Richard G. Lugar, United States Senator for Indiana

A press release on the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act is available at http://lugar.senate.gov/record.cfm?id=300697&. U.S. Sen. Dick Lugar's statement on the bill is available at http://lugar.senate.gov/record.cfm?id=300698&. A copy of the bill is available at http://lugar.senate.gov/sfrc/pdf/Pakistan.pdf.

The purpose and intent of this legislation is to help transform the relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan from a transactional, tactically-driven set of short-term exercises in crisis-management, into a deeper, broader, long-term strategic engagement.

For decades, the U.S. has sought to gain the cooperation of Pakistani decision-makers through military aid, while paying scant attention to the wishes of the population itself. The status quo isn’t working: the U.S. believes it is paying too much and getting too little—and most Pakistanis believe exactly the opposite. As a result, a critical mass of Pakistanis regard America as a greater threat than Al Qaeda.

Without changing this baseline, there is little likelihood of drying up popular tolerance for anti-U.S. terrorist groups, or persuading any Pakistani regime to devote the political capital necessary to deny such groups sanctuary and covert material support.

A premise for this plan is a simple thought-exercise: Following the 2005 Kashmir earthquake, the U.S. devoted nearly $1 billion to relief efforts, and reaped a greater reward in popular support than any amount of public diplomacy could generate. The sight of American servicemen and women saving the lives of Pakistani citizens was worth ten times the cost of operating the Chinook helicopters. For a brief period, America was challenging the terrorists in a true battle of hearts and minds—and winning.

Can we recreate these conditions – can we materially and powerfully demonstrate the true friendship of the American people for the Pakistani people – without waiting for a natural (or man-made) disaster?

Key provisions

Authorizes $7.5 billion over the next 5 fiscal years ($1.5 billion annually) in non-military aid. Advocates an additional $7.5 billion over the subsequent 5 years
Conditions military aid on certification by Secretary of State that Pakistani security forces are:

· making concerted efforts to prevent al Qaeda and associated terrorist groups from operating in the territory of Pakistan;

· making concerted efforts to prevent the Taliban from using the territory of Pakistan as a sanctuary from which to launch attacks within Afghanistan; and

· not materially interfering in the political or judicial processes of Pakistan.

Urges a reorientation of engagement towards the Pakistani people rather than merely towards the Pakistani government (civilian or military).
Urges accountability and transparent reporting of Coalition Support Funds.
Directs the Secretary of State (in consultation with other named officials) to develop a comprehensive strategy for the Afghan-Pakistan border area.

Additional information on key provisions

Non-military aid. This is the heart of the bill—shifting the center of gravity in the U.S.-Pakistan relationship from military to non-military engagement. The bill authorizes a figure more than triple the current levels of non-military funding.

To insure that the aid reaches the people directly, as much as possible goes directly to projects such as improving the secular educational system, building clinics, drilling wells, reforming police. Some of this money would be used in the border areas, but it would be available for projects throughout Pakistan.

The ten-year timeframe (5 years authorized, 5 years advocated) is intended to address persistent Pakistani fear that the U.S. is interested only in a short-term tactical (and highly transactional) relationship.

The $1.5 billion annual authorization is intended not merely to enable measurable progress, but to signal a serious shift in policy: a true break with the policy of the past that provides some insulation from the vagaries of the budgetary process.

Military aid conditions. These conditions incorporate longstanding U.S. demands for increased Pakistani cooperation against Al Qaeda and the Taliban, and for the military to refrain from interference in the democratic process. They provide powerful leverage for the Administration to gain better results for the billions we spend.

The bill takes no position on whether military aid will increase, decrease, or remain at current levels: That can be determined year-to-year, on the basis of need and cooperation.

These limitations will pose no undue burden: any Pakistani regime unable to satisfy the benchmarks would be an unlikely partner for U.S. efforts, and there is a national security waiver which can be exercised with explanation given in classified form if necessary.

Expanded engagement with the people of Pakistan. This is a key element of the overall strategy, but must rely on Administration policy implementation rather than on legislation. A deepened and broadened engagement would address issues of concern to the Pakistanis, rather than merely focusing on issues of concern to the U.S. Such topics include trade policy (textile quotas, etc.), visa policy, U.S. agricultural subsidies, U.S. policy in the Middle East, Guantanamo, or Kashmir.

We will not always agree with Pakistani interlocutors on such topics. But by insisting on a dialogue that is weighted almost entirely towards counterterrorism issues, we fail to provide the sort of respectful, open-ended engagement on which true cooperation is based.

Accountability and transparency for Coalition Support Funds (CSF). Currently, the U.S. supplies about $1 billion annually in CSF to Pakistan. These funds are regarded by the Bush Administration and the Pakistani government as “repayment” rather than “aid.” In fact, the accounting and transparency of this program makes a true reckoning impossible: How much of the $6 billion we’ve spent on CSF so far has actually gone to its intended purpose (compensation for actual expenses incurred in combating Al Qaeda and the Taliban)? How much has been used for the normal operating expenses of the Pakistani military? How much has simply been redirected to purposes of little or no benefit to the U.S.? The bill urges transparent accounting and tightened Congressional oversight.