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In examining the NASA budget for 1988 the Congress will make important decisions about the future of the civil space program in the face of competing spending priorities. In response to a request by the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, this staff working paper analyzes the major issues in the NASA fiscal year 1988 budget, with particular emphasis on the productivity of the space program and the overall cost of space activity after the space shuttle Challenger accident.

David H. Moore of the Congressional Budget Office's Natural Resources and Commerce Division prepared the report, under the supervision of Everett M. Ehrlich. Michael B. Berger, Kim Coffman, and Paul Dinardo of CBO provided valuable comments and assistance. Patricia H. Johnston edited the manuscript, and Patricia Joy prepared the report for publication.

Edward M. Gramlich
Acting Director
March 1987
 
 

SUMMARY

I  INTRODUCTION

• The Shuttle System's Role in the NASA Program
• The NASA Budget and Trends in Program Funding

II  THE CHALLENGER ACCIDENT: RESULTANT PROGRAM AND BUDGET CHANGES

• Space Flight, Control and Data Communications
• Research and Development

III  OPTIONS

• The CBO Baseline for NASA
• Space Transportation
• Space Science
• The Space Station
• NASA Program and Budget Options for 1988 Through 1992

APPENDIX
 

TABLES
S-1.	Budget Authority-Increases Above CBO Baseline Necessary to Reach Preaccident Goals
S-2.	Space Station Funding Profiles, Fiscal Years 1988-1992
1.	Budget for Space Flight, Control, and Date Communications, Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987
2.	Challenger Accident Costs Incurred in the Shuttle Production and Operational Capability Development Program
3.	Shuttle Operations Reimbursement, Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987
4.	Launch Delays for the Tracking and Date Relay Satellite (TDRS)
5.	Budget for Research and Development, Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987
6.	Budgets for Total Space Transportation Capability Development Program and for Major Components, Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987
7.	Budget for Space Science and Applications, Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987
8.	Physics and Astronomy Payload Launch Delays
9.	Budget for Total Physics and Astronomy Program and for Major Components, Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987
10.	Budget for Life Sciences Program, Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987
11.	Planetary Mission Launch Delays
12.	Budget for Planetary Exploration Program, Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987
13.	Budget for Environmental Observation Programs, Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987
14.	Payload and Mission Delays in Materials Processing in Space
15.	CBO Baseline for NASA, Fiscal Years 1987 Through 1992
16.	The October 1986 Manifest for Shuttle Flights
17.	Major Pay loads to be Launched in Fiscal Years 1980-1990 and Potential Consequences of Launch Delays
18.	Mission Candidates for Possible NASA Launching by ELV's, High and Low Options
19.	Annual Costs of High- and Low-Range ELY Options
20.	Space Station Funding Profiles, Fiscal Years 1988-1992
21.	CBO Baseline and the Range of Estimated Funding Levels Above Baseline to Support Various Program Additions
A-l.	Major Research and Development Payloads, 1986 Through 1987, Before and After Challenger Accident

 
 

Expectations for civil space activities exceed the budget allotted to the current program of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). In considering the NASA budget for fiscal year 1988, the Congress will have to decide how much of the present NASA program can be afforded as it competes with other important spending priorities and as it starts to recover from the Challenger accident and its consequences.

The most immediate consequence has been to increase the cost of all space activity at the very time that NASA was turning to its next major program and budget commitment, a permanently manned space station to be deployed in the mid-1990s. No less significant, but less direct, is a reexamination of major aspects of the currently planned program, including the role of the manned space shuttle versus unmanned rockets, the usefulness of the present space station in relation to large increases in its estimated costs, the role and cost of large space science projects, and their effect on the viability of small, less costly space science projects. In order to continue NASA's agenda at its preaccident level, this analysis estimates that the cost of program additions in space transportation, space science, and the space station would increase the NASA budget by $14.0 billion above the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) baseline for fiscal years 1988 through 1992.¹
 

BACKGROUND

Because the Challenger accident had such profound effects on the entire NASA program and budget, this analysis includes a brief background to highlight the particular problems that the Congress--and NASA itself--face as they plan for the 1988 budget and the year beyond.

