Skip to Content

Permanent Interests

The Expansion, Organization, and Rising Influence of African Americans in Congress, 1971–2007

Crafting An Identity on Capitol Hill

In 1976, <a href="/member-profiles/profile.html?intID=67">Barbara Jordan</a> of Texas, a captivating public speaker, became the first woman and the first African American to deliver a keynote address at a Democratic National Convention.In 1976, Barbara Jordan of Texas, a captivating public speaker, became the first woman and the first African American to deliver a keynote address at a Democratic National Convention.Image courtesy of Library of Congress

As African-American Members entered Congress during this era, they encountered an institution that, like American society generally, was becoming more accessible and offered more opportunities for minority participation. Though there were exceptions, the culture of overt racism of earlier decades—discrimination in the House Restaurant and barbershop, insulting floor tirades by pro-segregationist Members, and many other, unspoken slights—had largely vanished. Black Members now embarked on the mature phase of their institutional advancement by accruing service, winning better committee assignments, and gaining the attention and trust of House and Senate leadership. However, their ascent in Congress was accompanied by new challenges and questions about their identity and legislative strategies on Capitol Hill.

Like their predecessors in the previous century, African-American Members of Congress who served after 1970 generally perceived themselves as surrogate representatives for the larger black community. In the CBC’s 1971 meeting with President Nixon, Representative Diggs said, “Our concerns and obligations as members of Congress do not stop at the boundaries of our districts, our concerns are national and international in scope. We are petitioned daily by citizens living hundreds of miles from our districts who look on us as Congressmen-at-large for black people and poor people in the United States.”133 Cardiss Collins, one of the few women members of the caucus in its early years, agreed: “Our main goal is to have greater influence. It’s that simple. When we represent black people in our districts, we are representing all black people because their needs are very similar.”134

In this 1971 photograph, freshman House Members and outspoken peace advocates <a href="/member-profiles/profile.html?intID=38">Ronald Dellums</a> of California (center) and Bella Abzug of New York (in hat, at Dellums&rsquo;s left), speak to reporters about their proposal to conduct an unofficial inquiry into alleged U.S. war crimes in Vietnam. Two years later, at the insistence of House leaders who overrode Chairman F. Edward H&eacute;bert of Louisiana, Dellums earned a seat on the House Armed Services Committee, which had jurisdiction over every facet of the defense establishment.In this 1971 photograph, freshman House Members and outspoken peace advocates Ronald Dellums of California (center) and Bella Abzug of New York (in hat, at Dellums’s left), speak to reporters about their proposal to conduct an unofficial inquiry into alleged U.S. war crimes in Vietnam. Two years later, at the insistence of House leaders who overrode Chairman F. Edward Hébert of Louisiana, Dellums earned a seat on the House Armed Services Committee, which had jurisdiction over every facet of the defense establishment.Image courtesy of Moorland–Spingarn Research Center, Howard University

Never a monolithic group, the black Members of Congress became, if anything, more fragmented in the modern era because of their changing stature and growing numbers within the institution. While most black Members understood and accepted their role as surrogate representatives, there was no consensus on how to pursue the legislation that was important to their broad constituency. “We all have basically the same goals,” Mickey Leland observed. “The question is how to attain those goals.”135

Some, such as Barbara Jordan, chose an insider route that often took precedence over racial or gender issues. “I sought the power points,” she once said. “I knew if I were going to get anything done, [the congressional and party leaders] would be the ones to help me get it done.” Jordan was careful not to align herself too closely with the agenda of any special interest group, including the CBC and the Women’s Caucus, both of which she nevertheless joined. “I am neither a black politician nor a woman politician,” Jordan said in 1975. “Just a politician, a professional politician.” Her choice of seating in the House Chamber was revealing. Jordan chose to sit in the center aisle (away from the section customarily occupied by the CBC) because she could hear better, be seen by the presiding officer, and save a seat for colleagues who wanted to stop and chat. Her seating preference as well as her loyalty to the Texas delegation agitated fellow CBC members, but both were consistent with Jordan’s strategy for seeking congressional influence.136 Similarly, Julian Dixon accrued influence in the institution by working quietly with various factions. Syndicated political columnist David Broder observed, “Dixon is a fascinating example of the emerging alternative style of black leadership: a person who makes his way not by the militance of his advocacy of civil rights or other racially linked issues, but on the basis of personal and intellectual qualities that cross racial and ideological divisions and make an effective bridge-builder.”137

