Testimony of Dale Murden Chairman Rio Grande Valley Sugar Growers, Inc.

United States House of Representatives Committee on Agriculture

Field Hearing on the 2012 Farm Bill Lubbock, Texas May 17, 2010

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, for convening this hearing. On behalf of the 126 sugarcane farmers of Rio Grande Valley Sugar Growers (RGVGS), Inc., I want to express my deep appreciation for your leadership and bipartisanship in the successful passage of the 2008 Farm Bill. We look forward to working with you on the 2012 Farm Bill as well.

My name is Dale Murden, and I currently grow sugarcane, citrus, grains, vegetables and soybeans near my hometown of Monte Alto, Texas. In addition to being Chairman of the Board for the Rio Grande Valley Sugar Mill, I am also a member of the Hidalgo County Farm Bureau, Delta Lake Irrigation District, Texas Citrus Producers Board and the Hidalgo County AgriLife Program Committee. I was recently chairman of the National Sorghum Producers and a trade advisory team member to the U.S. Grains Council.

Rio Grande Valley Sugar Growers, Inc. is a member-owned cooperative comprised of growers in a three-county area. Together, our members produce more than 1.5 million tons of sugarcane each year, yielding nearly 160,000 tons of raw sugar and 60,000 tons of molasses. RGVSG is one of the top 10 producers of raw sugar in the United States.

Rio Grande employs up to 500 workers in a normal producing year, which culminates with a harvesting period from October to April. Annual payroll of our cooperative exceeds \$12 million, with an annual operating budget of more than \$32 million.

In Texas, where more than 8,000 jobs rely on a strong U.S. sweetener industry, RGVSG alone accounts for up to 11 percent of the total gross revenues produced by Valley agriculture every year. Member growers utilize over 40,000 acres of rich South Texas farmland in the cultivation of sugarcane crops.

The sugar provisions in the 2008 Farm Bill have given our producers confidence in the stability of a domestic sugar industry. Today, I will commend the sugar program's effectiveness but I also want to point out areas where we have some problems.

In January, a bad freeze in south Texas proved that the federal crop insurance program and the new permanent disaster program don't adequately cover our style of farming in the Valley. Affordable crop insurance at higher levels of coverage isn't available for cane and many of the fruits and vegetables grown in south Texas. Also, the SURE program won't cover losses to one crop if overall on farm revenues from the other crops grown on that farm are unaffected by a natural disaster.

Finally, the Biomass Crop Assistance Program (BCAP), created in the 2008 Farm Bill and whose intention was to help biomass producers offset specific costs, did not make payments on our cane applications yet approved \$170 million in funds to other biomass producers.

However, I do want to focus on one program that is working and explain why because our future ultimately depends on good farm and trade policy.

Food Security

Sugar is an essential ingredient in our nation's food supply. As an all-natural sweetener, bulking agent and preservative, it plays an important role in about 70% of processed food products and is called for in a multitude of favorite home recipes. Dependence on unreliable and unstable foreign suppliers is a threat to our food security, which is why a strong, diversified and reliable domestic industry has long been recognized as important to the nation.

U.S. sugar producers are globally competitive, but for decades we have been threatened by unfair competition. Roughly 120 countries produce sugar and all their governments intervene in their sugar markets in some way. Many countries subsidize their producers and dump their surpluses on the world market for whatever price it will bring. This depressed, so-called "world price" has averaged below actual global costs of producing sugar for many years. American producers are competitive, but cannot be expected to compete against these foreign treasuries and unfair predatory trade practices.

Importance, Size, Efficiency

In addition to the critical role it plays in local economies, sugar is a significant job producer and revenue-generator nationally. The U.S. sugar producing industry, with sugarbeets and sugarcane grown or processed in 18 states, generates over 146,000 jobs and more than \$10 billion per year in economic activity. These jobs range from the cane fields of Hawaii and the beet fields of Wyoming to the cane sugar refineries in New Orleans, New York City, and other cities.

The United States is the world's fifth-largest sugar producer. We are also the fifth-largest sugar consumer and the world's second-largest net importer. And, we are good at what we do. Our sugar farmers are among the lowest cost producers in the world. We are doubly proud of this distinction because we have achieved it while being fair to our workers and responsible stewards of the land. Farmers in the developing world, who dominate the world sugar market, generally operate with little or no enforced requirements for worker safety and benefits, or for air, water, and soil protection. Our standards, and compliance costs, are among the highest in the world.

