STATEMENT SUBMITTED
BY THE
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
TO THE
COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC
WORKS
UNITED STATES SENATE
CONCERNING
NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SECURITY
SUBMITTED BY
DR. RICHARD A. MESERVE
CHAIRMAN
SUBMITTED: JUNE
5, 2002
Mr. Chairman and Members of
the Committee, I am pleased to appear before you on behalf of the United States
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to discuss safeguards and security for
NRC-licensed commercial nuclear power plants as well as certain legislation
that has been introduced to strengthen security at these facilities. I will discuss the current status of actions
that NRC has taken in response to the terrorist acts that occurred on September
11, and will outline some of the work that lies ahead. I believe that the NRC’s response to the
attacks has been appropriate and thoughtful, and that the NRC’s current
programs continue to provide a very high level of security. I also believe that certain specific
legislative proposals, which I will discuss later, would contribute further to
the enhancement of nuclear plant security and I would urge the Congress to
enact this legislation before adjourning later this year.
The
Commission recognizes the elevated concern of the American public about the
potential for terrorist attacks on nuclear facilities and the use of
radioactive materials for purposes of terrorism. I hope that my testimony today will provide a useful perspective
for the Committee and will correct any erroneous perceptions on this important
subject.
For
decades before September 11, 2001, nuclear power plants were among the best defended
and most hardened facilities of the Nation's critical infrastructure. In the aftermath of the attacks, security
has been enhanced even further. On
September 11, the NRC immediately advised the licensees of nuclear power plants
and certain other licensees to go to the highest level of security and they
promptly did so. Our licensees have
remained at the highest level of security since that time.
We
have maintained a steady flow of information with our licensees through over 30
updates to the original threat advisory.
In February, we issued Orders to each operating power reactor licensee
specifying actions they must take to continue the high level of security to
protect the plants, and thereby to protect public health and safety and common
defense and security.
The
NRC receives a substantial and steady flow of information from the intelligence
community, law enforcement, and licensees that requires prompt evaluation to
assess threats to facilities or activities regulated by the agency. The NRC routinely communicates with other
federal agencies, such as the Office of Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Federal
Emergency Management Agency, the Federal Aviation Administration and the
Department of Defense. The protection of
nuclear power plants and other nuclear facilities and activities has been a
matter on which the NRC has received assistance from across the Government.
ORGANIZATION
Within
a few weeks of the September 11 terrorist attacks, I, with the full support of
the Commission, directed the staff to conduct a comprehensive re-evaluation of
the current safeguards and security programs.
The review encompasses analysis of the agency’s threat assessment
framework and design basis threat, evaluation of facility vulnerabilities,
access authorization processes, and emergency preparedness and response, and
review of NRC’s infrastructure, programs, and communications.
In
this connection, I specifically directed the staff to review the agency’s
organizational structure, staffing, and training in the security and safeguards
area. In early April 2002, the
Commission established a new Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response
in order to consolidate NRC security, safeguards, and incident response
capabilities and resources. The primary
responsibilities of this new Office include safeguards and security programs
and related policy development, threat assessment, and incident response operations.
ADVISORIES AND ORDERS
As
noted previously, after the events of September 11, 2001, the NRC issued
numerous safeguards and threat
advisories to our major licensees in order to strengthen the licensees’
capabilities and readiness to respond to a potential attack on their facilities. The advisories provide concise and relevant
guidance relating to the need for a given category of licensee to take specific
action to enhance security. Some of the
specific measures implemented by the licensees in response to the advisories
included increased patrols, augmented security forces and capabilities,
additional security posts, installation of additional physical barriers,
vehicle checks at greater stand-off distances, enhanced coordination with law
enforcement and military authorities, and more restrictive site access
controls.
The
advisory process, which was in place prior to September 11, was developed in
order to ensure rapid communication and response to potential security
concerns. It proved to be a quick and
effective means for communicating with licensees. Subsequent inspections and audits by the NRC confirmed that
licensees appropriately responded to the actions specified in the advisories
issued after the September 11 attacks.