In many respects, Representatives Jordan and Dixon introduced a new legislative style that emerged among black Members during this generation: In de-emphasizing race, they served to foster a consensus-crafting approach among various factions. One political observer described this shift among black House Members in the 1980s, suggesting they bore “striking similarities” to their “independent” contemporary colleagues in both major parties. “First, they worked painstakingly to build their own organizations to win election,” political commentator Richard Cohen wrote. “Once in the House, they have become issue activists and coalition builders eager for influence, not necessarily inclined to await the delayed rewards of the seniority system.”138 Political scientists also noted a gradual shift in the style of African-American representation during this era. During the 1960s and 1970s, legislative reformers and civil rights advocates emphasized the need for “descriptive” representation, i.e., electing more blacks to Congress with the goal of providing better representation for the African-American community. But by the latter part of the 20th century, many black Members of Congress had a new focus: “substantive” representation, which involved a connection between constituents and their Representatives that was based on legislative agenda and achievements rather than solely on the color of their skin.139

Representative <a href="/member-profiles/profile.html?intID=101">Carolyn Cheeks Kilpatrick</a> of Michigan presented the Tuskegee Airmen of World War II with the Congressional Gold Medal in 2007. In the 110th Congress, Congresswoman Kilpatrick chairs the CBC.Representative Carolyn Cheeks Kilpatrick of Michigan presented the Tuskegee Airmen of World War II with the Congressional Gold Medal in 2007. In the 110th Congress, Congresswoman Kilpatrick chairs the CBC.Image courtesy of U.S. House of Representatives Photography Office

Even those who were elected to Congress because they dissented from the prevailing political establishment underwent a process of institutional integration that conferred upon them legislative success and leadership positions. Several Members adapted their activism to prevailing institutional norms. Elected to Congress from the epicenter of the anti–Vietnam War movement, Ronald Dellums was a prime example. Soon after being elected to the House, he introduced legislation to investigate alleged U.S. war crimes in Southeast Asia, as well as a measure to impose penalties on the apartheid regime in South Africa. Dellums declared, “I am not going to back away from being called a radical. If being an advocate of peace, justice, and humanity toward all human beings is radical, then I’m glad to be called a radical.”140 He worked his way onto the Armed Services Committee largely to try to curb vast Pentagon expenditures. Dellums was literally denied a seat at the table when he first joined that panel: He was forced to share a single chair with Patricia Schroeder of Colorado (then the only woman on the committee) by Chairman F. Edward Hébert of Louisiana as a sign of contempt.141 But Dellums’s activism was tempered by the need to craft legislation through compromise. Contrary to opponents’ expectations, Dellums forged a reputation as an effective coalition builder to achieve his legislative goals; for instance, he allied with fiscal conservatives to halt production of the controversial B-2 bomber in the early 1980s. In 1993, partially reflecting the degree to which the Bay Area Representative had mastered institutional politics, Dellums became the senior Democrat and assumed the chair of the Armed Services Committee. “If you are around the House long enough, you learn its rules and customs and come to understand that no point of principle is served by remaining a permanent outsider,” Dellums reflected in retirement. “My constituency, like any other, had sent me to Washington to legislate. I owed them nothing less than my best.”142

