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Contact: Jessica Mancari (202) 225-6365

Members From Around the Nation Express Frustration, Concern Over Pentagon Secrecy


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Washington, D.C., Sep 30 - Members of the House Armed Services Committee yesterday pressed the Department of Defense on its repeated refusal to provide information to Congress, including its failure to provide analysis and documents related to the decision to close the U.S. Joint Forces Command. The following comments by Members of Congress outside the Virginia delegation were made during the House Armed Services Committee hearing on defense cuts.

After the hearing, 32 Members of the House Armed Services Committee sent a letter to the Chairman and Ranking Member to require Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to testify and subpoena him, if necessary.

Skelton:
“I am deeply concerned that the years of creating the joint culture and the enforcement thereof could go down the river and be lost."
House Armed Services Committee Chairman Ike Skelton (D-MO)
“Let me -- let me say, Mr. Secretary, that I am deeply concerned that the years of creating the joint culture and the enforcement thereof could go down the river and be lost. And as long as I am chairman, I'm going to do my best to make sure that that culture stays and that it is enforced. It's come at too much effort, not just by Congress, but by so many outstanding leaders who wear the uniform. They've made it happen. And I don't want to see that slip away. And if I have any message for you, Mr. Secretary, I hope you understand that.”
(The text of Chairman Skelton's questions to Secretary Lynn are below.)

McKeon:
“You've made decisions, you're moving forward, like we have no say whatsoever or no way to deal with this. And it leaves us somewhat frustrated.”
House Armed Services Committee Ranking Member Howard P. “Buck” McKeon (R-CA)
“So I think probably one of the -- one of the problems the committee or at least myself as a member of the committee are having is the things we've asked for are late in coming or incomplete in coming, and we can't seem to get an answer as to when we will get those things that we've asked for. And then you tell us that you've made decisions, you're moving forward, like we have no say whatsoever or no way to deal with this. And it leaves us somewhat frustrated.”

Ortiz: “This is why sometimes we are leery as to what is going on.”
Readiness Subcommittee Chairman Solomon Ortiz (D-TX)
“Secretary Lynn, Secretary Carter, General Cartwright, I know that you have huge responsibilities and serious obligations. But, as I said before, we're in the same boat. So do we. You know it. And I think that the Joint Forces Command, correct me if I'm wrong, came about because of the lessons learned during the first Persian Gulf. And the reason that at least this member is a little leery is that we established a base in Ingleside, Texas, because of the lessons learned during the Persian Gulf, which was mine warfare. That base has since been closed, has been moved someplace else at a huge cost because where they moved did not have the infrastructure. This is why sometimes we are leery as to what is going on, all these studies.”

Critz: “The frustration is that if we're not included in any of these decisions…it sort of gets a little dicey as to what do we support…”
Congressman Mark Critz (D-PA)
“…I go back to the briefing that we received that says the DOD indicates that though some analysis was done leading up to the decision to eliminate the command, the detailed plan for doing so will be developed over the upcoming year. And it -- it is frustrating, because if we're working together and good decisions are being made, certainly we're going to agree on them. But I think I can understand the frustration is that if we're not included in any of these decisions, but we're the authorizing committee, it sort of gets a little dicey as to what do we support, what we don't support? Are we working together for the American people?

Bartlett: “Is it possible that this suggested cure might be worse than the disease?”
Air and Land Forces Subcommittee Ranking Member Roscoe Bartlett (R-MD)
“The question is: Is the current suggestion of doing away with the Joint Forces Command -- which problem might be solved by other means, by the way, that we might need to discuss -- is it possible that this suggested cure might be worse than the disease?”

Wilson: “Thus far, your testimony is that the Joint Forces Command decision was made as a result of several ad hoc discussions among senior DOD officials.”
Military Personnel Subcommittee Ranking Member Joe Wilson (R-SC)
“Secretary Lynn, I share the concerns of Congressman Forbes. Thus far, your testimony is that the Joint Forces Command decision was made as a result of several ad hoc discussions among senior DOD officials. I know these officials have reviewed some documents that outlined their military rationale for the decision. Knowing that there's been documentation considered, I request those documents, print and electronic, used as the basis for the military decisions to be provided to the committee.”

McKeon: “The standup or closure of a combatant command deserves close scrutiny. It represents a major organizational and functional shift within the department.”
Ranking Member Howard P. “Buck” McKeon (R-CA)
“It's critical that the department provide this committee with as much information as possible about its plans to improve efficiencies, where cuts will come from, where reinvestment will occur, and the impact of each of those changes in terms of current and future operations. This is no more true than in the case of proposed closure of U.S. Joint Forces Command. The standup or closure of a combatant command deserves close scrutiny. It represents a major organizational and functional shift within the department and a significant change for the workforce.

