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HEARING ON EPA'S NEW OZONE STANDARDS

Tuesday, May 20, 2008,

House of Representatives,

Committee on Oversight and

Government Reform,

Washington, D.C.

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Committee Hearings

of the

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES



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The committee met, pursuant to call, at 1:46 p.m., in

Room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Henry

A. Waxman [chairman of the committee] presiding.

Present: Representatives Waxman, Cummings, Kucinich, Tierney, Watson, Higgins, Hodes, Sarbanes, Welch, Platts, Cannon, Issa, Bilbray, and Sali.

Staff Present: Phil Barnett, Staff Director and Chief Counsel; Kristin Amerling, General Counsel; Karen Lightfoot, Communications Director and Senior Policy Advisor; Greg Dotson, Chief Environmental Counselor; John Williams, Deputy Chief Investigative Counsel; Alexander Teitz, Senior

20 Environmental Counsel; Jeff Baran, Counsel; Erik Jones,

Counsel; Jen Berenholz, Deputy Clerk; Matt Siegler, Special 21 22 Assistant; Caren Auchman, Press Assistant; Leneal Scott, 23 Information Systems Manager; Rob Cobbs, Staff Assistant; William Ragland, Staff Assistant; Miriam Edelman, Staff 24 25 Assistant; Larry Halloran, Staff Director: Jennifer 26 Safavian, Chief Counsel for Oversight and Investigations; 27 Keith Ausbrook, General Counsel; A. Brooke Bennett, Counsel; Ashley Callen, Counsel; Kristina Husar, Counsel; John 28 29 Cuaderes, Senior Investigator and Policy Advisor; Larry 30 Brady, Senior Investigator and Policy Advisor; Patrick Lyden, 31 Parliamentarian & Member Services Coordinator; Benjamin Chance, Professional Staff Member; Ali Ahmad, Deputy Press 32 33 Secretary; and John Ohly, Staff Assistant.

Chairman WAXMAN. The Committee will please come to order. Today's hearing will focus on several recent decisions that are of fundamental importance to our health and the environment.

I have worked on health and environmental issues for decades, and I know that regulatory decisions in these areas can be very complex. But the law is clear: While all of us may have views as to how we may want the outcome to be in any rulemaking, we don't get the outcome we want, particularly; we are not entitled to specific results, but what we are all entitled to is a fair process that is based on the science, the facts, and the law.

That impartial and rigorous system is one of the critical pillars of our Government.

Unfortunately, President Bush seems to believe these rules don't apply to him. On key issues, this Administration has pushed ahead with its agenda despite the evidence and the law. We know that is what happened on the decisions to launch the Iraq War; it happened again on decisions authorizing torture; and it happened when the White House fired independent and nonpartisan Justice Department officials.

For months this Committee has been investigating recent Environmental Protection Agency decisions relating to both global warming and the new air quality standards, and after

reviewing nearly 60 thousands of pages of internal documents and interviewing officials involved in the rulemakings, we have found evidence that the White House often ignored the facts and the law.

The first rulemaking was a response to California's petition to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from cars and light-duty trucks. Under the Clean Air Act, EPA must approve California's request unless it finds the proposal is arbitrary, isn't technically feasible, or isn't justified by compelling and extraordinary conditions.

The record is overwhelming that EPA's experts and career staff all supported granting the California petition. In one internal document, EPA's own lawyer said: 'We don't believe that there are any good arguments against granting the waiver. All of the arguments are likely to lose in court if we are sued.''

Administrator Johnson apparently listened to his own staff people. The Committee has learned that before communicating with the White House, the Administrator supported granting a partial approval to California's request, but then the White House intervened. In December, after secret communications with White House officials, Administrator Johnson ignored the law and the evidence and denied California's petition.

The second EPA rulemaking revised the air quality

standards for ozone air pollution to protect both human health and the environment.

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In this case, EPA's exert advisory committee, the Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee, unanimously recommended a new standard for protecting the environment. After considering all of the alternatives, Administrator Johnson agreed with this new approach, which is called a seasonal standard. In a submission to the White House, he described the case for the new standard as ''compelling,'' and he said that there was no evidence from the perspective of biological impact supporting the alternative standard favored by industry.

But once again the White House intervened. On the evening before the final rule was released, President Bush rejected the unanimous recommendation of both EPA's scientific experts, lawyers, and Administrator Johnson and instructed EPA to abandon the new standard.

The Committee's investigation reveals that EPA officials were astounded by the President's decision and said it wasn't supported by either the science or the law. One official wrote: ''I have been working on National Ambient Air Quality Standards for over 30 years and have yet to see anything like this.''

Another wrote: 'We could be in a position of having to fend off contempt proceedings. The obligation to promulgate

109 a rule, arguably, means to promulgate one that is nominally 110 defensible.'' 111 And an EPA Associate Director observed: 'This looks 112 like pure politics.'' 113 The same thing happened in a third critical rulemaking. 114 Last April the Supreme Court directed EPA to determine 115 whether CO2 emissions endanger health and the environment and 116 must be regulated under the Clean Air Act. This is a Supreme 117 Court decision, and under Administrator Johnson EPA assembled 118 a team of over 60 career officials to work this hugely 119 important regulation. The staff determined that CO2 did 120 endanger the environment and drafted proposed rules to reduce 121 tailpipe emissions. 122 To his credit, Administrator Johnson listened to his 123 staff and sent an official ''endangerment finding'' to the 124 White House. That endangerment finding means that the 125 regulation should go forward. Jason Burned, the Associate 126 Deputy Administrator, told the Committee that he personally 127 transmitted the Administrator's determination to the White 128 House in December. 129 Yet once again the White House ignored the law, the 130

Yet once again the White House ignored the law, the science, and Administrator Johnson. Two months ago EPA was forced to announce that the agency would go back to square one and start the rulemaking process all over again.

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In each of these rulemakings, the pattern is the same:

The President apparently insisted on his judgment and overrode the unanimous recommendations of EPA's scientific and legal experts.

Now, our investigation has not been able to find any evidence that the President based his decisions on the science, the record, or the law. Indeed, there is virtually no credible record of any kind in support of the decisions.

I recognize and support the broad powers our

Constitution vests with the President of the United States.

But the President does not have absolute power, and he is not above the law. The President may have a personal opinion about the new ozone standards, California's regulations standards, and regulating CO2, but he is not allowed to elevate his views above the requirements of the law.

This is an important hearing, and I look forward to learning more from our witnesses.

[Prepared statement of Chairman Waxman follows:]

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Chairman WAXMAN. Before we proceed with hearing the witnesses, I want to recognize Mr. Issa, who is sitting in for Tom Davis, the Ranking Member of the Committee, with an opening statement.

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for expressing the Majority position extremely well. As we often say here in Washington, we are all entitled to our opinions, just not our facts.

The appropriate role of the President was established in the Constitution and has been revisited on numerous occasions by all three branches of Government. Presidents of both parties have asserted the right to oversee and direct the actions and decisions of regulatory agencies. President Clinton offered a prime example of an aggressive executive who was constantly involved in directing regulatory actions. Indeed, the Executive Order that gave rise to today's hearing was issued by President Clinton in 1997.

I say this to remind the Chairman that the goal of this hearing is to investigate whether or not the President provided his opinions to EPA Administrator Stephen Johnson. On the issue of National Ambient Air Quality Standards, or NAAQS, for ozone, it is pretty open and shut. He did.

The President makes no pretense that he did not, as might have been implied by the other opening statement. We knew that on March 12th, 2008, a memo sent from Susan Dudley

informing Administrator Johnson of the President's judgment on the secondary NAAQS standard. That memorandum is part of EPA's public docket on the ruling and has been available to staff since the initiation of the ozone investigation. In fact, the smoking gun is on the Website.

Moreover, the President's involvement in the ozone NAAQS discussion does not reflect any unusual or improper action. His involvement was pursuant to a process established by the Clinton Executive Order. That order openly declares the President's role in major rulemakings, namely, that the President will resolve disagreements between an agency and the Office of Management and Budgets Office of Information Regulatory Affairs, or OIRA.

Accordingly, according to the record, the President himself accepted OIRA's conclusions; therefore, the President carried out his constitutional responsibility consistent with the precedent an applicable Executive Order and the Clean Air Act.

I would also like to remind members of this Committee that a difference over policy outcomes does not necessarily make a policy outcome fatally flawed, meaning that in fact we can disagree but at the end of the day law is discretionary in this case, and when followed, as it was by the President or any president, he may choose among a variety of policy options.

It should not be surprising that the policy opinion chosen by a President of one party differs from the policy opinion that a member of Congress from another party would have chosen, nor should it be a reason to cast blameless aspersions or discredit the deliberative process used to arrive at that decision. From the beginning EPA had proposed the option of either setting a secondary standard equal to the primary standard or alternately adopting a more biologically relevant standard, the so-called W-126 standard of 21 parts per million per hour.

Given the legitimate role of the President in this decision and the legitimate choices before him, it appears this kind of oversight simply seeks to bully the President into making a decision supported by some members of the Congress. This is raw politics. The Majority supposes that the unwelcome decision is an unlawful one. The President concluded within his discretion, the ozone standard should be set at .075 because of the uncertainty of any benefit at a lower level.

Democrats can have a different judgment about the uncertainties and their benefits, but that does not make the President's decision improper in any way. If some Democrats want a stricter ozone standard, they could pass legislation to impose one. They have not done this and do not appear to be ready to do so, at least in part because some members of

227 their party disagree.

Finally, with respect to the proper role of the Clean
Air Scientific Advisory Board, in plain language the Clean
Air Act expressly states that CASAC is advisory, not a
standard-setting panel and not a policy-making panel. Under
no circumstances does the Clean Air Act require the
Administrator to simply rubber-stamp CASAC's findings. The
Advisory Committee is directed to review the science and make
recommendations to the Administrator.

By definition, 'recommendations' can be rejected.

With respect to the ozone NAAQS standard in particular, there is no bright line in the science today regardless of those who would like to seek one that shows that above-level ozone is unhealthy and below the level it is somehow of no danger.

Accordingly, setting the NAAQS level for ozone is necessarily a policy judgment entrusted to the Administrator and claiming that science dictates a certain outcome is contrary to both science and law. It is worth noting the EPA has spent over 3,200 staff hours in producing over 65 thousand pages of documents in their effort to comply with the Committee's demands.

OIRA has been similarly responsive, turning over somewhere between 6,800 and 7,900 document pages, and participated in half a dozen in-person meetings in conference calls in support of accommodating this Committee's needs.

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Throughout the process the majority has praised the EPA in 252 their efforts to accommodate the Committee's demanding 253 254 production schedule and acknowledge the logistical 255 difficulties involved in such a voluminous document 256 production. 257 Finally, I understand the Committee has recently 258 released a memorandum summarizing the Majority's findings 259 with respect to both ozone investigation as well as the 260 California waiver investigation. The Minority has also 261

Chairman WAXMAN. Without objection, all of the memoranda provided by the Majority and Minority staff will be made part of the record.

drafted a separate memorandum based on our own independent

evaluation of the facts. I ask that the Minority documents

[The information follows:]

be inserted into the record at this time.

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Mr. ISSA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to this fact-finding hearing. I believe it is appropriate to ask when there are differences in opinions, because I believe Congress has an oversight role, but as I said in my opening statement, it is very clear the President was within his discretion in this case, based on the facts presently available.

With that, I yield back.

Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Issa.

We are pleased to welcome three participants in our panel. We will hear from Stephen Johnson, who has served as the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency since May, 2005. He has been working at EPA in different capacities for the past 27 years.

Susan Dudley was appointed as Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in the White House's Office of Management and Budget since April 2007. Prior to her current position, Ms. Dudley worked at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University and as a consultant at Economists, Incorporated.

Dr. Rogene Henderson is currently the Chair of EPA's Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee and is a Senior Scientist Emeritus at the Lovelace Respiratory Research Institute. She is an expert on air quality and has had a distinguished career serving on multiple boards and

committees related to the topic. I would like to extend a special thank you to Dr. Henderson for the accommodations she has made to make herself available for this hearing. Thank you very much.

This hearing has been postponed twice, and each time Dr. Henderson rescheduled her flight and canceled her plans to make sure she was available. I believe she even canceled a vacation which I am sorry to hear about. Thank you very much for being here.

It is the policy of this Committee that all witnesses that testify before us do so under oath, so if the three of you would please stand and raise your hand I would appreciate it.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Chairman WAXMAN. The record will indicate that each of the witnesses answered in the affirmative.

Mr. Johnson, or all three of you, your prepared statements that you have submitted to us in advance will be made part of the record. We would like to call on you for your oral presentation. We usually like to keep that within around five minutes, if possible. We will have a clock running. It will be green, and then the last minute will be yellow, and then when the time has expired, it will be read.

I will not cut off any of you from your presentation, but if you are mindful that the time has expired, we would

319 | like you to keep that in mind and try to summarize.

320 l STATEMENTS OF STEPHEN L. JOHNSON, ADMINISTRATOR, U.S.

- 321 ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY; SUSAN E. DUDLEY,
- ADMINISTRATOR, OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS; 322
- 323 AND ROGENE F. HENDERSON, CHAIR, CLEAN AIR SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY
- 324 COMMITTEE

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325 STATEMENT OF STEPHEN L. JOHNSON

Mr. JOHNSON. Good afternoon, Chairman Waxman, and members of the Committee. I am pleased to be here to discuss EPA's decision to significantly strengthen the National Ambient Air Quality Standard, or NAAQS, for ground-level 330 ozone.

It is also a pleasure to appear alongside Dr. Rogene Henderson, Chair of EPA's Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee, or CASAC, as it is known. Former EPA Administrator Levitt appointed Dr. Henderson to this position in 2004 and in 2006 I invited her to continue serving in this important role.

Since 1980, ozone levels have been cut nation-wide by more than 20 percent, even while our economy has more than doubled. As many of the Bush Administration's recent rules to reduce air pollution take effect, we expect that trend to

341 continue.

While air quality has been improving so has our scientific knowledge of the relationship between pollution, public health, and our planet. As we learn more, science and the law require that we make changes. That is what we have done with regard to ozone.