Other Members of this generation followed a similar trajectory. For instance, Delegate Walter Fauntroy drew upon his experience in the civil rights movement and as a community activist in Washington, DC, to develop effective coalitions in the House on issues ranging from apartheid to home rule in the District of Columbia; he eventually chaired more than a half-dozen House subcommittees.143 As supporters, and in some cases, participants, in the civil rights movement, many of the founding members of the CBC initially believed that working outside the system—following Powell’s militant example during his House career—would best serve African Americans. But gradually it became apparent that working with House leaders, particularly with high-ranking Democratic Members, could produce measurable and substantive results. Mickey Leland, a self-described “revolutionary,” explained that many of his black colleagues could now bargain for legislative goals from a position of strength. “We understand that in order to get our point across we don’t have to jump up and down on the table or shoot off fireworks to get the attention of the leadership,” Leland remarked. “We go in and negotiate.”144

Over time, black Members forged alliances with congressional groups with similar policy goals. “The technique now is coalitions,” Julian Dixon remarked in the 1980s. “I don’t think we want to stand alone on the issues. The numbers tell us we won’t be successful.”145 Representative Schroeder, a cofounder of the Women’s Caucus, acknowledged the necessity for cooperative efforts among minorities in Congress during the 1980s: “It seemed that the three chairpersons of the women’s, black and Hispanic caucuses have been sewn together around issues of equal concern, such as hunger, the feminization of poverty, the extension of the Voting Rights Act and the reauthorization of the civil rights commission.”146

In June 1993, the CBC met with President William J. (Bill) Clinton. Though the CBC agreed with Clinton on many issues, the group sometimes was critical of the Democratic President because of his willingness to compromise with conservative lawmakers on efforts to reduce the federal budget deficit by curtailing entitlement programs.In June 1993, the CBC met with President William J. (Bill) Clinton. Though the CBC agreed with Clinton on many issues, the group sometimes was critical of the Democratic President because of his willingness to compromise with conservative lawmakers on efforts to reduce the federal budget deficit by curtailing entitlement programs.Image courtesy of William J. Clinton Presidential Library

African-American politicians’ electoral success in the latter half of the 20th century presented new challenges. New black Members, including more women and southern blacks, altered the gender and the geographic composition of the CBC. In 1997, Maxine Waters of California became the first woman elected to head the CBC since Cardiss Collins held the position in the 96th Congress (1979–1981), indicating the growing influence of women in the caucus; in the subsequent decade, Eddie Bernice Johnson of Texas (107th Congress, 2001–2003) and Carolyn Cheeks Kilpatrick of Michigan (110th Congress) also chaired the CBC.147 The influx of new Members from rural and suburban districts modified the substance of the caucus, which historically had fielded Representatives from northern cities.148 New committee assignments and issues that were significant to southern and rural districts, such as support for the space industry and tobacco farmers, were included in black Members’ more diversified approach to the political landscape.149

Consequently, the CBC had difficulty sustaining the collective voice envisioned by its founders in 1971. Although most black Members still represented majority-black districts, the swelling membership of the caucus and the conflicting opinions of its individual members resulted in internal divisions.150 Still, the group managed to focus on the common goals of opposing racism and backing equal opportunity. “Like coalition building in any context, holding the Black Caucus together required fluidity and flexibility, the constant search for common ground, and no rigid tests of membership,” Representative Dellums later noted, “otherwise the fate of other caucuses and coalitions that had arisen during the same period would have befallen the CBC as well.”151

In 1992, with the election of the second Democratic President during the CBC’s history, William J. (Bill) Clinton, political commentators believed the group would be able to advance a broad legislative agenda. Yet, much as with President Carter, the CBC was often at odds with the Clinton administration, particularly because of its willingness to compromise with conservatives on Capitol Hill.152 Many black Members dissented from key administration policies, such as portions of the 1993 Clinton budget, the North American Free Trade Agreement, relations with Haiti, and the controversial nomination (and then withdrawal) of civil rights scholar Lani Guinier for Assistant U.S. Attorney General for Civil Rights. However, the CBC’s clout ensured that the President seriously considered the group’s point of view and often consulted the caucus regarding policy affecting African Americans.153

