Good afternoon Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Subcommittee. I am pleased to have this opportunity to talk to you this afternoon about the current status of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), or more commonly known as Superfund. As the Assistant Attorney General for the Environment and Natural Resources Division, I am responsible, together with EPA, for federal enforcement of this country's environmental laws, including Superfund.
You have just heard from Tim Fields about our great progress in making the Superfund program fairer, faster and more efficient. I would like to focus on the enforcement side of the program. The "enforcement" side of the Superfund program refers to EPA's and the Department of Justice's actions to assure that the parties responsible for creating Superfund sites (know as potentially responsible parties, or "PRPs"), clean up these sites. During the 20-year history of Superfund, the enforcement program has evolved from one that focused on litigation to a program in which most PRPs enter into settlements or voluntarily comply with administrative orders, rather than litigating with the government. In order to understand the current status of enforcement efforts under the program it is useful to understand this evolution. The Superfund program you will hear about today is not the program that existed throughout the 1980s and even in the early 1990s.
The Superfund program was enacted in 1980 in response to a public outcry over environmental contamination and human health hazards discovered at such notorious hazardous waste disposal sites as Love Canal and Valley of the Drums. Decades of careless dumping and improper disposal led to a proliferation of dangerous hazardous waste sites across the country. These sites were contaminating soil and groundwater, fouling our drinking water sources, and threatening the health of our communities.
CERCLA was enacted to provide the federal government with the authority and funding to clean these sites up. Congress also decided that the parties that created these environmental hazards should pay for the cleanup. This "polluter pays" principle is implemented through the liability and enforcement provisions of the statute.
In the early years after CERCLA's enactment in 1980, the federal government sought to enforce the liability provisions of the statute through lawsuits brought in federal court seeking injunctive relief under section 106 of the statute. As with any new statute, many legal issues had to be resolved, and litigation proceeded slowly. Moreover, courts were called upon to resolve complicated technical issues regarding what would be an appropriate remedy. Given their inexperience in this area and the lack of precedent, the courts were understandably slow in resolving these issues. Thus, the 1980s were marked by extensive litigation and a relatively slow pace of cleanups.
In 1989, in a desire to accelerate the pace of cleanups, EPA and the Department reviewed their approach to enforcing Superfund liability and decided that litigating liability issues first was not the fastest way to get many sites addressed. As a consequence EPA and the Department developed the "Enforcement First" policy under which we operate today. Under this revised approach, the federal government first looks to responsible parties -- either under a settlement agreement, or, where settlement cannot be reached, through the issuance of an administrative order -- to clean up a site, rather than undertaking the cleanup itself and then suing the responsible parties to recover the costs. This approach allows federal dollars to be focused more quickly and efficiently on sites where there are not viable responsible parties, and more effectively combines public and private resources to get cleanups started.
In addition to this "Enforcement First" policy, EPA and the Department have adopted and implemented a series of administrative reforms over the past six years that address stakeholder concerns about the fairness of the liability system. We have recognized the need to address some of the past concerns raised about Superfund and have taken significant steps to reduce litigation, to promote earlier settlements, and to optimize fairness concerns in the application of Superfund's liability scheme. By streamlining the process by which we resolve our claims at Superfund sites, we are accelerating the cleanups themselves and increasing the pace at which contaminated properties can be moved back into viable economic use - the critical first step towards many brownfields development projects.
De Minimis and De Micromis Settlements
One of the most important of these reforms involves the Administration's efforts to identify and resolve the liability of small volume contributors, leading to what we call de minimis and de micromis settlements. EPA guidance defines these terms, but basically, a de micromis party is one whose contribution of waste at a site is truly small, and whose costs in hiring a lawyer, and negotiating a settlement, would dwarf any amount the party could reasonably be expected to contribute to cleanup costs. By contrast, a de minimis party is one whose contribution of waste, while more significant than a de micromis party's, is relatively minor, considering both volume and toxicity of the waste, in comparison to that of a "major" party at the site, and from whom we would seek a cash settlement, rather than performance of work. Some of our de minimis settlements, at sites with a large number of parties, have yielded over $1 million in proceeds. These proceeds inure to the benefit of the major contributors doing the cleanup work.
I am particularly pleased to tell you about the successes we have realized as a result of our de micromis policy. If a party is a truly tiny contributor, our policy is to deter other parties from suing de micromis parties and, if they do, then settling with those parties for little or no payment.