This afternoon, I would like to describe my decisions on the ozone standards, first for the primary standard designed to protect public health, and, second, for the secondary standard designed to protect public welfare. Since EPA last updated ozone standards in 1997, more than 1,700 new studies have been published about ozone's effects on human health. Many of these studies strengthen the linkages between ozone exposure and effects such as reduced lung function or aggravated asthma.

In a large number of new studies showed that ozone is both more damaging and harmful at lower concentrations than scientists understood. After evaluating the results of these studies, along with recommendations of staff, my Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee and public comments, I concluded that the 1997 standard no longer met the Clean Air Act requirement to protect public health with an adequate margin of safety. To provide that protection at a level that is requisite to protect public health, I selected a level of 0.075 parts per million for the primary standard as the most

stringent eight-hour standard for ozone in our Nation's history, it will provide significant public health benefits to millions of Americans.

Advances in science also provided significant new evidence about ozone's impact on the environment, particularly on sensitive plants and trees. When I proposed the standards last June, I presented two options: one, setting the standard identical to the primary as has been the practice for many years; or, two, setting a three-month standard to address the cumulative effects of plant exposure to ozone over the growing season. Each of these alternatives had strengths and also had weaknesses.

Selecting a secondary standard was difficult, as the record of this rulemaking shows. In making the decision, I reviewed the 1997 NAAQS decision and the scientific evidence available since then. I considered recommendations from CASAC and my staff. I read comments from the public, and as a matter of good government and as required by Executive Order 12866, I coordinated with others in the Executive Branch about the two options before me. I weighed all of this information in making my final decision, which was to set the standard identical to the primary standard at 0.075 per million.

This stronger standard will provide significantly increased protection for plants and trees. In my three years

as Administrator, I have strengthened two air quality
standards, one for particulate matter and one for ozone.

Earlier this month, I proposed to strengthen our Nation's air
quality standards for lead. This is the first time in 30
years.

In the process of navigating the requirements of the Clean Air Act, I have come to see both the strengths and limitations of this law, and, I believe, the need to change it for the better. I believe it is time to modernize the Clean Air Act to improve public health. When I announced the revisals on standards March the 12th, I also announced four principles upon which the Administration will seek proposals to modernize the Clean Air Act. Congress has adopted these principles and other environmental statutes such as the Safe Drinking Water Act

The Clean Water Act is an important act for us to review. The Clean Air Act is not a relic to be displayed in the Smithsonian but a living document that must be refurbished to continue realizing results. I look forward to working with you in our efforts to improve this important law and to continue our progress toward clear air across the Nation.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy to answer any questions.

[Prepared statement of Mr. Johnson follows:]

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Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Johnson.

Ms. Dudley?

419 STATEMENT OF SUSAN E. DUDLEY

Ms. DUDLEY. Chairman Waxman, and Ranking Member Issa, and distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me and giving me the opportunity to testify today regarding the role of the Executive Office of the President, NEPA's ozone NAAQS rulemaking.

In the interest of public transparency, both OMB and EPA placed in the correspondence related to this rulemaking in the public record to ensure clear presentation of the issues involved, Pursuant to Executive Order 12866 issued in 1993 by President Clinton, OIRA oversees the regulatory process for the Executive Branch by coordinating interagency review of significant regulatory actions. In most cases OIRA is able to work with the regulatory agency to resolve any issues that arise during the interagency review process. For those rare circumstances when such resolution is not possible, the Executive Order provides a process for conflict resolution by the President with the assistance of the Chief of Staff.

EPA's ozone NAAQS is a significant regulation under E.O. 12866 and such was submitted to OIRA on February 22nd, 2008. In the course of interagency review, concerns were raised with the secondary, the welfare-based standard. These concerns focused on the form of the standard, not the level.

EPA's proposed rule had sought comment on two alternative forms. Both were scientifically and legally valid, one set equal to the primary standard and another based on measured ozone levels over a season. The draft final rule would have relied on the seasonal form of the secondary standard.

Establishing a separate seasonal standard would have deviated from EPA's past practice which has been to set the secondary ozone NAAQS equal to the primary NAAQS. The draft initially submitted for review did not clearly support a conclusion that a secondary standard was requisite to protect the public welfare. First, as EPA observed in the preamble to the 2007 proposed rules, a secondary standard set at a level identical to the proposed new primary standard would provide a significant degree of additional protection for vegetation as compared to the current standard established in 1997.

Second, EPA's analysis indicated that the draft secondary standard accumulated over a season would not be more protective of vegetation than one set equal to the primary public health based standard. On the contrary, EPA recognized the seasonal standard in the final draft was generally less stringent than the primary standard.

Given the public interest in this regulatory proceeding, I wanted to ensure that these concerns were laid out clearly to avoid misunderstandings, so I conveyed them to

Administrator Johnson in memorandum dated March 6th. On March 7th, EPA Deputy Administrator Peacock responded in writing. Then, pursuant to the appeals procedure, the Executive Order, EPA sought further consideration of this disagreement regarding the form of the secondary standard.

Following the established Presidential Review process, the President concluded that, consistent with Administration policy, added protection should be afforded to the public welfare by strengthening the secondary ozone standard and setting it equal to the new primary standard.

On March 12th, I sent a memorandum to Administrator

Johnson memorializing this process. As the preamble to the

fine rule states: 'While the Administrator fully considered

the President's views, the Administrator's decision and the

reason for it are based on and supported by the record in

this rulemaking.''

So, in summary, let me reiterate three key points.

First, in the course of interagency review of EPA's final ozone, both OMB and EPA have been forthright in making key correspondence regarding initial disagreements over the form of the secondary standard available to the public.

Second, the focus of my correspondence with EPA was not the primary health-based standard, but the secondary, welfare-based standard. No changes were made to the level or form of the health-based standard.

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Third, discussions regarding the secondary standard related exclusively to the form of the secondary standard and did not affect the level of protection from ozone exposure provided to vegetation. Contrary to some media accounts, the eight-hour form ultimately selected by the EPA Administrator is not lower or less protective than the alternative seasonal form of the standard.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify.

500 [Prepared statement of Ms. Dudley follows:]

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502 Chairman WAXMAN. Dr. Henderson?

503 STATEMENT OF ROGENE F. HENDERSON

Ms. HENDERSON. Thank you for asking me to testify before this Committee. I am testifying as the current Chair of the USEPA's Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee, or CASAC, which is a Congressionally-mandated committee that advises and makes recommendations to the EPA Administrator concerning the scientific basis for setting air quality standards. The CASAC ozone panel included 25 members, all of whom were carefully vetted for their scientific qualifications and for any potential conflicts of interest.

The questions addressed by the ozone panel was the same as for any criteria pollutants. In light of newly available information, are the existing standards adequate to protect public health with a margin of safety in terms of the primary standard or to protect public welfare in terms of the secondary standard.

The ozone panel met with EPA staff in public meetings seven times to review eight documents over a two-year period. Public comments were solicited at each of our meetings. Highly productive discussions were held between EPA staff, the public and CASAC in our efforts to develop the best scientific advice to provide the Administrator.

A major product of these extended discussions was the

unanimous recommendation that the primary standard should be lowered from a level of 84 parts per billion to a level between 60 and 70 parts per billion. Note that the recommendation was in terms of a range. There is enough uncertainty at this low a concentration of ozone that CASAC can only recommend a range of values they consider to be protective of public health. It is a policy decision for the Administrator to determine where within that range to set the standard.

Our scientific advice was not accepted. The primary standard was lowered but only to 75 parts per billion. The CASAC panel does not endorse the new primary standard as being sufficient protective of public health with a margin of safety as explicitly required by the Clean Air Act.

Moving on to the secondary standard, which includes protecting our ecology, the panel was in unanimous agreement that we now have enough information to be able to set a cumulative seasonal secondary standard rather than having to default to using the primary standard. It is both common sense and fully justified scientifically to set a secondary standard separate from the primary standard, since, unlike humans, vegetation is affected by cumulative exposures to ozone during the growing season and during daylight hours.

It is also in agreement with the National Research
Council's 2004 Report on Managing Air Quality in the United

States in which they strongly recommend that the EPA move away from having identical primary and secondary standards to setting a reasonable secondary standard because there is growing evidence that some vegetation is more sensitive to pollutants than are humans.

Nevertheless, in March, Ms. Dudley of the OMB sent a memo to Administrator Johnson saying the form of the secondary standard should not be changed. This memo was clearly refused in a knowledgeable, well-written reply from Deputy Administrator Marcus Peacock. In reply, Ms. Dudley stated that President Bush had decided against having a secondary standard that was different from a primary standard. In defense of this decision, the White House said the decision was based on following the law. There is no law against having a different standards, as evidenced by the precedent set in 1971 when separate secondary standards were set for both particulate matter and sulfur oxides.

Equally perplexing is the fact that the OMB objections were to the proposed form of the secondary standard, which is a scientific matter and not to the level of the proposed standard, which includes policy decisions. CASAC has been accused of wandering from scientific issues into policy. In this case, policymakers wandered into scientific issues, and they did not do it well. Wilful ignorance triumphed over sound science.

Certainly the Administrator is the one who decides what standard to set, and CASAC's role is only advisory in nature. However, if the Administrator sets the standard outside the range recommended by his Science Advisory Committee, a strong reason for doing so should be given. The Administrator has said his decision was based on his own judgment.

Congress may want to ask, on whose advice is the Administrator basing his judgments? The Clean Air Act mandates that one source be the CASAC whose work is done transparently in public by vetted members. By contract, the advice that appears to be trumping the CASAC advice is not transparent. The OMB and the White House set the secondary standard in effect rather than the EPA Administrator.

In closing, I wold like to quote from Dr. Paul Gilman, who is the former Assistant Administrator for Research and a Science Advisor for the EPA, in a statement he made before a recent hearing of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works. 'Our best insurance that the science, the scientific judgment, and policy-making are as good as they can be is that the process is transparent, participatory, peer-reviewed, and followed with informed oversight. Setting the standards by fiat behind closed doors is not in our best interest.''

Thank you.

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[Prepared statement of Dr. Henderson follows:]

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Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you very much, Dr. Henderson.

We will now proceed to questions and, by agreement with the Minority, we will have 12 minutes on each side to begin, 12 controlled by the Chairman and 12 controlled by Mr. Issa. Then we will proceed to the five-minute rule. Without objection that will be the order.

Let me start off, Administrator Johnson. My concern is that the decisions at EPA are not being based on the science and they are not being based on the law. They are being made at the White House, and they are being made for political reasons. My concern is that this is happening over and over again. It appears to be what happened on the ozone rule. It appears to be what happened when you rejected California's efforts to regulate carbon dioxide from vehicles, and it appears to be what happened when EPA tried to regulate carbon dioxide itself after the Supreme Court decision.

Dr. Henderson, let me start with you. You are the Chair of the Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee, and you reviewed the new ozone standards that were recently announced by EPA. Are the standards that Administrator Johnson set consistent with the science?

Ms. HENDERSON. It is not consistent with the CASAC's recommendations which are based on science.

Chairman WAXMAN. Well, did CASAC give a range so that there was some discretion left that you thought would fit

with the science that you knew?

Ms. HENDERSON. Yes. The CASAC always recommends a range, never a bright line. We know that there is uncertainty at these low levels of ozone, so with careful consideration of the uncertainties and what we know from the scientific work that has been done since the last ozone standard was set, we recommend a range within which the Administrator could set a level that would be protective of public health with a margin of safety.

Chairman WAXMAN. And did the Administrator select within the range recommended by the Scientific Advisory Committee?

Ms. HENDERSON. No, he did not.

Chairman WAXMAN. Now, in essence, you are saying that Administrator Johnson did not follow the science, is that correct?

Ms. HENDERSON. That is correct.

Chairman WAXMAN. Now, Administrator Johnson, I want to give you a change to respond. Dr. Henderson says you didn't follow the science. Do you agree with that?

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, I would respectfully disagree with that characterization. One is that I did agree with our CASAC that the current standard was not requisite to protect public health with an adequate margin of safety, hence we were in agreement together. I should note that not all comments agreed with that conclusion.

Second is that not only do I have the advice--and I appreciate and certainly respect the advice of CASAC and Dr. Henderson's role as the Chair--but also I have the responsibility to listen to what my staff say and, of course, evaluate all of the public comments after all the comments are in. I made the decision based upon all of the science before me that .075 was requisite to protect public health with an adequate margin of safety.

Chairman WAXMAN. Excuse me, you answered my question. You think you set it within the protection of the science.

Mr. JOHNSON. Absolutely.

Chairman WAXMAN. Okay. Now, the record shows your views about the science and the law were constantly being reversed by the White House. Your professional views may be scientifically and legally correct, but they are not the ones that are prevailing comments to the White House that the secondary standard for ozone, the one that protects the environment, be set based on cumulative seasonal exposure, isn't that right?

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, more accurately, Mr. Chairman, would be that there are two options. There was one that the Agency preferred as part of the deliberation, and it was clear that there were others in the Administration who felt the other was a preferred option. Of course, as I believe good government, we went through the process as outlined by

President Clinton's Executive Order, and the President provided input. Ultimately, I made the decision, and made the decision to set a secondary standard that is the most protective secondary standard in our Nation's history.

Chairman WAXMAN. You, as the head of EPA, recommended a proposal. OMB and the White House looked at that proposal and said to you, we don't want that proposal. Then you made the decision that they recommended.

When you sent your draft final rule to the White House in February, it said that the evidence for seasonal standard was compelling and that a seasonal standard was necessary to ensure the requisite degree of protection. But the White House then objected to that proposal, and you changed it. Is that what happened?

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, I think, more accurately, was is that certainly it agreed with CASAC that a cumulative seasonal metric is the me most biologically-relevant form for vegetation; however, at the time we certainly noticed--

Chairman WAXMAN. I really want a direct answer to the question. You submitted a rule to the White House, and the White House said they wanted a different rule, and then you decided what the White House suggested to you.

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, there was a difference of opinion between two--

Chairman WAXMAN. No, no. Yes or no. Yes or no?

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702 Mr. JOHNSON. Well, I don't believe it is a yes or no question, sir.

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Chairman WAXMAN. Well, you gave them one option and they gave you the other, and the one you accepted was theirs.

Mr. JOHNSON. We had two options on the table. There was one that was preferred by EPA, one that was preferred by OMB and perhaps others, and it went through an Executive Order I think that is good government.

