

Testimony of
John Snyder
President
Washakie Beet Growers Association

United States House of Representatives
Committee on Agriculture

Field Hearing on the 2012 Farm Bill
Cheyenne, Wyoming
May 4, 2010

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, for convening this hearing. On behalf of the beet growers in the mountain states, I want to express my deep appreciation for your leadership and bipartisanship in the successful passage of the 2008 Farm Bill, and we look forward to working with you on the 2012 Farm Bill. I especially want to express our gratitude to Congresswoman Lummis for her excellent work and strong voice on the Committee on behalf of Wyoming agriculture.

My name is John Snyder, and I am President of the Washakie Beet Growers. My family has farmed in Wyoming for the past 70 years. My wife and I have been farming for 20 years, and raise sugarbeets, malt barley, corn, alfalfa and alfalfa seed. My youngest son, Steven, recently graduated from college with a degree in agriculture economics, and has bought into our farm. I hope the family farming legacy will continue through his involvement.

For over a century, the beet sugar industry has played an important economic role in the mountain region of Wyoming, Colorado, Nebraska and Montana. Today, there are two companies operating six beet sugar factories in our region. In 2002, the growers I represent purchased our factory, The Wyoming Sugar Company, which is based in my home town of Worland. At the same time, 1,000 producers in Colorado, Montana, Nebraska and Wyoming purchased their company and formed the Western Sugar Cooperative. Western Sugar, based in Denver, owns and operates five factories in the four-state area.

Our two companies produce 13% of the U.S. sugarbeet production on 135,800 acres, and support 1,500 full-time factory and seasonal jobs.

Since the 2002 Farm Bill, the entire U.S. sugarbeet industry has become 100% grower-owned. The sugar provisions in that bill, and in the 2008 Farm Bill, have given producers confidence in the stability of a domestic sugar industry.

Food Security

Sugar is an essential ingredient in our nation's food supply. As an all-natural sweetener, bulking agent and preservative, it plays an important role in about 70% of processed food products and is called for in a multitude of favorite home recipes. Dependence on

unreliable and unstable foreign suppliers is a threat to our food security, which is why a strong, diversified and reliable domestic industry has long been recognized as important to the nation.

U.S. sugar producers are globally competitive, but for decades we have been threatened by unfair competition. Roughly 120 countries produce sugar and all their governments intervene in their sugar markets in some way. Many countries subsidize their producers and dump their surpluses on the world market for whatever price it will bring. This depressed, so-called “world price” has averaged below actual global costs of producing sugar for many years. American producers are competitive, but cannot be expected to compete against these foreign treasuries and unfair predatory trade practices.

Importance, Size, Efficiency

In addition to the critical role it plays in local economies, sugar is a significant job producer and revenue-generator nationally. The U.S. sugar producing industry, with sugarbeets and sugarcane grown or processed in 18 states, generates over 146,000 jobs and more than \$10 billion per year in economic activity. These jobs range from the cane fields of Hawaii and the beet fields of Wyoming to the cane sugar refineries in New Orleans, New York City, and other cities.

The United States is the world’s fifth-largest sugar producer. We are also the fifth-largest sugar consumer and the world’s second-largest net importer. And, we are good at what we do. Our sugar farmers are among the lowest cost producers in the world. We are doubly proud of this distinction because we have achieved it while being fair to our workers and responsible stewards of the land. Farmers in the developing world, who dominate the world sugar market, generally operate with little or no enforced requirements for worker safety and benefits, or for air, water, and soil protection. Our standards, and compliance costs, are among the highest in the world.

Restructuring

Despite our efficiency, we are an industry that has been under enormous stress. From 1985 until 2009, we did not receive any increase in our price support level. Over this long period of essentially flat nominal prices, the real price we received for our sugar dropped sharply because of inflation. (Figures 1-2)

Only the producers who could match the declining real price with efficiency gains and lower production costs were able to survive. More than half could not. From 1985 to 2009, 54 of America’s 102 cane mills, beet factories, and cane sugar refineries shut down, with terrible consequences for the local families and communities. Just since 1996, 35 mills, factories, and refineries have closed. (Figures 3-4)

Trade Challenges

The U.S. is one of the most open sugar markets and one of the world’s largest sugar importers. The U.S. provides access to its market to 41 countries, as it is required to do under trade laws. Virtually all are developing countries, and most are highly supportive

of U.S. sugar policy because it provides an import price at which many can recover their costs of production.

