The United States has a clear national security interest in eliminating the al-Qaeda threat in Afghanistan and Pakistan.  Continued terrorist activity is a threat to our vital interests.  Working closely with our international friends and allies, we must prevent the spread of global violent extremism.

On December 1, 2009, President Obama announced a new U.S. strategy for Afghanistan calling for the deployment of 30,000 additional troops to stabilize security conditions and expedite the training of Afghan security forces.  The President also stated his intention to begin the transition of responsibility from U.S forces to their Afghan counterparts, with a goal of beginning the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan in July 2011.  I have great regard for the careful process employed by this administration in an effort both to define a new approach for the long-standing military commitment in Afghanistan and to put an operational framework in place for our responsible withdrawal.

Since early 2009 I have repeatedly said that the U.S. strategy for Afghanistan must proceed based on the following realities: (1) the fragility of the Afghan government; (2) whether building a national army of a considerable scale is achievable; (3) whether an increased U.S. military presence will ultimately have a positive effect in the country, or whether we will be seen as an occupying force; and (4) the linkage of events in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

Additionally, I have consistently stated that countering international terrorism requires highly maneuverable forces able to strike an intrinsically mobile enemy.  The departure of al Qaeda from Iraq and, in large measure from Afghanistan as well, demonstrates why more maneuverable U.S. forces are to be favored against mobile international terrorist movements.
 
Currently, we have approximately 100,000 troops deployed, along with many tens of thousands of American contractors and civilians, to implement a counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan.  This greatly enlarged U.S. presence in a country that has a historical and very successful resistance to foreign influence is a concern.  We run the risk, well-rooted in Afghanistan’s history, that the United States will be perceived as an occupying force instead of a presence seeking to assist the Afghans in improving their stability and development.

One of the primary challenges facing General Petraeus, the commander of our forces in Afghanistan, is the lack of clarity regarding U.S. objectives.  For more than two years, I have emphasized the necessity that U.S. strategy reflect clear and attainable objectives with a defined and understandable end point.  From the very outset I have been concerned that success in Afghanistan is subject to uncontrollable unknowns, particularly when it comes to the issues in the political realm beyond the scope of military operations.  Furthermore, it is unclear to many Americans what precisely will be achieved in terms of our national interests as a result of this massive effort.

In December, the administration will submit its next report to Congress on the progress made in achieving security and stability in Afghanistan.   I will reserve further judgments on its success until the submission of the December 2010 report.  I do so with the expectation that this report will provide very clear indications of the endpoint of our military operations, how the administration will achieve that objective, and the prospects for a timely transition of operations to the Afghan government.