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CBO
Testimony

Statement of
Peter R. Orszag
Director

Economic Volatility

before the
Joint Economic Committee
United States Congress


February 28, 2007

This document is embargoed until it is delivered at 9:30 a.m. (EST) on Wednesday, February 28, 2007. The contents may not be published, transmitted, or otherwise communicated by any print, broadcast, or electronic media before that time.




Notes

Some of the figures in this testimony use shaded vertical bars to indicate periods of recession. (A recession extends from the peak of a business cycle to its trough.)

Numbers in the text and tables may not add up to totals because of rounding.


Chairman Schumer, Vice-Chair Maloney, Congressman Saxton, and Members of the Committee, I appreciate the invitation to participate in today’s hearing. My testimony makes four main points:

Macroeconomic Volatility

Macroeconomic volatility has been significantly lower during the past 20 years than in preceding decades. Although recessions can still be quite painful for particular sectors and workers, recessions have been less severe overall—in duration, frequency, and magnitude—than they were between 1950 and the mid-1980s. The quarter-to-quarter fluctuations in gross domestic product (GDP) have become smaller (see the top panel of Figure 1). In addition, the level and volatility of inflation over the past 20 years have also been relatively low (see the bottom panel of Figure 1). Volatility in more recent years has been less than half that of the previous period (see Table 1). The corresponding reduction in people’s uncertainty about prices allows them to plan better for the future. Volatility has declined not only in the growth of overall GDP and inflation but also in virtually all of the major components of GDP and in aggregate unemployment, wages, and income.

Figure 1.


Macroeconomic Volatility

(Percent)
Figure 1

Sources: Congressional Budget Office; Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

a. Inflation as measured by the growth of the chained price index for personal consumption expenditures.


Table 1.


Changes in Macroeconomic Volatility

Volatility
  1950–1984 1985–2005
     
GDP Growth 3.1 1.4
   
Inflation 2.9 1.0

Sources: Congressional Budget Office; Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

Note:  Volatility is measured as the standard deviation of the change from the previous year in gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (for GDP growth) and in the chained price index for personal consumption expenditures (for inflation), in each case using quarterly data.


Although there is no conclusive explanation for the decline in the volatility of GDP growth and inflation, numerous reasons have been advanced, many of which are closely interrelated. The proposed explanations fall into four broad categories.

Workers’ Earnings and Households’ Incomes

The story at the level of the individual worker or household is different from the story at the macroeconomic level. Individual earnings tend to rise over time, but the data suggest that workers and families experience substantial volatility year to year around that underlying trend.

To examine earnings and income volatility, CBO analyzed recent data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (a data set collected by the U.S. Census Bureau). The analysis focused on workers who were 25 to 55 years old and not in school in school, so it therefore does not capture changes in earnings associated with graduating from school or leaving work for school.(3) Even so, the analysis shows substantial variation in workers’ before-tax earnings from 2001 to 2002. After an adjustment for inflation, one in four workers saw his or her earnings increase by at least 25 percent, while one in five saw his or her earnings decline by at least 25 percent. A substantial portion of workers, 11 percent, saw their earnings decline by at least half (see Figure 2).

Figure 2.


Distribution of Changes in Workers’ Annual Earnings from 2001 to 2002

(Percent)
Figure 2

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the 2001 panel of the Bureau of the Census’s Survey of Income and Program Participation.

Note: The sample consists of individuals ages 25 to 55 who had positive earnings in 2001 and were not enrolled in school that year or in 2002. Earnings are inflated to 2002 dollars using the research series of the consumer price index for urban consumers.


Workers with less education tend to experience more volatility in their earnings than do workers with more education (see Table 2). For example, from 2001 to 2002, 16 percent of workers without a high school education had their earnings decline by 50 percent or more, compared with 10 percent of workers with more than a high school education.

Table 2.