In addition to coping with the problems of rising costs, pests, disease, and natural disasters, American sugar farmers have had to deal with another threat: trade agreements that have ceded more and more of the American sugar market to foreign producers – even if the foreign producers are subsidized and inefficient. And more such concessions are being contemplated.

Trade agreements force the U.S. to provide duty-free access for 1.4 million short tons of sugar each year, whether the country needs the sugar or not. This amounts to about 15% of domestic sugar consumption.

In addition, under the NAFTA, Mexico now enjoys unlimited access to the U.S. sugar market. It is difficult to predict how much sugar Mexico might send north each year. Key variables include Mexican sugar production, government decisions (one-fourth of the sugar mills are owned and operated by the Mexican government), and the pace at which corn sweetener, mostly from the U.S., replaces sugar in the massive Mexican beverage industry. Mexican sugar exports to the U.S. have varied widely in the past, and could in the future – over 1.4 million short tons last year, but only about 0.5 million forecast for this year. (Figure 5)

Furthermore, the U.S. is negotiating a Doha Round of the WTO that would result in additional market access concessions. The TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership) trade negotiations, recently launched by the Obama Administration, could also eventually result in substantial market commitments for sugar to the many countries lining the Pacific Rim. Such trade concessions threaten to reduce U.S. sugar producers' access to our own market even further, and reduce prices as well, making it impossible for those of us who are struggling to survive. (Figure 6)

Previous Farm Bill

In the 2002 Farm Bill, USDA had only two tools to balance U.S. sugar supplies with consumer demand.

1. It could limit foreign supplies to minimum import levels required by the World Trade Organization (WTO) and other trade agreements.
2. It could limit domestic sugar sales through marketing allotments. Each year, USDA would forecast domestic sugar consumption, subtract required imports, and allow U.S. producers to supply the balance.
 - If U.S. production was insufficient to fill demand, USDA could increase imports by expanding the tariff-rate quota (TRQ).
 - If U.S. production exceeded the allotment quantity, American producers had to store the excess at their own expense, not the government's.

This market-balancing system worked reasonably well until 2008, although misjudgments in setting the TRQ in 2006 seriously depressed the U.S. sugar market. That's when Mexico gained unlimited access to our market under the NAFTA, and USDA effectively lost control of the market.

The 2008 Farm Bill

Congress, in its wisdom, designed a sugar policy that is working to the considerable benefit of consumers and at zero cost to taxpayers, and is giving the remaining American sugar farmers a chance to survive. And, it fully complies with the rules of the WTO.

While retaining the basic-market-balancing tools described above, Congress made a number of important improvements in 2008. The Farm Bill minimizes the erosion of American sugar farmers' share of their own market by limiting reductions in their marketing allotments to not less than 85% of consumption. It's worth noting that in many years, imports amount to much more than 15% of the U.S. market.

If imports exceed the difference between domestic market allotments and consumption, USDA will divert surplus sugar into fuel ethanol production and restore balance to the sugar market for food. The added ethanol production would be consistent with national goals to reduce American dependence on foreign oil and improve air quality.

In addition to the use of ethanol as a market balancing mechanism, two other Farm Bill measures are helping to stabilize the market and improve producer prospects:

1. The first increase in the sugar support price since 1985. The raw cane sugar loan rate rose by $\frac{1}{4}$ of a cent per pound this year, and will rise the same amount in fiscal years 2011 and 2012. Refined beet sugar rates will rise by a commensurate amount. In fiscal year 2012, the raw cane loan rate will be 18.75 cents per pound and the refined beet sugar rate will be 24.09 cents.
2. USDA may not announce a TRQ above the minimum required by trade agreements until halfway through the crop year (April 1), unless there is a supply emergency. By April, much more is known about actual U.S. sugar production and consumption and the volume of imports from Mexico. This will prevent a recurrence of situations such as that in the summer of 2006, when USDA announced an excessive TRQ for the coming year, the market was badly oversupplied, and producer prices languished for almost two years.