Chairman WAXMAN. Okay. Well, this is not a minor change; it was a major reversal that I believe was not supported by the record. Your own staff said it was pure politics and that they have never seen anything like it in 30 years of working on air quality standards.

An agency lawyer worried that the final decision was not even nominally defensible, and this wasn't the only time you have been reversed by the White House. It seems to be happening over and over again.

Your Deputy Associate Administrator, Jason Burnett, told the Committee that last fall you supported granting California's petition to regulate carbon dioxide emissions from vehicles. According to Mr. Burnett, you changed your position after you talked with the White House. accurate?

Mr. JOHNSON. I don't believe that that is a fair characterization, Mr. Chairman. I think, certainly, as you

look through the thousands and thousands of pages, including his deposition, that shows a very deliberate process going through where I evaluated all options from moving from a full approval to denial and options in between.

Chairman WAXMAN. And you recommended be in between. You didn't agree that there should be a complete granting of what California wanted, which was a waiver to do exactly what they wanted. You wanted a partial waiver so that it would go into effect through a period of time, and that was sent to the White House.

Mr. Burnett told us under oath that he thought a partial grant-he, meaning you--thought that a partial grant of the California was the best course of action.

Well, that is what happened in this instance. The same thing happened the third time. According to your staff, you decided last fall that EPA should issue its own greenhouse gas rules, and you submitted a proposing endangerment finding to the White House. You also circulated a proposal to other agencies to regulate tailpipe emissions of carbon dioxide. Is that accurate?

Mr. JOHNSON. It is true that we have a draft of endangerment finding that was part of the rule-making process before the Energy Independence and Security Act was passed.

Chairman WAXMAN. And you also recommended that other agencies regulate tailpipe emissions of carbon dioxide.

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, that was part of a draft decision that has not gone through interagency process.

Chairman WAXMAN. But you recommended it to the Department of Transportation.

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, again, it was so deliberative and they had not reviewed it, and again, it was before the Energy Independence and Security Act, which then changed the course of action for EPA, and that is writing a regulation for renewable fuel standard.

Chairman WAXMAN. We interviewed--

Mr. JOHNSON. Excuse me. I am just working, as required, working with the Department of Transportation as they updated--

Chairman WAXMAN. Well, we interviewed seven senior career EPA officials earlier this year, and they all told us the same thing. You supported Federal regulations for carbon dioxide emissions and submitted an endangerment finding to the White House. They said the proposal was sent to the White House in the first or second week of December. They told us that after you submitted your recommendations to the White House, they were told to stop all work on the regulations. This policy reversal became official in March when you announced that EPA was going to start the regulatory process all over again.

My concern, Administrator Johnson, is that you become

essentially a figurehead. Three times in the last six months you have recommended to the White House that EPA take the steps to address climate change and protect the environment. In each case, your positions were taken.

Now, your positions were right on the science and the law, yet in each case you backed down. You received your instructions from the White House. Now that is not how our Government is supposed to work. Congress passes the laws and the Executive Branch is supposed to faithfully administer them.

But what we see happening at EPA is that when you try to follow the law and the science, you are overridden. The attitude in the White House seems to be that President Bush can ignore the environmental laws that Congress wrote and do whatever he pleases.

Now, my questions are about the process and the results. Let's go to this ozone decision. EPA is require under the law to set an ozone standard to protect public health and a secondary ozone standard to protect crops, forest, and other aspects of public, and we just went over that very briefly.

After years of scientific review, you sent the draft final ozone standard to the White House for review. To protect the environment your draft recommended that EPA establish a new standard, one that would protect plants from cumulative exposure over growing season. The document to the

White House stated that you found the evidence for the new standard to be compelling and necessary. You also wrote that you found no evidence to support the alternative standard favored by industry.

When the final rule was issued on March 12th, you made a complete reversal on the environmental standard, you abandoned the seasonal approach, and you adopted the short-term approach that industry favored. These changes were made at the last minute pursuant to instructions from White House. According to the record, they were personally directed by the President.

Administrator Johnson, your statement that there was compelling evidence in support of the seasonal standard was dropped in the final rule. So was your statement that there was no biological evidence supporting the industry standard. Why were these statements deleted from the rule?

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, Mr. Chairman, as we prepared for making a decision—as I prepared making a decision on the secondary standard, again, we proposed two options, and I think the important point to note is it was not an issue of a level of protectiveness. Either form provided additional level of protectiveness for public welfare.

Chairman WAXMAN. Did the White House provide you with new scientific evidence to change your mind?

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, Mr. Chairman, certainly during the

review, it was part of the Executive Order. OMB certainly issued a concern and, in fact, I quote: 'The draft is not adequate to support such a decision.' And as I evaluated their comments and, certainly, the President's comment and reviewed it, I made the decision to establish the secondary standard--

Chairman WAXMAN. I understand you made that decision.

Mr. JOHNSON.--after I made the primary standard.

Chairman WAXMAN. But the Clean Air Act is clear in setting ozone standards. The Agency is required to use the best science and set a standard that protects health and environment.

Did the White House do this? Did the Administration listen to the scientists, or did they reject the science and set standards that will not protect health and the environment?

Mr. JOHNSON. No. Again, as I said, both forms were protective of the environment. The question is, what is the form? It is not the standard. And, in fact, for the secondary standard, some of the issues that I was facing in terms of uncertainty with adopting a separate standard, a cumulative three-months so-called W-126 form, was, for example, crop yield data was derived largely from data generated 20 years ago.

In addition, the degree of risk attributable to varying

852 levels of ozone exposure, there were uncertainties. 853 of protection that any specific cumulative seasonal standard would produce and associated potential for error in 854 855 determining the standard and what would be providing a 856 requisite degree of protection, all of those were among the uncertainties that, certainly, as I factored into my decision 857 858 played a role. That is why I chose the primary form with 859 input in this case from the President. 860 I am very proud of the process. It has been a very 861 transparent process where Susan's memo, Marcus' memo, and in 862 fact a letter citing what the President's input to me is a 863 final decision. I think that is good government, and I think 864 that is the way we ought to operate. 865 Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Johnson. 866 Mr. Issa? 867 Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will continue 868 where the Chairman left off because I think it is a good line 869 of questioning. 870 Administrator Johnson, you, if I understand correctly, 871 are a career professional, is that right? 872 Mr. JOHNSON. That is correct. 873 Mr. ISSA. When did you join the EPA? 874 Mr. JOHNSON. In 1980. 875 Mr. ISSA. In 1980. 876 Mr. JOHNSON. Well, actually, I came to EPA, left and

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877 then came back, but my service computation date is 1980. 878 Mr. ISSA. Longer than some of the staff behind me have 879 been alive, so we will say you have been there a long time, 880 and you are not a political appointee. I mean, even though 881 you sit now in an appointed position, you are a career 882 professional, is that right? 883 Mr. JOHNSON. I am a career professional who also is a 884 political appointee, and I am proud of both of those mantles. 885 Mr. ISSA. But you were selected because of your long 886 tenure with the EPA, clearly. 887 Mr. JOHNSON. I believe the President, in fact, it was 888 said that he wanted the most experienced, best person for the 889 job, and I am honored to be serving our Nation and the 890 President in that capacity. 891 Mr. ISSA. Well, let's run through a little of that 892 experience. First of all, I assume you were at the EPA when California asked for a waiver from the need for MTBE or other 893 894 oxygenates and try to use things that wouldn't destroy our 895 water or wood corrosive, Do you remember that? 896

Mr. JOHNSON. I do remember that, yes, sir.

Mr. ISSA. Do you remember that that was denied by the Clinton Administration?

Mr. JOHNSON. I do.

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Mr. ISSA. So when it came to California meeting its own high clean air standards and not being at the back of the

902 ethanol lobby, the Administration under President Clinton was 903 not willing to grant that waiver, right?

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, I must say that that is tangential because I was not in the Air Office or working on air issues, but I am aware of that fact.

Mr. ISSA. And California's request for a waiver was, they were going to comply with all of the standards; they simply weren't going to use things that poisoned our water or required that corn farmers in the Midwest get a special benefit.

So the strange thing is, you know, today we are asking about a reduction, and I want to go into that. I am trying to figure out what good deed can possibly go unpunished. Let me run you through that.

You were also there in--and I apologize, I said 1997--it was a typo. The Executive Order of President Clinton's was at the beginning of his administration in 1993, isn't that true?

Mr. JOHNSON. That is correct.

Mr. ISSA. And didn't he essentially assign that to Vice President Al Gore as sort of the go-to on air quality, if you remember?

Mr. JOHNSON. I don't remember, sir.

925 Mr. ISSA. I don't forget on that one. But I certainly 926 think that is within the Administration's right. In this

927 case, President Bush has kept that to himself.

But in 1993, if I understand correctly, the ozone level was 1.0 or 120 parts where today it is going to be 75. That was the air quality prior to the 1997 ruling, is that right?

931 Mr. JOHNSON. Yes.

Mr. ISSA. And so in 1997 it was reduced from 120 to 84. Since 1997 when it was reduced to .084, has Mr. Waxman's district ever been in compliance? Does Hollywood or L.A.

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Mr. JOHNSON. No, sir, not.

Mr. ISSA. Okay. So we have had a standard, and many parts of California have never reached that standard. Many parts of America have never reached that standard, is that correct?

941 Mr. JOHNSON. There are a number of parts of America that 942 have not, that is correct.

Mr. ISSA. And doesn't it make the science a little inexact to figure out where the safety level is if, in fact, people are above the existing standard and you are going to lower it even further? Isn't that one of the variables you have to deal with?

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, the law actually prohibits me from considering costs or considering whether or not the standard is actually able to be implemented. Of course, that is one of the reasons why, among a number of reasons why, that I

952 think that it is worthy of congressional debate.

I believe there is an opportunity to improve the Clean Air Act. I think that it is unconscionable that we have a standard that we have gone through years of scientific evaluation to say this is protective of public health and then communities not even being in compliance with that for 20 or plus years. I think it is worthy of Congressional debate, and I believe that there are other approaches that could achieve public health protection sooner.

Mr. ISSA. So, particularly, when it comes to CO2, if I understand your recommendation, it is time for Congress to act to create a more responsive law that would allow for compliance, offsets, things to deal, to be honest with the Chairman and myself as Californians, the fact that we have some containment areas that just simply never complied.

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, sir, I wholeheartedly agree. My experience in 27 years with a very complex statute as the Clean Air Act is, dealing with global air pollutant with many, many, many issues, my experience says that a legislative fix is the more efficient and effective way because, my experience says, with these complex laws subject to years and years of litigation.

I believe that global climate change needs to be addressed. I believe the greenhouse gas emissions need to be addressed, and I think the most efficient and effective way

is through a legislative fix. Having said that, I am initiating the rulemaking process by issuing an advance notice of proposed rulemaking of, later this spring.

Mr. ISSA. Well, I appreciate that. Just to finish on my numbers game here a little bit, you mentioned in your opening statement we are down about 20 percent over several decades, most of your career. If I do the numbers, coming from 120 parts to 84 parts, it was about 33 percent reduction. So if we are down 20 percent, we obviously didn't hit--we didn't go from the 120 to the 84.

Now if I understand correctly, going to .75 is about an 11 percent reduction, and going to .070 would be about a 16 percent. So today we appear to be having a hearing about whether a reduction of 11 percent is somehow anti people's breathing versus a reduction of 16 percent would somehow make it okay. Is that pretty much what I should be understanding today?

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, that is certainly a view. Again, ultimately, when I made the decision on both the primary and the secondary both in regard to the primary, public health, I determined that the existing standard was not protective. It was not requisite to protect public health with an adequate margin of safety and wholeheartedly agreed with CASAC that it needed to be reduced.

I made the decision to reduce it and to make it more

health protective. In fact, again this is the Nation's most health-protective eight-hours ozone standard in the history of the Nation, and that shouldn't go unnoticed.

Mr. ISSA. I appreciate that, and I agree. If I understand correctly, though, basically, if two, three, four years from now after we have achieved a portion of this 11 percent reduction that is presently being ordered, there is nothing that stops this process, with Dr. Henderson's help and so on, from seeing that there is an even lower level bolstering the science and ordering a lower level. There is nothing whatsoever stopping it from happening at any time, is that correct?

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, it is not only not stopping it, we are actually directed by law and it is part of the 77 amendments to the Clean Air Act, we are required every five years to review each and every one of these standards.

Of course, one of the challenges for the Agency since that amendment in 1977, the Agency has never met the five-year requirement, and, of course, that is why we believe that there are changes and improvements in the way we actually go through the NAAQS process: to preserve science as well as to improve the timeliness of what we are doing.

So we are required to make these evaluations and keep up with what the current state of the science is.

Mr. ISSA. I appreciate it. I would like to yield for a

1027 | few minutes to Mr. Bilbray, as he needs it.

Mr. BILBRAY. Thank you.

Mr. Johnson, I don't come from a business background, and I don't come as a lawyer. I come from the regulatory background. I served on Air Resources Board in California, I served in the air district, San Diego, on the few--in fact the only--air district I know in California that has actually had its standards dropped recently, I mean its category dropped because we were so successful.

You talked about since 1980 a 20 per cent reduction in emissions just in California during that time with 20 percent reduction, and I think our California numbers will be less, I think more of a drop. We have had a 50 percent increase in population. And that is one thing I hope that when we talk about the threat to the public health, we think about the fact that sheer population has been ignored from the entire environmental impact of those sheer numbers and that that has to be considered.

Doctor, you serve on one of the most critical bodies when it comes to environmental strategies, and I was very happy to work with our scientific body at ARB. California's program has been very successful because of the use of science.