Distribution of Changes in Workers’ Annual Earnings from 2001 to 2002, by Educational Attainment and Age

(Percent)
Decrease in  Changes in  Increases in 
Earnings of at Least Earnings of Less Than Earnings of at Least
  50 Percent 25 Percent 25 Percent 25 Percent 50 Percent
 
All Workers 10.7 19.8 55.5 24.7 14.2
Educational Attainment
Less than high school 15.6 26.0 47.9 26.0 16.4
High school 11.6 19.8 55.0 25.2 14.8
More than high school 9.5 18.8 57.0 24.2 13.6
Age
25 to 30 11.4 20.0 53.8 26.2 14.6
31 to 40 10.7 19.8 54.5 25.7 14.9
41 to 55 10.5 19.7 56.7 23.6 13.7

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the 2001 panel of the Bureau of the Census’s Survey of Income and Program Participation.

Note:  The sample consists of individuals ages 25 to 55 in 2001 who had positive earnings in 2001 and were not enrolled in school that year or in 2002. Earnings are inflated to 2002 dollars using the research series of the consumer price index for urban consumers.


Such fluctuations in earnings can result from many sources, including job changes, job losses, job gains, voluntary exits from the labor force to care for children or other family members, changes in the number of hours worked per year, or changes in the wage rate received by workers. Among workers who experienced at least a 50 percent drop in earnings, most did not work at least a month and typically did not work eight months in 2002. When asked why they were not working, the most common responses were that they were caring for a child or other family member or were pregnant; were not able to find work or had been laid off; were unable to work because of disability, illness, or injury; or were not interested in working or were retired.(4) The responses appear to be split evenly between those suggesting that the departure from the labor force was voluntary and those suggesting that it was not.

Total household income consists not only of the earnings of household members but also other sources of cash income such as unemployment insurance, retirement income, dividends, and interest. Compared with earnings, it thus represents a broader measure of the economic resources available to individuals.(5) Like workers' earnings, household income can vary from year to year, though it tends to be less variable than individual earnings. First, if an individual worker in a household with multiple earners loses a job, the earnings of the other members may partially mitigate the consequences of the job loss. Second, a loss in earned income may be alleviated by an increase in other sources of income, like unemployment insurance, payments from a retirement plan, or disability insurance. Neither the mitigating effects of the presence of other earners in the household nor the potential for increases in nonlabor income is captured in the more narrow measure of individual earnings.

To be sure, household income can vary from changes in the composition of households. Households are not fixed entities: They often evolve, as couples marry, separate, or divorce and working children move out of or into the house.

According to CBO’s analysis, the growth of before-tax income varied substantially among households between 2001 and 2002 (see Figure 3). Nearly one in four households experienced an increase in income of at least 25 percent, virtually identical to the number of individuals who experienced a similar percentage increase in earnings. Fewer households, one in seven, experienced a decrease in income of at least 25 percent. And one in 25 households experienced a decrease in income of at least 50 percent—compared with one in nine individuals who experienced such a decline in earnings. Unlike the variability of earnings, however, the variability of household income seems similar across education levels (see Table 3).

Figure 3.


Distribution of Changes in Households’ Annual Income from 2001 to 2002

(Percent)
Graph

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the 2001 panel of the Bureau of the Census’s Survey of Income and Program Participation.

Note: The sample consists of households in January 2001 that were surveyed for all of that year and 2002. Income, which is before taxes, includes earnings, unemployment compensation, workers’ compensation, Social Security benefits, Supplemental Security Income, public assistance, veterans’ payments, survivors' benefits, disability benefits, pension or retirement income, interest, dividends, rents, royalties, income from estates or trusts, alimony, child support, financial assistance from outside the household, and other cash income. Income is inflated to 2002 dollars using the research series of the consumer price index for urban consumers.


Table 3.