Consumer Benefits

American food manufacturers and consumers continue to benefit from reliable supplies of sugar that has been produced responsibly and is reasonably priced, high in quality, and safe to consume. In real terms, corrected for inflation, U.S. wholesale and retail prices have declined substantially over the past three decades. Food manufacturers and consumers in the rest of the developed world pay about 10% more for sugar than Americans do. Taking per capita income levels into account, sugar is more affordable in America than in virtually every other country in the world – rich or poor. (Figures 7-12)

Taxpayer Benefits

Sugar is the only major commodity program that operates at no cost to taxpayers, and government projections through 2020 say it will remain no cost over all these years. Projections prior to the enactment of the 2008 Farm Bill suggested significant costs because of excessive imports from Mexico, low prices, and government loan forfeitures.

But thanks to steady consumption growth, stable domestic production, manageable import levels from Mexico, and sound program management by USDA, costly surpluses have not occurred. (Figures 13-14)

The 2012 Farm Bill

The U.S. sugar industry has endured a wrenching restructuring over the past two decades. American sugar farmers remain grateful to the Congress for crafting a sugar policy that is balancing supply and demand, ensures consumers of dependable, high-quality supplies, and is improving market prospects for sugar producers. The policy achieves all these goals at zero cost to American taxpayers.

With some prospect of continued market stability, producers should be able to re-invest in their operations, further reduce their costs of production, and survive. We strongly urge the continuation of this successful, no-cost policy in the next Farm Bill.

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for holding this important hearing and for all that you and the Committee do for American agriculture. We look forward to working with you in the future.

Figure 1




Figure 2




Figure 3

Since Last Sugar Loan Rate Increase in 1985: More Than Half of U.S. Sugar-Producing Operations Have Shut Down




Figure 4

35 Sugar Mill and Refinery Closures, 1996 - 2009

BEET CLOSURES

- Spreckels Sugar, Manteca
California, 1996
- Holly Sugar, Hamilton City
California, 1996
- Western Sugar, Mitchell
Nebraska, 1996
- Great Lakes Sugar, Fremont
Ohio, 1996
- Holly Sugar, Hereford
Texas, 1998
- Holly Sugar, Tracy
California, 2000
- Holly Sugar, Woodland
California, 2000
- Western Sugar, Bayard
Nebraska, 2002
- Pacific Northwest, Moses Lake
Washington, 2003
- Western Sugar, Greeley
Colorado, 2003
- Amalgamated Sugar, Nyssa
Oregon, 2005
- Michigan Sugar, Carrollton
Michigan, 2005
- Spreckels Sugar, Mendota
California, 2008

CANE CLOSURES

- Ka'u Agribusiness
Hawaii, 1996
- Waialua Sugar
Hawaii, 1996
- McBryde Sugar
Hawaii, 1996
- Breaux Bridge Sugar
Louisiana, 1998
- Pioneer Mill Company
Hawaii, 1999
- Talisman Sugar Company
Florida, 1999
- Amfac Sugar, Kekaha
Hawaii, 2000
- Amfac Sugar, Lihue
Hawaii, 2000
- Hawaiian Commercial & Sugar, Paia
Hawaii, 2000
- Evan Hall Sugar Cooperative
Louisiana, 2001
- Caldwell Sugar Cooperative
Louisiana, 2001
- Glenwood Sugar Cooperative
Louisiana, 2003
- New Iberia Sugar Cooperative
Louisiana, 2005
- Jeanerette Sugar Company
Louisiana, 2005
- Cinclare Central Facility
Louisiana, 2005
- Atlantic Sugar, Belle Glade
Florida, 2005
- U.S. Sugar, Bryant
Florida, 2007
- South Louisiana Sugar Cooperative
Louisiana, 2007
- Gay & Robinson, Kaunakani
Hawaii, 2009