Back in the 1990s when California petitioned a waiver from the oxygen mandate, the mandate that we put ethanol or

1052 MTB into our gasoline, was your committee review that 1053 mandate? 1054 Ms. HENDERSON. No, because we an air committee, so we 1055 did not. 1056 Mr. BILBRAY. Well, this was an air committee. 1057 coming from the --1058 Ms. HENDERSON. This was from the Air Board? 1059 Mr. BILBRAY. This was coming from the Air Resources 1060 Board. Ms. HENDERSON. I became chair of this committee back in 1061 1062 2004, so it did not occur during my chairmanship. 1063 Mr. BILBRAY. Okay. Let me just tell you something. Ву 1994, California had recognized and our scientists had 1064 recognized that ethanol and methanol in our gasoline was not 1065 1066 only not beneficial but was an environmental detriment, not 1067 just for water but air pollution. 1068 We formally requested this in 1994. I, for one, 1069 authored the bill that every Californian except one signed 1070 onto, to allow us to burn a cleaner, cheaper fuel for 1071 California. But we were blocked. 1072 Mr. Johnson, what was the rationale of the Clinton 1073 Administration for blocking the request for a waiver for cleaner fuel for the consumers of California and for the 1074 environment of California? What was their justification 1075 1076 requiring us to put MTBE in our fuel and ethanol in our fuel

when the best scientists in air pollution that reviewed the process said there was no scientific reason to do it?

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, sir, I am with Dr. Rogene, it was actually before my time, but certainly I know I have staff and can get back for the record to respond to that.

Mr. BILBRAY. Well, I will tell you, now that we have people that are administrators of EPA at that time who was over at California.

And, Mr. Chairman, I am just telling you, I was outraged at that time that the Clinton Administration, in my opinion, was bending to political pressure that was influenced by contributions at that time, and I think that we ought to recognize that, yes, there is undue influence on administrations.

But no one Administration has a monopoly there, and I wish that both Republicans and Democrats could have stood up for the environment against the political pressure, not only in the White House but here in the legislative body. To this day for us to point fingers at one Administration when we went for almost a decade requesting a waiver based on the environment, and it was denied by Washington to the people of the State of California who, I think we all admit, have done extraordinary things to protect the environment.

Thank you very much.

Mr. ISSA. Administrator Dudley, continuing on, let me

ask you a question. Could you explain to the Committee why
the regulations of carbon dioxide is such a unique pollutant
that it requires a new regulatory paradigm and doesn't fit
into the old regulatory structures of the Clean Air Act?

Ms. DUDLEY. I think that Administrator Johnson mentioned
this a bit in his previous remarks, too. CO2 is a global
pollutant. It doesn't matter where it is emitted, the
effects will be felt regardless of whether it is emitted here

1110 or in China. In order to achieve the reductions that we

1111 think we need requires new technology, so massive incentives

1112 for new technology.

So the Clean Air Act, which was mostly recently updated in 1990, just was never designed for it and really isn't well-suited to it.

Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Issa.

Mr. ISSA. Could we ask that Administrator Johnson also answer it, if you don't mind, Chairman? He has something.

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. I would just say that one of the, I think, important reasons for the advanced notice of proposed rulemaking is that the Massachusetts versus EPA decision was in the context of automobiles and light trucks. The way the Clean Air Act operates is that that decision in endangerment not only affects that narrow area of mobile sources but all mobile sources and, in fact, spills over into Title I and all stationary sources as well.

So when I moved forward with an advanced notice for proposed rulemaking, it is actually expanding and looking at the entire, all sources, potential sources, of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases. I think that it is important for us as an agency, to understand all of those issues, and I think it will also help Congress, you, as you debate this very important issue.

As I have said I believe, given my experience, a

As I have said I believe, given my experience, a legislative approach is a much better approach than working through the intricacies of the Clean Air Act, and with the likely litigation that would ensue.

Chairman WAXMAN. You might prefer another law, but there was a law. There is a law, the Clean Air Act adopted by Congress, and the U.S. Supreme Court said that EPA is supposed to regulate carbon emissions under that law. Even if you would like another law, you have to enforce the law that is there.

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, and that is why I am proceeding with an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking, which is the first step in the regulatory process.

Chairman WAXMAN. Mr. Tierney?

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Henderson, in your written testimony you address the decision to set an environmental standard for ozone that is higher than the standard that scientific experts recommended.

1152 You stated, 'Wilful ignorance triumphed over sound 1153 science.''

Those are strong words. Would you explain for us?

Ms. HENDERSON. I was referring, really, to the secondary standard because in the case of the secondary standard, we were really excited that we now have enough information to use a different form for the secondary standard. In the past, we have had to default to the primary standard because we didn't have the right information.

Then, to get so close to having the form changed and then at the last minute, with no explanation, really, of why it was done, that form was squelched. The new form was squelched by the White House because President Bush said we couldn't have a different secondary standard from the primary standard.

Now, that is ignorance to me. That is wilful ignorance because I do not think the OMB really hadn't read the Clean Air Act to know that you can set that. I don't think the OMP really hadn't read the EPA staff documents that carefully explained why we were focusing on vegetation as the welfare effect of concern.

So that is what my 'wilful ignorance' meant. It bothers me, with all the hard work that went into this by the EPA staff and by CASAC to develop this different form for a secondary standard that someone can just, for no transparent

reason, say, no, can't do that. That is what I meant by wilful ignorance.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you very much.

Mr. Johnson, do you want to respond?

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, again, the record clearly indicates that this was a difficult decision and that these were two, both viable, options. Again, an important piece is that the level of protectiveness was essentially equivalent whether a W-126 form or identical to the eight-hour ozone--

Mr. TIERNEY. That is interesting you should say that because what I see is there was no new evidence--at least you couldn't give an answer to Mr. Waxman--no new evidence from the White House at all on that issue. Before you had found evidence to be compelling, in your own words, and necessary, in your own words, and, in your own words, found no evidence to support the alternative standard that was favored by industry.

So, Mr. Johnson, you say that the final decision was justified, but looking at your own words—and let's look at some of the words of your own staff, what they had to say about it. If you look through the documents that were provided by EPA as part of the investigation, and it is stunning; stunning to see how EPA staff reacted to the rejection of the seasonal standard recommended by Dr. Henderson.

1202 An EPA Associate Director comments, 'Looks like pure 1203 politics.'' An EPA lawyer wrote, ''We could be in a position of 1204 1205 having to fend off contempt proceedings. The obligation to 1206 promulgate a rule arguably means to promulgate one that is 1207 nominally defensible.'' 1208 One EPA manager told his colleagues that he offered 1209 ''sympathies to all for all the work that went down the 1210 drain.'' 1211 Another career official stated, 'I have been working on 1212 NAAQS for over 30 years and have yet to see anything like this.'' 1213 Yet another Agency official responded by saying, ''I 1214 1215 know how incredibly frustrating and disgusted we all are at 1216 the moment.'' 1217 So, Mr. Johnson, I think what is happening with the EPA is pretty unacceptable. It is the Administrator's job to 1218 1219 implement our Nation's environmental laws and to protect the 1220 public health and welfare. It has to be based on the best 1221 evidence, By your own words, the evidence was compelling, it 1222 was necessary that the standard be different and the new form 1223 be instituted. So it looked to me that by your own words and 1224 by your staff's words, you are not doing your job. 1225 Recently, the Union of Concerned Scientists released the results of a survey of nearly 1,600 EPA scientists. 1226

survey revealed that EPA scientists face significant 1227 political interference with their work. Nearly 1,000 EPA 1228 1229 scientists said they personally experienced at least one 1230 incident of political interference during the past five 1231 years. Over 500 EPA scientists knew of many or some cases 1232 where the EPA political appointees had inappropriately 1233 involved themselves in scientific decisions. 1234 Mr. Johnson, are you concerned at all that hundreds of EPA scientists are reporting incidences of political 1235 interference with their work? 1236 1237 Mr. JOHNSON. Well, sir, I am proud of the fact that EPA 1238 has consistently ranked in the top 10 places for Federal 1239 employment. As a career--1240 Mr. TIERNEY. Are you concerned, as my question was, are you concerned that hundreds of EPA scientists are reporting 1241 1242 political interference in their work? 1243 Mr. JOHNSON. Well, I would like to quote to you, if I 1244 may, a quote from Dr. Paul Gilman, who just recently 1245 testified. Let me just give you a quote: ''EPA has become 1246 too politicized in its actions, too eager to pursue narrow 1247 political goals and too willing to ignore congressional 1248 intent. At least a dozen former EPA officials who played 1249 roles in setting policy now work as industry consultants, or''--this is also quoted, Orlando Sentinel--''Science is as 1250 politicized in America as it was in the Soviet Union and Nazi 1251

1252 Germany, and EPA is a prime example.''

He then goes to say, 'I want to make this point that

1254 these headlines all came prior to the current Administration

1255 and pertained to the previous administration.''

1256 So, sir--

1257 Mr. TIERNEY. So that is just an excellent defense, Mr.

1258 Johnson.

1259 Mr. JOHNSON. So, sir--

1260 Mr. TIERNEY. So apparently because you think something

1261 was politicized in a previous Administration, politicizing in

1262 this administration is laudable.

1263 Mr. JOHNSON. No, that is an inappropriate conclusion,

1264 sir.

1265 Mr. TIERNEY. My question to you was, are you proud of

1266 the fact, or are you concerned of the fact that hundreds of

1267 EPA scientists are reporting political interference with the

1268 work now, not in the past administration -- we can have a

1269 hearing on that some other time. Are you proud of what is

1270 going on now?

1271 Mr. JOHNSON. I am very proud of the work of the Agency

1272 and all the thousands of scientists that we have and includes

1273 | 17,000 employees at EPA.

1274 Mr. TIERNEY. Well, I take it some--

1275 Mr. JOHNSON. And, Mr. Tierney, I will say just I will

1276 share my experience as a scientist growing up in the Agency

that there are those times that scientists agree with the 1277 ultimate decision; there are times that they don't, and I 1278 understand that. 1279 1280 As my role as Administrator is to evaluate the science 1281 and evaluate the policy under what the law directs me to do 1282 and make the best decision, that is what I have been doing, 1283 l and that is what I continue to do. Mr. TIERNEY. Clearly, that is not what happened here, 1284 Mr. Johnson. 1285 1286 Chairman WAXMAN. The gentleman's time has--Mr. TIERNEY. By your own admission. 1287 1288 Chairman WAXMAN. Time has expired. Mr. Bilbray? 1289 Mr. BILBRAY. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I have to say--let me 1290 1291 just follow up on this issue of a survey by scientists that 1292 there was an undue political influence here. 1293 Mr. Johnson, is it fair for me to say that there were 55 requests for comment sent out by the Union of Concerned 1294 1295 Scientists? Mr. JOHNSON. I don't--1296 Mr. BILBRAY. Fifty-five hundred. Fifty-five hundred, I 1297 1298 am sorry. Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. I don't know the numbers of what was 1299 1300 done or what wasn't. I am aware that, in fact, the survey was received by political appointees and non-scientists, so I 1301

have no idea what criteria they used for sending the survey out.

Mr. BILBRAY. That I have, sir. Fifty-five hundred out there. About 1,500 came in, and of that we are looking at maybe half of them had concerns, and there might have been--my concern was that for this to be used in this hearing as some kind of scientific document, and I say anybody who would like to take a look at this and said it is not a scientific document, it doesn't just--no pollster in the world would accept this. Any elected official that would accept it as being a standard, I think, would be appalled by it, but we will talk about with the next panel.

Doctor, my question to you is, in your analysis, you know, you talked about the vegetation and the ecosystem. Was there a consideration of economic value considered in that standard?

Ms. HENDERSON. CASAC is not allowed to consider economic issues, and what we are asked to do is give advice and recommendations on what will be protective of vegetation and the welfare without regard to the costs or the ease of implementation.

So what we did consider was what was biologically relevant and what was recommended by the National Research Council. Also, I have a concern for the effect of ozone on vegetation as well as on people. When you continually

emphasize the primary standard, where do you monitor? 1327 1328 monitor where the people are in urban areas. But we are neglecting the rural areas where our food crops and plants 1329 1330 are grown, and when you need to have information, well, how 1331 does ozone affect those crops, and how protective do we need to be for that? 1332 Mr. BILBRAY. Doctor, how long have you been chairman of 1333 1334 this body? 1335 Ms. HENDERSON. I am in my fourth year. I go off in 1336 October. 1337 Mr. BILBRAY. Okay. I am concerned because when I talk 1338 about economic value, you went immediately to a defensive 1339 based on the cost of implementing strategies. You didn't 1340 talk about the economic value of the crops that might have 1341 been destroyed. 1342 Ms. HENDERSON. Well, I--forgive me. Mr. BILBRAY. You shifted and went way off of where I was 1343 talking about, and I have to understand that, you know, that 1344 1345 economic value is something regulatory agencies do all the 1346 time. 1347 Ms. HENDERSON. Certainly, and there is a, I believe--what do they call it--a regulatory impact assessment 1348 1349 done after our assessment. 1350 Mr. BILBRAY. My question to you, then, if you did not 1351 make that, what criteria did you use to set that on the

Ms. HENDERSON. To set the form?

Mr. BILBRAY. Yes. What standards have you used?

Ms. HENDERSON. The form was purely a scientific issue. I am not an ecologist, but we have very good ecologists on our panel, and they are the ones who develop the form.

I mentioned Ellis Kelling [phonetically], a member of the National Academy of Sciences and others. They know what they are doing, so they developed the form.

Mr. BILBRAY. Okay. I am just concerned that, you know, Ms. Dudley and Johnson, this issue of economic values both in the impact of not doing something and--I am sorry, the doctor went off just worried about enforcement, but also enforcement--isn't there a consideration if you have an economic value impact from both sides: first of all, lack of action and action?

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, again, under the Clean Air Act and under establishing NAAQS, I am not allowed to consider costs or whether in fact it can be implemented or not. So I have to base my decisions based upon what the science says. Of course, I think it is also important to note that with all science there are uncertainties, and there is a range of uncertainties. So, then, science, policy, and then ultimately judgment needs to be exercised to make an appropriate decision.