Restructuring

Despite our efficiency, we are an industry that has been under enormous stress. From 1985 until 2009, we did not receive any increase in our price support level. Over this long period of essentially flat nominal prices, the real price we received for our sugar dropped sharply because of inflation. (Figures 1-2)

Only the producers who could match the declining real price with efficiency gains and lower production costs were able to survive. More than half could not. From 1985 to 2009, 54 of America's 102 cane mills, beet factories, and cane sugar refineries shut down, with terrible consequences for the local families and communities. Just since 1996, 35 mills, factories, and refineries have closed. (Figures 3-4)

Trade Challenges

The U.S. is one of the most open sugar markets and one of the world's largest sugar importers. The U.S. provides access to its market to 41 countries, as it is required to do under trade laws. Virtually all are developing countries, and most are highly supportive of U.S. sugar policy because it provides an import price at which many can recover their costs of production.

In addition to coping with the problems of rising costs, pests, disease, and natural disasters, American sugar farmers have had to deal with another threat: trade agreements that have ceded more and more of the American

sugar market to foreign producers – even if the foreign producers are subsidized and inefficient. And more such concessions are being contemplated.

Trade agreements force the U.S. to provide duty-free access for 1.4 million short tons of sugar each year, whether the country needs the sugar or not. This amounts to about 15% of domestic sugar consumption.

In addition, under the NAFTA, Mexico now enjoys unlimited access to the U.S. sugar market. It is difficult to predict how much sugar Mexico might send north each year. Key variables include Mexican sugar production, government decisions (one-fourth of the sugar mills are owned and operated by the Mexican government), and the pace at which corn sweetener, mostly from the U.S., replaces sugar in the massive Mexican beverage industry. Mexican sugar exports to the U.S. have varied widely in the past, and could in the future – over 1.4 million short tons last year, but only about 0.5 million forecast for this year. (Figure 5)

Furthermore, the U.S. is negotiating a Doha Round of the WTO that would result in additional market access concessions. The TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership) trade negotiations, recently launched by the Obama Administration, could also eventually result in substantial market commitments for sugar to the many countries lining the Pacific Rim. Such trade concessions threaten to reduce U.S. sugar producers' access to our own market even further, and reduce prices as well, making it impossible for those of us who are struggling to survive. (Figure 6)

Previous Farm Bill

In the 2002 Farm Bill, USDA had only two tools to balance U.S. sugar supplies with consumer demand.

- 1. It could limit foreign supplies to minimum import levels required by the World Trade Organization (WTO) and other trade agreements.
- 2. It could limit domestic sugar sales through marketing allotments. Each year, USDA would forecast domestic sugar consumption, subtract required imports, and allow U.S. producers to supply the balance.
 - If U.S. production was insufficient to fill demand, USDA could increase imports by expanding the tariff-rate quota (TRQ).
 - If U.S. production exceeded the allotment quantity, American producers had to store the excess at their own expense, not the government's.

This market-balancing system worked reasonably well until 2008, although misjudgments in setting the TRQ in 2006 seriously depressed the U.S. sugar market. That's when Mexico gained unlimited access to our market under the NAFTA, and USDA effectively lost control of the market.

The 2008 Farm Bill

Congress, in its wisdom, designed a sugar policy that is working to the considerable benefit of consumers and at zero cost to taxpayers, and is giving the remaining American sugar farmers a chance to survive. And, it fully complies with the rules of the WTO.

While retaining the basic-market-balancing tools described above, Congress made a number of important improvements in 2008. The Farm Bill minimizes the erosion of American sugar farmers' share of their own market by limiting reductions in their marketing allotments to not less than 85% of consumption. It's worth noting that in many years, imports amount to much more than 15% of the U.S. market.

If imports exceed the difference between domestic market allotments and consumption, USDA will divert surplus sugar into fuel ethanol production and restore balance to the sugar market for food. The added ethanol production would be consistent with national goals to reduce American dependence on foreign oil and improve air quality.

In addition to the use of ethanol as a market balancing mechanism, two other Farm Bill measures are helping to stabilize the market and improve producer prospects:

- 1. The first increase in the sugar support price since 1985. The raw cane sugar loan rate rose by ¼ of a cent per pound this year, and will rise the same amount in fiscal years 2011 and 2012. Refined beet sugar rates will rise by a commensurate amount. In fiscal year 2012, the raw cane loan rate will be 18.75 cents per pound and the refined beet sugar rate will be 24.09 cents.
- 2. USDA may not announce a TRQ above the minimum required by trade agreements until halfway through the crop year (April 1), unless there is a supply emergency. By April, much more is known about actual U.S. sugar production and consumption and the volume of imports from Mexico. This will prevent a recurrence of situations such as that in the summer of 2006, when USDA announced an excessive TRQ for the coming year, the market was badly oversupplied, and producer prices languished for almost two years.