However, in light of the current threat environment, the Commission
concluded that the additional actions to strengthen security at operating power
reactors and other facilities should be embodied in an established regulatory
framework. Therefore, on February 25, 2002,
the NRC issued Orders that modified the operating licenses for each of the
power reactors to require compliance with specified interim compensatory
measures.
A
number of the Orders’ requirements formalize measures specified in the
advisories issued earlier, and have already been implemented. Other requirements provide additional
security enhancements that have emerged from the on-going comprehensive
safeguards and security program re-evaluation.
Implementation of the requirements must be completed by August 31,
2002. A licensee would have to meet a
very high threshold to receive an extension of that date, and no such extension
has been granted thus far.1
An
Order was also issued on March 25, 2002, to the licensee of the one existing
uranium conversion facility. And, on
May 24, the NRC issued Orders for the decommissioning reactor facilities. The NRC is also developing Orders or
considering other actions that will require implementation of interim
compensatory measures for other categories of licensees.
The
NRC will continue to evaluate whether further changes are needed as part of our
ongoing comprehensive safeguards and security program re-evaluation.
ISSUES
I
would now like to discuss briefly a number of specific issues that may be of
interest to the Committee. These
are: (1) the design basis threat used
to assess security readiness at nuclear facilities, (2) the threat of airborne
attack, (3) the adequacy of security exercises at nuclear facilities, (4)
personnel access authorization and related security background checks, and (5)
protection of spent nuclear fuel. This
will be followed by a discussion of proposed legislation.
(1) Design
Basis Threat
Security
programs at certain NRC-licensed facilities, including nuclear power reactors,
are designed to protect against a specified level of threat called the Design
Basis Threat (DBT). After September 11, the NRC initiated a re-examination of
the basic threat assumptions underlying the current civilian nuclear facility
security programs, including its two established DBTs. The DBTs characterize the adversary force
against which certain NRC licensees (power reactors, Category I fuel cycle
facilities, and transportation of Category I special nuclear material) must
design their physical protection systems and response strategies. The NRC continually assesses the threat
environment and regularly reviews the adequacy of the DBTs in close
coordination with the national intelligence and law enforcement community. Longer term revisions to the DBTs are now
needed to reflect changes in the threat environment. The Commission is currently developing specific guidance to the
NRC staff for revising the DBTs. Any final decision on the DBTs will be
considered with appropriate stakeholders and federal and state agencies. These revisions will lead to changes in the
security requirements for licensed facilities and activities. The February 25 Order referred to above
includes enhancements to respond to the current threat environment.
(2) Airborne
Attack
Following
the use of commercial jetliners as missiles on September 11, many questions
have been raised regarding the potential effects on public health and safety if
an aircraft attack were made on a nuclear facility. As we have stated many times, nuclear facilities are among the
most hardened industrial facilities.
But no existing nuclear facilities were specifically designed to
withstand a deliberate, high-velocity, direct impact of a large commercial
airliner.
The
capability of a plant to cope successfully with an aircraft impact will, in the
first instance, depend upon the plant’s specific design features. It should be recognized that nuclear power
plants are massive structures with thick exterior walls and interior barriers
of reinforced concrete. The plants are
designed to withstand tornadoes, hurricanes, fires, floods, and earthquakes. As a result, the structures inherently
afford a measure of protection against deliberate aircraft impacts. In addition, the defense-in-depth philosophy
used in nuclear facility design means that plants have redundant and separated
systems in order to ensure safety. That
is, active components, such as pumps, have backups as part of the basic design
philosophy. This provides a capability
to respond to a variety of events, including aircraft attack.
It
is also important to note that nuclear power plants have a robust emergency
preparedness program that includes biennial, evaluated exercises. In the event of a serious problem including
a terrorist attack around a nuclear power plant, the plans and procedures that
have been routinely exercised would be activated. This provides a capability to
respond to events of all types, including aircraft attack.