1377 Mr. BILBRAY. Well, isn't, in the statute, the term 1378 ''economic value'' actually integrated right into the statute? Isn't there a reference there? 1379 Ms. DUDLEY. I have it in front of me. 1380 1381 Mr. BILBRAY. Go ahead, ma'am. 1382 Ms. DUDLEY. It says, ''Welfare includes but is not 1383 limited to effects on soils, water, crops, vegetation, 1384 man-made materials, animals, wildlife, weather, visibility 1385 and climate, damage to and deterioration of property, hazards 1386 to transportation, as well as effects on economic values and 1387 on personal comfort and well-being." 1388 Mr. BILBRAY. Well, let me just say that that is a 1389 consideration with setting standards. I sure wish we would set the same standard before we start putting poison in our 1390 field, too. 1391 1392 Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Bilbray. 1393 Mr. Higgins? 1394 Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to 1395 focus on the primary standard and health impacts. 1396 this is really important because it affects lives, health, 1397 and the well-being of people across the Nation. 1398 There are health risks we have some control over, but 1399 unhealthy air affects each and every one of us. Breathing in this life is not an option. Ozone is a dangerous pollutant. 1400 1401 It hurts our lungs, worsens coughs and asthma, and makes us

1402 more vulnerable to colds and flu. When ozone layers are 1403 high, more people go to the hospital, more children miss 1404 school, and more adults miss work, and more people die. 1405 Dr. Henderson, will the standards set by EPA adequately 1406 protect Americans from ozone pollution? 1407 Ms. HENDERSON. The CASAC panel does not agree that the 1408 standard that was set is sufficiently protective of public health, particularly in regard to a margin of safety. Our 1409 1410 concern is for particularly asthmatic children whose asthma 1411 is aggravated by the higher ozone levels and for what you--Mr. HIGGINS. So the answer is no? 1412 1413 Ms. HENDERSON. The answer is no. I should be more 1414 succinct. No. 1415 Mr. HIGGINS. Administrator Johnson, how do you respond 1416 to Dr. Henderson's concerns? 1417 Mr. JOHNSON. Well, I disagree that I set the standard 1418 that is requisite to protect public health with an inadequate 1419 margin of safety. That is the statutory requirement, and 1420 that is what the science in my judgment indicates. 1421 I think it is also, and as you can read in our final 1422 agency decision document, and we go in great detail, and in 1423 fact we--I think it is a good idea and we are also required 1424 to respond to CASAC's recommendations. 1425 There was one study that was a pivotal study, a clinical 1426 study conducted by Dr. Adams, and that his study he was the

only one that had gone and studied to the level of .060, which was at the lower end of the CASAC range. Dr. Adams actually wrote to the Agency twice questioning the use of his study in saying that we were misusing his study, that there were too many scientific uncertainties at that level.

So that, and for other reasons which are documented in our decision document, I disagreed with CASAC on the actual level and agreed--but I did agree that the current standard was not requisite to protect public health, and that is why I reduced it from 0.084 to .075.

Mr. HIGGINS. Well, look, yes, I want to address an inconsistency within EPA's analysis. I believe there is a major inconsistency here. EPA developed a regulatory impact analysis comparing the standard you chose to the standard recommended by Dr. Henderson. EPA projected that your weaker standard will produce the following results each year:

Between 500 and 3,500 premature deaths, 1,400 non-fatal heart attacks, almost 10,000 asthma attacks or asthma symptoms, 7,500 emergency room and hospital visits, 67,000 lost work days, and almost a million lost school days.

Mr. Johnson, why didn't you listen to your own staff and set a more stringent standard to avoid these harms?

Mr. JOHNSON. Again, the Clean Air Act does not require a primary standard to be set at zero risk, and to achieve that which you are referring would have to be set at a zero,

probably zero level. The Clean Air Act does not require that.

The standard of the law is requisite to protect public health within an adequate margin of safety, and through court decisions, that standard is neither more or less stringent than necessary.

Mr. HIGGINS. Yes.

Mr. JOHNSON. And then that is my judgment, and I made the judgment that we needed to strengthen the standard, and I strengthened the standard which is the Nation's most health-protective eight-hour ozone standard in our history.

And I am very proud of that.

Mr. HIGGINS. The public health experts aren't uncertain about the harm from ozone. The most eminent public health organizations in America agreed upon the Science Advisory Committee's recommendations, and this included the American Academy of Pediatrics, the American Medical Association, the American Heart Association, among others.

I have a letter from the American Lung Association to this Committee strongly critiquing EPA's rule, and I ask unanimous consent to enter it into the record.

1473 Chairman WAXMAN. Without objection that will be ordered.

1474 [The referenced material follows:]

1475 ******** COMMITTEE INSERT *******

Mr. HIGGINS. The American Lung Association says, ''If EPA had followed the law, we could have cut the risk of life-threatening pollution to millions of Americans nationwide.

Administrator Johnson, last question. Your decision seems to be inconsistent with the mainstream thinking. It rejects the recommendations of your expert panel, your own staff, the outside public health organizations. It is just not credible to argue that your decision is based on science.

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, I disagree with that, and we certainly have in excess of 400 pages of document that goes in great detail describing the science behind my decision, and that it is the most health protective standard in the Nation's history.

I might add, as I met with all the public health officials, and I met with others so that I could have their input, and I think that is important as part of the process in me making a decision.

As I mentioned in my oral testimony, I have just proposed a new health protective standard for lead, and I have taken it a step further because CASAC recommended a particular range. But as part of the evaluation the Centers for Disease Control have said that there is no safe level of lead. So CASAC did not recommend, but I felt it was important as a public health official to ask the question:

1501 Should we be setting the standard for lead at zero? 1502 Chairman WAXMAN. Mr. Higgins, your--1503 Mr. JOHNSON. So those are the kinds of decisions that I 1504 have to make, and I see input. Again, I appreciate the 1505 Council of CASAC, my staff, the notice and comment, the public hearings all of which, but, ultimately, I need to make 1506 1507 a tough decision. 1508 Mr. HIGGINS. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 1509 Chairman WAXMAN. The gentleman's time has expired. 1510 Mr. Platts? Mr. PLATTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you 1511 1512 holding this hearing, and I apologize that a scheduling 1513 conflict prevents me from remaining, but I would like to 1514 yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from 1515 California, Mr. Issa. 1516 Mr. ISSA. I thank the gentleman. 1517 You know, if we could put the map up on the board, I think we have--1518 1519 Chairman WAXMAN. Mr. Platts? 1520 Mr. ISSA. Oh, would you ask Todd to stay for a few 1521 minutes? 1522 Chairman WAXMAN. Mr. Platts is yielding his time. He 1523 must stay here. Go ahead. 1524 Mr. ISSA. Okay. If you could put the map up on the 1525 board, and this will primarily concern, I think, most both

Administrator Dudley and Administrator Johnson, but if you 1526 1527 will look at the chart, these are counties with monitor 1528 violations in 2008, primary ozone at the .75 parts per 1529 million, and secondary standard of .21. 1530 Now, my understanding is that every area that is dark, 1531 which includes, unfortunately, most of California. 1532 no effective difference whether you set the standard for 1533 secondary higher or lower, is that correct? That basically, 1534 the ones that are in compliance will be in compliance at 1535 either level; the ones that are not in compliance will not be 1536 in compliance at either level. Is that roughly true, based 1537 on the map you see up there, if you are familiar with it? 1538 Mr. JOHNSON. Based upon analysis that our staff did that whether the form was the W-126 form or the following 1539 1540 identical to the eight-hours ozone standard, based upon the decision that I made to be protective that it didn't matter 1541 1542 either way.

1543 Mr. ISSA. Okay, following up on that--

Mr. JOHNSON. But, clearly--excuse me, sir.

1545 Mr. ISSA. Yes.

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Mr. JOHNSON. But clearly, for the primary standard there were many counties based upon monitoring data that would be out of compliance within the new primary health protective standard.

Mr. ISSA. I realize that and, of course, if California's

out of compliance, in such a large area they are going to be in either case.

I would note that the food basket of California appears to be producing a tremendous amount of crops for us with already noncompliant ozone layers.

Dr. Henderson, can you explain, essentially, why productivity has increased dramatically in most of America, whether it is corn, wheat, rice, or the vegetables grown in California during a time in which ozone levels were far above what you are saying you would like them to be?

Ms. HENDERSON. Well, it would be a mistake for me to try to calculate all the factors that go into food production.

What I was trying to mention was we could do a better job of air quality management in rural areas if we had some kind of handle on what the ozone levels are and if they are at a level that can affect the foliage.

Mr. ISSA. Okay, but back to Administrator Johnson, you didn't find that setting a different standard would have made any difference. In other words, the economic value that you are required by statute to--and, Administrator Dudley, you, too--you are required to look at this economic value. If I read this map correctly, there is not economic value to the different standard because it doesn't, in fact, change the compliance. Is that correct?

Mr. JOHNSON. You have to be very precise. Based upon

the data sets analyzed between 2003 to 2005, and then 2004 to 2006 from currently monitored counties, no additional counties would have been out of attainment under the seasonal secondary standard initially proposed by EPA.

Mr. ISSA. Okay. Could we put the chart up that comes next? This is the chart of levels for the 12-hour standard, the so-called W-126 standard. I think all of you are familiar with this.

When I read it, looking at the difference between the .075 and the .070, under the 126 standard, 21 parts per million, I see no change again. Is that essentially a more graphic way to show that, in fact, there would have been no benefit had we implemented the lower standard? The secondary standard.

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes.

Mr. ISSA. So, Dr. Henderson, if I accept science--and I do--and that your conclusions are well-intended but without the economic value consideration, would you agree, based on no counties changing, the 126, that in fact it was within the Administrator's purview to judge that and to come up with at least the standard for now of .075?

Ms. HENDERSON. I am mixing whether you are talking about the secondary standard or the primary standard.

Mr. ISSA. Well, I am going to the secondary standard, but let me put it another way. Your advisory role is for the

Administrator to accept or reject that, in fact, it is advisory even though it is scientific based, and you have standards different than he does. You said yourself you do not evaluate this economic value where he does. Is that correct?

Ms. HENDERSON. It is certainly within his purview. He is the one who decides. We are advisory only. In the case of the secondary standard, I think the decider was President Bush. And that is within his purview, I mean.

Mr. ISSA. Thank you. Thank you for allowing me to clear up the difference in scope, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WAXMAN. Mr. Hodes?

Mr. HODES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The law is very clear that EPA may not consider costs in setting a National Air Quality Standard to protect the environment. The Supreme Court specifically addressed the issue in 2001. The Court wrote that if EPA established a standard by ''secretly considering the costs without telling anyone,'' it would be grounds for throwing out the standard because the Administrator had not followed the law.

I am concerned that this is exactly what happened in this case. The record before this committee shows that the unanimous recommendation of the Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee was rejected by you, Mr. Johnson, apparently on the basis of White House opinion or desire to which you

1626 apparently exceeded, given the change in your position from 1627 February 22nd to March 12th, for which is there is no explanation that is reasonable other than what the White 1628 1629 House told you to do, and much weaker standards were finally 1630 selected. 1631 I want to know, Mr. Johnson, during the Agency's consultation with the White House, did White House officials 1632 1633 express concerns about the costs of implementing the ozone 1634 standards? 1635 Mr. JOHNSON. Sir, are you referring to the primary or 1636 the secondary standard? 1637 Mr. HODES. Either one. Did they express concerns about 1638 the costs of implementing the ozone standards with respect to either primary or secondary? And I will just point out for 1639 you that your Administrator, Mr. Peacock, said that it is 1640 1641 clear that the prohibition extends even to secondary standards. 1642 Mr. JOHNSON. That is my belief, and that is the way I 1643 1644 operated in my decision-making. 1645 Mr. HODES. Did the White House express concerns about 1646 the costs of implementing either the primary or secondary standards in your consultations with the White House? 1647 1648 Mr. JOHNSON. As I said, for making a decision, it is my decision and my decision alone, made independently, and I 1649 1650 cannot consider and did not consider costs nor whether it was

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Chairman WAXMAN. Mr. Hodes, I don't think he has answered your question.

Mr. HODES. I know. I am sorry, Mr. Johnson. Here is my question: Not what you consider, I am asking you, Mr. Johnson, during the consultations you had with the White House, did the White House officials express concerns to you or your agency about the costs of implementing the ozone standards.

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, if I did recall, I am not sure that it would be appropriate for me to get into what--who said what at what point in time. In fact, I believe that it is important for me and others, future administrators, to be able to have candid discussions with members of the Executive Branch, and, as I said, I made the decision. I made the decision without consideration of cost, and that is the important--

Mr. HODES. Let's stop there because I want to pursue this, and I want an answer to my question. When I hear a witness start talking to me about 'if I did recall,'' I wonder whether or not the witness is being evasive. Do you recall having discussions with the White House concerning costs of implementing the standards?

Mr. JOHNSON. I have routine conversations with members of the Executive Branch.

Mr. HODES. Sir, it is a simple yes or no answer. Do you 1676 1677 recall? 1678 Mr. JOHNSON. It is not a simple yes or no answer because 1679 I have routine conversations on a multitude of issues, and I am saying is that with, on this issue, I made the decision. 1680 1681 I understand what the law directs me to do, and that is not 1682 consider costs and I did not consider costs. 1683 Mr. HODES. Let me go back. Do you recall, sir--search 1684 your memory--having conversations with the White House about 1685 costs in implementing the standards? 1686 Mr. JOHNSON. If I did recall, it would not be 1687 appropriate for me to discuss the nature of those conversations. 1688 1689 Mr. HODES. So you won't tell me whether you do or do not 1690 recall? 1691 Mr. JOHNSON. As I said, it was not part of my decision-making. 1692 1693 Mr. HODES. That is not my--1694 Mr. JOHNSON. That is the important piece, sir. 1695 Mr. HODES. With all due respect, I am asking the 1696 questions and you are answering them. 1697 Mr. JOHNSON. I am answering and you don't like the 1698 answers. 1699 Mr. HODES. No. What I want to know is, do you recall or 1700 don't you recall?

1701 Mr. JOHNSON. I said even if I did recall, it is not 1702 appropriate for me to get into the nature of discussions I 1703 have within the Executive Branch. 1704 Mr. HODES. And the basis of your refusal to answer the 1705 question, is it your lack of recollection or some assertion 1706 of privilege? 1707 Mr. JOHNSON. I am not asserting any privilege at this 1708 time, but I think that it is important, and I think that it 1709 is important that I and future administrators have the 1710 ability to had candid conversations. I also believe that that is important, and certainly as the Agency deliberates on 1711 issues that are before us, and I think that that is an 1712 1713 important privilege, and also I think that it is an important 1714 principle that I need to maintain for me and for future 1715 administrators. 1716 Mr. HODES. I will try this one last time. understand, sir, you are under oath before this Committee? 1717 Mr. JOHNSON. Oh, I understand that, sir. 1718 1719 Mr. HODES. Do you or don't you recall having conversations with the White House about whether or not costs 1720 1721 were considered by the White House? 1722 Mr. JOHNSON. As I said, that whether or not I recall or 1723 don't recall, I don't believe that it is appropriate for me 1724 to discuss the nature of those conversations. I believe it is appropriate for me to be able to have candid 1725

1726 conversations, and I also said under oath that I did not 1727 consider costs in making my decisions.

Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hodes. Your time has expired.

Mr. Sarbanes?

Mr. SARBANES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ms. Dudley, I am going to give you some equal time here. I was intrigued by your memo that came, let me see if I can find it, on March 6th, which was six days before this deadline, you sent a memo to EPA where you said, ''The draft does not provide''--this is the draft EPA report--''does not provide any evidence that a separate secondary standard would be more protective than one set equal to the draft primary standard.'' Explain that.

Ms. DUDLEY. The air quality that would be achieved by setting the secondary standard based on that seasonal form averaging it over three months or setting it equal to the primary, the level of air quality is the same. I think it gets back to the maps that were up there.

But what we care about is air quality, and the air quality that vegetation and humans are exposed to, the two standards from all the analysis that EPA did would have the same effect.

Mr. SARBANES. I am incredulous that you could claim there wasn't any evidence when in the draft, original draft,

the Administrator indicated that he found evidence compelling that ozone-related effects on vegetation are best characterized by an exposure index that is cumulative and seasonal in nature, and that that conclusion on the part of the Administrator was reflective of what the expert panel had concluded, and what months if not years of research and work on the part of the EPA staff had concluded.

So again, I mean I could see you asserting perhaps that it does not provide adequate evidence or sufficient evidence, but to suggest that it didn't provide any evidence, that there was no evidence that this secondary standard that was originally being ut forward would be the appropriate one doesn't seem to jibe with all of the other testimony and documentation that we have.

Ms. DUDLEY. There are two different issues here. One is that whether vegetation responds over a season rather than over a day, and EPA did present evidence to that. EPA also presented evidence that the current standards--or the previous standard may not be protective of vegetation.

But at the end of the day, regardless of which form you used, air quality would be reduced so that that vegetation would be exposed to the same air quality. That is the bottom line, so that the form of the standard will not affect the air quality. It won't affect what people have to do to come into compliance with the standard, and it won't affect the

air quality in those counties that are affected by the 1776 standard.

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Mr. SARBANES. Well, what you are saying strikes me as double-talk in the context of what we heard in the original draft from the Administrator, and certainly the reaction of the staff and the experts to the ultimate decision to abandon the more cumulative standard in favor of the same standard as the primary was intense, and it was lamented at all levels within the staff which to me suggests that there was sufficient evidence. Certainly, there was evidence that that would be the most appropriate route to take.

Administrator Johnson, I just want to say to you that I am offended -- and I am not trying to be facetious here, I actually mean this -- I am offended on your behalf by the White House's handling of this matter, because right up to the end you were going with the science. In fact, I commend you for the fact that after you started to see the writing on the wall on March 6th, you nevertheless, and then at that point, had the ability, I guess, to begin regrouping. nevertheless pushed forward right up to the point of the deadline when the rug was essentially pulled out from under you, or you received this countermand, this final countermand or overwrite from the White House.

I am going to ask you a question which again I don't mean to be facetious. You are somebody who was in the Agency

for many years, you had this opportunity to take the top spot there. I am curious, when you did that, did the President in speaking with you about taking this job, or the White House in speaking with you about it, did they indicate to you that there would be times when the science would be overridden for political purposes? And you would essentially have to carry that water for the White House? How clear were they about these instances occurring.

Mr. JOHNSON. Sir, my charge and certainly my oath of office was to carry out the mandates and the laws that I am responsible for under the Environmental Protection Agency. That was the charge. The President sent further and said, Steve, I want you to accelerate the pace of environmental protection while you help maintain the Nation's economic competitiveness. That was the charge that was given. I have certainly been very public about that.

I have been carrying out those duties to the best of my ability, looking at sound science, and, as I said, science isn't pure. There are many uncertainties and science requires policy judgments and, of course, then there are a variety of other issues that come into play depending upon the statute.

Mr. SARBANES. Well, with all due respect, I can't imagine a clearer example of where your charge to carry out the law in respect to science could come into conflict with

what the President's and White House's edict was in this 1826 1827 particular matter. 1828 I yield back. Chairman WAXMAN. The gentleman's time has expired. 1829 1830 Mr. Welch? 1831 Mr. WELCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 1832 Mr. Johnson, my understanding is Jason Burnett is a 1833 senior member of the EPA. 1834 Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. 1835 Mr. WELCH. And he is a trusted and respected advisor, is 1836 that right? 1837 Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. 1838 Mr. WELCH. A person on whom you had confidence, have confidence? 1839 1840 Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. 1841 Mr. WELCH. Is that correct? He, as you know, has been 1842 deposed, and he testified that, according to him in his 1843 testimony, you favored granting this California waiver in 1844 full in August and September. Is Mr. Burnett correct? Mr. JOHNSON. Well, I think that he is correct in 1845 1846 characterizing that over time, as I was briefed--1847 Mr. WELCH. Let's keep it simple. I mean, I understand 1848 this is a process. My question, and I am really going to try 1849 to frame a question that is clear, that allows you to answer 1850 it as clearly and as succinctly as possible. I do appreciate

that this is a process, and you have many things that come in 1851 1852 so what happens today isn't necessarily what is the wise decision tomorrow, okay? 1853 1854 But is he correct in his recollection, according to his 1855 testimony, that in August and September, you were leaning towards a full waiver? 1856 1857 Mr. JOHNSON. Well, I don't recall the August and September time frame, but I can say with confidence that I 1858 1859 was considering all options, including a full grant and also 1860 a full denial, and options in between. And I think my 1861 recollection is, as I read the transcript last night, and I 1862 think he also states that as well. 1863 Mr. WELCH. Mr. Burnett said -- it was very clearly -- that 1864 in August and September you were favoring granting a waiver 1865 in full. 1866 We have to move on here. I only have five minutes, so you read it last night. That is what he said. 1867 1868 Chairman WAXMAN. Well, the issue isn't what Mr. Burnett 1869 said; the issue is whether it is accurate or not. Mr. JOHNSON. Well, as I said, is that I considered each 1870 1871 one of the options. 1872 Mr. WELCH. All right, let me go through this. 1873 Mr. JOHNSON. I don't recall the particular time, but I 1874 did consider --1875 Mr. WELCH. But that is obvious. It is obvious that you

1876 did. Here is what he said. I think you have more or less 1877 acknowledged that in August and September he was correct, you were leaning towards a full waiver. He said that over time 1878 1879 you began to think of a partial grant. Is he right there? Mr. JOHNSON. I considered a partial grant, that is 1880 1881 correct. 1882 Mr. WELCH. All right. Then on December 19th you issued 1883 a denial. 1884 Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. Mr. WELCH. Was that after you had been to the White 1885 1886 House to have conversations about this issue? 1887 Mr. JOHNSON. Well, again, I have routine conversations with the White House throughout the calendar. Again, this 1888 1889 was my--1890 Mr. WELCH. Did you have any--1891 Mr. JOHNSON. This was the decision. 1892 Mr. WELCH. Did you have anything--Mr. JOHNSON. I understand--1893 Chairman WAXMAN. Mr. Johnson, we would appreciate it if 1894 you answer the questions. 1895 l 1896 Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, I am trying. 1897 Mr. WELCH. Did you have a meeting with the President 1898 about this? Mr. JOHNSON. I have routine meetings with the Executive 1899 1900 Branch, including the President.

1901	Mr. WELCH. Okay. What part of my question don't you
1902	understand? Did you have a meeting with the President about
1903	this issue of the EPA waiver?
1904	Mr. JOHNSON. When and where and if I have meetings with
1905	the President areI said I have routine meetings with
1906	members of the Executive Branch. Those meetings I believe
1907	are in confidence.
1908	Mr. WELCH. Is there something
1909	Mr. JOHNSON. And as I said, I made the decision. It was
1910	my decision alone.
1911	Mr. WELCH. Mr. Johnson, you described this process is
1912	transparent and open, correct?
1913	Mr. JOHNSON. Yes.
1914	Mr. WELCH. And you are proud of the process?
1915	Mr. JOHNSON. I am. This was an excellent process. As
1916	you can see from the thousands of pages.
1917	Mr. WELCH. Does transparent mean if we can't know
1918	whether you, in fact, met with the President and discussed
1919	with him this issue?
1920	Mr. JOHNSON. I believe that as Administrator that I need
1921	to have the ability to have private meetings with the
1922	President and members of the Executive Branch.
1923	Mr. WELCH. Did I just ask you what the content was of
1924	your meeting with the President?

1926 have routine meetings with the President and members of the 1927 Executive Branch. I think that is good government. 1928 Mr. WELCH. Yes, but a few things: In your September 12th 1929 briefing, there were slides that were presented that included 1930 a statement from our staff that the clearest and most 1931 defensible option would be to grant the waiver. 1932 true? 1933 Mr. JOHNSON. I don't recall that particular slide. know that there was a wide range of options and that they 1934 1935 were all legally defensible. 1936 Mr. WELCH. There were staff evaluations at the September 1937 meeting--this is all in the record. This is not disputable. 1938 Mr. JOHNSON. I said I don't remember that particular 1939 document. Mr. WELCH. So we can pretend to the people listening 1940 1941 that this is an established fact, but let's--Mr. JOHNSON. Sir, there were how many thousands of pages 1942 1943 of documents that were submitted to you? 1944 Mr. WELCH. --September 12th briefing it said California 1945 has extraordinary ozone conditions, that greenhouse gas 1946 standards are reasonably viewed as necessary to address 1947 climate change, and opponents to the waiver have not met their burden of showing the California standards won't 1948 1949 benefit climate change and ozone conditions. 1950 Are you aware that in these evaluations they originally

1951 contained those remarks in writing until they were removed at 1952 the insistence of Mr. Meyers? 1953 Mr. JOHNSON. I don't recall that situation, and I don't 1954 necessarily see documents that are drafted by individual 1955 staffs. 1956 Mr. WELCH. But you were at the meeting. 1957 Mr. JOHNSON. Oh, I don't necessarily see all the 1958 workings of drafting and redrafting before that it reaches my 1959 desk. That is the point. 1960 Mr. WELCH. This is sounding like some of the meetings 1961 you were at you were present, and some of the meetings you 1962 are at, you are not. September 20th and 21st briefing, this 1963 is your briefing. I mean, it is not somebody else's. 1964 Did the EPA staff make it clear that the statutory criteria for granting the waiver had been met? 1965 That is a 1966 threshold question, correct? 1967 Mr. JOHNSON. There were a wide range of options, and 1968 there were opinions that were provided to me that as part of 1969 the record. As I said--1970 Mr. WELCH. It is a little frustrating. Mr. JOHNSON. Well, it shouldn't be frustrating--1971 1972 Mr. WELCH. Well, it is. 1973 Mr. JOHNSON. --because there is a 50-page document--1974 Mr. WELCH. No, no, it is a simple--1975 Mr. JOHNSON. --describing my decision and the scientific

1976 basis on what the law requires me to decide, which I decided. Chairman WAXMAN. Mr. Welch, your time has expired. 1977 Mr. Johnson, you admitted you had a conversation with 1978 1979 the President on the California waiver. That wasn't an 1980 issue. Now, you are refusing to say whether you had a 1981 conversation with the President on the ozone waiver. 1982 1983 the difference? Mr. JOHNSON. As I said, I have routine conversations 1984 with the President as well as members of the Executive 1985 Branch, and I believe that those--1986 1987 Chairman WAXMAN. Let me get the record straight. Mr. ISSA. Could we have regular order? 1988 Chairman WAXMAN. The Chairman is pursuing regular order. 1989 1990 You said for the record that you had a conversation with the 1991 President on the ozone layer? Mr. JOHNSON. I don't recall making that --1992 1993 Chairman WAXMAN. On the ozone ruling? 1994 Mr. JOHNSON. I don't recall making that comment myself. 1995 Chairman WAXMAN. Do you recall making a comment that you have had a conversation with the President on any of these 1996 three rules that we have been looking at? 1997 Mr. JOHNSON. As I said, what I do recall and I believe 1998 is an accurate reflection of what I have said, is that I have 1999 2000 routine conversations with members of the Executive Branch,

2001 including the President on a wide range of issues. Chairman WAXMAN. Okay, I am not going to pursue this 2002 because I will have another opportunity, but it seems to me 2003 2004 you are being awfully evasive, and I don't know why you 2005 cannot tell this Committee whether you in fact had a 2006 discussion about this rule or that rule or the other rule. 2007 We are only talking about three different rules. 2008 did or you didn't. I don't know why you cannot tell us that 2009 information. 2010 No one is asking you what was said. We are just asking 2011 you whether you had a conversation, and the answer is not 2012 acceptable to say, I have had conversations with the 2013 President and others on a routine basis, and I am not going 2014 to tell you whether I had a conversation on these subjects. 2015 What else do you talk to him about? 2016 Mr. JOHNSON. As I have said, I have routine 2017 conversations on--2018 Chairman WAXMAN. In those routine conversations, did you 2019 talk about the ozone --2020 Mr. JOHNSON. -- on a wide range of topics. 2021 Mr. ISSA. Mr. Chairman, I must insist that we go to 2022 regular order. 2023 Chairman WAXMAN. The gentleman is not in order at this 2024 time. 2025 Mr. ISSA. Mr. Chairman, the rules of the House--

2026 Chairman WAXMAN. The gentleman will cease. 2027 Mr. ISSA. The rules of the House call for an alternating 2028 five minutes on--2029 Chairman WAXMAN. The gentleman will cease. 2030 Mr. ISSA. -- on what time does the Chairman speak. 2031 point of order, Mr. Chairman, on what time does the Chairman 2032 speak and ask these questions. 2033 Chairman WAXMAN. The Chair has the prerogative to pursue 2034 for the record a clarification and I am pursuing it. Mr. ISSA. Mr. Chairman, where in the rules is that 2035 2036 Could I see a copy of the rules that allow it, 2037 because as I said, the rules of the House, Mr. Chairman--2038 Chairman WAXMAN. We will furnish you with a copy at the 2039 appropriate time. 2040 Mr. ISSA. Mr. Chairman, there are multiple members that 2041 could yield to you time. I would ask that you--2042 Chairman WAXMAN. I will have you physically removed from 2043 this meeting if you don't stop. I want to know an answer to the question. 2044 2045 Did you have a discussion with the President on any one 2046 of these three rules? 2047 Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman, as I said, I have routine 2048 conversations with the President and the Executive Branch on 2049 all, on many matters before the Agency of particular 2050 importance. I don't believe that it is appropriate for me to

get into the details of what those conversations are or are not. I think that is an important privilege that and opportunity that we have.

