Statement of Robert J.
Martin
before the United States
Senate
Committee on Environment and
Public Works
Thank you Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Committee for the opportunity to appear and testify before you in connection with S. 606, the pending Ombudsman reauthorization Act of 2002. I understand the focus of the hearing is to make inquiry regarding the actions of the Environmental Protection Agency and the EPA Office of the Inspector General impacting the Ombudsman and to offer suggestions relating to the establishment of a permanent Ombudsman institution for the environment. As the former National Ombudsman for Hazardous and Solid Waste at the EPA for nearly ten years, I trust my remarks on the foregoing matters will prove useful to the Committee as you deliberate on the nature of this vital institution.
Moreover, it is my hope that this testimony and the statements from communities will serve to tell a story. It is a compelling story that begins and ends with the American people in many communities who continue to face the most difficult of circumstances involving harm to their health and financial well being from hazardous waste and the actions or inactions of the EPA regarding the management of that waste. The presence of an independent National Ombudsman function at the EPA has been a significant chapter in that story, empowering American communities from New York City to Coeur D’Alene, Idaho in the struggle to keep hope and truth alive while seeking to make changes necessary to protect human health and the environment or to provide help with resulting financial harm.
A new and disturbing chapter emerged in the story, however, when EPA Administrator Whitman dissolved the independent National Ombudsman function. Over and against my objections and the protests of many American communities as well as the pleas of the Congress, Administrator Whitman implemented her decision on April 12, 2002 to end the independent EPA Ombudsman by having the EPA Office of Inspector General take control of the Ombudsman function. Within days, my position description as Ombudsman was eliminated, the locks were changed on the doors and files were removed affecting dozens of cases while I was on official travel. American communities who had come to rely upon an independent EPA Ombudsman function have suffered a great loss.
They have lost a place to be listened to when no one else at the EPA would listen to their cares and needs. They have lost a place of refuge when they were insulted in their own neighborhoods by their own government. They have lost a meaningful voice of advocacy within the EPA bureaucracy for the truth of their own experiences. They have lost a mediating influence to secure desperately needed changes within the EPA when the government made a decision that harmed their neighborhoods or would not make a decision that would save their neighborhoods. They sustained all these losses when the independent EPA Ombudsman function was eliminated by Administrator Whitman.
I resigned on April 22, 2002 under circumstances tantamount to a constructive dismissal as it became clear that the independent Ombudsman function would be absorbed and eliminated by the EPA Office of Inspector General. An independent EPA Ombudsman cannot exist within the EPA Office of Inspector General both as a practical and legal matter. To remain in EPA under such circumstances would have been to cooperate in a lie and would have compromised the relationship of trust I had developed with many American communities. I offer the following today: (1) a chronology to help explain how the independent National Ombudsman function evolved; (2) a discussion of why an independent National Ombudsman function cannot exist with the EPA Office of Inspector General and (3) a vision of a Congressionally established National Ombudsman for the Environment.
Discussion
A true
and independent National Ombudsman function cannot exist within the EPA Office
of Inspector General. First, EPA itself
has recognized that any change or limitation on the scope of the EPA National
Ombudsman’s function is a “rulemaking subject to notice and comment
requirements. Specifically, on January
3, 2001, EPA published “Draft Guidance for the National Hazardous Waste
Ombudsman and the Regional Superfund Ombudsmen Program” in which it attempted
to more clearly define the ombudsman’s office and to limit the scope of the
ombudsman’s authority where matters in litigation were concerned. 66 Fed. Reg. 365 (Jan. 31, 2001). Whereas EPA recognized the need to comply
with the rulemaking requirements on January 5, 2001, Administrator Whitman
simply ignored them on November 27, 2001.
Administrator
Whitman’s unilateral decision to eliminate the EPA National Ombudsman’s office
was rulemaking subject to notice and comment requirements under 5 U.S.C. §
553. Administrator Whitman did not
publish notice and no comment period was provided. Because the decision to eliminate the Office of the Ombudsman is
a rulemaking act, doing so without giving notice and comment period clearly
violated the APA rulemaking requirements listed above. Administrator Whitman’s decision was, thus,
invalid.
By
establishing the EPA National Ombudsman’s office, prescribing a set of
procedures for handling complaints and grievances and establishing the
ombudsman program, EPA created a program to deal with public grievances and
complaints. Where an agency “has
crystallized what its policy shall be, the agency must abide by that
policy. The Morton v. Ruiz decision in 1974 illustrates than an agency which
has adopted a rule cannot abandon it casually and go back to ad hoc decision
making without first undoing or making exceptions from the rule.”
O’Reilly, James T., Administrative Rulemaking, § 3.07 (1983). Administrator Whitman’s decision was more
than merely moving EPA’s National Ombudsman from the OSWER building to the OIG
building. It was the elimination of an
entire program for addressing and resolving grievances and complaints from the
public which has both environmental and economic impacts. Any decision which has such a significant
impact on the public is more than merely “agency organization, procedure and
practice.” Such a decision is clearly
not within exceptions to rulemaking requirements.
