The Looming Budgetary Impact of Society's Aging
The federal budget-making process is near-term in nature, with rules and procedures that are applicable only five or 10 years into the future. As a result, the looming multidecade rise in government spending associated with society's aging is not in the budget picture on which the Administration and the Congress are required to act annually.
The relatively sanguine budgetary outlook for the next decade does not encompass the demographic shifts--emerging with the retirement of the post-World War II baby-boom generation--that will cause federal spending to begin rising sharply within the next 20 years (see Figure
1). At the same time, the near-term outlook offers an opportunity
to introduce the necessary policies to mitigate the long-term pressures.
Those policy changes affecting federal commitments to the elderly should
be implemented far enough in advance to offer future recipients of Social
Security and other entitlement benefits time to alter their savings and
retirement plans.
For the President and the Congress, the immediacy of having
to make year-to-year budgetary policy will always place heavy emphasis
on the near term. However, it is critical for policymakers to begin addressing
the long-term budgetary pressures associated with the aging of the U.S.
population. |
Figure 1.
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Federal Outlays, Fiscal Years 2002 to 2075 |
(As a percentage of GDP) |
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The Near-Term Focus of the Budget-Making Process
Federal budgeting does not have a long time horizon. The Congress enacts
annual budget resolutions that look no farther ahead than the next 10 years,
and annual budget projections and updates prepared by the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) and the Administration's Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) typically are limited to five- and 10-year periods. Appropriations
similarly reflect a near-term perspective as they are made from year to
year. This emphasis on the near term is set by precedent and long practice.
Although long-range projections are not part of the budget process,
they have been made regularly for Social Security and Medicare, as well
as for a number of other federal retirement and disability systems.(1) In Social Security's early years, the program's trustees used a projection technique that employed an "infinite" period of valuation, and since 1965, they have used a 75-year period. For Medicare, long-range estimates have been a more recent phenomenon. For the Hospital Insurance portion of the program, 25-year projections were the practice until the mid-1980s.
For the Supplementary Medical Insurance part of the program, only annual
projections were routinely made.
In recent years, as attention has been drawn to the long-range demographic
trends affecting the nation, both the Administration and CBO have been
called on to make longer-term estimates. The trustees for both Social Security
and Medicare now routinely make 75-year projections, and both OMB and CBO
have been issuing long-range budget projections since the mid-1990s.
In a period of stable demographic trends and modest swings in the economy,
a short horizon for budgeting may be sufficient as a framework for policymakers
to operate in. But it does not provide a long enough perspective to address
the very large and continuing rise in government spending that will occur
20 to 30 years from now. The outlook reflected in CBO's baseline projections
for fiscal years 2003 to 2012 (the latest of which were issued in March
2002) and in the subsequent decade is relatively favorable, as modest surpluses
are expected to arise within the next few years and to continue until the
early 2020s (under the assumption that current policies are not altered).
However, the first of the baby boomers will become eligible for Social
Security in just six years, and the seeds for a long-term rise in federal
spending begin to emerge shortly thereafter as more and more members of
that generation draw on the government's largest entitlement programs.
Society's Aging and Entitlement Programs
Certainly, long-range projections are subject to unforeseeable economic
and political events. In the short term, budget projections can change
significantly (even from year to year, as recent experience has shown),
and relatively small changes can have very large long-range effects as
they are compounded through time. Therefore, skepticism about long-range
estimates is justified.
However, a substantial portion of the demographic change underpinning
the long-term budgetary outlook is in place. The "baby boom" and subsequent
"baby trough" are events that have occurred; the subsequent uptick in birth
rates has not been substantial and may now have leveled off; and life expectancy
continues to increase (see Figures 2 and 3). As a share of gross domestic product (GDP), spending for Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid--the three entitlement programs most affected by the looming demographics--appears to be relatively stable over the next five years, growing only modestly. However, 10 years out, the outlook starts to change. The population age 65 or older will be growing rapidly. Although that segment constitutes 12 percent of the population today, according to the Social Security and Medicare trustees it is expected to grow to 18 percent in 2025, 21 percent in 2050, and 23 percent in 2075. At the same time, growth in the nation's
workforce is expected to slow, resulting in a more slowly growing economy
(see Figure 4). By 2035, the number of elderly will double, while the number of workers contributing to Social Security and Medicare will rise by only 17 percent. The ratio of the population ages 65 or older to the population in its prime working years (ages 20 to 64) will grow from
21 percent today to 32 percent in 2025 and 42 percent in 2075 (see Figure 5).