Distribution of Changes in Households’ Annual Income from 2001 to 2002, by Educational Attainment and Age of the Head of the Household

(Percent)
Decrease in Changes in Increases in
Income of at Least Income of Less Than Income of at Least
  50 Percent 25 Percent 25 Percent 25 Percent 50 Percent
 
All Households 4.3 14.2   62.2 23.6 12.5
Educational Attainment of the Head of the Household            
  Less than high school 4.3 14.6   62.1 23.3 12.6
High school 4.2 13.8   61.9 24.2 12.6
More than high school 4.3 14.3   62.3 23.3 12.4
Age of the Head of the Household
25 to 30 4.2 14.8   59.3 26.0 13.8
31 to 40 4.3 14.7   59.6 25.7 13.6
41 to 55 4.8 15.1   61.2 23.7 12.1

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the 2001 panel of the Bureau of the Census’s Survey of Income and Program Participation.

Note:  The sample consists of households in January 2001 that were surveyed for all of that year and 2002. Income includes earnings, unemployment compensation, workers’ compensation, Social Security benefits, Supplemental Security Income, public assistance, veterans’ payments, survivor benefits, disability benefits, pension or retirement income, interest, dividends, rents, royalties, income from estates or trusts, alimony, child support, financial assistance from outside the household, and other cash income. Income is inflated to 2002 dollars using the research series of the consumer price index for urban consumers.


For another point of comparison, CBO conducted a similar analysis using data from 1997 to 1998—a period of relatively rapid economic growth, in contrast to the relatively slow growth from 2001 to 2002—and found similar results.(6) Thus, substantial variability in workers’ earnings and income can occur in periods of both strong and weak economic growth.

Using surveys to measure the year-to-year variability in earnings and income is complicated by the fact that individuals’ responses are often in error (which could either overstate or understate the actual changes in earnings or income).(7) In addition, while the surveys are intended to be nationally representative, they may not include undocumented workers and can be subject to biases because some people either refuse to respond at all or drop out of the surveys before their completion. An important question, then, is whether, over longer periods of time, earnings and income volatility has increased. According to most studies on the topic, earnings have tended to fluctuate more, on a percentage basis, over the past 25 years than they did during the 1970s.(8)Relative to other questions about income and earnings, however, the trend in their volatility has received relatively little research attention. More research is therefore needed before firm conclusions about the precise time trend in earnings and income volatility can be reached.

To the extent that variability in earnings and income has increased, the phenomenon may be consistent with—and indeed perhaps part of the explanation of—the decreased macroeconomic volatility described earlier. For example, more-flexible labor markets could enable the economy to adjust to changes in the economic
environment more quickly but also could mean that individuals change jobs and have their wages change more frequently.

Risk Sharing, Income Fluctuations, and Taxation

Economists have long noted that the tax system serves as an automatic stabilizer that offsets at least part of demand shocks to the economy.(9)A decline in aggregate before-tax income of one dollar generates a decline in aggregate after-tax income of less than one dollar. As a result, the tax system helps to stabilize demand for goods and services, which in turn helps to reduce fluctuations in the overall economy.(10)

In addition to its well-recognized role as a macroeconomic automatic stabilizer, the tax system can serve as a microeconomic automatic stabilizer by helping to smooth out variability at the level of workers' earnings and households' income.(11) The tax system automatically reduces the tax burden when before-tax income declines and automatically raises the burden when before-tax income rises. After-tax income therefore tends to vary less than before-tax income.(12) In that way, the tax system provides a form of after-tax earnings or income insurance, which complements the social insurance provided through a variety of government programs.

(Although the federal tax system generally works to smooth out fluctuations in income, that attribute does not apply for each and every taxpayer.(13))

The risk-sharing features of the tax system can be illustrated in a simple example (see Table 4). Consider a single worker earning $45,000 in 2006 with no other sources of income. At that level of income, the worker would owe $5,695 in federal income taxes and $3,443 in payroll taxes and would therefore have $35,863 in after-tax income. If the worker's earnings fell by 20 percent, to $36,000, after-tax earnings would decline to $29,491. Although before-tax earnings fell by $9,000 (20 percent), after-tax earnings declined by only $6,372 (18 percent).