A reserved but influential advocate for civil rights, <a href="/member-profiles/profile.html?intID=30">Gus Hawkins</a> of California once said, &ldquo;The leadership belongs not to the loudest, not to those who beat the drums or blow the trumpets, but to those who day in and day out, in all seasons, work for the practical realization of a better world&mdash;those who have the stamina to persist and remain dedicated.&rdquo;A reserved but influential advocate for civil rights, Gus Hawkins of California once said, “The leadership belongs not to the loudest, not to those who beat the drums or blow the trumpets, but to those who day in and day out, in all seasons, work for the practical realization of a better world—those who have the stamina to persist and remain dedicated.”Image courtesy of Office of the Clerk, U.S. House of Representatives

After the Republicans won control of Congress in 1995—and a majority in the House for the first time in 40 years—the CBC’s legislative momentum and hard-fought institutional gains dissipated. The institutional structure of the House, which favors the majority, relegated Democratic black Representatives to a secondary role, much like the status of their white Democratic colleagues. Nevertheless, many members of the caucus promised to continue their mission, regardless of the party change. “The Congressional Black Caucus has got to yell louder and scream or be steamrollered,” asserted Cynthia McKinney of Georgia, epitomizing the pitched partisanship during the latter half of the decade.154 Political scientist Robert C. Smith, writing shortly after the GOP takeover, voiced widely shared frustration with black Members’ inability to advance a legislative agenda. Despite numerical gains, the attainment of leadership positions, and prominent civil rights efforts, “blacks in Congress are frequently an isolated, invisible, inconsequential minority unable to enact (or often even to get serious debate and deliberation on) proposals it deems minimally necessary to meliorate the problems of joblessness, crime and dispossession that plague its core constituency.”155

Still, the change in party control—largely the result of southern white Democrats in the House being replaced by an insurgent Republican Party in the South—had ancillary benefits for black Members. In the minority Democratic Party, black Members now represented a larger percentage of the Democratic Caucus.156 Given the relative electoral safety of their districts, this increase portended significant consequences for boosting blacks into a greater share of leadership roles in the party as they collectively accounted for greater percentages of the more experienced cadre of Democrats.157

Conflicting Imperatives: Black Interests Versus Party Agenda

While the institutional headway made by African-American Members during the 1970s and 1980s strengthened the collective authority of the CBC, it posed new challenges to the cohesiveness of the organization. Its success advancing black Representatives into the upper echelons of the institutional establishment raised expectations for the group and for individual Members to produce immediate, tangible results for Black Americans. Moreover, some black Members began to experience conflicting pressures between their allegiance to the CBC, their responsibilities as committee and party leaders, and their debt to the Democratic leaders who had placed them in positions of power. The development of conflicts between individual aspirations and collective goals was a sign of African-American institutional maturation, and other minority groups in Congress experienced such conflicts as well. A similar process unfolded among women Members of Congress, often creating tension between the institutional apprenticeship generation of the 1940s and 1950s, who had attained leadership positions, and the feminist activists who followed them.158

Elected to the House at age 29, <a href="/member-profiles/profile.html?intID=74">Harold Ford, Sr.</a>, of Tennessee later became one of the youngest Members ever to chair a subcommittee on Ways and Means. He left his position as chairman amid legal problems, but regained his seniority and chairmanship after his acquittal.Elected to the House at age 29, Harold Ford, Sr., of Tennessee later became one of the youngest Members ever to chair a subcommittee on Ways and Means. He left his position as chairman amid legal problems, but regained his seniority and chairmanship after his acquittal.Image courtesy of Office of the Clerk, U.S. House of Representatives

This theme recurs throughout the service of this generation of Black Americans in Congress. The career of Representative Bill Gray provides an illustrative example. As chairman of the House Budget Committee for the 99th and 100th Congresses (1985–1989), Gray asserted his independence: “I am not here to do the bidding of somebody just because they happen to be black. If I agree with you, I agree with you. I set my policy.”159 Once he rose to the chairmanship of the Budget Committee, Gray encouraged the CBC to continue submitting an alternative budget, although he did not publicly support it. His decision to vote “present” when the CBC measure came to the House Floor disrupted the public solidarity of the organization and angered some of his black colleagues, who thought Gray was placing personal interests ahead of caucus goals.160 Similarly, Julian Dixon, who chaired the CBC in the 98th Congress, refused to bring the Caucus’s alternative budget to the House Floor for a vote. House leaders had asked Dixon, also a subcommittee chairman of the Appropriations Committee, to pledge his support for the House Budget Committee’s budget proposal to attract rank-and-file Democrats’ votes for the measure. Knowing he could extract some concessions for his support, the CBC chairman agreed. “Our purpose, hopefully, is not to go down to defeat with honor,” Dixon explained. “Our purpose is to have some success.”161

