Testimony of
Robert C. Shinn, Jr.
Commissioner
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection
Before the
U. S. Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works
Superfund, Toxics, Risk and Waste Management Subcommittee
November 14, 2001
Good afternoon. My name is Robert C. Shinn, Jr.
I am Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection.
With me is Allan Edwards, Assistant Administrator for the Office of Release
Prevention. We appreciate the opportunity to come before you today to discuss
the important topic of chemical plant safety and security. I especially want to
take this opportunity to acknowledge and thank Senator Corzine for the
leadership he is showing in this area.
In light of September 11th, a discussion on the
need to ensure that there are adequate safeguards to protect the public from
any accidental or intentional releases of hazardous chemicals is especially
pertinent and timely. I trust that you will understand that, due to security
concerns, my testimony will be general and not refer to specific facilities or
specific security measures we have implemented in New Jersey.
There are two major themes that I would like to
touch upon today. First, I would like to give the committee the benefit of New
Jersey’s experience and success in the area of chemical safety preparedness and
response. The second point I will make is that, even in a state such as New
Jersey with a successful and comprehensive chemical safety program, there are
certain areas in which augmented federal authority would support our effort.
While New Jersey’s program has focused on
prevention of accidental releases of extraordinarily hazardous substances and
not those releases caused by terrorist actions, we feel that the system we have
set up and the preparedness we have instituted positions us in good stead. We
are not only on guard against such an unfortunate occurrence, but we must be
better able to respond if it did occur.
Over the course of nearly two decades, we have
built a coordinated, effective program that not only works to prevent releases
of hazardous chemicals but also provides us with the information and
infrastructure so that we can be ready at a moment’s notice to respond if a
release of a hazardous substance does happen. In this way, any releases that
occur, whether they are accidental or intentional, can be contained and the
impacts minimized.
While our program in its entirety may not be
transferable to the federal level, I hope that this committee will be able to
take what New Jersey has done and use it, or components of it, as a model for
federal action where appropriate.
New Jersey is the nation’s most densely
populated state. It also has a large number of facilities that produce or use
highly hazardous chemicals. This has forced us to be especially diligent in
ensuring that there is little to no possibility that the public will be exposed
to the release of these substances. I am not here to imply that our level of
regulation would be appropriate for or should necessarily be imposed upon other
states that do not have New Jersey’s population or number of facilities.
In 1986, shortly after the tragic accident in
Bhopal, India, the New Jersey State Legislature passed the centerpiece of our
effort, the Toxic Catastrophe Prevention Act, commonly known as TCPA. It has
enabled our state to develop what is still the most comprehensive program in
the country to prevent accidental releases. I may be biased, but we think it is
also the most effective.
Before I describe some of the more salient points
regarding our regulatory process, there is one feature of our program that I
would like to highlight. While it is a regulatory program, it was designed in
cooperation with the regulated community. Cooperation has been in place since
the very beginning of the program. When we created the initial rules in
1986-87, we had very heavy industry involvement. Professional chemical safety
experts from the chemical industry and the insurance industry helped us write
the rules in the first place. A lot of time was spent with these professionals
to make sure that the technical requirements were valid.
Then, a few years ago when we readopted our
TCPA regulations to incorporate the federal Accidental Release Prevention
requirements and to make other improvements, we again had intense interaction
and discussions with the regulated community over a period of months. We asked for and received up-front input
from the regulated community. We feel that this hand-in-hand approach has made
for a more effective regulatory scheme.
This cooperative spirit has also been reflected
in the implementation of our program. In the past, an environmental inspection
could often be an adversarial encounter resulting in fines, penalties and
orders. We have found it very effective to use these inspections to emphasize
compliance assistance rather than solely as violation spotting visits. When we
perform an inspection of a TCPA-regulated facility, a typical inspection will
be performed over the course of an entire week where we work with the facility
to examine alternatives - in many cases involving the use of innovative
technologies - to get the facility into compliance.
To their surprise, many facilities realize
efficiencies and increased profits once they implement the changes to their
processes that were decided upon in this cooperative manner.
We would strongly recommend that any federal
legislation in this regard promote a compliance assistance approach to
regulation, without sacrificing appropriate enforcement response, when
necessary. I realize that it is a fine line that has to be considered, but it
is well worth the effort.
There are several key features of New Jersey’s
TCPA program that have contributed to the success of this program and which you
may wish to consider for incorporation into the federal scheme. The main thing
I would suggest is that the overall philosophy, as expressed in section 112(r)
of the Clean Air Act, place a greater emphasis on prevention and preparedness.
In New Jersey, we emphasize identification of risks and the steps that should
be taken to reduce those risks. At this time, where we need to be cognizant not
only of accidental releases but those that may be intentional as well, an
emphasis on up-front prevention and quantitative risk analysis is called for.