Table 4.


Effect of Taxes on the Variability of Income: An Example

(Dollars)
Change in Wages
Initial Wages Lower Wages Dollars Percent
 
Before-Tax Wages 45,000 36,000 -9,000 -20
Income Taxes 5,695 3,755
Payroll Taxes 3,443 2,754
Total taxes 9,138 6,509
After-Tax Wages 35,863 29,491 -6,372 -18

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: Based on the tax schedule for a single worker in 2006.


The predictability of households' income will affect how much value they place on the insurance provided through the tax system. To the extent that swings in earnings or income are unpredictable, households will tend to value the insurance more. However, the value of that insurance will be smaller for households whose earning or income swings are largely expected or stem from intentional decisions about how much and when to work.

The insurance provided by the progressive tax system to households with variable income comes at a price: it can reduce average after-tax income for such households. Consider two people who have the same amount of lifetime earnings; one has steady earnings and the other, large swings in earnings. Under a progressive tax system based on annual income, the steady earner pays less in taxes over a lifetime even though both people have the same total amount of earnings. Thus, progressive taxation combined with an annual accounting period fails to treat people in similar circumstances in the same way. Various options for changing the tax system would alter the trade-off between the income smoothing insurance provided and the average cost imposed on households with variable income.

In addition to that trade-off between the insurance provided to and the price paid by households with variable income, any risk-sharing benefits that the tax system generates must be weighed against the potential costs that it imposes on the economy at large. Marginal tax rates affect households' decisions about how much to work and save, as well as the form in which to receive compensation for doing so, and those distortions reduce the efficient operation of the economy. The implicit insurance that the government provides through the tax system may have other effects, such as changing the types and forms of insurance products offered by the private markets or encouraging people to take risks they would not take in the absence of that implicit insurance.(14)

Comparing the various costs and benefits is difficult, and a complete accounting of all of those effects has not yet been achieved. Nonetheless, some recent studies have found that, compared with some alternatives, the current tax system may provide insurance benefits that are larger than the costs that it imposes on the economy by distorting decisions about working and saving.(15) However, those analyses depend on many assumptions, and alternative assumptions could yield different estimates, so the studies should be viewed with caution. Despite those caveats, a reasonable conclusion from this new research is that the income-smoothing insurance provided through the tax system could be quantitatively important and should be taken into account in any analysis of the relative costs and benefits of different tax systems.

Finally, it is important to note that the benefits of risk sharing and the costs of distortions are not captured by changes in GDP. Although GDP is a useful summary measure that may be related to households' well-being, it does not measure the value that households place on smoother incomes or the cost of distorted decisionmaking. Instead, GDP is merely a measure of how much output the market economy produces using its capital, labor, and technology. It does not measure what ultimately matters and what needs to be measured: changes in the well-being of households.

Conclusion

The U.S. economy has become less volatile: Macroeconomic fluctuations are now much milder than they were in the past. At the same time, however, households continue to experience substantial variability in their earnings and income, and that variability may now be greater than in the past—perhaps contributing to anxiety among workers and families. The tax system can help to smooth fluctuations in income not only at the macroeconomic level but also at the level of workers and households. The income insurance provided as a result may be quite valuable but needs to be weighed against the other effects of the tax system.



1. See Congressional Budget Office, The Economic Effects of Recent Increases in Energy Prices (July 2006). See also Lawrence F. Katz and Alan B. Krueger, “The High Pressure U.S. Labor Market of the 1990s,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, no. 1 (1999).

2. Securitization involves the conversion of cash flows into securities; credit derivatives are financial instruments designed to transfer credit risk from one party to another; and interest-rate swaps are an exchange of a series of payments based on different interest rates, which entities undertake to manage their exposure to changes in those rates.

3. For a discussion of wage trends in low-wage labor markets, see Congressional Budget Office, Changes in Low-Wage Labor Markets Between 1979 and 2005 (December 2006).

