For Immediate Release
March 23, 2009

Statement of Senator Dianne Feinstein On the Law Enforcement Review of the 2009 Inauguration Review

Washington, DC—The multi-agency law enforcement team, led by the U.S. Secret Service, today released an executive summary of its review of security and crowd management issues that developed during the 56th Presidential Inauguration.  In addition to the Secret Service, the agencies that participated in the review included the U.S. Capitol Police, the Washington Metropolitan Police Department and the U.S. Park Police. The following is a comment by Senator Dianne Feinstein, who served as chairman of the Joint Congressional Committee on Inaugural Ceremonies:

“An enormous amount of preparation and planning went into this historic event, and I am grateful to all those who worked so hard to make the day a success.  More than 1.8 million people attended the inaugural ceremonies, the largest public gathering in the history of Washington, DC, and there were no major arrests or injuries. But for those with tickets who could not get into the swearing-in ceremonies, or were turned away from the parade or one of the balls, it was a tremendous disappointment and a cause for outrage.  To address the concerns raised by thousands of people who wrote to the Committee, I asked Secret Service Director Mark Sullivan to commission this comprehensive analysis.

While this review cannot change what happened, and may not satisfy all of those who were shut out of the event, it does provide a good assessment of both the successes and deficiencies of the planning for 2009.  It also uses the lessons of 2009 to provide important and thoughtful guidance for the next inaugural planners.

The law enforcement review showed that a number of factors led to thousands of ticketed guests not being admitted to the Capitol grounds in time to witness the inauguration. These factors included the unprecedented crowds of non-ticketed guests trying to view the inauguration and merging with people who had tickets; different understandings of street closures between various law enforcement agencies; inadequate crowd management tools to direct, sort and queue the people seeking to get onto the Capitol grounds or gain access to the National Mall; and a failure to properly monitor or respond to the unexpected queuing of thousands of people in the northbound Third Street tunnel tube.

Among the extensive recommendations made by the review team are for the law enforcement agencies that have been solely responsible for crowd management to adopt a more integrated approach to crowd issues, including directly involving the Congressional and Presidential Inaugural Committees in the planning process and turning over responsibility for pre-screening and way-finding to these committees to hire staff or recruit volunteers for this function.

The report also recommends that the authority be better centralized within an executive steering committee established as part of the National Special Security Event designation to help resolve conflicts that might develop between the various law enforcement agencies involved and ensure that all agencies are working together on a common mission.

Some of the other key findings are provided below:

1. The tickets printed in July did not have the most up-to-date directions because changes were made to the silver ticket gate location to accommodate revised parade and security plans, and a supplemental map handed out with the tickets could have done a better job of explaining the changes. The chief recommendation was to print the tickets much later in the process—but an alternative might also be to continue printing them over the summer, without a map, but include a reference to a centralized web site and telephone hotline and ensure that the map is printed at the latest possible date, and handed out with the tickets.  Much more extensive information on pathways to the gates and queuing areas also should be made available on the centralized web site utilized by all the agencies and committees involved in the planning process.
   
2. The review found that contrary to initial reports, no gate was closed because the purple or blue areas and  their overflow zones had become too crowded.  Nevertheless, a key recommendation is to revise future plans to consider decreasing the number of standing room guests to assure no problems in case of crowd surges or other unexpected developments.
3. The review concluded that adequate numbers of screeners and magnetometers were used in the purple and blue areas, and the 16-foot-gates to get into the screening areas were wide enough for the crowds.  However, as a layman, I believe this should be examined further in making preparations for the next inaugural.
4. The Purple gate situation was aggravated by a nearby entrance to the parade screening area, a nearby pedestrian exit from the southbound tube of the Third Street tunnel through which crowds of non-ticketed guests came, a proximity to Union Station and large crowds of non-ticketed guests, and the compounding issues created by people queuing in the northbound tube of the Third Street tunnel.  There were insufficient law enforcement resources at the scene, and no public address system by which to communicate with the crowd at large.
5. Also, the problems were worsened at Purple, Blue and Silver because of insufficient resources and signage to keep the ticketed guests and non-ticketed guests separated, and to form good queues for arriving ticketed guests. The report makes a number of very good recommendations for improving queuing, having better signs and distributing them much more widely for both ticketed and non-ticketed guests and for having public address systems at all the gates and queuing areas.  It also recommends transferring authority for pre-screening and way-finding services from law enforcement and to JCCIC for the swearing in and to PIC for the parade so they can hire staff or volunteers to do this in place of law enforcement.  I agree that there is a major need for a much greater number of pre-screeners and way-finders and other guides.  I believe future inaugural planners need to assess the best way to accomplish this and whether to also utilize more National Guard or outside law enforcement provided from other areas of the country.
6. Regarding the Third Street Tunne—The northbound tube of the Third Street tunnel had been reserved for emergency vehicles only—no pedestrians—but according to the report, there were no barrels, signs or other devices in place to block entrance and very early in the morning, people started using it as a queue for the purple gate.  When a police team saw the queue, the report said they sought to redirect people, but when that was not possible, they began telling people to line up in the tunnel.  However, it appears no police report on this made its way to the multi-agency command post (MACC).

Later in the morning, when calls came into the MACC from people who felt trapped in the tunnel, the information was misinterpreted and officials were not aware of the extent of the problem.  These are very serious problems and need to remedied for the next inaugural.  The report recommends a number of changes to improve joint planning and the use of tunnels and roadways, and ensure high-level executive steering committee signoff of all such plans.  Another important recommendation was to create a much better reporting system at the joint command center, along with a future integration of social network tools such as Facebook, Twitter  and text messages from civilians to ensure more comprehensive awareness of problems as they develop in real time.

Attached is a copy of the executive summary of the multi-agency law enforcement report.  The Secret Service has classified the full report as “law enforcement sensitive” and not for public release.

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