In
our recent Orders to nuclear power plant licensees, the Commission directed
licensees to develop specific plans to respond to an event that results in
damage to large areas of their plants from explosions or fire. In addition, mitigative measures required by
the Orders include assuring the presence of Emergency Plan staffing and
associated resources needed to respond to such an event. The NRC is also continuing a major engineering
evaluation relating to the vulnerabilities and potential effects of a large
commercial aircraft striking a nuclear facility. This effort includes consideration of additional mitigative and
protective measures.
Suggestions
have been made that anti-aircraft defenses should be installed at U.S. nuclear
power plant sites. Such a step would
present very difficult command and control issues, and the use of such weaponry
could lead to significant collateral damage to plant workers and members of the
public. Although the decision whether
to deploy anti-aircraft capability must rest with the military, the Commission
believes that the best approach to dealing with threats from aircraft is
through strengthening airport and airline security measures.
(3) Security
Exercises
The
NRC has conducted force-on-force security exercises, known as Operational
Safeguards Response Evaluations (OSREs), at nuclear reactor sites since 1991,
and carried out similar tests before that time. These are tough, simulated commando-style raids, designed to
identify shortcomings in security personnel performance or strategy. Identification of a weakness during an
exercise leads to immediate corrective or compensatory measures. We are not aware of any comparable
performance testing of security measures
for any other commercial facilities in the United States.
Following
the September 11 attacks, force-on-force exercises were temporarily suspended
because, in the heightened threat environment, the conduct of exercises would be
a significant distraction to security forces.
In addition, the NRC had diverted its limited security inspection
resources to staff response centers and to monitor and evaluate the licensees’
heightened security posture. We
recognize, however, that force-on-force drills are an important means to assess
security readiness. The NRC staff is
currently preparing options for Commission consideration on how to reinstate
security exercises. For example, in the
future we may involve local and State law enforcement in the exercises and we
may look at beyond-design basis threats and the ability of operator actions to
mitigate any hypothetical damage caused by a beyond-design basis attack.
(4) Personnel
Access Authorization
The
NRC’s comprehensive security program re-evaluation includes an assessment of
the personnel access authorization requirements and programs at nuclear power
facilities. This effort is intended, in
part, to address potential insider threats.
Current
NRC regulations, which are the toughest in any non-defense industry in this
country and which were in place prior to September 11, generally require an
individual seeking unescorted access to a nuclear power plant to undergo a
background investigation to verify the individual’s true identity and require
the licensee to develop information about the person’s background. The investigation includes review of the
individual’s employment history, education history, credit history, military
service, and character and reputation, as well as a psychological assessment to
evaluate trustworthiness and reliability.
The background investigation also includes a criminal history check
conducted by the FBI.2 The requirements related to unescorted access are also
supplemented by behavioral monitoring once on the job, and random drug and
alcohol testing as part of a comprehensive fitness for duty program. Further, those who enter the protected area
pass through portal monitors that detect weapons or explosives.
We
took additional steps after September 11.
The NRC, in coordination with the FBI, checked NRC employees and
licensee personnel against the FBI watch list established as part of the
investigation of the events of September 11.
Since that time, we have been working with the Office of Homeland
Security to facilitate information sharing among federal agencies to enhance
access to relevant information and improve the access authorization programs.
The
NRC is also coordinating with the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
in the effort to validate the employment eligibility of employees at nuclear
power plants. We seek to ensure that
only persons authorized to work in the U.S. are employed in nuclear power
plants. However, there are limitations
on the NRC's and its licensees' ability to obtain and use information available
in INS and other federal data bases for this purpose. For example, current law (8 U.S.C. § 1342b) prohibits
discrimination on the basis of alienage in the context of employment. This section has been interpreted to
preclude asking non-citizens for more proof of identity than citizens. In addition, in the process of dealing with
access authorization, the Constitutional rights of both citizens and
non-citizens must be protected.
(5) Spent
Nuclear Fuel
Most
of the radioactive material at power reactors is concentrated in the spent
nuclear fuel that has been removed from the reactors. Spent nuclear fuel is stored at reactor sites in spent fuel pools
or in dry cask storage facilities.