In New Jersey, our law requires regulated
facilities to perform comprehensive reviews and risk assessments of all
possible release scenarios that may cause off-site impacts. Presently, federal
regulation only requires facilities to perform analysis of worst-case scenarios
and one alternate case scenario. Furthermore, in New Jersey, we require that
facilities quantitatively assess and characterize risk, going a step beyond any
other process safety management and risk management program regulations in the U.S.. This means that the potential releases and
resultant off-site impacts that may occur under each scenario must be
quantified. To date, federal regulation does not require quantitative analysis
of risk. We would recommend that such quantification be required.
Our requirement that any and all release
scenarios that may possibly result in off-site impacts be analyzed and planned
for has had positive benefits not only for the public but also, in many cases,
for the facilities themselves. Because of the intense review and planning
efforts, state and local emergency response officials, as well as the response
officials for the plants themselves, have comprehensive plans that cover a
whole range of situations.
This review process has also benefited
businesses, which invariably improve their processes as they have gone through
the scenario review. Many improvements that otherwise would not have been
considered come to light. Some of the process improvements performed by the
facility were not specifically required by our regulations, but instead were
inspired by the facility itself. These are processes that make good economic
sense but would never have been done had the analysis not been performed.
For example, the use of remote control shut off
valves on chlorine rail cars has become pretty common practice. However, this
was not always the case. It was not until facilities began to analyze scenarios
that it became obvious that in certain situations, emergency workers would have
to endanger themselves by going into what could be the thickest part of the
plume, find the switch and shut down the release. There would also be the danger that the switch could not be
reached and the release would continue unabated. Remote switches make good
business safety and health decision sense.
As a practical matter, we would recommend the
incorporation of threshold amounts into any legislation that is considered.
TCPA only kicks in if a facility handles, uses, manufactures, stores or has the
capability to generate an extraordinarily hazardous substance at specified
threshold quantities. These thresholds have been developed for each individual
substance through scientific analysis of the respective potential off-site
impacts. The fact that there are thresholds, and also the fact that there are
fees applied based on the amounts maintained over that threshold, provide
real financial and regulatory
incentives to convince facilities that it would be in their best interest to
reduce inventories of extraordinarily hazardous substances.
Over the life of this program, we have seen
numerous facilities either reduce the amount of the substances they keep on
hand or change their processes altogether so that they use more benign
substances to accomplish the same ends. For example, when our program first got
up and going in the fall of 1988, New Jersey had 575 TCPA-regulated water
treatment facilities meeting the then 500-pound or greater threshold quantity
of chlorine. In less than three years, 375 of these facilities had reduced the
amount of chlorine on hand to levels below the threshold, removing them from
the program. Another 100 facilities changed their processes and ceased the use
of chlorine altogether; instead using alternatives that have the potential for
only very limited off-site impacts.
As I have emphasized, we are very proud of the
program we have developed in New Jersey to minimize the risk of catastrophic
releases. The TCPA program, working in conjunction with other programs such as
Discharge Prevention Containment and Countermeasures, Worker and Community
Right-to-Know and Emergency Response has established a prevention and response
system that is second to none. The DPCC Program, for example, covers the
universe of facilities whose releases would not have the dire consequences of a
TCPA release, but would still cause adverse impact to the public and the
environment. This program has some requirements that mirror the TCPA
requirements regarding secondary containment and preparedness and prevention.
Still, however, there are areas where additional federal regulation would improve our efforts. Let me briefly describe those areas.
One thing that we would support is federal
promotion of the use of inherently safer
technology. It goes beyond what we feel we could require at the state level
in New Jersey, but we do believe that it would be proper policy to promote
safer technology at the federal level. Installation of inherently safer
equipment would help to ensure that facilities and emergency responders would
have the most up-to-date technology at their disposal in the event of a
release.
It would also be helpful to New Jersey if a
federal statute allowed for state regulation of the transportation of
extraordinarily hazardous materials. DOT regulations have historically been
unclear as to when freight is in transit and when it is not. Our TCPA program
generally regulates material once it enters onto a plant site. However, the
longer freight is in transit, the less opportunity we have to impose
regulations as a state. For example, there are some who are pushing for
railcars to be exempt from State regulation until they are completely unloaded.
Due to interstate commerce concerns, a State’s jurisdiction over the railcar
and its contents is unclear while in transit.
DOT is currently taking comments on a proposal
to define when a commodity is to be considered “in transit.” This might be an
appropriate time for Congress to weigh in on this issue.
I thank you for this opportunity to come before you and discuss this vital topic. We are available to answer any questions that you may have.