Investigations, Corruption, and Race

Concerns about public corruption became commonplace in the post-Watergate Era as the number of Americans who trusted their government decreased. That distrust was magnified by a growing adversarial relationship between the press and public officials. Throughout this period, a number of African-American officeholders, including a significant number of black Members of Congress, observed that federal investigations into political corruption unfairly targeted black politicians.162 This perception may have been partially due to an increase in the total number of corruption probes conducted by the federal government, which soared more than 2,300 percent between 1970 (63) and 1991 (1,452).163 Additionally, the number of black officials who held public positions increased from 1,469 in 1970 to 6,681 in 1987. Nevertheless, African-American officials seemed disproportionately targeted. One study found that of the 465 political corruption probes initiated by the Justice Department between 1983 and 1988, 14 percent investigated black officeholders—even though they represented just 3 percent of all U.S. officeholders.164 Black Members of Congress often believed they were the targets of such investigations, asserting that they were singled out for scrutiny on racial grounds and were held to higher standards than their white counterparts. Some interpreted such scrutiny as a coordinated effort to silence black officeholders by “diluting [their] influence and credibility.”165 Representative Bill Clay, Sr., maintained that the legal problems encountered by Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., and Harold Ford, Sr., were examples of a “pattern” of investigatory practices and “harassment.”166

From 1981 to 1993, roughly half the members of the CBC were the subjects of federal investigations or indictments, though few were convicted.167 Bill Clay, Sr., claimed that federal investigations and political corruption probes into the careers and personal lives of black officeholders were often part of a long-standing “conspiracy to silence dissent.” According to Clay, business and “elite” interests—using government, judicial, and law enforcement mechanisms as well as a pliant press—sought to ruin the reputations of those who spoke out about racial, economic, or social inequality.168 Some political observers did not fully agree with that viewpoint. “There is no question there is real racism in our country,” said African-American journalist Juan Williams in 1987, but he added, “Unfortunately, it is not the case that racism explains all charges of corruption.” Some prominent black officials, such as then-Virginia Governor L. Douglas Wilder and Representative John Lewis, publicly disputed the conspiracy viewpoint. An official from a black political organization succinctly described the relationship between blacks’ new role in the political process and the increased scrutiny by public officials: “White folks are in a fishbowl; they get to swim. Black folks are in a test tube; they have to go straight up or down.”169

Within Congress, African-American Members were appointed to chair the House Standards of Official Conduct (Ethics) Committee more often than any other congressional panel.170 In the 1980s and 1990s, respected insiders such as Representatives Stokes and Dixon led the Ethics Committee, once during a highly sensitive investigation into alleged standards violations by Speaker Jim Wright of Texas. The scandal with the strongest effect on black Members during this era occurred in 1992 when the press publicized General Accounting Office and House internal investigations revealing that dozens of lawmakers (some 220 former and current Members) had overdrawn their accounts at the informal House “Bank” run by the House Sergeant at Arms. Nine African-American Members revealed that they had written checks without sufficient funds, and five were on the list of the “worst offenders” that was released by the House Ethics Committee.171 The occurrence of the scandal in an election year, with the economy in recession, magnified voters’ discontent with incumbents. However, only one black incumbent, Charles Hayes, lost his primary re-election campaign in the Chicago district he had represented for a decade; his name appeared on a list that was leaked days before the contest.172 As in the preceding generation, African Americans who faced such investigations or congressional disciplinary actions enjoyed unusually strong loyalty from their constituencies.

