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The Economics of U.S. Tort Liability:
A Primer
  October 2003  


Cover Graphic





                
Preface

Many controversies and policy issues surround the U.S. tort system, which holds parties liable for injuries to people or property. Critics charge that the system is costly and inefficient, arbitrary and open to abuse, and indirectly harmful through its adverse effects on economic vitality and consumers' choices. In contrast, defenders argue that the tort system serves important social objectives, such as compensating injury victims, improving product safety, and punishing egregious behavior. Several bills now before the Congress propose to change the rules that govern tort claims for medical malpractice and asbestos exposure and claims litigated as class actions.

This Congressional Budget Office (CBO) study--prepared at the request of the Senate Budget Committee--attempts to clarify the issues and policy options surrounding the tort system by presenting an economic perspective on tort liability. The study outlines the strengths and weaknesses of tort liability as a tool for promoting economic efficiency and fairness, discusses the available data on the benefits and costs of the tort system, and analyzes in qualitative terms the likely effects of various policy options for altering the system. In keeping with CBO's mandate to provide objective, impartial analysis, this study makes no recommendations.

Perry Beider and Cary Elliott of CBO's Microeconomic and Financial Studies Division wrote the study, under the supervision of David Moore and Roger Hitchner. The authors received valuable comments and assistance from Heywood Fleisig, Stuart Hagen, and Robert Murphy of CBO, as well as from Jeff O'Hara, formerly of CBO; Christopher DeMuth of the American Enterprise Institute; Paul Rubin of Emory University; Alan Sykes of the University of Chicago; and Paula Hannaford-Agor and Neil LaFountain of the National Center for State Courts.

Christian Spoor edited the study, and Christine Bogusz proofread it. Maureen Costantino took the cover photograph and designed the cover. Lenny Skutnik printed the initial copies of the report, and Annette Kalicki prepared the electronic versions for CBO's Web site.

Douglas Holtz-Eakin
Director
October 2003




CONTENTS


  Summary
   
Introduction
   
An Overview of the U.S. Tort System
      The Expansion of Tort Liability in the United States
      Characteristics of the Tort System Today
   
Tort Liability as a Tool for Achieving Efficiency and Equity
      The Complexity of the Policy Problem
      Liability Rules in Principle
      Liability Rules in Practice
      Should Tort Rules Be Set at the Federal or State Level?
      Tort Liability Versus Insurance and Regulation
   
The Costs of the Tort System
      Defining the Costs of Tort Liability
      Evidence About the Costs of the Tort System
      Are Tort Costs Excessive?
   
An Overview of Policy Options for Changing the Tort System
      Options for Reducing the Scope of Tort Liability
      Options for Reforming the Tort System as a Whole
      Options for Reforming Certain Types of Torts


Tables
   
1.  Characteristics of Tort Cases Decided by Trial in State and Federal Courts, 1996
2.  Summary of Major Tort Liability Standards
3.  The Primary Effects of Some Broad Options for Tort Reform

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