AS PREPARED FOR DELIVERY

STATEMENT ON THE NEW START TREATY AND NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION

M. President, I rise today to speak once again about the New START Treaty. Today I will talk about the New START treaty and the maintenance of a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. That means maintaining and sustaining the nuclear weapons stockpile and delivery platforms; modernizing the buildings and equipment in the nuclear weapons complex; and supporting the experts who are involved in it.

I'd like to preface my remarks by underlining the urgency for the Senate to ratify the treaty. How can it be that we don't have a treaty with Russia in place - along with its verification regime -360 days after the expiration of the original START treaty? That's more than six months after the Administration submitted the treaty to the Senate.
The verification regime will provide crucial insight into Russian forces - insight that's degrading over time without the treaty in place.

We need to ratify this treaty now.

For decades, our relations with the Soviet Union, and now with Russia, have been stabilized and made more predictable and cooperative through arms control agreements. How can it be that now - when Russia is no longer our enemy and yet not our ally - my friends across the aisle are refusing to move forward on ratifying a modest treaty that's critical for our national security?

If consideration of the treaty is delayed or blocked, it will make cooperation with Russia on national security interests much more difficult, if not impossible. Do you seriously believe that, if you block or reject the treaty, we'll see Russia's continued cooperation with international sanctions on Iran? Aren't you concerned that Russia will reconsider its prohibition on the sale of the S-300 anti-air defense missile systems to Iran, as it did in September?

And why put the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program at risk? Senator Lugar himself has warned that failure to ratify the treaty could imperil that enormously successful program in securing loose nukes.

If this modest treaty is blocked by the minority, I don't believe my friends on the other side will be pleased with the consequences.

Many of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle want to see negotiations with Russia on reductions in tactical nuclear weapons. I agree. That's going to be a difficult task under any circumstances. But as our lead negotiator Rose Gottemoeller said recently, there is zero chance of getting to the negotiating table with the Russians on tactical nuclear weapons unless we get this treaty ratified and entered into force.

It's also important to note that my colleagues on the other side of the aisle have been delaying consideration of the treaty for some time. Back in August, Senator McConnell said, "The only way this treaty gets in trouble is if it's rushed." And Senator Kyl told reporters that since it could be hard to get everything done before the November election, the Senate might need a lame duck session to vote on New START.
The Administration and Chairman Kerry deferred to those Republicans, but now those same colleagues are saying we can't do it during the lame duck session. To them, I say, if not now, when? If we defer and delay further, we risk a collapse in relations with Russia-including the loss of their continued cooperation on the all-important Iran issue.

Now, the remaining major objection to ratification that Republicans have raised is not a feature of the treaty itself, but maintenance and modernization of our nuclear arsenal and complex.

There is bipartisan agreement that as our nuclear arsenal gets smaller through arms control agreements, ensuring that it remains safe, secure, and effective takes on added importance. From my perspective, that's the fundamental justification for nuclear modernization. And I agree with Senator Kyl, who emphasized in a floor statement, and I quote, the "direct link between nuclear force reductions and modernization of the U.S. nuclear weapons complex." Likewise, Senator McCain has noted that, quote, "as we move to reduce the size of our nuclear stockpile, this modernization effort becomes all the more important."

The Obama Administration has made a serious commitment to nuclear modernization, and they've paired it with arms control. We have an extensive set of programs in place to retain confidence in the stockpile without testing. We're extending the life of our current nuclear delivery vehicles and studying, planning, and beginning the next generation. And we're continuing to develop plans for major improvements in the complex of facilities that support the nuclear enterprise.

I support the Administration's approach to modernization tethered to arms control. Now I have to admit, in these tough economic times, I do have concerns with spending $85 billion on an enormous nuclear complex - that's a staggering amount of money. Without a commitment to arms control and non-proliferation, it's impossible to justify spending that much money. This is the 21st century, not the Cold War, and our needs are different.
That's why I won't support this massive investment in modernization without an equal commitment to arms control and non-proliferation. That's why earlier this year I joined several colleagues in writing to the Budget Committee in support of the Administration's massive FY 2011 request for the National Nuclear Safety Administration, or NNSA.

I will continue to fight for nuclear modernization paired with arms control. But they must be paired. Our national security requires it. And political reality requires it.

