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10 **Remarks to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence**

11 December 6, 2007

12 Samuel Sanders Visner,

13 Deputy Chairman,

14 Intelligence Committee,

15 Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association

1 On behalf of Intelligence Committee of the Armed Forces
2 Communications and Electronics Association (AFCEA) and as a
3 member of the industrial base supporting the Intelligence
4 community, I appreciate the opportunity to join in this discussion
5 with the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. I am
6 the Deputy Chairman of the AFCEA Intelligence Committee.

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8 AFCEA, founded in 1946, is a non-profit membership association
9 serving the military, government, industry, and academia as an
10 ethical forum for advancing professional knowledge and
11 relationships in the fields of communications, IT, intelligence, and
12 global security. The AFCEA Intelligence Committee was founded
13 in 1981 to enhance AFCEA's outreach to the U.S. Intelligence
14 Community and to support intelligence professionals in the
15 government, military and private sectors. The Intelligence
16 Committee serves as a forum to strengthen the public/private
17 partnership and to advocate for foreign and domestic intelligence
18 in support of improved national security. Committee members
19 bring experience gained in government, industry, academia, and
20 the Federal research and development community.

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1 Like many people, I was impatient after 9/11 with what appeared
2 to be the slow pace with which we were rebuilding our nation's
3 Intelligence Community and national intelligence capability. A
4 sudden shock seemed to require a vigorous response.

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6 Looking back, we might, in fact have done far worse than we've
7 done. The reform of the Intelligence Community, including
8 organization change, new resources and capabilities, changes in the
9 operational concepts, have a lot of moving parts. The reform of
10 our national security community following the 1947 National
11 Security Act; the changes brought about by the passage of
12 Goldwater-Nichols in 1986 – these changes took many years to
13 bring about. Our impatience with intelligence reform should be
14 tempered by these realities. In the years following 9/11, I think we
15 have deployed new capabilities; we've recruited many young
16 people to Government and industry components of the Intelligence
17 Community, and we've started to focus on the operational concepts
18 that will make a long-term difference.

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20 The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of
21 2004 provides the overarching context for efforts to restructure the
22 Community and strengthen Community management.

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1 The Act calls for “information sharing,” and “information
2 technology systems that include ... intelligence integration
3 capabilities.” The term “interoperability” appears throughout the
4 Act.

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6 Given these needs, the AFCEA Intelligence Committee’s white
7 papers have recommended consistently that an integrated
8 Intelligence Community requires integrated capabilities based on
9 interlocking requirements across the Community, and buttressed
10 by Community-wide architecture, system engineering, and
11 acquisition processes and activities. These are hard things to do –
12 and they’re not glamorous. Building a set of Community-wide
13 operational requirements and using them to drive architecture,
14 engineering, acquisition, and – eventually – capabilities – is
15 technical, demanding, and it takes time. Perhaps it’s taken more
16 time than we want – or than it should. But, I think some important
17 steps have been taken.

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19 The DNI’s 500-Day Plan is among the most important of those
20 steps. Among its goals are several that link integrated Community
21 requirements with integrated Acquisition.

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1 They are – and in order:

- 2 1. Create a Culture of Collaboration
- 3 2. Accelerate Information Sharing
- 4 3. Foster Collection and Analytic Transformation
- 5 4. Build Acquisition Excellence and Technology Leadership

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7 How well will the DNI succeed in meeting these goals? First,
8 there's already evidence of progress. The use of community-wide
9 collaborative tools gives impetus to the development and
10 application of common information standards. It calls inevitably
11 for more enterprise-level applications that can link analysts across
12 the Community, and new ways of working that exploit the power
13 of these tools and applications. Over time, there is a real chance
14 that that integration, interoperability, and collaboration at the
15 analyst level will encourage integration for processing and mission
16 management.

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18 In the longer term, I think much depends on the quality of the
19 cadre of architects, engineers, and acquisition professionals the
20 DNI already have and can put in place. It depends on the will with
21 which the Community rebuilds and empowers its acquisition and
22 program management cadre, Community-wide – something that
23 should not be deferred and that should be resourced strongly.

1 It depends as well on a vigorous industrial base, one that is seen as
2 organize to the Community, one that provides needed services, and
3 more important, real capabilities. Our nation succeeds when it
4 mobilizes industry, brings it into the fight, and leverages our
5 nation's industrial and organizational advantages. I believe the
6 DNI's Deputy for Acquisition will operate from this perspective,
7 just as I believe he understands the importance of building a strong
8 program and acquisition cadre. I'd urge Congress to facilitate his
9 doing so.

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11 Let me close those comments by thanking the Committee again for
12 this opportunity to participate. I look forward to this session and
13 our discussion.

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