecessarily limit the pool of potential guards by
prohibiting retired military and other government officials who would be
prohibited from serving as Federal security personnel and continuing to draw
their Federal pension.
Others in Congress and elsewhere have advocated
placing anti-aircraft artillery installations at nuclear plants to protect
against an air attack. The industry
believes that Federal resources would be more properly focused on increased
airport security to ensure that terrorists are denied access to the large
commercial airliners that are of most concern.
Given the strong physical structures at nuclear
plants and the highly trained guard force to protect commercial nuclear
facilities, resources may be more appropriately focused on other critical
infrastructure facilities.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to
discuss these issues with you. Let me
close by reiterating that the nuclear industry recognizes our responsibility
for protecting the public health and safety, and we are committed to taking the
steps necessary to do so.
I would be pleased to answer any questions you may
have.