On September 11, 2001, the United States was attacked by members of Al Qaeda, a stateless band of lethally dangerous, well-financed religious fanatics and terrorists.  We lost over 3,000 Americans on that day—one that will forever haunt us.

In order to defend against another attack, we had to apprehend these terrorist criminals and try them for their crimes. In October 2001, the United States attacked Al Qaeda and its supporters in Afghanistan.  This was essential to our national security.  I supported our military effort in Afghanistan against al Qaeda and  Osama bin Laden—those who actually attacked our nation—at that time and I still support a limited military engagement there today.

Within weeks, American troops were able to subdue our enemies in Afghanistan. We forced Osama bin Laden and his top lieutenants to retreat into the mountains near Tora Bora.  It seemed that we would strike a death blow against Al Qaeda.

At the same time, President Bush was planning a second war against Iraq—a country that had no connection to Al Qaeda.  He said that there was evidence that Saddam Hussein was developing chemical, biological and nuclear weapons—Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD’s).  He told us that it was essential to attack Iraq in order to prevent these weapons from falling into terrorist hands.

The US, in concert with our allies, should have been pursuing our attackers—where they were—with vigor and focus.  Instead, President Bush ordered the massive deployment of US troops to Iraq, a country that had not attacked us, and left a much smaller, under-resourced force on the ground in Afghanistan.  Bin Laden was able to disappear into the mountains between Afghanistan and Pakistan—and after eight years, he is yet to be found.  Intelligence reports tell us that Al Qaeda has reorganized and that it is more active than ever.  In 2008, the National Counterterrorism Center released a report entitled “Al- Qaeda Better Positioned to Strike the West,” which concluded that Al Qaeda had largely rebuilt itself.  Across Al Qaeda’s new safe haven in remote Pakistani tribal areas, terrorist training camps have multiplied, and estimates are that 2,000 or more militants now operate there.  Only four years ago, there were just a few hundred.

President Bush’s strategy to fight terrorism was a failure.  He allowed the top Al Qaeda leadership to escape from Afghanistan, he started a costly, lengthy, and unnecessary war in Iraq (which never had any WMD’s), and he allowed Al Qaeda to regain power worldwide.

Today, terrorism presents an even more serious threat to the United States than it did on September 11th. Al Qaeda, which is only one of many terrorist organizations, remains well-financed and well-organized. Its leaders continue to broadcast messages from its new base in Pakistan, and they are still determined to launch other large-scale strikes against our country.  The Afghanistan-Pakistan area has been cited as the “epicenter” of terrorist activity (by the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, as well as by many witnesses who have testified in the 111th Congress before the House Armed Services Committee).  Pakistan is an unstable nation, which now has a substantial Al Qaeda and Taliban presence in several regions and a sharply increasing level of violence.  It also has nuclear weapons.  If terrorists were to gain control of the Pakistani state and its nuclear weapons, the danger to the United States would be severe.  The current instability in Afghanistan driven by the Taliban insurgency has the potential to further destabilize Pakistan.

As we continue redeploying our forces from Iraq, we and our allies need to refocus our efforts on the fight against these terrorist criminals in Pakistan and neighboring countries. To be successful in the fight against terrorism and the Taliban insurgency, we must create a coherent strategy that works with and not against Afghanistan’s tribal structures.  I believe this means using a strategy with a light footprint that relies more on Afghans defending their own villages. one that actually succeeded at the beginning of our engagement in Afghanistan, when a few hundred Special Forces worked with Afghan tribal defense forces to throw the Taliban from power and literally chase them from Afghanistan. I support shifting our resources to such a strategy—which I think is likely to be more successful than one with a heavier footprint. 

On July 14, 2010, General Petraeus struck an agreement with the government of Afghanistan to establish community police forces in Afghan villages to protect them from the Taliban. Local forces can provide effective protection for small or isolated Afghan communities where the military is absent, which is most of Afghanistan. This focus on local leaders should allow U.S. Special Forces to operate more effectively in tracking down terrorists, disrupting their operations and ultimately eliminating their ability to attack the United States. I believe that the best chance for success in Afghanistan depends on the willingness of local tribes to defend their own backyard and take increasing responsibility for their own defense.

While President Obama has brought a badly needed focus to operations in Afghanistan, I disagree with his decision to further increase our presence in Afghanistan to over 100,000 U.S. and allied soldiers.  This heavy-footprint approach will not only be costly, in lives and in treasure, but will likely be counterproductive.  If Afghans resent our increased presence, as can easily happen with the heavy footprint approach, they will be even more inclined to support the Taliban insurgency.

We need to be knowledgeable and sensitive to the cultures and customs of the region, and to use our soft power whenever possible, targeting aid appropriately, and communicating with the local populations more effectively.  The key to success in the region is not just military, and our goals will not be accomplished by using a “lone wolf” approach.  The Obama Administration believes this also, and has initiated vigorous diplomatic efforts across the region. In December, the Obama Administration began to increase diplomatic efforts to stabilize relations between India and Pakistan. Easing regional tensions will put more pressure on the Taliban and other extremist organizations. We also need other nations to work closely with us on this mission. We need our allies in Europe to step up their assistance, particularly in contributing to the costs of operations and bearing their share of the fighting.  I believe we need to engage the entire region to bring real stability to the broader Middle East.