The NASA Program Before Challenger

The year 1986 was to have been one of significant accomplishments for NASA. In early January, popular press articles, previewing the planned course of space activities for that year, hailed 1986 as "the year of space science." Several long-term, very costly (and in some cases long-delayed) missions were to be launched, including the Galileo probe to Jupiter, the Ulysses probe to measure solar radiation, and the highly sophisticated Hubble Space Telescope. As important for other parts of the NASA research and development program were flights carrying numerous small satellites, scientific instruments, and round trip experiments.

At the same time, the shuttle system was to have realized its promise by completing a second year of operating at a significant flight rate, at or above the nine flights of 1985, and by carrying not only NASA payloads but also those of the Department of Defense (DoD), private firms, and foreign governments. The space station, described by NASA as the "next logical step," was to continue in its design phase, with actual development expenditures beginning in 1987.

These program developments were reflected in the NASA budget. Development expenditures were to end for the major research and development missions that were to have been launched. The shuttle system was to require less new federal investment and would realize budgetary savings through improved operating efficiency. Moreover, net inflows to NASA were anticipated because receipts for transportation services provided to the DoD were expected to exceed the cost of the services provided. These savings and revenue gains, along with the Administration's proposal for 1 percent annual real growth in the NASA budget, were to create a budget wedge permitting the space station to be funded.

The Challenger Accident

The Challenger accident has at best postponed this vision of U.S. activities in space and made it more expensive. At worst, a new, more modest set of objectives will characterize the post-Challenger space program.

The NASA program and budget continue to be affected by the accident. The shuttle program--the major activity in the space flight, control, and data communications function of the NASA budget--will be grounded for a minimum of two years. The goal of increasing the shuttle flight rate to 24 per year has been replaced by the goals of producing a new orbiter and returning the shuttle system to safe flight. Budget increases were granted in 1986 and 1987 relative to the preaccident baseline of $2.6 billion--$531 million in 1986 to cope with the immediate consequences of the accident, and $2.1 billion in 1987 to replace Challenger.

Research and development programs and budgets have been particularly affected. Launch delays have caused a backup of payloads, and some of these need new development funds to meet tighter safety standards. The overall research and development budget legislated for 1987 was close to the Administration's request, but the program it would fund was radically different. Numerous missions that were to have flown in the late 1980s are being rescheduled into the mid-1990s. Those parts of the over $3 billion annual research and development program which is dependent on space flight are essentially on hold.
 

PROGRAM ADDITIONS FOR 1988 THROUGH 1992

The many choices confronting the Congress in the 1988 NASA budget generally fit the same pattern--the Congress can either lower the objectives of the program or significantly increase NASA funding above the CBO baseline. Real baseline budget authority for fiscal year 1988 through 1992 is $8.4 billion, derived from NASA's 1987 real funding level of $10.5 billion less the one-time $2.1 billion appropriation for an orbiter to replace Challenger, and then adjusted for inflation in the outyears. Program and funding additions in three areas are arguably necessary for NASA to achieve the goals of the preaccident program. Table S-l presents a range of cost estimates above the CBO baseline in each of three areas: space transportation, space science, and the space station.

Space Transportation

In space transportation, the current program and budget restricts NASA's launch options to the shuttle system. Providing expendable launch vehicles (ELVs), particularly for NASA science payloads, is an alternative. The rationale supporting this option emphasizes the backlog of NASA payloads even if the shuttle recovery program were implemented as planned. Moreover, given the substantial probability of delays in the launch schedule for 1988 through 1992, the prospect of additional delays and costs in the space science program adds weight to the argument for NASA use of ELVs.

The most significant argument against the addition of rockets is its cost. The low option program included in Table S-l would cost $700 million above the baseline over the five-year period and provides for nine payloads during that time. The low option does not relieve pressure on the shuttle system after 1992, but does not preclude additional orders later. The high option would cost $2.3 billion over five years, but would provide for 26 pay-loads, including seven for the space station, between 1989 and 1995.
 