CANE REFINERY CLOSURES

- Aiea, C & H
Hawaii, 1996
- Everglades, Imperial
Florida, 1999
- Sugarland, Imperial
Texas, 2003
- Brooklyn, Domino
New York, 2004

Note: In 2010, 22 beet factories, 18 raw cane mills, and 8 cane refineries remain in continuous operation, a 41% drop since 1996. U.S. Sugar, FL, has announced plans to close after 2015.

ASA 2010

Figure 5




Figure 6

| U.S. Sugar Import Concessions: In Place, Proposed, or Being Negotiated | | | | |
|---|---|-----------|-----------|--|
| | Minimum Import Amount | | | Comment |
| | WTO | FTAs | Total | |
| -Metric tons, raw value- | | | | |
| In Place | | | | |
| WTO (40 countries) | 1,139,175 | -- | 1,139,175 | Uruguay Round commitment |
| NAFTA - Mexico ¹ | 10,212 | Unlimited | Unlimited | Unlimited access began January 1, 2008 |
| CAFTA/DR ² | 311,700 | 119,060 | 430,760 | Grows, on average, by 3,153 mt/yr years 2-15; by 2,640 mt/yr thereafter |
| Peru ³ | 43,175 | 11,000 | 54,175 | Grows by 180 mt/yr forever |
| Negotiated, not yet approved | | | | |
| Colombia | 25,273 | 50,000 | 75,273 | Grows by 750 mt/yr forever |
| Panama | 30,538 | 7,000 | 37,538 | Grows by 60mt/yr for 10 years |
| Being negotiated | | | | |
| WTO: | If and when completed by Congress, the Doha Round of WTO trade negotiations would result in a substantially increased tariff-rate quota (TRQ) for sugar and a reduced tariff. | | | |
| TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership): | These negotiations could result in substantial, additional concessions to sugar-producing countries throughout the Asia-Pacific region (including Western Hemisphere countries) through renegotiation of existing FTA's or negotiation of new FTA arrangements. | | | |
| ¹ Canada excluded from the sugar provisions of the NAFTA. | | | | |
| ² CAFTA/DR access for CY 2009; includes 2,000 tons of specialty sugars for Costa Rica. CAFTA countries' WTO access included in WTO total. | | | | |
| ³ Peru FTA includes 2,000 tons of specialty sugars not subject to net exporter status. | | | | |
| Note: CAFTA/DR and Peru FTA net-exporter provisions (exports to world market minus imports from world market) could limit the access of the Dominican Republic some years and Peru in most years. | | | | |

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Figure 7




Figure 8





Figure 9

Actual Wholesale Refined Sugar Prices Worldwide

--Cents per pound, refined--




Source: LMC International Ltd. Oxford, England, June 2009; last-quarter 2008 prices.
 Developed-Country Average represents the weighted average of 29 foreign developed countries.

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Figure 10

Developed Countries' Average Retail Sugar Prices: 11% Higher Than USA

-- Cents per pound, refined --




Source: LMC International Ltd. Oxford, England, June 2009; last-quarter 2008 prices.
 Developed-Country Average represents the weighted average of 29 foreign developed countries.

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Figure 11


Minutes of Work Required to Buy One Pound of Sugar: USA Among Lowest in World



Source: LMC International Ltd., 2009. Calculations assume that the average person is paid for 2,080 hours of work per year and earns that country's average gross national income. Developed country average represents the weighted average of 29 foreign developed countries.

Figure 12

Expenditures on Sugar as a % of GNP: USA Lowest in World




Source: LMC International Ltd., 2009. Developed country average represents a the weighted average of 29 foreign developed countries.