That's what the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States - better known as the Perry-Schlesinger Commission - made clear. The Commission's report has been the main touchstone on all sides of the debate over New START.

The December 15, 2009 letter to the President from 41 of my colleagues, including all the members of the minority, relies heavily on the Commission's recommendations in spelling out its requirements for the treaty and modernization. Senator McCain's September 14th letter to the Foreign Relations Committee relies on the Commission's perspective on the modernization of the nuclear complex. Senator Kyl's May 24, 2010 floor speech on New START also makes prominent reference to and endorses the Commission's report.

Here is the first page of the report's Executive Summary - quote:
"While deterrence plays an essential role in reducing nuclear dangers, it is not the only means for doing so, and accordingly the United States must seek additional cooperative measures of a political kind, including for example arms control and nonproliferation. This is a time when these approaches can be renewed and reenergized."- Unquote.
Not only deterrence, but also arms control and nonproliferation. We must be committed to both together. That's why the Commission goes on to say, "These components of strategy must be integrated into a comprehensive approach."

It is just such a comprehensive approach that the Administration has taken. In its very first recommendation, the Commission warns of the importance of maintaining both components of strategy:

"The United States should continue to pursue an approach to reducing nuclear dangers that balances deterrence, arms control, and nonproliferation. Singular emphasis on one or another element would reduce the nuclear security of the United States and its allies."

I submit that the Administration and those of us who have pushed nuclear modernization in good faith - to support deterrence and nonproliferation and arms control - are following this recommendation. Those who have held the New START treaty hostage to ungrounded complaints about modernization and ever-changing demands are not.

I believe many of my colleagues on the other side will vote for this treaty. They understand that it is modest, but also important, and they'll put national security ahead of partisan political pressures. But if a small number of Republicans continue to delay and block this treaty, they will be responsible for the disintegration of the consensus on nuclear modernization, and the complex and arsenal will once against become subject to controversy, dispute, and drift. That's just the reality.

It's true that Republicans have broadly questioned the Administration's commitment on nuclear modernization. But their criticisms do not stand up to scrutiny.

Thus, Senator Kyl's criticisms of the Obama Administration's pledge to spend $100 billion to maintain and modernize nuclear delivery systems - that's right, $100 billion - is that "the plan makes a commitment only to a next-generation submarine - not to a next-generation bomber, ballistic missile, or air-launched cruise missile."

This makes it sound like the Administration lacks commitment to a credible deterrent, but that is just not true. Where decisions need to be made now, the Administration has made them - with respect to the SSBN(X), the next-generation submarine. Where decisions would benefit from further consideration, and do not need to be made now, that's what is happening.

The Administration is undertaking a comprehensive set of assessments of 21st-century threats and needs, and it will then make decisions on what follows the Minuteman III, the Air-Launched Cruise Missile, and the B-52 and B-2.

The Minuteman III missile is, by congressional mandate, having its life extended through 2030. Studies to inform the decision about the follow-on are needed now, and they are happening.

Similarly, the Department of Defense is studying the right mix of long-range strike capabilities, and part of that will be the appropriate role for successors to the Air-Launched Cruise Missile and the bomber. The decision with respect to our bombers can be made in the future because the bombers, though old, don't get that much stress and still have a lot of life left in them. The same is true for the Air-Launched Cruise Missile, though a decision on what will follow next needs to be made sooner.

The decision on our long-range strike capabilities should be deferred in part because - as the Under Secretary of Defense recently explained - the DoD will seek the same productivity growth and cost savings here as it is pursuing with the SSBN(X) submarine.

On the nuclear stockpile, the Administration, with Congressional support, is moving forward with the ongoing Life Extension Program for the W76 and with studies for the B61 Life Extension Program. It will also conduct a similar study for the W78, including exploring the potential for a common system with the W88 warhead.

Republicans have complained that the Administration's policy for the refurbishment, reuse, and replacement of nuclear components in the warheads unduly constrains the work of scientists in the nuclear complex. This is not so, as the lab directors have testified. These lab directors are on the frontlines of maintaining and modernizing the stockpile, and they will have the flexibility they need.