For example, at the Petrochem/Ekotek Site in Utah, we knew that the parties we had sued had threatened to sue hundreds of de micromis parties if they did not accept their settlement. To prevent this, EPA took out advertisements in Salt Lake City area newspapers and on the radio urging de micromis parties to refuse that offer. The United States also sought, and received, a hearing before the District Court Judge, and argued that the settlement demand was inappropriate. As a result, the defendants agreed to withdraw their demand against the de micromis parties.
In addition, we have taken steps to discourage the joinder of de micromis parties in the first instance. For example, a settlement involving the Bypass 601 Superfund Site, a former battery recycling facility in North Carolina, gave contribution protection to some 2400 parties who contributed less than 319 pounds of lead-bearing materials, but imposed no payment obligation upon them. Rather, the decree requires that the major contributors, who are the owner/operator defendants and 450 large-volume generator defendants, pay EPA's past costs of $4 million, implement a remedy estimated to cost between $40.5 and $100 million, and agree not to assert any claims at all against persons meeting de micromis criteria, whether or not those persons are parties to the decree.
We think that our policy protecting de micromis parties is being taken seriously by the regulated community, and that has deterred efforts to add de micromis parties at Superfund sites. Moreover, just this past summer in the Keystone case, in Pennsylvania, over the objection of several of the main owner/operator and generator defendants, Federal District Court Chief Judge Sylvia Rambo approved 200 proposed de micromis settlements, finding that they were fair, reasonable and in accordance with CERCLA's objective.
With respect to de minimis parties, we have placed a priority on achieving quick, efficient resolutions of the liability of these small volume contributors to protect these contributors from burdensome contribution litigation. Through model settlement decrees and guidances, we have been successful at getting these contributors out of the system quickly. As of a year ago, we and EPA had achieved over 430 settlements with over 21,000 small-volume contributors, protecting these parties from expensive private party litigation. Nearly two-thirds of these de minimis settlements were reached in the last four years.
Orphan Share Policy
The Department often exercises its enforcement discretion to compromise claims in order to achieve comprehensive settlements with responsible parties, taking into account numerous equitable considerations. Through this enforcement discretion we have moved federal dollars into promoting cleanups. We also cooperate with EPA in implementing the orphan share policy, another reform that has increased the fairness of Superfund settlements. At many Superfund sites, parties that individually or collectively were responsible for a share of the waste disposed at a site may no longer exist or are bankrupt. In order to promote fairness and achieve settlements, EPA and the Department of Justice developed the "orphan share" policy, under which the United States can compensate settling parties for a portion of the "orphan share." This share will be recognized primarily through a compromise of past costs or a reduction of future oversight costs. EPA issued its Interim Guidance on Orphan Share Compensation in June 1996 and since then the Department has moved aggressively to put this concept into practice. Over the last 4 years, the United States has offered orphan share compensation of more than $175 million at 98 sites to responsible parties willing to negotiate long-term cleanup settlements. Municipal Settlement Policy The municipal settlement policy reflects the fact that municipal waste typically is not as toxic as industrial waste, and that it is the presence of hazardous industrial wastes disposed in municipal landfills that generally drives costly remedies. It also addresses the unique position of municipal owners and operators of co-disposal landfills. The municipal policy provides a fair and efficient basis for settling with municipalities and other generators and transporters of municipal solid waste (MSW) that are potentially liable under Superfund. The policy establishes a formula for calculating a municipality's share of response costs at a site based on the typical costs for cleaning up the waste found in a municipal solid waste landfill (as compared to hazardous wastes). It also provides a presumptive settlement percentage of 20% for municipal owners and operators of co-disposal sites where there are other viable PRPs to share the cost of cleanup. This new policy streamlines the settlement process and protects municipalities, and generators and transporters of municipal solid waste, from expensive transactional costs. Our use of the policy methodology as a basis for settlement was recently endorsed by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio as being reasonable, fair, and consistent with CERCLA in approving a consent decree relating to the Fultz Landfill near Byesville, Ohio. The United States is in the process of finalizing several other settlements on the basis of the municipal settlement policy. Moreover, we have learned that the policy has been successful in promoting several private party settlements by providing a fair methodology by which to determine the share of municipal solid waste parties. Other Administrative Reforms Other administrative reforms that have also led to faster, fairer, and more efficient settlements include the use of mixed work/mixed funding agreements, settlements that take into consideration a party's "ability-to-pay," and the use of interest-bearing special accounts. Under the last of these, the United States will agree to hold monies recovered in settlement in special accounts for later Superfund cleanup at the same sites where the settlement occurred. Through 1999, the United States has collected over $486 million and placed it in 133 special accounts, which have generated over $85 million in interest. These accounts ensure greater fairness in the settlement process by taking monies recovered from parties that simply "cash out" their liability and setting them aside for later use by parties that are performing the cleanup work. This reform makes more monies available for actual cleanup, which can be an important factor in reaching a successful settlement.