Figure 13

Government Net Outlays for Sugar and All Other Commodity Programs, 1996-2010

- Million dollars -

1991-2010 Totals
All Other Program Total Net Outlays:
 \$277,212 million
Sugar Total Net Revenues:
 \$22 million



Data source: USDA/FSA, May 2009; All commodities net outlays 1991-95: \$52.4 billion. Sugar: 1991-99 -- revenues from sugar marketing assessment tax (1991-95 revenues: \$101 million); 2000-01 -- value of sugar forfeited to, or purchased by, government, plus storage costs; 2002-05 -- revenues from sale of CCC sugar onto market at a profit.


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Figure 14

Government Net Outlays for Sugar and All Other Commodity Programs, 2009-2020

- Million dollars -

2009-2020 Total Net Outlays:
All Other Programs : \$118 billion
Sugar: Zero



Source: USDA/FSA, Budget Division, Commodities Estimates Book for FY 2010 President's Budget, Output 9, CCC Net Budgetary Expenditures and Other Financial Data, Major Commodity Program Summary, February 2010.

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Committee on Agriculture
U.S. House of Representatives
Information Required From Non-governmental Witnesses

House rules require non-governmental witnesses to provide their resume or biographical sketch prior to testifying. If you do not have a resume or biographical sketch available, please complete this form.

1. Name: John W. Snyder Jr.
2. BusinessAddress: 1292 South Road 11
Worland, WY 82401
3. Business Phone Number: 307-431-5950
4. Organization you represent: Washakie Beet Growers Assoc..
5. Please list any occupational, employment, or work-related experience you have which add to your qualification to provide testimony before the Committee:
sugar beet grower; president of the Washakie Beet Growers Association;
president of Sage Creek Land & Cattle Co.(a sugar beet growing entity)
Board member of the American Sugarbeet Growers Association(ASGA)
6. Please list any special training, education, or professional experience you have which add to your qualifications to provide testimony before the Committee:
BS degree in Agriculture Economics from the University of Wyoming
over 20 years experience in personally growing sugar beets as a crop
member of the Wyoming LEAD class 3, board member of other local organizations
7. If you are appearing on behalf of an organization, please list the capacity in which you are representing that organization, including any offices or elected positions you hold:
board member of ASGA and chairman of the Public Relations Committee

PLEASE ATTACH THIS FORM OR YOUR BIOGRAPHY TO EACH COPY OF TESTIMONY.

Committee on Agriculture
U.S. House of Representatives
Required Witness Disclosure Form

House Rules* require nongovernmental witnesses to disclose the amount and source of Federal grants received since October 1, 2007.

Name: John W. Snyder Jr.
Address: 1292 South Road 11
Telephone: 307-431-5950

Organization you represent (if any): American Sugarbeet Growers Association
and Washakie Beet Growers Association

- 1. Please list any federal grants or contracts (including subgrants and subcontracts) you have received since October 1, 2007, as well as the source and the amount of each grant or contract. House Rules do NOT require disclosure of federal payments to individuals, such as Social Security or Medicare benefits, farm program payments, or assistance to agricultural producers:

Source: _____ Amount: _____
Source: _____ Amount: _____

- 2. If you are appearing on behalf of an organization, please list any federal grants or contracts (including subgrants and subcontracts) the organization has received since October 1, 2007, as well as the source and the amount of each grant or contract:

Source: _____ Amount: _____
Source: _____ Amount: _____

Please check here if this form is NOT applicable to you: _____ X

Signature: 

* Rule XI, clause 2(g)(4) of the U.S. House of Representatives provides: Each committee shall, to the greatest extent practicable, require witnesses who appear before it to submit in advance written statements of proposed testimony and to limit their initial presentations to the committee to brief summaries thereof. In the case of a witness appearing in a nongovernmental capacity, a written statement of proposed testimony shall include a curriculum vitae and a disclosure of the amount and source (by agency and program) of each Federal grant (or subgrant thereof) or contract (or subcontract thereof) received during the current fiscal year or either of the two previous fiscal years by the witness or by any entity represented by the witness.

PLEASE ATTACH DISCLOSURE FORM TO EACH COPY OF TESTIMONY.