Continue Reading »

Footnotes

  1. Congressional Record, House, 92nd Cong., 1st sess. (30 March 1971): 8710.
  2. “A Time of Testing for Black Caucus as Its Members Rise to Power in House,” 27 April 1985, National Journal: 911.
  3. Cohadas, “Black House Members Striving for Influence”: 680.
  4. See Fenno, Going Home: 106–109.
  5. David Broder, “Ethics Committee Head Passes Colorblind Test,” 17 April 1989, St. Louis Post-Dispatch: 3B.
  6. Richard Cohen, “New Breed for Black Caucus,” 26 September 1987, National Journal: 2432.
  7. For a discussion of the topic, see Swain, Black Faces, Black Interests: 5–6, 207–225. For a countervailing viewpoint, see Kenny J. Whitby, The Color of Representation: Congressional Behavior and Black Interests (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997): especially 135–144.
  8. Ray Mosley, “Violence Disavowed by Rep. Dellums,” 14 February 1971, Washington Post: 113.
  9. Dellums and Halterman, Lying Down With the Lions: 149–150.
  10. Ibid., 175.
  11. See Appendix F, Black-American Chairs of Subcommittees of Standing Committees in the U.S. House and Senate, 1885–2007.
  12. Coleman, “Black Caucus Comes of Age.”
  13. Cohadas, “Black House Members Striving for Influence”: 681.
  14. Ruffin and Brown, “Clout on Capitol Hill”: 102.
  15. See Appendix I, Congressional Black Caucus Chairmen and Chairwomen, 1971–2007; Juliet Eilperin, “Black Caucus Taps Rep. Maxine Waters as New Chair; First Woman Since 1979,” 21 November 1996, Roll Call: 18.
  16. For more on changing southern representation in the late 20th-century Congresses, see Nelson Polsby, How Congress Evolves: Social Bases of Institutional Change (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).
  17. Jeremy Derfner, 27 March–10 April 2000, The American Prospect: 16. In his autobiography, Dellums discusses the growing diversity of the CBC during the 1990s and also reflects upon an incident in which he mistakenly assumed the CBC would back one of his proposals based on past experience. Dellums and Halterman, Lying Down With the Lions: 117–121.
  18. For example, while the CBC as a group publicly denounced the controversial North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1993, nine members of the caucus voted in favor of the measure. Eight House Members from the CBC voted in favor of NAFTA in addition to the lone black Senator, Carol Moseley-Braun. See Singh, The Congressional Black Caucus: 183.
  19. Dellums and Halterman, Lying Down With the Lions: 120.
  20. For more on the CBC’s relationship with President Clinton, see Singh, The Congressional Black Caucus: 178–192. Clinton’s nearly 1,000-page memoirs contain no substantive policy discussion or debate involving the CBC. See Bill Clinton, My Life (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004).
  21. Ronald A. Taylor, “Congressional Black Caucus Displays Growing Clout,” 13 September 1993, Washington Times: A10; Adam Clymer, “Black Caucus Threatens Revolt on Clinton Budget,” 10 June 1993, New York Times: A22; “The Black Caucus,” 16 July 1993, Christian Science Monitor: 18. See also, for example, Brent Staples, “Wanted: A Million Black Republicans,” 21 June 1993, New York Times: A18; Max Boot, “Black Caucus Feels Left Out of Clinton Plans,” 30 June 1993, Christian Science Monitor: 1; Michael Wines, “Democrats Expect Tight Budget Vote,” 26 July 1993, New York Times: A12.
  22. John E. Yang, “Black Caucus Adjusts to New Political Scene,” 23 September 1995, Washington Post: A15.
  23. Smith, We Have No Leaders: African Americans in the Post-Civil Rights Era: 211–225, quotation on page 222.
  24. For instance, in the 103rd Congress (1993–1995), after the landmark 1992 elections brought a record number of 40 blacks to the House, African Americans constituted 15 percent of the House Democrats. In the following Congress, the 41 black Representatives accounted for 20 percent of the Democratic Caucus. These totals reflect the largest number of blacks serving at any one time during a Congress, not the total that served during the full span of a Congress. See Mildred Amer, “Black Members of the United States Congress, 1870–2007,” 27 September 2007, Report RL30378, CRS.