EPA and the Department of Justice are also doing a much better job of making sure that all non-de minimis responsible parties involved at a site are identified and pursued by the government. Complaints were made in the early days of the Superfund program that EPA chose to pursue only a handful of "deep pockets" at a site, leaving these parties with the responsibility to find and pursue in contribution actions other parties responsible at a site. It is the government's policy to undertake a thorough PRP search at every site and to make sure that as many of those parties as possible participate in settlement at the site so as to spread the burden of site cleanup among all parties.
Another important way the Department ensures fairness in the enforcement process -- and which reinforces the importance of settlement -- is by actively pursuing those parties that choose not to settle. Indeed, in a recent decision, U.S. v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 200 F.2d 143 (3rd Cir. 1999), the Third Circuit upheld the federal government's authority to enforce administrative orders issued to non-settling parties that direct them to participate in site work being done by other parties. This decision has strengthened our ability to ensure greater fairness at Superfund sites. For example, at the Lipari Superfund site in Gloucester County, New Jersey, Owens- Illinois, Inc. chose not to join a settlement the United States reached with numerous parties and instead pursued years of litigation. When it finally choose to settle in 1998, Owens was required to pay $13.8 million in settlement for cleanup costs. By refusing to cooperate, Owens-Illinois incurred substantially higher costs than it would have had it initially agreed to take responsibility for its actions.
Alternative Dispute Resolution
Another way that the Department has sought to make the Superfund enforcement process less time-consuming and costly is through the use of alternative dispute resolution, or ADR. The Department of Justice is committed to the use of ADR to assist in appropriate and efficient resolution of cases and issues. ADR can be a useful tool in focusing efforts on protecting public health and the environment, rather than on protracted litigation. We have found ADR to be particularly helpful in complex multi-party CERCLA cost-recovery actions, which require enormous time and resources and demand immediate steps to address environmental contamination.
ADR has led to many success stories in CERCLA cases, including cases which involved much more than simple cost recovery issues. An example is the Landfill & Resource Recovery Superfund Site in Rhode Island. The parties at the site were many and varied the United States, the State of Rhode Island, four owner/operators of the Site, twelve generators and transporters of hazardous substances disposed of at the Site, and two "ability to pay" parties. And the issues were complex, involving claims under section 107 of CERCLA for reimbursement of past and future response costs, implementation of response actions, and civil penalties for failure to comply with a Unilateral Administrative Order ("UAO") issued under section 106 of the Act. Mediation enabled us to negotiate a settlement among these parties that resolved all outstanding issues much more quickly than might otherwise have occurred, saved the parties from costly transaction expenses, and reimbursed the government for nearly all expected Site costs.
The parties began negotiations under the First Circuit's Court of Appeals Mediation Program (CAMP) and ultimately reached a settlement through the assistance of U.S. District Court Judge Mazzone. The consent decree resolved the United States' complaint, a state court action related to the Site, and an appeal in the First Circuit challenging an earlier de minimis settlement. This settlement determined a reasonable settlement payment for the "ability to pay" parties, and obligated the remaining settling parties to perform operation and maintenance of the remedial action and to pay past and future oversight costs, as well as a civil penalty of $400,000 for noncompliance with the UAO. It also resolved natural resource damage claims of the Department of the Interior and provided $525,000 to purchase wetlands or related property within the Blackstone River Valley National Heritage Corridor. When combined with previous settlement recoveries for this Site, and the performance of the remedial action by the settlors, this mediated settlement will result in a recovery of 97% of expected Site costs.
Just this month we achieved a superb settlement involving the Auburn Road Landfill Superfund Site in Londonderry, New Hampshire, through a voluntary mediation. United States and the State of New Hampshire v. Exxon Corporation, et al. (D.N.H.). On March 10, 2000, a consent decree was entered that resolves the government's claims against four defendants and twenty-seven third-party defendants. Under the proposed decree, the settlors have agreed to perform the remedy and to reimburse the United States for its past ($5.84 million) and future oversight costs. The remedy involved operation and maintenance of the landfill cap, monitoring of ground water, surface water and sediments, and the performance of any active remediation that EPA may select in the future.