Spent fuel pools use water to cool the spent fuel and shield personnel
from radiation. The pools are robust
structures constructed of very thick concrete walls with stainless steel
liners, and are designed to withstand earthquakes. Spent fuel casks are also robust, typically constructed of a
combination of concrete and steel that allow for air cooling of the spent fuel.
Spent
fuel stored at NRC-licensed facilities poses a lesser security challenge than
an operating reactor because the risk to the public health and safety is
diminished. NRC’s comprehensive
safeguards and security program re-evaluation includes the consideration of
potential consequences of terrorist attacks using various explosives or other
techniques on spent fuel pools and spent nuclear fuel dry casks at storage
sites. The program also addresses the
transportation of spent fuel and other significant quantities of radioactive
material.
The
Orders issued by the Commision on February 25, 2002, to operating reactors, and
on May 2, 2002, to decommissioning reactors and the General Electric spent fuel
storage facility, enhance the security measures for spent fuel stored in spent
fuel pools. The specific security
measures are understandably sensitive, but generally include requirements for
increased patrols, augmented security forces and capabilities, additional
security posts, vehicle stand-off distances, and enhanced coordination with law
enforcement and military authorities.
We will shortly issue a similar Order to independent spent fuel storage
facilities using dry cask storage.
I
would also like to address security during transportation. Our existing regulations currently contain
significant safety and security requirements for the transport of radioactive
material. After the September 11, 2001
event, we also issued advisories to increase security in transportation of
specific types of radioactive material, including spent fuel shipments and
shipments referred to as Highway Route Controlled Quantities of radioactive
material. In order to codify the
advisories, the Commission is currently in the process of issuing Orders to
licensees shipping specific quantities of radioactive material and will be
considering expedited rulemaking in this area as well. We will also review transportation
requirements as part of our comprehensive review of the safeguards and security
programs that I previously mentioned.
LEGISLATIVE NEEDS
Since
the events of September 11, 2001, many members of Congress have asked the NRC
how they can help to improve the security at nuclear power plants and other
facilities. In response, the Commission
has requested that Congress enact several specific legislative proposals that
would amend three sections of the Atomic Energy Act. These proposals were contained in an omnibus bill the Commission
transmitted to the Congress in June of last year and in letters I sent to
Congress this fiscal year. The NRC has
been seeking enactment of most of these amendments for almost fifteen
years. Most of these provisions are
contained in S. 1586, which was introduced by Senators Inhofe and Smith at the
end of last October. I should note that
all of our proposals have been coordinated with the Executive Branch and enjoy
the strong support of the Administration.
One
of the proposals would provide federal authorization for guards to carry and
use firearms at NRC-regulated facilities designated by the Commission, and to
protect property of significance to the common defense and security located at,
or being transported to or from, such facilities. The proposal would enhance national security by eliminating
several weaknesses under the current safeguards and security regime. In particular, this amendment could provide
some protection for licensee guards from State criminal prosecution for actions
taken during the performance of their official duties. Ameliorating guards’ concerns regarding State
prosecution should make their actions more dependable in situations calling for
use of their weapons.
The
Atomic Energy Act permits the Department of Energy (DOE) and its contractors
and subcontractors engaged in the protection of property located at nuclear
facilities, or being transported to or from such facilities, to carry arms,
make arrests, and use force as the Department deems necessary in the interests
of the common defense and security. As
a result, DOE guards may be shielded from State criminal prosecution for
actions taken during the performance of their official duties. However, this does not apply to guards at
NRC-licensed facilities. State laws
govern the use of weapons by guards at NRC-licensed facilities, and some States
laws do not permit guards to use weapons, except to protect against an
immediate threat to their own lives or the lives of others. In such States, it may not be possible to
shield the guards at NRC-licensed facilities from State criminal prosecution
for actions taken during the performance of official duties.
