Wilmington | December 30, 2009 - The failed bombing attempt by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab on a Northwest Airlines flight from Amsterdam to Detroit on Christmas day has raised several important areas of immediate concern.  There has been a clear failure within our current intelligence sharing system to connect the dots which must be reviewed and immediately addressed.  Also, in a rush to close Guantánamo, it seems clear that this Administration has overlooked some key information that could affect the safety and security of all Americans.  Specifically, the rushed statement made by Secretary Napolitano failed to acknowledge the serious nature of the gaps in our existing system and the evidence linking the failed attack to a broader terrorist network.   

The bomber has been linked to Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), an Al Qaeda cell active in Saudi Arabia and Yemen.  Two of the AQAP leaders were repatriated to Saudi custody in 2007 under the Bush Administration and ultimately released.  Half of the remaining Guantánamo detainees are Yemeni, approximately 90 men, and the Pentagon has identified 60 as dangerous.  Yet, in the past few weeks, the Obama Administration has overseen the repatriation of six Yemenis from Guantánamo back to their home country.  As we learn more about Abdulmutallab’s ties to Yemen and AQAP, it is increasingly clear that the transfer of detainees from Guantanamo is a flawed process demanding immediate review.

We are also seeing some of the same failures within our intelligence systems to share information and collaborate to enact protections based on that information. The CIA reportedly had a person of interest, dubbed “The Nigerian,” suspected of meeting with terrorist elements in Yemen for the past several months.  In November, Abdulmutallab’s father went to the U.S. embassy in Nigeria to warn the CIA about his son’s ties to suspected al Qaeda operatives in Yemen.  The CIA has stated that the agency passed this information to the government's terrorist database-including mention of his possible extremist connections in Yemen and key biographical information to the National Counterterrorism Center. The NCTC, created on the recommendation of the 9/11 Commission, was designed to connect the dots on terrorism.   

There were many aspects of Abdulmutallab’s recent actions that should have raised red flags and included him on the No Fly list.  He had no checked luggage; he paid for his ticket with cash; British officials had rejected his visa renewal application and had his name on their own watch list; and his name had already surfaced on the National Counterterrorism Center’s database of known or suspected international terrorists.  In spite of all this information, his name never made it to the database used by Transportation Safety Administration.  An immediate review by the Administration and Congress to identify the problems within the current system and a blueprint for solutions is in order.