As a
matter of law, Administrator Whitman’s decision necessarily terminates the
National Ombudsman function. Whitman’s
decision to “transfer the function” of the EPA National Ombudsman’s office to
the OIG was ultra vires because the OIG lacks the authority to act as an
ombudsman and Administrator Whitman cannot expand the OIG’s authority as
delegated by Congress. The root of this
argument was aptly explained by one commentator as follows:
`An
administrative agency … is a creature of the legislature.’ As a corporation is to its charter, the
administrative agency is to its enabling legislation. This means that the basic doctrine of administrative law, as of
corporation law, is the doctrine of ultra vires. The jurisdictional principal is the root principle of
administrative power. The statue is the
source of an agencies authority as well as its limits. If an agency act is … outside [the statutory
limits] (or vires), it is invalid.
Schwartz,
Bernard, Administrative Law, § 4.4 (1984) (citations omitted). This principle was clearly stated by the
United States Supreme Court, “When Congress passes an Act empowering
administrative agencies to carry on governmental activities, the power of those
agencies is circumscribed by the authority granted.” Stark v. Wickard. 321 U.S. 288,
309 (1944).
Unlike
the EPA itself, the OIG was not created by executive order but by an Act of
Congress. Inspector General Act of
1978, 5 U.S.C. Appx. § 1. Although EPA
tried to characterize Administrator Whitman’s decision as nothing more than
moving the ombudsman function from one office in the agency to another for
purposes of expediency, this is a completely inaccurate characterization.
The
OIG, although housed within EPA, is actually a completely separate entity. Administrator Whitman even admitted this in
the November 27, 2001 decision where the Administrator stated, “The OIG is by
statute an independent organization within the agency.” (Memo, Nov. 27, 2001 Decision). The OIG’s narrow authority and functions are
prescribed, and circumscribed, by the Inspector General Act of 1978. Stark v. Wickard. 321 U.S. at 309. This Act
authorizes the OIG to investigate waste, fraud, and abuse, to report criminal
activity to the United States Attorney for prosecution, and to recommend
policies and procedures for avoiding and prohibiting waste, fraud and abuse to
the head of the agency. See 5 U.S.C. Appx § 1 et seq. Nowhere in the ‘OIG’s organic statute is the OIG authorized or
delegated authority to act as an ombudsman or to perform the duties and
responsibilities of seeking to resolve citizen complaints and grievances. The OIG is not authorized by its organic
statute, 5 U.S.C. Appx. § 1, to perform the duties and responsibilities
identified in the “Duties and Responsibilities” attachment to the “Position
Description” EPA published for the National Ombudsman position.
Further,
the “ombudsman” function is not a subordinate role to those functions
authorized by Congress and the ombudsman function is not a necessary component
of the OIG’s other functions. In fact,
Congress explicitly recognized that the OIG was not intended to function as an
EPA “ombudsman” by creating the National Ombudsman’s Office, six years after
the Inspector General Act of 1978, via the 1984 Solid and Hazardous Waste
Amendments to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. See H.R. Rep. No. 98-198 (May 17, 1983) (“EPA has been
hampered in its ability to communicate with the public by not having a single
office whose essential purpose is to respond to citizen inquiries and
complaints. The Committee recognizes
this important need and as adopted a provision establishing, within the Agency,
the Office of Ombudsman.”)
“The
legislative power of the United States is vested in the Congress, and the
exercise of quasi-legislative authority by governmental departments and
agencies must be rooted in a grant of such power by the Congress and subject to
limitations which that body imposes.” Chrysler
Corp. v. Brown. 441 U.S. 281,302 (1979). Because the OIG does not have a delegation
of authority from Congress to act as an “ombudsman,” it lacks the ability to
receive the National Ombudsman “function” purportedly transferred by
Administrator Whitman’s November 27, 2001 decision. Thus, the purported transfer of the ombudsman function to the OIG
was ultra vires and invalid.
EPA
sought refuge in the provision of the Inspector General Act that authorized the
Administrator of the EPA, at the time the 1978 Act was adopted, to transfer
“offices or agencies, or functions, powers or duties” to the OIG. However, this power is limited to those
offices or agencies, or functions, powers or duties that are “properly related
to the functions of the Office [of Inspector General]” and which do not involve
“program operating responsibilities” and the Administrator cannot transfer
functions not properly related to the functions of the OIG set forth in the
statute, all of which concern waste, fraud and abuse. Inspector General Act, § 9(a)(2).
The
Ombudsman program is not properly related to the functions of the OIG as set
forth in the Inspector General Act of 1978.
The kind of offices intended to be transferred to OIG were those offices
within the various agencies that would duplicate the OIG upon its
creation. See e.g., Inspector General Act, §
9(M)(Transferring the EPA “office of Audit” and the PEA “Security and
Inspection Division” to the OIG).