This
difference between the protections offered to DOE guards and guards at
NRC-licensed facilities exists even where both are protecting special nuclear
material. Several years ago, Congress
extended the protections applicable to DOE guards to guards at the gaseous
diffusion facilities operated by the United States Enrichment Corporation. It would seem logical to extend equivalent
protections to guards at NRC-licensed or certified facilities designated by the
Commission.
In
addition, some State laws make it difficult for licensees or their security
contractors to use more effective
weaponry. To alleviate this problem,
the Commission has developed an addition to the proposed amendment establishing
federal authorization for guards to carry and use firearms at NRC-regulated
facilities. This additional provision
-- not included in S. 1586 -- would authorize the guards to carry and use,
where necessary to the discharge of their official duties, such weapons as the
Commission may require, pursuant to guidelines issued with the concurrence of
the Attorney General. A copy of the
original proposal with additional language to address this concern is attached
to my written statement.
Another
provision would make it a federal crime to bring unauthorized weapons and
explosives into NRC-licensed facilities.
There have been a number of reported incidents where persons without
authorization have brought firearms into protected areas of NRC-regulated
sites. Although the NRC may impose
sanctions against the licensee for violations of its security regulations,
there is no federal law permitting the imposition of criminal sanctions against
the person responsible for bringing the weapon or other dangerous instrument to
the site. This amendment would assist NRC licensees in their efforts to
safeguard licensed nuclear facilities and materials that must be protected
against radiological sabotage or nuclear theft. It would permit the NRC to promulgate regulations prohibiting the
unauthorized introduction of weapons into NRC-regulated sites. Violation of the regulations would
constitute a Federal crime, which could result in a fine or imprisonment, or
both.
Our
final proposal would make federal prohibitions on sabotage applicable to the
operation and construction of such NRC-licensed or certified facilities as
nuclear reactors and enrichment and fuel fabrication facilities. This amendment would provide criminal
sanctions for sabotage or attempted sabotage of such a facility during its
operation or construction where the action could affect public health and
safety during the operation of the facility.
We
believe that the modest legislative changes that I have described will
contribute to enhancing the security of nuclear facilities and material. S. 1586 contains provisions that are similar
to these proposals, except that it does not contain the more recently developed
provision I have described authorizing guards to carry and use, where necessary
to the discharge of their official duties, such weapons as the Commission may
require, pursuant to guidelines issued with the concurrence of the Attorney
General.
S. 1746
The
Commission opposes S. 1746, which would federalize the security forces at
commercial nuclear facilities. There
are several fundamental difficulties with this legislation.
First,
S. 1746 separates the strategy for the security of nuclear facilities from that
of all other types of sensitive facilities (e.g., chemical plants, refineries,
and dams). We believe society’s
defensive resources should be allocated in accordance with relative risk, and
that the separation of nuclear facilities from all other types of sensitive
facilities will fragment the overall consideration of risk
inappropriately. Since resources are
not infinite, disproportionate protection at one kind of facility may increase
the risks at other kinds of facilities.
Second,
the requirement that the NRC establish a security force for sensitive nuclear facilities
addresses a non-existent problem. S.
1746 would require the hiring of thousands of new federal guards to displace
the private security forces now used by licensees. The private guard forces that exist today at such facilities are
qualified, trained, and tightly regulated. There is no need, unlike the
situation of airports, to federalize security at such plants. There have been
no failures in nuclear plant security that would warrant the creation of a new
federal security force for NRC-licensed facilities.
Third,
S. 1746 would bring about a fundamental shift in the responsibility and mission
of the NRC. The demands of the
legislation would refocus the NRC principally as an agency to ensure nuclear
security, which could have the unintended consequence of detracting from the
Commission’s mission to protect the public health and safety from radiological
hazards.
Fourth,
NRC’s role as an independent regulator would be compromised by the bill’s
requirement that the NRC design security plans for all sensitive nuclear
facilities, implement the plans with NRC employees, and then conduct safeguards
evaluations of the efficacy of the implementation of those plans. In the security area, the legislation would
force the NRC to regulate its own activities.