In addition to resolving the United States' claims, the settling defendants have agree to reimburse the State for a portion of its past response costs and to reimburse the Town of Londonderry over $1.7 million in partial reimbursement of the Town's response costs for constructing the landfill cap. Also, the owner of the Site has agreed to convey to the Town of Londonderry over 100 acres of property at and around the Site for beneficial reuse. Finally, the defendants will collectively pay $125,000 in penalties. These great results were achieved more quickly and at lower costs to the parties through the mediation process than would have been possible through litigation.
U.S. v. Allied Signal et al. (D.N.J.) and its companion contribution action Rollins Environmental v. United States (D.N.J.) provides another good example of the use of ADR in complex, multi-party Superfund litigation to resolve cost recovery and contribution litigation. The Site in question, the BROS Superfund Site in Logan Township, New Jersey, long considered one of the most technically challenging sites under the Superfund program, was used as a waste oil collection facility and chemical waste storage site for three decades. When it closed in the late 1970s, millions of gallons of waste oil and other dangerous pollutants were left at the Site, much of it in a thirteen-acre lagoon -- a "toxic soup" of waste material. Spills and leaks from the facility had also contaminated the Site's groundwater and adjacent wetlands. Mediation resulted in settlement among 80 private parties and several state and federal agencies.
That settlement, conservatively valued at $221.5 million and one of the largest ever under CERCLA, covers about 70% of the cleanup costs and requires the private companies to complete the remaining cleanup of the Site's groundwater and wetlands. The settlement is the result of more than two years of complex negotiations between the federal government, the State, and settling parties. It reflects Superfund reform policies that allow EPA to share in the cleanup costs when some of the responsible private parties are defunct or financially insolvent. Our commitment to ADR led to settlement in record time for a case of this magnitude.
As demonstrated by these examples, ADR enables parties to create an environment to explore solutions that may not be obtainable through the judicial process. The potential for creativity and concomitant flexibility is invaluable in resolving the difficult problems sometimes posed in CERCLA cases.
Federal Facilities
In addition to enforcing Superfund, the Department is also responsible for representing other federal departments and agencies at Superfund sites. Federal facilities are also making significant progress in cleaning up contaminated federal property under CERCLA. Federal property must satisfy the same cleanup process and standards as private property under CERCLA, including the application of state laws as applicable or relevant and appropriate requirements, participation by EPA, states, and the public in the cleanup process, and the ability of states and citizens to judicially enforce inter-agency agreements under section 120.
Results of Administrative Reforms
What has been the result of all of these administrative reforms? They allow us to reach settlement more quickly on terms that are considered more fair to responsible parties. This in turn allows us to proceed more quickly to cleaning up sites -- the fundamental purpose of the Superfund -- so as to ensure protection of human health and the environment. And faster cleanups mean that these contaminated properties are available for economic development sooner.
Over 91% of sites on the National Priorities List either have been cleaned up or have cleanup construction under way. Moreover, the pace of cleanups has accelerated sharply in the last decade. Whereas only 61 sites were cleaned up during the first ten years of the program, some 680 sites now have cleanup construction complete. And we are getting sites cleaned up faster. In the last four years, we've finished cleaning up more sites than in the previous fourteen. Through enforcing the Superfund law, the Justice Department has played a critical role in obtaining these cleanups. The "Enforcement First" policy has led to a dramatic shift in the performance of Superfund cleanups by private responsible parties. Today 70% of all NPL site cleanups are being conducted by private parties. By contrast, 67% were conducted by the federal government in the early years of the program. In 1999, we obtained a record $387.3 million in reimbursed federal response costs. These numbers demonstrate that the Superfund program is working in a cost-effective manner to clean up sites. The Department remains committed to implementing fully the administrative reforms that have made these results possible and to refining and improving these reforms, where necessary.