Further, EPA fails to recognize that Congress created a “program” when
it required EPA to create the Office of Ombudsman and transferring the
ombudsman program would necessarily involve the transfer of “program operating
responsibilities.” The EPA National
Ombudsman “is primarily responsible for national coordination of the Hazardous
Waste Ombudsman Program and for the
ongoing review, evaluation and analysis of the program.” (Hazardous Waste
Ombudsman Handbook at 2-4 (emphasis added, numerous other references to the
National Ombudsman’s program operating responsibilities can also be found
within the handbook). Thus, a transfer
of the National Ombudsman “function” to OIG would require the OIG to accept
“program operating responsibilities” in violation of § 9(a)(2) of the Inspector
General Act. Administrator Whitman’s
decision which purportedly transfers the ombudsman function to OIG was not
authorized by the Inspector General Act and was ultra vires.
Given
that the transfer of authority to OIG was invalid and that the exercise of the
“ombudsman function,” by the OIG would be ultra vires, one must look at the
remaining effect of Administrator Whitman’s decision. The remaining elements of the decision are, essentially, the EPA
National Ombudsman’s files for “review,” and the transfer of Robert Martin, the
EPA National Ombudsman, from a “management official” position to a
non-supervisory, “unclassified position” at OIG. Clearly, Administrator Whitman’s decision worked a termination of
not only the office, but the function of the EPA National Ombudsman.
However,
the OIG, which is entirely independent from EPA, has a limited scope of
authority that does not permit it to perform the ombudsman “function.” 5 U.S.C. Appx. § 1. OIG has no right, authority, or obligation
to carry on any of the investigations, except to the extent of looking for
waste, fraud and abuse, reporting criminal conduct to the attorney general and
making policy recommendations for avoiding or mitigating waste, fraud and
abuse. 5 U.S.C. Appx. § 1 Because the National Ombudsman does not
handle matters relating to waste, fraud and abuse, but instead forwards them to
the OIG (Hazardous Waste Ombudsman Handbook at 3-3: allegations of such
wrongdoing to be forwarded to OIG), these should be little or nothing in the
Ombudsman’s cases that the OIG has authority to handle. Thus, as a matter of law, the OIG will not
be able to, and cannot be compelled to continue any of the Ombudsman cases.
Third,
as a practical matter, EPA’s own “Position Description” defines the PEA National
Ombudsman as:
A
management official (as defined by Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act)
who formulates, determines, or influences
an organization’s policies. This
means creating, establishing, or prescribing general principles, plans, or
courses of action for an organization; deciding on plans or courses of action
for an organization; or bringing about a course of action for the
organization.
Management
officials must actively participate in shaping the organization’s policies; not just interpret laws and regulations,
give resource information or recommendations, or serve as experts or highly
trained professionals who implement and interpret the organization’s policies
and plans.
Further,
EPA’s “duties and responsibilities” attachment to the National Ombudsman’s
“Position Description” describe the function of the National Ombudsman:
The …
Solid and Hazardous Waste Ombudsman … is the public official who investigates
people’s concerns regarding matters pertaining to the disposal of solid and hazardous
waste. [It] will receive and take action on individual complaints, grievances, and
requests for information submitted by any
person with respect to any program or requirement under solid and hazardous
waste programs. Based on any findings,
will make appropriate recommendations to the Assistant Administrator, and to
other appropriate Agency officials ….
Id.
(Duties and Responsibilities Description at 1). EPA authorized the National Ombudsman to formulate, determine or
influence EPA’s policies. The EPA
further gave the National Ombudsman the duty to investigate people’s concerns,
to take action on individual complaints and grievances, and, based upon
findings, to make appropriate recommendations to EPA officials through the
Assistant Administrator. Id. (Duties and
Responsibilities Description at 1-2).
Further, the EPA National Ombudsman “[s]erves as the Agency’s expert on
matters concerning the relationship between solid and hazardous waste statutes
and the public. The [National
Ombudsman] performs this function through coordination, implementation, and
interpretation of current policy as it affects the public.” Id. The National
Ombudsman “[d]irects and manages staff and resources establishing internal
operating policies and procedures, allocating resources, assigning and
evaluating work, and carrying out the objectives of [the] unit.” Thus, the National Ombudsman was authorized
to determine the means of carrying out his duties, including holding public hearings
and conducting alternative dispute resolution proceedings.
When
Administrator Whitman eliminated my position description and transferred me to
the EPA OIG to an “unclassified” position, the National Ombudsman function was
essentially obliterated.
To
properly function as an “ombudsman,” I would have to be completely independent
and impartial and would require the ability to have an independent budget, to
hire, fire and supervise my own staff and to make independent decisions
regarding which complaints and grievances the Ombudsman would investigate and
resolve and which to forward to other agencies. (GAO Report, at 6-10;
Hazardous Waste Ombudsman Handbook at 1-1.)
Vision
An
ombudsman should be entirely independent of the Agency that it
investigates. I agree with the
testimony of the United States Ombudsman Association, therefore, that the
National Ombudsman function established by the Congress should be located
within Congress and report directly to the Congress with the ability to make
collateral recommendations to the Executive Branch through the EPA and the
White House Council on Environmental Quality.
As I enunciated in my resignation nearly two months ago, the American
people deserve nothing less than a truly independent and empowered National
Ombudsman to protect their health and environment. I entrust the Congress with the noble task of establishing this
Ombudsman institution for the people of the United States of America. Thank you for your support and
consideration.