Figure 2.
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Birth Rates |
(Births per woman in her lifetime) |
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Figure 3.
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Years of Life Remaining at Age 65 |
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Figure 4.
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Growth in Real GDP and the Number of Workers |
(Annual percentage) |
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Figure 5.
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The Population Age 65 or Older as a Percentage of
the Population 20 to 64 |
(Percent) |
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Exacerbating the population trends, Social Security benefits are automatically
scheduled to rise in tandem with workers' wages, at a rate that is likely
to exceed inflation. And the cost of medical care is expected to continue
to climb at an even faster rate because of better technology and the demand
for more and better medical services--a rate that for years has consistently
outpaced the growth of GDP. As a result, national health expenditures,
including those financed by Medicare and Medicaid, will absorb a rising
proportion of the nation's production.
The Necessity of Looking Beyond the Near-Term Budgetary Window
Although these demographic and budgetary trends are not new to fiscal
policymakers, the budget process does not provide an effective means to
address them. That said, the near-term focus of the process does not preclude
a longer view. In the past, major reforms of entitlement programs have
taken both near-term and long-range concerns about fiscal policy into account.
However, unlike the circumstances leading to earlier reforms, the situation
today poses no imminent threat to anyone's benefits. But the problem with
waiting until the rapid escalation in costs falls within the budget window
is that doing so may not leave sufficient transition time to deal with
it in a gradual fashion.
Reform requires an awareness of the financial pressures that lie ahead
and a consensus that legislative changes are necessary. The information
presented here and in other long-term budget analyses is intended to help
policymakers acquire a fuller perspective about the issue and make prudent
decisions.
Supporting Tables
|
Economic Trends and Projections |
(Percent) |
Calendar Year |
Average Annual Rate of Growth
|
Real GDP |
Number of Workers |
1960-1965 |
5.0 |
1.6 |
1965-1970 |
3.4 |
2.1 |
1970-1975 |
2.7 |
1.5 |
1975-1980 |
3.7 |
2.9 |
1980-1985 |
3.1 |
1.5 |
1985-1990 |
3.2 |
2.0 |
1990-1995 |
2.4 |
0.9 |
1995-2000 |
4.1 |
1.6 |
2005 |
3.2 |
1.1 |
2010 |
2.2 |
0.7 |
2020 |
1.8 |
0.3 |
2030 |
1.8 |
0.4 |
2040 |
1.8 |
0.4 |
2050 |
1.7 |
0.3 |
2060 |
1.7 |
0.2 |
2070 |
1.7 |
0.2 |
2080 |
1.6 |
0.2 |
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Demographic Trends and Projections |
|
Calendar Year |
Life Expectancy at Age 65a
|
Births per Woman |
Population Age 65+ as Percent of Population 20 to 64 |
Women |
Men |
1940 |
79.7 |
77.7 |
2.23 |
11.6 |
1950 |
81.2 |
78.1 |
3.03 |
13.8 |
1960 |
82.4 |
78.2 |
3.61 |
17.3 |
1970 |
83.5 |
78.8 |
2.43 |
18.5 |
1980 |
83.8 |
79.7 |
1.85 |
19.5 |
1990 |
84.2 |
80.6 |
2.07 |
20.9 |
2000 |
84.7 |
81.4 |
2.13 |
21.1 |
2010 |
85.3 |
82.1 |
2.07 |
21.2 |
2020 |
85.9 |
82.8 |
1.99 |
27.5 |
2030 |
86.6 |
83.4 |
1.95 |
35.5 |
2040 |
87.2 |
84.0 |
1.95 |
36.8 |
2050 |
87.7 |
84.6 |
1.95 |
37.1 |
2060 |
88.2 |
85.2 |
1.95 |
39.2 |
2070 |
88.8 |
85.7 |
1.95 |
41.3 |
2075 |
89.0 |
85.9 |
1.95 |
42.3 |
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1. |
The projections made for these programs routinely have been published in separate reports by agencies or trustees as long-range actuarial evaluations of the programs. They have not been published in a single report nor presented in a budget
format. However, aspects of them have been consolidated as part of a required
analysis of the federal government's financial statements and are now published
annually in the Treasury Department's Financial Report of the United
States Government, 2001 (March 29, 2002). The underlying assumptions often are not consistent from program to program. |
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