Consumer Benefits

American food manufacturers and consumers continue to benefit from reliable supplies of sugar that has been produced responsibly and is reasonably priced, high in quality, and safe to consume. In real terms, corrected for inflation, U.S. wholesale and retail prices have declined substantially over the past three decades. Food manufactures and consumers in the rest of the developed world pay about 10% more for sugar than Americans do. Taking per capita income levels into account, sugar is more affordable in America than in virtually every other country in the world – rich or poor. (Figures 7-12)

Taxpayer Benefits

Sugar is the only major commodity program that operates at no cost to taxpayers, and government projections through 2020 say it will remain no cost over all these years. Projections prior to the enactment of the 2008 Farm Bill suggested significant costs because of excessive imports from Mexico, low prices, and government loan forfeitures. But thanks to steady consumption growth, stable domestic production, manageable import levels from Mexico, and sound program management by USDA, costly surpluses have not occurred. (Figures 13-14)

The 2012 Farm Bill

The U.S. sugar industry has endured a wrenching restructuring over the past two decades. American sugar farmers remain are grateful to the Congress for crafting a sugar policy that is balancing supply and demand, ensures consumers of dependable, high-quality supplies, and is improving market prospects for sugar producers. The policy achieves all these goals at zero cost to American taxpayers.

With some prospect of continued market stability, producers should be able to re-invest in their operations, further reduce their costs of production, and survive. We strongly urge the continuation of this successful, no-cost policy in the next Farm Bill.

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, for holding this important hearing and for all that the Committee does for American agriculture. I look forward to working with you in the future.

Figure 1




Figure 2




Figure 3




Figure 4

35 Sugar	Mill and Refinery Closu	res, 1996 - 2009
BEET CLOSURES	CANE CLOSURES	
Spreckels Sugar, Manteca California, 1996	Ka'u Agribusiness Hawaii, 1996	Evan Hall Sugar Cooperative Louisiana, 2001
Holly Sugar, Hamilton City California, 1996	W aialua Sugar Haw aii, 1996	Caldwell Sugar Cooperative Louisiana, 2001
W estern Sugar, Mitchell	McBryde Sugar	Glenwood Sugar Cooperative
Nebraska, 1996	Hawaii, 1996	Lousiana, 2003
Great Lakes Sugar, Fremont	Breaux Bridge Sugar	New Iberia Sugar Cooperative
Ohio, 1996	Louisiana, 1998	Louisiana, 2005
Holly Sugar, Hereford	Pioneer Mill Company	Jeanerette Sugar Company
Texas, 1998	Haw aii, 1999	Louisiana, 2005
Holly Sugar, Tracy	Talisman Sugar Company	Cinclare Central Facility
California, 2000	Florida, 1999	Louisiana, 2005
Holly Sugar, Woodland	Amfac Sugar, Kekaha	Atlantic Sugar, Belle Glade
California, 2000	Hawaii, 2000	Florida, 2005
W estern Sugar, Bayard	Am fac Sugar, Lihue	U.S. Sugar, Bryant
Nebraska, 2002	Haw aii, 2000	Florida, 2007
Pacific Northwest, Moses Lake Washington, 2003	Hawaiian Commercial & Sugar, Paia Hawaii, 2000	South Louisiana Sugar Cooperative Louisiana, 2007
W estern Sugar, Greeley Colorado, 2003		Gay & Robinson, Kaumakani Hawaii, 2009
Am algamated Sugar, Nyssa Oregon, 2005	CANE REFINERY CLOSURES	
Michigan Sugar, Carrollton	Aiea, C & H	Sugarland, Imperial
Michigan, 2005	Haw aii, 1996	Texas, 2003
Spreckels Sugar, Mendota	Everglades, Im perial	Brooklyn, Dom ino
California, 2008	Florida, 1999	New York, 2004
Note: In 2010, 22 beet factories, 18 ra U.S. Sugar, FL, has announced plans	uw cane mills, and 8 cane refineries remain in to close after 2015.	continuous operation, a 41% drop since 1996. ASA 2010 54k