Then there is the nuclear complex. In the ten-year plan the Administration submitted under Section 1251 of last year's defense authorization, the Administration made an historic investment in the nuclear complex. It set a dramatically higher baseline for FY 2011. It included several years of funding increases consistent with what the NNSA can absorb and execute. And over 10 years, it initially committed to an $80 billion investment in the nuclear complex, a $10 billion increase.

Now, the Democratic Congress took the extraordinary step this past September of including funding at the full FY2011 level for weapons activities in the Continuing Resolution we passed. Almost everything else in the Continuing Resolution stuck to 2010 levels.

The nuclear complex is one of the most controversial parts of the debate over nuclear modernization, particularly the prospect of replacing two major facilities. The first is the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Facility Replacement at Los Alamos, which is central to our plutonium capabilities. The second is the Uranium Processing Facility at the Y-12 Plant in Tennessee.

Republicans have complained that there is uncertainty and not enough funding for these two replacement projects. But the Administration's budget has shown a significant commitment. Where there is uncertainty, it's not due to a lack of commitment on the Administration's part, but simply because the design and planning process for these facilities are in an early phase.
We simply don't know what construction of the facilities is going to cost, and that's something the FY 2011 budget submission from NNSA makes abundantly clear. To budget as though we did know those costs would be irresponsible-especially for an agency that has historically been plagued by cost overruns. It's simply too soon to have a solid baseline planning number.

To be sure, the Administration has been updating and revising its plans and estimates. Two weeks ago, it released an update to its Section 1251 report with a revised, substantially higher cost estimate for both replacement facilities.

It also included yet more funding for the NNSA's overall budget. The Administration has proposed an additional $600 million in funding for FY 2012 and an additional $4.1 billion over the next five years. That brings the total for the next decade to $85 billion. This both serves as a reminder that it's too early to have a fixed budget for the new facilities, and also strongly reinforces the Administration's good-faith effort and commitment.

This brings me back to my fundamental point. I believe that support for the two new facilities can be sustained if we follow the path laid out by the Perry-Schlesinger Commission and pursued by the Administration. This means balancing deterrence, arms control, and non-proliferation. The reality is that there will be significant questions and doubts about proceeding with such a costly modernization effort if it's not accompanied by equal support for arms control and non-proliferation.

There is no doubt that the existing facilities are aging and run down. There are even safety problems. Something must be done.

But if we are going to move forward effectively, modernization must be paired with arms control. And that starts with a modest first step-ratification of the New START treaty.

Without that step, consensus will break down, the replacement facilities will once again lose a coherent mission, and we will be stuck with drift and controversy. The Perry-Schlesinger Commission recognizes that if it's not possible to sustain the budget requisite for both facilities concurrently, choices will have to be made.
They give powerful reasons for moving forward with the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Facility before the Uranium Processing Facility. That is the kind of tough choice we'll have to make if New START is not ratified. Similarly, real uncertainty will creep into the consideration of just what sort of project the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Facility should be.

Let me conclude by noting that the Administration and the Democratic Congress have met every demand that many of my friends across the aisle have made on modernization. To my friends on the other side, I say, look at the demands in the December 2009 letter that you all signed. The Administration has met each of those demands.

Look at what Senator Kyl said in an op-ed in July: "A key test is whether the Democratic-controlled Congress will approve the president's nuclear modernization requests for the coming fiscal year." We passed that test, and as I mentioned earlier under an otherwise flat-lined continuing resolution.

In that same piece, and in his March letter with Senator McConnell to the President, Senator Kyl indicated he wanted assurances that the FY 2012 budget would include adequate funding as well. Although next year's budget isn't due out until February, as I mentioned before the Administration has already announced what it will be requesting, and it will be another enormous increase in the weapons activities budget. Can there really be any doubt that the Administration will move aggressively forward with modernization - if Republicans take the first modest step of ratifying New START now?

We have passed our key test. The Administration has met the demands Sen. Kyl had laid out. Now the key test for Senator Kyl and others is whether they will join us in ratifying the New START treaty. If they don't do that now, the consensus that we have built will fall apart. Our national security will be put at risk. And we will return to the dark days when the nuclear enterprise was the subject of neglect and controversy.

The New START treaty is a modest but very important step. It is one we should all take together, without controversy.

Thank you, and I yield the floor.