Space Science

While launching the backlog of payloads is the foremost issue in space science, a second problem in this area--evident before the accident--concerns the mix of large and small projects. The accident has dramatized the risks of a space science program that is dominated by large projects. Moreover, the range of problems confronted by scientists in the fields interested in space for itself, or in using the attributes of space, is best addressed by a broader number of experiments.

The large-scale projects that rely on the shuttle have been well-supported. The Hubble Space Telescope, an orbiting observatory to be launched and serviced by the shuttle, is a billion dollar investment that may require support costs of $200 million annually. If a decision is made to go forward with the space station, projects related to it are also likely to be supported. Intermediate and small-scale projects that cost from several million dollars to $500 million and that are directed toward a limited set of scientific objectives could be lost in the ensuing budget squeeze. To address this concern and to include room for these efforts over the next five years, several intermediate-size projects--the Topex ocean observation satellite and two smaller physics payloads--provide the basis for an illustrative increase above baseline for science spending of $100 million in 1987 dollars.

Space Station

The space station is the major NASA program and budget issue that the Congress will decide upon this year. Support for the NASA station design and program this year strongly implies support for the multiyear commitment of perhaps as much as $30 billion between 1988 and 2000.

Before the accident, the case for the NASA station emphasized benefits in scientific and commercial areas, particularly in materials and life sciences, and in robotic and automation spin-offs for U.S. manufacturing. In addition, the station is viewed by supporters as a logical step in the manned space program toward a permanent base on the moon and a manned voyage to Mars.' The accident has added force to this case by creating a perception that the U.S. leadership in space is being lost to the Soviet Union and competitors in Europe and Japan.

The accident has also added to the case against the NASA station by calling attention to the uncertainty of its benefits and its final cost. The lost shuttle flights, particularly in materials and life sciences, have decreased uncertainty about the usefulness of the station. The capacity of the shuttle fleet to support the station construction phase is very unclear. Construction of the station could fill two-thirds of the shuttle manifest for several years, forcing the deferral of crucial security and science pay loads.

Table S-2 presents three alternative funding profiles for the space station: the CBO baseline, the level of spending included in NASA's 1988 budget plan, and a high option based on the publicly reported new NASA cost estimate for the station (roughly $14.6 billion, in 1984 dollars, as opposed to earlier estimates of $8 billion, also in 1984 dollars). The CBO baseline, at best, would provide a modest intermittently tended space station. The middle option plan, based on the five-year spending profile for the space station in the Administration's fiscal year 1988 request, could fund the station planned by NASA, but later than the mid-1990s completion date currently contemplated, or it could support a more modest but undefined space station in the mid-1990s. The high option is the best current estimate of the levels of spending that would be required to meet the goal included in the preaccident program--construction of the current design by the mid-1990s. Even this high option does not include transportation, operations, additional scientific equipment, and a "lifeboat" spacecraft that would allow the station crew to return to earth in the event of an emergency.

A central conclusion of this analysis is that the expectations of the preaccident program cannot be realized without substantial spending increases above the CBO baseline. Full funding of the additions to the NASA program considered in this analysis would raise NASA spending to $9.9 billion in 1988, $1.0 billion above the baseline, and to $62.5 billion over the 1988-1992 period, $14.0 billion above the $48.5 billion baseline. Moreover, this analysis excludes some of the aspirations of the preaccident NASA program and more recent suggestions that the NASA budget include development of a new, unmanned, heavy lift vehicle. Still the increases over the baseline are indicative of the support necessary to permit NASA to reach the goals of the preaccident program. The Congress must determine, therefore, which aspects of the NASA program deserve sizable increases above baseline and which should be deferred or reexamined in the light of competing spending priorities.

This document is available in its entirety in PDF.

1. The CBO baseline assumes no real growth in the NASA budget for 1988 through 1992, after subtracting $2.1 billion from the 1987 appropriation to account for the one-time appropriation to replace Challenger. The $14.5 billion estimate assumes that the program additions are not partially offset by reductions elsewhere in the NASA budget.