STATEMENT
SUBMITTED
BY
THE
UNITED
STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
NUCLEAR
SECURITY INFRASTRUCTURE
TESTIMONY
SUBMITTED BY
RICHARD
A. MESERVE
CHAIRMAN,
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Submitted:
November 1, 2001
Mr.
Chairman and members of the Committee, I am pleased to have been invited
to appear before you, on behalf of the United States Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC), to discuss programs related to safeguards and security
for NRC-licensed commercial nuclear facilities, and to discuss the actions
that NRC and its licensees have taken in response to the terrorist acts
that occurred on September 11th.
The
NRC response began immediately after the September 11th attacks.Within
30 minutes of the plane strikes, we activated and staffed the NRC Operations
Center at NRC Headquarters and the incident response centers in the NRC
Regional offices, and we began close coordination with the FBI and other
intelligence and law enforcement agencies, our licensees, and various military,
state and local authorities.Shortly
after the attacks, we advised all nuclear power plants, non?power reactors,
nuclear fuel facilities, gaseous diffusion plants, and decommissioning
facilities to go to the highest level of physical security (Level 3), which
they promptly did, discussed immediate actions and addressed specific questions.Increased
security measures were also implemented at NRC offices.
As
of today, the NRC and our licensees are still in a heightened state of
securityreadiness.We
have enhanced NRC building security, and we continue to monitor the situation
closely.Our Headquarters Operations
Center and Regional Response Centers are fully staffed, 24 hours per day,
7 days per week.We are prepared
to make adjustments to security measures as circumstances warrant.
SECURITY
AND SAFEGUARDS FOR COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR FACILITIES
NRC
activities related to domestic safeguards and security and emergency response
can be grouped into four categories:
--Developing
and implementing requirements for safeguarding certain types of
nuclear
facilities and material and inspecting for compliance with those requirements;
--Assessing
the threat environment, including the international environment insofar
as it has implications for domestic threats;
--Maintaining
and coordinating emergency response capabilities; and
--Providing
physical security for NRC employees and offices.
For
example, one NRC requirement which reflects the graded approach to protection,
is that commercial power reactors must have the capability to defend against
certain defined security threats, referred to as a Design Basis Threat.The
specifics of this Design Basis Threat are safeguards information.What
I can say in public, is that the Design Basis Threat assumes that the adversaries
will consist of a number of well-trained and dedicated individuals with
knowledge of the facility, armed with weapons up to and including automatic
weapons and specialized equipment, such as incapacitating agents and explosives.It
also envisages use of land vehicles and a potential truck bomb.Licensees
must establish and implement a security plan to respond to this assumed
threat. NRC oversight of licensee efforts in this area includes routine
and event-based on-site inspections, performance indicator reviews, and
force-on-force exercises.Any deficiencies
found in an exercise are promptly corrected and the corrections are verified
by NRC inspectors.In addition to
the capacity to defend against a Design Basis Threat, licensee security
programs include provisions for requesting assistance from offsite authorities
when appropriate.
The
requirements to protect against sabotage or theft or diversion of nuclear
materials also apply to major NRC-regulated fuel cycle facilities, such
as the gaseous diffusions plants and uranium hexafluoride conversion facilities.Aside
from the nuclear materials aspects of these operations, these types of
facilities present chemical hazards.The
NRC coordinates with other Federal agencies, such as EPA and FEMA, to address
these non-radiological hazards.
The
NRC's emergency response program includes the capability to respond to
a radiological sabotage incident. This would be accomplished within the
U.S. government interagency crisis and consequence management framework.Most
of these activities areconducted
under the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan, in coordination
with theFederal Emergency Management
Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of
Energy,
and other Federal participants.As
noted earlier, NRC has lead Federal Agency responsibilities for radiological
emergencies.NRC's program is designed
to assess licensee
responses
to plant-specific events and to support local, State, and Federal authorities
in the case of an emergency declaration.
Finally,
we protect NRC personnel and contract staff and facilities through a comprehensive
physical and personnel security program. This program includes the continual
assessment andadjustment of physical
security measures in response to Federal government-wide advisories.In
this regard, since September 11 we have increased our physical protection
in a variety of areas, including the controls of access to NRC campuses
by persons and vehicles.Most recently,
we have taken measures to protect NRC mailroom employees from the biological
threat posed by contamination by anthrax spores spread through the mail.
In
the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the continuing
uncertainty about future terrorist intentions, the NRC is expanding its
review of its safeguards and physical security program, even though we
believe that the nuclear power plants and fuel cycle facilities that fall
under NRC jurisdiction are among the best protected industrial sites in
America.The nature of the attacks
requires that the NRC=s review include a comprehensive examination of the
basic assumptions underlying the current safeguards and physical security
program.
We
also are re-evaluating the agency=s ability to communicate with the press,
the public, and interested parties regarding information relevant to security
and physical protection of our licensees.Prior
to September 11, the NRC provided to the public via NRC=s Website or its
electronic ADAMS database, most documents pertinent to its regulatory regime,
including extensive information on individual plant design and operation.In
light of the events of September 11, which showed that some of the information
that the NRC had made available to the public via the Internet could be
of potential use to terrorists, the NRC shut down public access to these
electronically available documents and removed some documents from our
Public Document Room.The NRC is
now in the midst of a careful review to determine the material that should
be electronically made available to the public.In
recent days we have restored public meeting notices, pertinent information
on agency rulemaking proceedings, electronic reading room material, and
information on contracting opportunities.Substantially
more information will be restored in the coming weeks.As
part of its ongoing re-examination process, the agency is examining issues
related to withholding from the public critical infrastructure information.If
the NRC determines that additional authority is needed to protect such
information, the NRC will seek the necessary legislation.
We
have also, since June 22, 2001, developed a fourth proposed statutory change
which would confer upon guards at NRC designated facilities the authority
to possess or use weapons that are comparable to the Department of Energy
guard forces or other Federal protective forces.Some
state laws, for instance, in New Jersey, currently preclude guard forces
at NRC-regulated facilities from utilizing a wide range of weapons, which
are available to the guard forces at other NRC-regulated facilities in
states without such restrictions.We
would advocate a more uniform national system.
We
expect that our reassessment of commercial nuclear security and safeguards
will strengthen our ability to improve our security requirements and programs,
as needed.In considering potential
legislative and regulatory changes, we must consider carefully the boundaries
between private and government responsibility, and the delicate balance
between openness and security.The
balance between risk avoidance and risk mitigation must also be considered.These
are difficult areas, but we are determined to address safeguards and security
needs expeditiously in light of the September 11 events.