Figure 5





Figure 6

		U.S. Su	gar Import C	oncessions:	
]	In Place, Pr	oposed, or B	eing Negotiated	
	Minim	um Import A	mount	Comment	
	WTO	FTAs	Total		
	-Metric tons, raw value-				
In Place					
WTO (40 countries)	1,139,175		1,139,175	Uruguay Round commitment	
NAFTA - Mexico ¹	10,212	Unlimited	Unlimited	Unlimited access began January 1, 2008	
CAFTA/DR ²	311,700	119,060	430,760	Grows, on average, by 3,153 mt/yr years 2-15;	
				by 2,640 mt/yr thereafter	
Peru ³	43,175	11,000	54,175	Grows by 180 mt/yr forever	
Negotiated, not yet approved					
Colombia	25,273	50,000	75,273	Grows by 750 mt/yr forever	
Panama	30,538	7,000	37,538	Grows by 60mt/yr for 10 years	
Being negotiated					
WTO:	If and when co	ompleted by (Congress, the D	Ooha Round of WTO trade negotiations would result in a	
	substantially in	ncreased TRC	for sugar and	a reduced tariff.	
TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership):				ial, additional concessions to sugar-producing countries throughout	
	the Asia-Pacific region (including Western Hemisphere countries) through renegotiation of existing FTA's onegotiation of new FTA arrangements.				
¹ Canada excluded from the sugar provision	ns of the NAFTA.				
² CAFTA/DR access for CY 2009; include	s 2,000 tons of spec	ialty sugars for C	osta Rica. CAFTA	countries' WTO access included in WTO total.	
³ Peru FTA includes 2,000 tons of specialty	sugars not subject t	o net exporter sta	tus.		
Note: CAFTA/DR and Peru FTA net-export Peru in most years.	orter provisions (expo	orts to world mark	cet minus imports fr	om world market) could limit the access of the Dominican Republic some years and	
				73	

Figure 7









Figure 9







Figure 11






Figure 13





Figure 14



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Committee on Agriculture U.S. House of Representatives Required Witness Disclosure Form

House Rules* require nongovernmental witnesses to disclose the amount and source of Federal grants received since October 1, 2007.

Address:	25551 Rio Forms Road Monte Alto TX 78538
Telephone:	
Organizatio	n you represent (if any): <u>Rio Farms</u> and
Ric	Grande Valley Sugar Growers, Inc.
1. Plea you each to in	se list any federal grants or contracts (including subgrants and subcontract have received since October 1, 2007, as well as the source and the amount o grant or contract. House Rules do <u>NOT</u> require disclosure of federal payn dividuals, such as Social Security or Medicare benefits, farm program tents, or assistance to agricultural producers:
Source:	Amount:
Source:	Amount:
contr Octo	a are appearing on behalf of an organization, please list any federal grants acts (including subgrants and subcontracts) the organization has received the figure of the subgrant of each grant or contract: 10,046,495

* Rule XI, clause 2(g)(4) of the U.S. House of Representatives provides: Each committee shall, to the greatest extent practicable, require witnesses who appear before it to submit in advance written statements of proposed testimony and to limit their initial presentations to the committee to brief summaries thereof. In the case of a witness appearing in a nongovernmental capacity, a written statement of proposed testimony shall include a curriculum vitae and a disclosure of the amount and source (by agency and program) of each Federal grant (or subgrant thereof) or contract (or subcontract thereof) received during the current fiscal year or either of the two previous fiscal years by the witness or by any entity represented by the witness.

PLEASE ATTACH DISCLOSURE FORM TO EACH COPY OF TESTIMONY.

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Committee on Agriculture U.S. House of Representatives Information Required From Non-governmental Witnesses

House rules require non-governmental witnesses to provide their resume or biographical sketch prior to testifying. If you do not have a resume or biographical sketch available, please complete this form.

1.	Name: Dale Murden
2,	BusinessAddress: Rio Farms
	25551 Rio Farms Road
	Monte Alto TX 78538
i.	Business Phone Number: 956 -262- 1387
	Organization you represent: Rio Grande Valley Sugar Growers, I
	Please list any occupational, employment, or work-related experience you have which add to your qualification to provide testimony before the Committee:
	GROWER OF 2000 ACRES OF SUGARCANE
	ALJO Grows COTTON CORN, JOLEHOM, CITTLUS
	AND VEGETABLE
	Please list any special training, education, or professional experience you have which add to your qualifications to provide testimony before the Committee: TEXAL GRAZUS SOLGHUM ALSO COURTED - VICE STAXM TEXAL FARM BUNGAUS - BOD NATIONAL SOLGHUM PRODUCIN - PAT GRAZU
	If you are appearing on behalf of an organization, please list the capacity in which you are representing that organization, including any offices or elected positions you hold: Member/Groner of Rio Grande Valley Sugard Chairman of the Board

PLEASE ATTACH THIS FORM OR YOUR BIOGRAPHY TO EACH COPY OF TESTIMONY.