SUPERFUND AND BROWNFIELDS ECONOMIC REDEVELOPMENT
In addition to promoting cleanups through enforcement activities and associated negotiations, the Department also plays a significant role in assisting EPA in promoting brownfields redevelopment. The Department does this in a number of ways. It does this first and foremost by ensuring cleanup of Superfund sites, many of which are redeveloped following cleanup and returned to productive use. The Department also promotes brownfields redevelopment through its enforcement of other environmental statutes and its use of creative settlement mechanisms, such as supplemental environmental projects, to transform blighted properties. A good example of the effective use of supplemental projects in enforcement is United States v. City of Chicago, IL (ND Ill, 1999), in which the Department of Justice negotiated a consent decree resolving EPA's Clean Air Act claims against the City of Chicago from its operation of a now-closed municipal incinerator. The decree requires the City to pay a $200,000 civil penalty and complete four projects at a cost of $700,000. The first two projects require the City to spend $450,000 to remove and dispose of contaminated soils at two abandoned industrial sites near the incinerator, thus facilitating the future redevelopment of the two sites. The third project requires the City to spend $100,000 to construct a lead-safe house. The lead-safe house will serve as a temporary residence for low-income Chicagoans while lead- abatement work is being undertaken in their homes. The fourth project requires the City to spend $150,000 on a lead-abatement project in northwest Chicago.
Prospective Purchaser Agreements ("PPAs")
The Department further supports brownfields redevelopment by entering into administrative settlements termed "Prospective Purchaser Agreements," or "PPAs." PPAs can provide prospective purchasers with certainty regarding Superfund liability that might be assumed in buying property. At sites where there is already federal involvement, a PPA can provide a buyer with protection from Superfund liability for existing contamination caused by previous property owners. PPAs, of course, do not provide protection for prospective purchasers if they create new contamination or make existing site conditions worse. Further, in return for the government's promise not to sue them, prospective purchasers usually pay for -- or perform -- some of the response actions at a site. In deciding whether to enter into a PPA, we take into account benefits that the community might receive through redevelopment and job creation. By providing reassurance to buyers of contaminated lands regarding their liability, PPAs have significantly contributed to redevelopment.
It is the responsibility of the Department, exercising the Attorney General's authority to compromise claims in litigation, to enter into PPAs and, as the Assistant Attorney General for the Environment and Natural Resources Division, I am the person who ultimately signs PPAs on behalf of the Department.
To ensure consistency and to streamline the process of issuing PPAs, we have worked with EPA to develop a model PPA setting forth standard language and provisions to be included in such agreements. This model was issued with EPA's revised guidance on PPAs in July 1995 (60 Fed. Reg. 34,792). Since 1989, when we issued the first PPA, the Department has approved 152 PPAs. More than 125 of these have been approved in the last five years alone, and even more are in progress. When EPA conducted a survey last year, the Agency found that redevelopment projects related to PPAs cover over 1200 acres, have resulted in over 1500 short- term jobs, and have created over 1700 permanent jobs. And those figures do not reflect the redevelopment that is occurring on adjacent properties around the country.
One PPA success story that happened just this summer was in the foothills of the Blue Ridge Mountains in Virginia, about sixty miles west of Washington, D.C. As part of a consent decree to resolve a case that had been litigated for years, FMC Corporation agreed to take over cleanup of the rest of the 440-acre Avtex Fibers Superfund site (including removing aboveground and underground storage tanks, hazardous substances, and demolition debris) consistent with redevelopment plans by the Town of Front Royal and Warren County. One of the new uses of the site will be as soccer fields, which will be the first project sponsored by the U.S. Soccer Foundation on a Superfund site. The PPA that helped to make this consent decree possible will also help to put dollars into a cleanup in the community, rather than into litigation of a case in a courtroom. U.S. v. FMC Corp., No. 5:99-CV-0054 (W.D. VA)
Another recent successful PPA involved the Murray Smelter Site in Murray, Utah. The site is located right across the street from City Hall and was the location of one of the nation's largest lead and arsenic smelters. After the smelter closed in the 1940s, the Site was taken over by light industry and warehouses. Parts of the facility served as a dumping ground for cement slabs. Under our settlement, ASARCO, the company that owned and operated the smelters, will perform all the remedial action work. In the consent decree for this settlement, we also entered into a PPA with a developer that provides an option to purchase the property. The development will include a hospital, a large movie theater complex, and associated retail establishments. This type of redevelopment is likely to help revitalize the City by increasing employment and the city's tax base.