  25. For an early example of such analysis, see Alan Gerber, “African Americans’ Congressional Careers and the Democratic House Delegation,” The Journal of Politics 58 (August 1996): 831–845.
  26. See for example, Office of History and Preservation, Women in Congress, 1917–2006: 3–5, 340–341, 546–547. Some outside critics of this transformation implied that the process amounted to a cooptation that marginalized the interests of the black community. Political scientist Robert C. Smith concluded in the mid-1990s that, “The institutional norms and folkways of the House encourage exaggerated courtesy, compromise, deference, and above all loyalty to the institution. And the black members of Congress are probably more loyal to the House and their roles in it than they are to blacks.” See Smith, We Have No Leaders: African Americans in the Post-Civil Rights Era: 225.
  27. Eric Pianin, “Black Caucus Members Face Dilemma of Hill Loyalties,” 23 September 1987, Washington Post: A1.
  28. Pianin, “Black Caucus Members Face Dilemma of Hill Loyalties”; Kenworthy, “Congressional Black Caucus Facing New Circumstances After 20 Years.”
  29. Richard Simon and Nick Anderson, “Respected Lawmaker Julian Dixon Dies,” 9 December 2000, Los Angeles Times: B1.
  30. See, for example, the chapter titled, “A Conspiracy to Silence Dissent,” in Clay, Just Permanent Interests: Black Americans in Congress 1870–1991: 312–338. For more on the subject, see George D. Musgrove, “The Harassment of Black Elected Officials: Race, Party Realignment, and State Power in the Post-Civil Rights United States,” Ph.D dissertation, New York University, 2005.
  31. Richard Sutch, “Table Ec1356–1370, Federal Prosecutions of Public Corruption: 1970–1996,” in Carter et al., eds., Historical Statistics of the United States, Volume 5: Governance and International Relations: 331.
  32. Gwen Ifill, “Black Officials: Probes and Prejudice—Is There a Double Standard for Bringing Indictments? The Jury’s Still Out,” 28 February 1988, Washington Post: A9.
  33. Clay, Just Permanent Interests: Black Americans in Congress, 1870–1991: 314–337. For a countervailing viewpoint, see Ifill, “Black Officials: Probes and Prejudice.”
  34. Clay, Just Permanent Interests: Black Americans in Congress, 1870–1991: 82–83, 332–334. Of the accusations made against Powell, writes Clay, they “could have been leveled against every chairman of every full committee in the House of Representatives. He did no more, and no less, than any other in terms of exercising traditional legal privileges that accompanied the powerful position of committee chairman. His private life, including intimate relations with numerous and glamorous women, was routine activity for many members of Congress, committee chairmen or not.”
  35. “Were Black Office-Holders More Routinely Investigated During the ’80s?” 19 December 1993, Atlanta Daily World: 5.
  36. Clay, Just Permanent Interests: Black Americans in Congress, 1870–1991:312–316, 335–337.
  37. For the Juan Williams quote, see Charles J. Abbott, “Panel Says Smear Tactics Used to Discredit Black Politicians,” 10 October 1987, New Pittsburgh Courier: 1. For “fishbowl” and “test tube,” see Ifill, “Black Officials: Probes and Prejudice.”
  38. Indeed, from 1981 forward, when Democrats controlled the House Chamber (e.g., eight Congresses) African Americans have led the Standards of Official Conduct Committee for all but one Congress. The black chairs were Louis Stokes (1981–1985; 1991–1993), Julian Dixon (1985–1991), and Stephanie Tubbs Jones (2007 to present).
  39. “The 22 Worst Offenders,” 17 April 1992, Los Angeles Times: A18; “List of Members of the House of Representatives Who Acknowledge Having Written Checks on Insufficient Funds at the House Bank,” 13 April 1992, Associated Press.
  40. “House Check-Kiter List Official: 2 Names Missing from Panel’s Record of Worst Abusers,” 2 April 1992, Chicago Tribune: 6.