Fifth,
the bill would create command and control difficulties because it would
establish two classes of employees at commercial nuclear sites, both of which
would be responsible for safety in the event of a terrorist attack -- licensee
personnel responsible to the licensee for safe operations and federal employees responsible to the NRC
for security. In an emergency
situation, these separate lines of authority could, in fact, lead to a
diminution of the capacity to ensure safety.
Sixth,
making guards at nuclear facilities employees of the Commission (as S. 1746
would do) would require significant additional resources that could be used
more effectively in other efforts to enhance the security of the nation’s
infrastructure. Moreover, given the enhancement
in the security threat against which the guard force would be required to
defend in accordance with the proposed legislation, the NRC would be required
to hire more than 5,000 new federal workers, which is nearly twice the number
of staff now employed by the agency.
These
fundamental difficulties in S. 1746 argue against its adoption, but there are
also other concerns raised by the bill, including the following:
-
S. 1746 does not alleviate concerns, arising from State law, similar to those
described earlier in my discussion of differences between the situation of
guards at DOE facilities and guards at NRC-licensed facilities.
-
S. 1746 would create a “Nuclear Security Fund,” to be used to pay costs of
salaries, training, and other expenses of the nuclear security force
established by the bill as well as costs of developing and implementing
security plans. To ensure that adequate
amounts are available for these purposes, the Commission would be directed to
assess licensees a fee “not to exceed 1 mill per kilowatt-hour of electricity
generated” by “sensitive nuclear facilities”.
This does not take into account that a significant portion of those
facilities (for example, decommissioned nuclear power plants) do not produce
electricity.
-
S. 1746 would create a new NRC Office (the Operations Safeguards and Response
Unit) within the NRC. This aspect of
the legislation has already been accomplished and thus the statutory provision
is unnecessary. In early April of this
year the Commission established a centralized security organization within the
NRC -- the Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response. This office combines security
responsibilities previously exercised by the Office of Nuclear Material Safety
and Safeguards and the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
-
S. 1746 provides a new focus on Federal-State relationships. For example, until now States have borne the primary responsibility
for emergency response. However, the
bill would require the Commission to certify that stockpiles of potassium
iodide (KI) tablets have been established within a 50-mile radius of sensitive
nuclear facilities, and to develop plans for prompt distribution of the
stockpiles in the event of a release of radionuclides. Thus, S. 1746 would require intrusion by the
NRC into the States’ responsibilities in this area. In addition, Congress recently addressed the subject of KI
distribution in the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and
Response Act of 2002, which now awaits Presidential signature. No further legislation regarding KI is
warranted.
In
light of the above considerations, the Commission believes that the current
system, with coordination of security and safety through organizations subject
to NRC regulatory scrutiny, is clearly preferable to that proposed by S. 1746.
CONCLUSION
In
closing, the events of September 11 have had, and continue to have, a
significant effect on both the NRC and our licensees. Nonetheless, our licensees’ primary responsibility of ensuring
safe operation of their facilities, and the NRC’s fundamental mission of
protecting public health and safety, have not changed. Licensees’ physical protection programs in
place prior to September 11 continue to be effective in protecting the public,
and have been appropriately enhanced since September 11. Moreover, the NRC continues to work with a
variety of agencies, including the Office of Homeland Security, in an effort to
develop an integrated national strategy to deal with critical
infrastructure. We continue to believe
that nuclear security would be enhanced by enactment of the legislation
proposed by the NRC. We look forward to
working with the Congress both on the enactment of the NRC legislative
proposals I have discussed and on continuing to ensure adequate protection of
the public health and safety and the common defense and security.
I
appreciate being here today to discuss the NRC’s programs and am prepared to
answer your questions.
SECTION . CARRYING OF FIREARMS BY LICENSEE
EMPLOYEES
Section
161 k. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2201(k)) is amended to read
as follows:
"Sec.