Chairman WAXMAN. Are you asserting executive privilege?
Mr. JOHNSON. Not at this time, sir.

Chairman WAXMAN. Okay, Ms. Watson is now recognized.

Ms. WATSON. Thank you, and let me try this: Mr. Johnson, in December of 2007, you announced that EPA would deny California's petition--and I am a Californian--for a Clean Air Act waiver to enforce its standards to reduce greenhouse gas pollution from cars and trucks. In our previous investigations of the White House's manipulation of climate change science, we learned that the Office of the Vice President was involved in these activities.

Because the California waiver directly relates to climate change, I would like to ask you about the Vice President's role in the California waiver decision. It is very important to me. Was the Vice President's Office involved with the deliberations on the California waiver?

Mr. JOHNSON. Not to my knowledge, no.

Ms. WATSON. Your answer is no, okay. According to press accounts, the Vice President was involved in the issue and the Press has reported that the CEO of Ford and Chrysler met with Vice President Cheney prior to the denial and urged the Administration to reject the waiver. Did the Vice President

or his staff put any pressure on you or your staff to deny the California waiver request?

Mr. JOHNSON. No.

2079 Ms. WATSON. Did the Vice President or his staff tell you 2080 they opposed the California waiver?

Mr. JOHNSON. Not that I recall.

Ms. WATSON. Mr. Johnson, we are looking at a mysterious, last-minute reversal of your position on the California waiver. We need to fully understand the reasons for that sudden change of course. Transparency is what we are trying to get to, and it would be fundamentally wrong if you reversed your decision because of the meeting the Vice President had with the auto industry. It would violate the Clean Air Act if a denial resulted from any pressure from the Vice President's office.

But the Committee won't know the truth if you do not tell us and, in terms of being transparent, we want to know why there was a reversal. We asked for the waiver because living in California, having worked for 20 years in the legislature, we did a lot to clean up our air. In fact, it took us 14 years for the smoking policies that stopped smoking on airplanes in California air space, and now it is the practice around the globe.

So we kind of know what we are doing when we ask for a waiver. So if you could be transparent, was there any

2101 pressure put on you at all to change your own recommendations, to reverse your own recommendations. 2102 Mr. JOHNSON. Well, then I would with due respect beg to 2103 2104 differ with your characterization. I didn't reverse any 2105 decision; I made the decision, and the decision was 2106 documented in the letter of what I intended to do -- to the 2107 Governor -- in December, and later on then, as I said, the approximately 50-page document goes into great detail on my 2108 2109 decision. 2110 It was my decision, it was mine alone, and as I note in the document that climate change is a problem that is not 2111 2112 unique to California. My decision is grounded in the law and 2113 the facts that were before me. 2114 Ms. WATSON. We have your words down in the record, but 2115 was there any input from the White House that influenced your 2116 final decision to deny us a request for a waiver? 2117 Mr. JOHNSON. Again, my decision was based upon the law and the facts in Section 209. 2118 2119 Ms. WATSON. No, let me clarify and speak real clearly. Mr. JOHNSON. Please. 2120 2121 Ms. WATSON. So you can answer me directly, was there any input from the White House, either the President or Vice 2122 2123 President, that influenced your decision? 2124 Mr. JOHNSON. Again, I have routine conversations with the Executive Branch and--2125

2126 Ms. WATSON. All right, you will not answer--2127 Mr. JOHNSON. -- and I made the decision--2128 Ms. WATSON. Hold on. Hold on, I am asking some 2129 questions. I have gone through this for the last hour. Yes 2130 or no. Mr. JOHNSON. As I said, I have routine conversations --2131 2132 Ms. WATSON. No. That doesn't--2133 Mr. JOHNSON. Well, again--2134 Ms. WATSON. Right, we are talking about transparency. 2135 Mr. JOHNSON. As I said--2136 Ms. WATSON. Yes or no? 2137 Mr. JOHNSON. The answer is no, they did not make the decision. 2138 The answer is yes, I made the decision. 2139 Ms. WATSON. I didn't ask did you do that. Maybe my 2140 English is not clear. Let me see if I can restate it. 2141 Mr. JOHNSON. Please. 2142 Ms. WATSON. Yes. You have these routine conversations. Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. 2143 Ms. WATSON. Was there anything--you don't have to give 2144 2145 me the content--was there anything in the conversation, any 2146 input from either the President or the Vice President -- and 2147 the Vice President in particular, because we do have a record 2148 of conversations with an industry that adds to the pollution 2149 in the air, was there any input from the Vice President that 2150 impacted on your decision to deny California its waiver?

Mr. JOHNSON. Specifically, for the Vice President I 2151 2152 don't recall any. 2153 Ms. WATSON. Your answer is that you don't recall. 2154 Mr. JOHNSON. I said no, I don't recall any. 2155 Ms. WATSON. Okay, thank you. Thank you very much. 2156 Chairman WAXMAN. Mr. Issa expressed that I was being 2157 unfair by taking additional time out of order, and I, in order to be fair, will yield him at the point three minutes 2158 2159 so he could pursue further questions. 2160 Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate the 2161 balance. 2162 In a nutshell, Administrator Johnson, you are aware that 2163 members of Congress enjoy the speeches and debate 2164 exemption -- it is been well documented -- that what we do and 2165 say in order to make our decisions and how we come to the 2166 Floor is protected from, basically, discovery by your branch. 2167 So it probably shouldn't come as a surprise, or should come 2168 as a surprise to you that we are surprised that you are not 2169 going to tell us whether or not there were conversations 2170 within the Executive Branch that led to your independent 2171 decision. 2172 So I hope you will take that as an 2173 I-understand-it-even-if-others-don't. 2174 In a nutshell, you serve at the pleasure of the President, is that correct? 2175

Mr. JOHNSON. That is correct.

Mr. ISSA. But the President doesn't have the right to order you; he only has the right to either accept what you do, statutorily, make independent judgment if he has statutory, or fire you. Isn't that essentially correct?

Mr. JOHNSON. Essentially, that is--

Mr. ISSA. Okay, so you have independent authority subject to that portion of the pleasure, and you have asserted that in order to make your decision.

I would like to quote a well-known gentleman, Chairman Dingell, who declared that this regulation of CO2 was a glorious mess. Do you agree with Chairman Dingell that under the current law taking a common material that is going to be everywhere and diffuses quickly, and regulating it under the existing Clean Air Act, will be a glorious mess?

Mr. JOHNSON. I believe that there are many intricacies and complications with the Clean Air Act, and my personal opinion is that, given the likely years and years of litigation that would ensue, I prefer a legislative approach. However, as the Chairman duly noted, I had responsibilities to administer the Clean Air Act, and that is what I am doing by beginning with an advance notice of proposed rulemaking, which will certain help the Agency as it sorts through the intricacies of the Clean Air Act and, I trust, will also help members of Congress.

2201 Mr. ISSA. Now, in your consideration of granting a 2202 waiver to California, did it occur to you at least as to CO2 2203 that when you haven't yet set levels on something you have 2204 just now been told through the courts you have the ability to 2205 set a level on, an independent request would be premature and 2206 inappropriate. 2207 Is that part of your consideration in how do you grant a 2208 waiver before you have even determined what the basis? You 2209 might, in fact, regulate to a level much lower than what 2210 California would? 2211 Mr. JOHNSON. Well, actually, the Section 209 of the Clean Air Act actually identifies three very specific 2212 2213 criteria, and that has to be the sole basis of my evaluation 2214 of any waiver petition. In my judgment, California did not 2215 need the second criteria, which is a compelling and 2216 extraordinary conditions. I go into great detail describing why I do not believe, in my judgment, they met those 2217 2218 conditions. 2219 Chairman WAXMAN. Mr. Cummings? 2220 Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 2221 Administrator, let me ask you this: I found it 2222 interesting that when the Chairman was asking you about 2223 meetings with the President, you did not provide a direct

You talked about all these wonderful times that you

have, and then when Ms. Watson asked you about the Vice

2224

2225

answer.

2226 President, you did answer and say that you didn't have 2227 meetings with regard to the California standards. 2228 I just want to make sure I understand why it sounds like there was a different standard there for you. 2229 2230 Mr. JOHNSON. It is not a different standard, sir, but, 2231 as I said, I have routine meetings with the Executive Branch, 2232 including the President. Asked specifically about the Vice 2233 President, and to best of my recall I did not have any conversations with him. I was just trying to respond to--2234 2235 Mr. CUMMINGS. And all with regard to this, is that 2236 right? 2237 Mr. JOHNSON. With regard to the California waiver, that 2238 is correct. So I was just trying to clear that up. 2239 Mr. CUMMINGS. Yes. Well, I am glad you did. I just, you know, one of the things, this stuff is personal for me 2240 2241 because I have asthma. In my district in Baltimore, we have 2242 a high rate of asthma, and the taxpayers pay you. They pay you as they pay us. We, in Maryland, are anxious to adopt 2243 2244 the same standards that California has, and so, you know, we 2245 are curious as to how our Administrator, our man in the EPA, 2246 how he makes his decisions. So, you know, during the time that the EPA, as 2247 2248 Administrator many of your decisions have provoked widespread public criticism and even outrage. In response, you have 2249 2250 said, ''It is not a popularity contest,'' and you said, ''In

the end, it is the judgment, and each of these decisions is
my decision and my decision alone.'' Do you remember saying
that?

Mr. JOHNSON. I do remember saying that, and I agree with that.

Mr. CUMMINGS. But you don't get to decide whatever you want. You must base your decisions on the scientific data and the criteria that Congress established in law. The final decisions are made by the courts to determine whether your decision is conformed to the law. All too frequently their answer has been no.

Chairman Waxman asked you recently about EPA, as to EPA for the full litigation record on the Clean Air Act decisions issued by this Administration. It is not a pretty picture. Out of the 26 cases decided by the D.C. Circuit, EPA lost two-thirds in whole or in part.

Did you know that?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, I do, and our then General Counsel Roger Martella sent, I believe, a letter to the Chairman detailing all of the court cases which do not reflect that kind of percentage. So, yes, I am concerned when we lose cases, and that is why I am going my very best job to make sure that not only are our decisions, my decisions, based upon sound science but on good laws as well.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Well, I am glad you said that, because

2276 these losses include some of this Administration's highest 2277 profile environmental rules. In 11 cases, the court said 2278 that the EPA's position was barred by the plain language of 2279 the law, which is the legal equivalent of a shutout. 2280 To date, the D.C. Circuit has reviewed eight of your 2281 decisions and has entirely or partially rejected half. Does 2282 this track record concern you? 2283 Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. Any time that the Agency loses a 2284 lawsuit, I think that that is important, and that is of 2285 concern to me. 2286 Mr. CUMMINGS. And I know EPA has fine lawyers. 2287 concern is whether you and the White House are listening to 2288 them. 2289 Mr. JOHNSON. Well, sir, I listen to all of my staff, 2290 including a great legal staff. As I said, I base my 2291 decisions on science and on the law and on the facts that are before me. 2292 Mr. CUMMINGS. Now, the Committee's investigation of your 2293 2294 denial of the California waiver decision revealed that legal 2295 staff warned that a denial would likely--that you would 2296 likely lose, but you disregarded their advice even when EPA 2297 has lost in court the first time. That hasn't stopped the 2298 Administration from trying again. 2299 This summer EPA plans to issue a third New Source Review rule, which would allow dirty power plants to upgrade and 2300

2301 increase air pollution without installing pollution control 2302 The D.C. Circuit overturned the Administration's 2303 second New Source Review rule as well as part of the first, 2304 and the Supreme Court has already rejected the legal theory 2305 EPA is relying on. 2306 Has your legal staff warned you that this rule would be 2307 highly vulnerable to legal challenge? 2308 Mr. JOHNSON. Well, since the rule is pending before the 2309 Agency, that is an important issue that we are currently 2310 debating. 2311 Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 2312 Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Cummings. 2313 Mr. Cannon? 2314 Mr. CANNON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This has been an interesting and relatively intense hearing. I would like to 2315 2316 give Mr. Johnson the opportunity just to sort of respond to 2317 some questions that he has time to respond to, so we can 2318 actually make some sense out of those. 2319 On December 19th, Mr. Johnson, of 2007 you announced 2320 that you would be denying California's waiver request, and on 2321 February 29th, 2008, you released the complete decision 2322 document explaining the decision. Were you advised that the 2323 decision to deny California's waiver request was supported by 2324 the law? 2325 Mr. JOHNSON. Yes.

2326 Mr. CANNON. Would you like to elaborate on that a little 2327 bit? Mr. JOHNSON. Well, the staff presented me a wide range 2328 2329 of options. We went through each of those options, and each 2330 one, those that were not defensible, were eliminated, and the 2331 ones that were presented, options were presented to me, 2332 including denial were presented, and ultimately that is the 2333 decision that I made. 2334 Mr. CANNON. So there were some options perhaps out there that didn't make it to you because they were not legally 2335 2336 justifiable. 2337 Mr. JOHNSON. Again, I don't know which ones were or were 2338 not, but certainly the ones that were presented to me were 2339 legally defensible, including a denial. 2340 Mr. CANNON. Were you advised that the decision to deny 2341 the waiver we requested was supported by the facts of the 2342 record as well as the law? 2343 Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. In fact we have an approximately 2344 50-page decision document that goes into great detail, 2345 detailing my decision and based upon all of the facts. 2346 Mr. CANNON. So you were presented with options that were 2347 justified by the law and the facts, and then you made a decision, and that decision was then substantiated by the law 2348 and the facts in your decision? 2349 2350 Mr. JOHNSON. Yes.