“However, not only was the response extremely tardy, but it was incomplete. My colleagues and I requested the DOD general counsel legal counsel about the applicability of the BRAC law, a copy of the recommendation and analysis provided by senior staff to the secretary of defense, regarding the closure of U.S. JFCOM, any business case analysis conducted relating to this initiative, finally, terms of reference provided the task force charged with implementing closure of U.S. JFCOM.”

Andrews: “…when you're going to make decisions like this you should follow either of two tracks...the budget...or another BRAC...”
Congressman Robert Andrews (D-NJ)
“A little unsolicited advice. As you've heard from Mr. Nye's concerns, Mr. Forbes' concerns, you'll hear from Mr. Scott, anytime we make some kind of reduction or change in this budget, it is very difficult to do… I think it's especially important to do so in a way that is procedurally defensible in every respect. The concern that I would express…about the Joint Forces Command, is, you know, a decision announced August 9th, given the cycle of when the Congress considers appropriations bills, when it considers authorization bills, is unfortunate.

“I think when you're going to make decisions like this you should follow either of two tracks. You should do it in the budget presentation so the normal process can work its course, or you should call for another BRAC, and, imperfect as that process is, I think it's gained some credibility. So the hard decisions that you have ahead of you I think will become more achievable if you follow some sort of regular order.”

Davis: “…a lot of issues have been raised about other commands…you might be thinking about closing.”
Susan Davis (D-CA)
“OK. I think a lot of issues have been raised about other commands or other installations that might be -- you might be thinking about closing. Is there anything else that you might share with us of other -- other commands at this point?”

The full text of Chairman Skelton's questions to Deputy Secretary of Defense William J. Lynn:

SKELTON:  So that leads me to my first question, Secretary Lynn, if I may: The Joint Forces Command is a subject of elimination. If that comes to pass, who within the department will have as its central mission the job to advocate and develop and disseminate joint operating concepts, doctrine and training? Would we be throwing away all of the efforts that began with Goldwater-Nichols, should that happen? I'm very concerned about where that will go, how much thought has gone into that, and will our military be better off as a result. But answer the first question, Secretary Lynn: Who assumes that duty?

[Lynn answers]

SKELTON:  Where does it go, again?

LYNN: The -- the -- as I said, the leadership, in terms of training and doctrine, much of it will come from the Joint Chiefs and the joint staff, but the place that we're in is fundamentally different than the one that we were in, in the '70s and '80s and into the '90s. We have a much stronger joint culture inside the military departments and the military services themselves, and the combatant commands inherently operate jointly and have a joint ethos as part of how they operate.

SKELTON:  All right. Our committee's asked for a range of information on how the department reached the decision to disestablish the Joint Forces Command. Thus far we have not received the information. Mr. Secretary, when will the information be forthcoming?

CARTER:  Mr. Chairman, we've provided, I think, briefings to the staff. We've provided an extensive...

SKELTON: No, no, I'm not talking about briefings. I'm talking about information. Sheets of paper.

CARTER: Pieces of paper, we've provided an -- I think an extensive legal opinion on the relevance of the BRAC legislation. We've provided the task force memos. And we'll continue to answer the committee's questions and provide the documentation and the material that the committee needs. As we move -- as the task force moves into the implementation phase, there will be much more material available for the committee.

SKELTON: Have you provided everything for which we have asked?

CARTER: I'm not sure the committee would agree with that. We have been trying to be as responsive to the committee's questions as possible, and we're going to continue to do so. If there are specific pieces of information that you think we need, I'm happy to follow up -- that you need I'm happy to follow up for the record.

SKELTON: For the record, I would like to receive the copy of the memorandum for the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of staff director, "cost assessment and program evaluation, subject: Joint Forces Command Disestablishment Working Group. I would like to have a copy of that piece of information, please.

SKELTON: As I understand it, you don't know how much you would save in efficiency by elimination of that command?

LYNN: We don't have the net number yet. We know it costs about a billion dollars to operate that command every year, and we know we'll be -- we -- going to eliminate portions of that headquarters and some of the other functions, and that will save some money, and we'll provide that analysis, that -- I think what Mr. McKeon called the business case analysis, as we proceed this fall.

SKELTON: As I see it, Mr. Secretary, somebody is going to have to ride shotgun on jointness. I think that's a given. The services could very well resort to stovepipe activities without that joint doctrine being enforced one way or the other. That really worries me.

CARTWRIGHT: Congressman, you know, as we looked at this activity, I tend to be much aligned and we have had many conversations over the years about jointness and the incentives that drive us to joint. ….We're working on that. We'll have several options that we're going to develop, and we will provide the committee with the results and with those choices and with the analysis that we perform. But at the end of the day, I am where you are: Somebody has to get up every morning believing they're in charge of this.

SKELTON: That's an excellent answer. However, there should have been an answer in place before announcing to disband this particular command, don't you think, General? You announce you're going to get rid of it and then we'll find a replacement. Come on.

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