4. Only those individuals who had at least four consecutive months without a job responded to the question.

5. Household income, as reported here, is before-tax income and excludes capital gains and losses.

6. The data are from the 1996 and 2001 panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation, conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau.

7. See John Bound and Alan B. Krueger, "The Extent of Measurement Error in Longitudinal Surveys: Do Two Wrongs Make a Right?" Journal of Labor Economics, vol. 9, no. 1 (January 1991), pp. 1–24.

8. See, for example, Peter Gottschalk and Robert Moffitt, “The Growth of Earnings Instability in the U.S. Labor Market,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, no. 2 (1994); Costas Meghir and Luigi Pistaferri, “Income Variance Dynamics and Heterogeneity,” Econometrica, vol. 72, no. 1 (2004), pp. 1–32; Maury Gittleman and Mary Joyce, “Earnings Mobility in the United States, 1967–91,” Monthly Labor Review, vol. 118, no. 9 (September 1995), pp. 3–13; and Peter Gottschalk and Robert Moffitt, “Trends in the Transitory Variance of Earnings in the United States,” Economic Journal, vol. 112, no. 478 (2002), pp. 68–73.

9. See Alan J. Auerbach and Daniel Feenberg, “The Significance of Federal Taxes as Automatic Stabilizers,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 14, no. 3 (Summer 2000), pp. 37–56; and Thomas J. Kniesner and James P. Ziliak, “Tax Reform and Automatic Stabilization,” American Economic Review, vol. 92, no. 3 (June 2002), pp. 590–612.

10. The stabilizing effect of the tax system on the overall economy reached a peak around 1980 and by 1995 had declined to about the same level as in the 1960s. Since 1995, according to CBO’s estimates, there has been relatively little change. Those movements mirror the increase and then the decline in effective tax rates. See Auerbach and Feenberg, “The Significance of Federal Taxes as Automatic Stablizers.”

11. See Hal R. Varian, “Redistributive Taxation as Social Insurance,” Journal of Public Economics, vol. 14, no. 1 (August 1980), pp. 49–68; Jonathan Eaton and Harvey S. Rosen, “Labor Supply, Uncertainty, and Efficient Taxation,” Journal of Public Economics, vol. 14, no. 3 (December 1980), pp. 365–374; Jonathan Eaton and Harvey S. Rosen, “Taxation, Human Capital, and Uncertainty,” American Economic Review, vol. 70, no. 4 (September 1980), pp. 705–715; Jonathan Eaton and Harvey S. Rosen, “Optimal Redistributive Taxation and Uncertainty,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 95, no. 2 (September 1980), pp. 357–364.

12. Variability of income can be measured in different ways. Some analysts measure it as the change in dollar income; other analysts measure it as the percentage change in income. A pure proportional tax system can reduce the dollar amount of variability but does not affect the variability in percentage terms; a progressive tax system can reduce variability by both measures.

13. See Robert Moffitt and Michael Rothschild, "Variable Earnings and Nonlinear Taxation," Journal of Human Resources, vol. 22, no. 3 (Summer 1987), pp. 405–421. For example, the payroll tax for the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance program does not apply to earnings above the taxable maximum ($97,500 in 2007). As a result, when earnings fluctuate across that threshold, after-tax earnings can be more variable in percentage terms than before-tax earnings.

14. See Dirk Krueger and Fabrizio Perri, "Public Versus Private Risk Sharing" (working paper, December 2005).

15. See Shinichi Nishiyama and Kent Smetters, "Consumption Taxes and Economic Efficiency with Idiosyncratic Wage Shocks," Journal of Political Economy, vol. 113, no. 5 (October 2005), pp. 1088–1111; Juan Carlos Conesa and Dirk Krueger, "On the Optimal Progressivity of the Income Tax Code," Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 53, no. 7 (October 2006), pp. 1425–1450.