There are numerous other great examples of how PPAs have turned around brownfields sites. For example, at the Publicker Superfund site located on the Delaware River in Philadelphia, the United States entered into a PPA with Holt Cargo Systems, Inc. and several related entities interested in purchasing and redeveloping this site without incurring Superfund liability for past disposal activities. The original owner/operators used this site to manufacture dry ice, whiskey, industrial alcohol, and other chemicals for many years. After Publicker ceased manufacturing operations, the site fell into decay and was used for storage of hazardous chemicals. EPA listed the site on the NPL and completed the necessary cleanup at a cost of $20 million. Under the PPA with Holt and others, Holt paid $2.07 million to the United States and $230,000 to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in partial reimbursement of the cleanup costs. In determining the amount of this payment, the United States took into consideration the amount it could expect to recover from liens on the property. The property was particularly desirable for the expansion of Holt's shipping business, because it is located on the riverfront in Philadelphia, with ready access to train and truck transportation. As a direct result of the PPA, this urban wasteland has become an economically productive port facility used for transportation and distribution of produce and freight.
PPAs have also been entered into for smaller properties. At the Middlefield-Ellis- Whisman ("MEW") Superfund site, located in Mountain View, California, the United States has entered into separate PPAs with several different entities for different parcels of this prior manufacturing site. The existing Superfund site is being cleaned up pursuant to administrative orders issued to the site owners and operators. In two recent PPAs related to this site, one covering a 10-acre parcel of the site, and one covering 1.17 acres, the United States agreed to release purchasers of these parcels from Superfund liability for past contamination. In exchange, the purchasers will each pay $75,000, and have committed to make land available for the soil and groundwater treatment remedy (in the first agreement), and committed to provide access to ensure that existing cleanup activities are undertaken (in the second agreement). The $75,000 payments will compensate EPA for administrative costs and provide monies to a regional cleanup effort. These PPAs will allow the purchasers to build office buildings on these parcels that will return blighted properties to productive use and create more than 100 jobs for the local community.
The Administration has also taken a number of steps administratively to work with states regarding the treatment of sites they are handling under their programs. For example, an EPA guidance specifies that when certain sites are being cleaned up under state authority, the Agency will defer listing them on the National Priorities List. (Guidance on Deferral of NPL Listing Determinations While States Oversee Response Actions (May 3, 1995).) Further, EPA has signed memoranda of understanding with twelve states (and is negotiating with eight more states) governing voluntary cleanups done under those states' laws. EPA has stated that generally it will not anticipate doing removal or remedial actions at the typically low-risk sites covered by those MOUs. Under these policies, EPA enforcement is preserved in the event of an imminent and substantial endangerment to human health and the environment. My understanding is that states with MOUs have been quite satisfied about the level of assurance regarding anticipated EPA action. These MOUs have also served the valuable function of keeping state and federal officials better informed regarding each other's site cleanup plans.
LEGISLATION
Legislation to reauthorize the federal Superfund program has been proposed in Congress for several years, but has not been enacted. In the meantime, through administrative reforms, we have successfully moved the program forward and gotten sites cleaned up. The administrative reforms EPA and DOJ have implemented have addressed many of the concerns about the program and have led to overall improvement in the program. Given the present state of the program, comprehensive reform legislation on Superfund is no longer needed, and in fact is highly likely to return the program to litigation, to delay further cleanup, and to undermine the progress we have achieved.
There remains a public perception that legislative change could facilitate and expedite brownfields redevelopment. Brownfields are parcels of land, most often located in urban areas, that contain abandoned or under-used contaminated commercial or industrial facilities, the expansion or redevelopment of which is complicated by the presence of hazardous substances. Cleaning up these parcels and returning them to productive use provides numerous benefits to the community: it improves the health of surrounding communities, as well as the appearance and economic well-being of these communities, because such projects bring new vitality and jobs to the areas developed. Brownfields development also protects undeveloped property and green space from the pressures of development.
Because of its importance to the environmental and economic well-being of cities, we have taken a number of steps to encourage brownfields redevelopment. Targeted federal legislation may encourage such redevelopment even further. To that end, we urge Congress to continue funding the Administration's successful brownfields program so that more grants and loans can be made available to local communities all across the country. We also support legislation that has all of the following targeted and specific elements. These are:
- liability relief for qualified prospective purchasers of contaminated property, innocent landowners, and contiguous property owners.
- ensuring that state cleanup programs are well qualified -- the program must provide notice and adequate opportunity for public involvement in cleanup decisions, must contain standards that protect human health and the environment and ensure completion of the cleanups, and must have adequate resources to implement and enforce its program.
- guaranteeing that federal authority to respond to circumstances that may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to human health or the environment is preserved.
Thank you for the opportunity to speak to this committee.