161. GENERAL PROVISIONS.
“In
the performance of its functions the Commission is authorized to --
* * * *
"k. (1) authorize such of its members, officers, and employees as
it deems necessary in the interest of the common defense and security to carry
firearms while in the discharge of their official duties. The Commission may also authorize—
"(A) such of
those employees of its contractors and subcontractors (at any tier) engaged in
the protection of property under the jurisdiction of the United States located
at facilities owned by or contracted to the United States or being transported
to or from such facilities as it deems necessary in the interests of the common
defense and security; and
"(B) such of those
employees of persons licensed or certified by the Commission (including
employees of contractors of licensees or certificate holders) engaged in the
protection of (i) facilities owned or operated by a Commission licensee or
certificate holder that are designated by the Commission, or (ii) property of
significance to the common defense and security located at facilities owned or
operated by a Commission licensee or certificate holder or being transported to
or from such facilities; to carry firearms while in the discharge of their
official duties. A person authorized to
carry firearms under this subsection may, while in the performance of, and in
connection with, official duties, make arrests without warrant for any offense
against the United States committed in that person's presence or for any felony
cognizable under the laws of the United States if that person has reasonable
grounds to believe that the individual to be arrested has committed or is
committing such felony. An employee of
a contractor or subcontractor or of a Commission licensee or certificate holder
(or a contractor of a licensee or certificate holder) authorized to carry
firearms under this subsection may make such arrests only when the individual
to be arrested is within, or in direct flight from, the area of such
offense. A person granted authority to
make arrests by this subsection may exercise that authority only in the
enforcement of (A) laws regarding the property of the United States in the
custody of the Department of Energy, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, or a
contractor of the Department of Energy or Nuclear Regulatory Commission or a
licensee or certificate holder of the Commission, or (B) laws applicable
to facilities owned or operated by a Commission licensee or certificate holder
that are designated by the Commission pursuant to this subsection, and property
of significance to the common defense and security that is in the custody of a
licensee or certificate holder or a contractor of a licensee or certificate
holder of the Commission, or (C) any provision of this chapter that may subject
an offender to a fine, imprisonment, or both.
The arrest authority conferred by this subsection is in addition to any
arrest authority under other laws; The
Secretary and the Commission, with the approval of the Attorney General, shall
issue guidelines to implement this subsection;
“(2)
authorize employees of persons licensed or certified by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (including employees of contractors of licensees or
certificate holders) who are trained and qualified as guards and whose duty is
the protection of facilities designated under paragraph (1)(B)(i) or property
described under paragraph (1)(B)(ii) to carry and use, where necessary to the
discharge of their official duties, such weapons, devices, or ammunition as the
Commission may require. Such employees
shall have the power to carry and use such weapons while in the discharge of
their official duties, regardless whether such employees have been designated
as Federal, State, or local law enforcement officers. Such employees shall have such law enforcement powers as are
provided to them under this section and section 161 i. of this Act. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission shall
issue guidelines, with the approval of the Attorney General, to implement this
paragraph. The authority conferred by
this paragraph with respect to employees of persons licensed or certified by
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (including employees of contractors of
licensees or certificate holders) who are trained and qualified as guards and
whose duty is the protection of facilities designated under paragraph (1)(B)(i)
or property described under paragraph (1)(B)(ii) shall not be implemented until
such guidelines have become effective;”
1Licensees were also required to
submit a schedule of implementation of the Orders’ requirements within
20 days of the February 25 Order.
Requests have been received for extension of that deadline, and are
considered on a case-by-case basis.
Granting an extension to the schedule submission does not change the
requirement for implementation of the February 25 Order by August 31. Nor does granting an extension to the
schedule submission deadline mean that a licensee cannot meet the August 31
implementation deadline. Any extension
dates granted for schedule submissions have been set so as to leave sufficient
time to meet the implementation date of August 31.
2 Current NRC regulations allow an
individual to obtain temporary unescorted access during the conduct of the
criminal history check, but many of the other requirements for unescorted
access must be satisfied in such a situation.
The Orders issued to commercial nuclear power licensees in February
required additional restrictions on the use of temporary unescorted access
authorizations.