Kucinich Concerned About Future of U.S. Participation In ABM Treaty
Washington,
Dec 11, 2001 -
Congressman Dennis Kucinich (D-OH), ranking Democrat on the Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations has written to President Bush urging him to reconsider his decision to withdraw the United States from the 1972 Anti Ballistic Missile treaty.
"This treaty is integral to world security; scrapping it will seriously jeopardize our international coalition against terrorism and undermine America's counter terrorism initiatives," Kucinich wrote. "The ABM treaty is necessary to protect the U.S. and the entire world from the threat of a nuclear arms buildup. Withdrawing from it would undermine our leadership in promoting international security."
Although Kucinich has supported the Administration's efforts to combat terrorism, he has been a strong opponent of missile defense tests and continues to support the reduction of nuclear arms. Earlier this year, Congressman Kucinich introduced H.R. 2977, a bill to ban the weaponization of space.
Attached is a copy of the letter Congressman sent to President Bush on Tuesday, December 11th.
The Honorable George W. Bush
President of the United States
White House
1600 Pennsylvania Ave
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Mr. President:
I write to object to your decision to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. I urge you to reconsider. Because this treaty is widely considered integral to the world's security architecture, scrapping it will seriously jeopardize the maintenance of your international coalition against terrorism, and thereby undermine your administration's counter-terrorism initiatives.
During your September address to Congress, you emphasized the necessity of international cooperation in order to successfully root out terrorists and prevent further attacks worldwide. "This is the world's fight," you stated. "We ask every nation to join us. We will ask and we will need the help of police forces, intelligence service and banking systems around the world." This approach is an effective one, and I commend you and your administration for consulting and cooperating with the world's leaders in formulating an appropriate course of action in response to the September 11th attacks.
These efforts, however, will now be strained as a result of the decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. Whether or not the administration shares the view, many nations consider the Treaty a vital non-proliferation tool. Various countries are also deeply skeptical of U.S. plans to build a ballistic missile defense system. Consequently, seeking cooperation on counter-terrorism initiatives while simultaneously reneging on U.S. arms control obligations for the purposes of proceeding with a missile defense system may alienate our international partners in the fight against terrorism.
Of prime concern is Russia, which, despite being open to revision of the ABM Treaty, has long pushed for its preservation as a "cornerstone" of global stability. Given the shifting political winds in our historic relationship with Russia, it would be prudent to hold onto the ABM Treat as a means of blocking an arms escalation at a later date. Though both you and members of your cabinet have had productive discussions with high-ranking officials concerning nuclear reductions and amendments to the ABM Treaty, no agreement has been finalized. Thus, your decision to withdraw from the treaty will adversely affect U.S. efforts to secure Russian cooperation.
In particular, your administration has expressed concern over Russia's arms sales to Iran and other nations that may harbor terrorists. Stemming this arms trade will thus be essential to the prevention of future terrorist attacks. Russia's strong moral and material support over the past two months of the U.S. mission in Afghanistan, where Osama bin Laden is believed to still be hiding, further demonstrates the need for U.S.-Russian cooperation and the potentially high cost of disrupting that cooperation.
Similarly, the U.S. decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for the purposes of missile defense could place the support of its NATO allies in jeopardy. In May, NATO members failed to accede to language depicting ballistic missiles as a "common threat" to NATO countries. U.S. missile defense plans continued to be met with skepticism in Europe throughout this past summer, and there is little evidence to suggest these stances have softened. Without the resources and backing of these nations, a comprehensive international operation on terrorism could be undermined.
Your decision also has profound security implications beyond U.S. counter-terrorism efforts. Nearly all experts predict a nuclear build-up by China if the United States scuttles the ABM Treaty. Indeed, officials in your administration have tacitly acknowledged this as likely, and have suggested that your government will acquiesce.
Forcing a nation to augment its nuclear stores is always a dangerous step to take. But in this case, it could prove catastrophic. An expansion in China's nuclear arsenal would prompt regional rivals India and Pakistan (most recently at odds over their competing roles in the U.S. effort in Afghanistan) to accelerate their nuclear testing programs. History confirms the likelihood of this scenario. Proliferation in South Asia began in the 1960s with India seeking deterrence against China after the Chinese conducted their first nuclear test. Pakistan was spurred to begin testing in the 1970s in response to India's 1974 nuclear test and its defeat of Pakistan during a 1971 war. Both India and Pakistan are currently under self-imposed moratoriums on nuclear testing. A resumption of testing would further destabilize a region already considered by experts to be the most likely location for a future nuclear conflict.
Finally, the ABM Treaty does not currently constrain the United States' missile defense activity. Defense officials have portrayed the planned construction of new missile defense facilities in Alaska as allowing realistic testing of the system and providing a means of protecting the United States in an emergency. But the planned Fort Greely missile silos, upgraded BMEWS early-warning radar at Clear, and upgraded Cobra Dane radar on Shemya, to be completed in 2004, constitutes neither realistic testing nor protection in an emergency. As the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization has itself admitted, the Fort Greely missile silos would have no significant role in a flight test program, since falling material cast off by a missile launched from Fort Greely would pose a risk to populated areas in Alaska. Moreover, even if missile interceptors could be launched from somewhere in Alaska, neither the BMEWS nor Cobra Dane radar would substitute for the yet-to-be-built X-band radar necessary to track the incoming dummy warhead.
As this analysis suggests, these facilities would be of extremely limited utility during an actual attack on the United States. Indeed, beyond problems posed by the relatively unsophisticated sensors at Clear and Shemya, there is little reason to have confidence in the interceptor missiles, which will almost certainly not have begun operational testing by 2004.
I thus urge you once again to reconsider your decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. It is neither necessary to protect United States citizens nor desirable given its potential to disrupt the administration's international counter-terrorism efforts and hinder world security at a time when you have led efforts to strengthen security through the fight against terrorism.