2351 Mr. CANNON. Was denying California's waiver request one 2352 of the options that was included as one of the options included by your staff? 2353 2354 Mr. JOHNSON. That is correct. 2355 Mr. CANNON. Do you have any reason to believe your staff 2356 would present you with an option that was not supported by the law or the facts of the record? 2357 2358 Mr. JOHNSON. I do not. 2359 Mr. CANNON. Is there anything else you would like to say 2360 about this issue since you have been hectored to 2361 Mr. JOHNSON. Well, sir, I know that the Chairman and 2362 other members of the Committee disagree with my decision, and 2363 I understand that. These decisions are not easy decisions, but I made the right decision. I made the decision based 2364 upon the facts, based upon the law, what the law directs me 2365 2366 to, and I stand by that. It was my decision and my decision 2367 alone. 2368 Mr. CANNON. Thank you. You just answered the next 2369 question I was about to ask. It was your decision. Do you 2370 stand by that decision today? 2371 Mr. JOHNSON. Absolutely. Mr. CANNON. You know, I personally have some bona fides. 2372 2373 I worked in the Reagan Administration after the Surface Mining Law had been passed, and the first of the regulations 2374 2375 had been done under the Carter Administration. The second had

been done under Secretary Jim Watt, and both were probably extreme. It is very difficult to find a middle path that actually works, works for industry and works for the American people and works for the environment.

I just want you to understand that some of us understand how difficult these things are, especially difficult when the world changes and technology has changed the world around us. It has changed the world in which we can regulate and manage regulation. And to suggest that we could never do anything new, whether you are Democrat or Republican, would bind us, tie us up in a way that would not make any sense at all. In fact, I would hope that in America we would start looking at how we can actually move away from Federal, centralized regulation to more local regulation throughout the country.

I think our information technology gives us that opportunity. Our understanding that the science of pollution and what is harmful to our bodies, what is harmful to the environment, is moving rapidly forward, and I would hope that the hectoring that you have felt today will not be perpetuated in the future by whoever replaces you and others but, rather, is a thoughtful review of what happens so that we can help guide these sort of bumpers instead of being sledge hammers about it.

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, sir, I appreciate that, and I also respect the role of Congress and important role in oversight,

2401 and I am very supportive of oversight responsibility, and I 2402 am also supportive of transparency. But, as you can well 2403 imagine, I have to also be supportive of the ability to have candid conversations, have advice so that I can make 2404 2405 decisions that are independent decisions, whether that be 2406 independent decisions from Congress or independent decisions, 2407 again under the law, or independent decisions from the White 2408 House, or anybody else. 2409 I do respect the oversight responsibility, and I believe 2410 that the thousands of pages and the depositions and all the 2411 rest demonstrate to me that I went through a very thoughtful, 2412 I went through excruciating number of briefings and details 2413 so that I could be best equipped to make the most informed 2414 decision. 2415 So again, I appreciate the opportunity to be here, Mr. 2416 Chairman, and thank you for those remarks. 2417 Mr. CANNON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I assume my time 2418 has expired. 2419 May I just thank Ms. Dudley for being here? Her office 2420 is also under the jurisdiction of the Committee that I am the Ranking Member of on Judiciary. We have spent some time 2421 2422 I appreciate her being here, and perhaps some 2423 other time we can ask more questions of you, Ms. Dudley. 2424 I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 2425 Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Cannon.

2426 Ms. WATSON. Mr. Chairman, a question to you. 2427 Chairman WAXMAN. Yes? 2428 Ms. WATSON. Is it possible for us to get a copy? 2429 Johnson has spoken of the 50-page report, and I think it is 2430 in the public domain. Can we access a copy of that? Chairman WAXMAN. We will make it available to you. 2431 2432 Ms. WATSON. All right. Thank you very much. 2433 Chairman WAXMAN. I would like to recognize myself. 2434 Constitution is clear. Congress passes the laws and the 2435 Executive Branch must faithfully execute them. 2436 Administrator Johnson, we knew what your professional 2437 positions were as the head of EPA. You had a record. 2438 heard from an advisory committee, you heard from your staff, 2439 you got input from all sorts of groups, environmentalists and 2440 industry. That is all appropriate that you get all this 2441 input in to make the decisions. 2442 We knew what your decision was on three areas: ozone, 2443 the California waiver, and the greenhouse gas question. 2444 at least we know what you sent to the White House. 2445 And then you reversed yourself after you had a candid 2446 conversation with the White House that would indicate you are 2447 getting input from the President, which you may think is 2448 important. But it also may indicate that the President is really making the decisions. What we need to do our 2449 oversight job is to find out on what basis he is telling you 2450

that you ought to make a different decision than what you initially proposed.

Now, in the case of ozone the Clean Air Act clearly states that air quality standards must be set by you using your best judgment based on the latest scientific information. The law does not provide that it is the President's decision; it says that it is your decision.

Now, I understand some constitutional scholars would say when Congress grants an agency authority, the President is granted that authority as well. Other scholars disagree. We don't have to resolve that issue, but in the setting of ozone standards, the science and staff work all pointed in one direction: Set a secondary standard that uses a seasonal form.

EPA's record is clear, but in literally the last hours of the rulemaking process when you faced the deadline in which you have to come out with a rule, the President helped you see that you ought to reverse what EPA and what you had suggested, and the record does not explain how the President made his decision.

Now, we issued a subpoena both to Administrator Johnson and Administrator Dudley to provide documents that will help the Committee understand how this decision was made.

Ms. Dudley, the subpoena required you to produce the documents by April 18th.

24.93

Mr. Johnson, you were required to produce the documents by May 6th. Unfortunately, you both continued to withhold documents.

I wrote to both of you on Friday. I informed you that unless there is an assertion of executive privilege, you must produce the documents at this hearing today. Administrator Johnson, has the President asserted executive privilege over the documents responsive to the subpoena?

Mr. JOHNSON. My understanding, sir, that executive privilege is not something to be invoked lightly, and that constitutional confrontations between the legislative and executive branches should be avoided whenever possible.

At this time I am not making an assertion of executive privilege today. Instead, I am committing that to you that my staff remains available and willing to continue our discussions about how to reach a mutually agreeable resolution regarding the remaining documents.

My staff earlier, right before the hearing, delivered a number of additional documents on the ozone max.

Chairman WAXMAN. Administrator Dudley, has the President asserted executive privilege over the documents that we requested of you pursuant to a subpoena?

Ms. DUDLEY. I know that our lawyers have been discussing the documents. We have produced over 7,000 pages and, in fact, I have a letter delivered to you from OMB General

2501	Counsel today which, with permission, I would like to put on
2502	the record.
2503	Chairman WAXMAN. Without objection, we will have it in
2504	the record.
2505	[The referenced material follows:]
2506	******

Chairman WAXMAN. Well, during my 10-year tenure as chairman of this Committee, we have established a track record of making reasonable accommodations to Executive Branch interests that have arisen in committee investigations. In this case, you are trying to shield the White House from reasonable oversight, and that is not a reasonable position or an accepted one.

The precedents are clear: Unless there is a valid claim of executive privilege, you need to turn over the documents.

As Chairman Burton recognized when he was chairman: 'The only privilege under which the President may withhold subpoena documents is an executive privilege.''

Ranking Member Davis took the same position. In this investigation there has been no assertion of executive privilege, and the documents the Committee seeks are central to understanding whether the President has complied with the law. This is a serious issue, and your defiance of the subpoena is a serious matter that the Committee is going to have to address.

As an example of this is whether, in establishing the ozone rule whether costs were taken into consideration in a surreptitious way, and we know what the Supreme Court has to say about that matter, and we also know that Ms. Dudley has a March 6th memo from the White House that was sent to EPA where she criticized EPA for failing to respond to economic

2532 values in setting the environmental standard.

One of her objections seems to be the EPA proposal would be too costly to industry. We want to know more about that. We want to know on what basis that position is reached and others. So what I am telling you both, that unless you assert executive privilege, this Committee has always stood by the fact that we expect the compliance with the subpoena.

Mr. Issa?

2550.

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WAXMAN. I have taken five minutes and 41 seconds. The minute will be given five minutes and--

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to follow up on that. The President's involvement in the ozone proceeding, as I understand it, is not only allowed, and it is not improper influence but, in fact, is consistent with President Clinton's even greater involvement in setting the 1997 standard, isn't that correct?

Mr. JOHNSON. That is correct.

Mr. ISSA. And I wasn't here in 1997, but I don't believe that the deliberative process between the Agency, that internal process, was ever demanded that it be exposed. Do any of you know if there was a record under one of the previous chairmen where they demanded to know everything that led to President Clinton assisting in the decision-making process finally made by the EPA but his input into that

2557 standard in 1997?

2558 Mr. JOHNSON. I don't know.

2559 Mr. ISSA. I don't think there was, and I think we may be
2560 working with slightly different standards of what is
2561 appropriate.

Chairman WAXMAN. Will, the gentleman yield?
Mr. ISSA. Of course, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WAXMAN. Well, I do want to indicate that these standards that you are talking about were exhaustively examined by Congress. In the 105th Congress, there were approximately 30 days of hearings and at least 10 committees on this topic. EPA Administrator Carol Browner personally testified over a dozen times regarding the standards. Our own Committee conducted an investigation about the matter as well.

Mr. McIntosh, who was the subcommittee chairman, requested OMB produce all records related to OIRA's view of the proposed rules in response to this and other requests.

OMB produced thousands of pages in documents, including internal White House communications, and apparently withheld only two memoranda to the President from senior advisors within the Executive Branch of the President.

So this record demonstrates that Congress, especially our Committee, spared no effort in conducting oversight over the Clinton rulemaking. It also shows that the Clinton

Administration was extraordinarily responsive to our Committee's extensive demands for interviews and documents.

Mr. ISSA. Well, and I appreciate the reclaiming of my time. It certainly shows that we have a long tradition of looking into it and that we also have a long tradition of recognizing that the President has a role to set, to participate in the standard-setting, both President Clinton and now President Bush.

I would like to get to one closing matter, because I think we have sort of made the point with the inclusions of these graphs and so on that the difference in the secondary standard would have made no difference. So I think we will go on to out of ozone and on to CO2.

Administrator Johnson, if you were to have granted California's waiver request, and if California went into global cap-and-trade, and if California reduced its CO2, assuming that China and India continue to produce new coal facilities that have absolutely no scrubbers, that are just putting out CO2, would it really be all that significant when you look at the present level in California reduced by, let's say, 20 or 30 percent versus the new coal plants being put up on a weekly basis in China?

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, if I may, those are not the criteria on which I had to base the California waiver.

Mr. ISSA. No, no, I understand that, but you are

2607 obviously--

2608 Mr. JOHNSON. So I based that on were there the criteria 2609 that were in the law.

Now, asking the other question, the challenge that we have as a Nation and as we have across all the States, including my home State of Maryland, is that all contributes to global climate change. So, in fact, what is happening in Maryland over what is happening in Florida or New York or wherever, is all contributing to--

Mr. ISSA. Okay. And I want to focus on that because, although it is not the primary portion of this hearing, I think as we close this hearing as to this panel, I think it is important. We have to get down the amount of CO2 going into the atmosphere on a worldwide basis if we are going to be effective in reducing CO2 worldwide, thus assuming that the scientists' predictions are right that if we continuing putting more CO2 in, we will, by definition, be contributing to global warming.

We make that assumption. This Committee has studied it, extensively. Based on that assumption, isn't it a global issue, one that requires treaties and a reduction on a global basis if we are going to be effective?

Mr. JOHNSON. I believe it requires that each of the nations, whether you are a rapidly-developing economy like China or India, or the United States or European Union, to be

leaders and to move forward, and that each situation is different. Fifty percent of our electricity comes from coal; Australia it is 82 percent; France is much less than that, it is less than 10 percent.

Mr. ISSA. One final question, because I think we have made that point. You have a responsibility as a Federal officer to all Americans, and if I understand the standard under which you rejected California's waiver, part of that is an equal protection, that States are not allowed to arbitrarily have separate standards without need because in fact you are protecting all of us and our commerce against arbitrary changes in standards by States.

Isn't that true?

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, again, the three criteria that focus specifically on California, other States are not allowed to take any other action themselves unless the waiver was granted, and then they can adopt what the California standard is.

The issue that was before me was, was there compelling and extraordinary conditions, and my decision--again part of those 50 pages--clearly shows, and the science clearly shows, whether it is sea level rise--sea level rise is more of a problem for the East Coast than it is for the West Coast.

Acceleration of temperature or higher temperatures, yes, California experiences higher temperatures but there are

2657 other parts of the Country that make it worse. And so, as looked at, the criteria, particularly 2658 compelling and extraordinary, in my judgment based upon the 2659 2660 science, did not meet the standard. 2661 Mr. ISSA. Thank you, and thank you for this hearing, Mr. 2662 Chairman. I yield back. 2663 Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Issa. We have another panel of four witnesses. If members 2664 2665 would permit, I would like to move on to the next panel. 2666 Mr. Bilbray? Mr. BILBRAY. Mr. Chairman, can I just follow up, just 2667 2668 quickly, on one item? The standard that we are complaining about with the 2669 2670 ozone standard, the Science Committee was saying it should be at .07, right, minimum? Or maximum? 2671 2672 Ms. HENDERSON. Maximum, but we gave a range of .06 to 2673 .07. 2674 Mr. BILBRAY. California's standard, Mr. Johnson, is sitting at the maximum that it was recommended. 2675 2676 traditionally, has there been ever a time--and I am trying to remember it my 30 years of involvement in this issue--has 2677 2678 there ever really been too many regulations where the Federal 2679 standard has been more, you know, more stringent than the 2680 California standard? Mr. JOHNSON. I don't recall. 2681

Mr. BILBRAY. I just want to say, when we argue about this, we are talking 5 to 7 percent. But I think we admit that—I know you are going to get sick and tired of hearing me talk about California, and when we get to greenhouse, I will beat our breast about importing all the electricity but not wanting to have the coal plants. But what I am saying, it is in all fairness, we are so close on this issue it is not the huge element, and I would ask our toxicologist how many deaths per million are we talking about here which we usually talk about.

So I yield. Mr. Chairman, I just want to say that there are some big issues out there, and I wish that we would be setting some standards here like stop burning coal here in the capital or buying coal electricity for the capital here. And I hope that we can work together at getting a waiver for California on the greenhouse and the fuel mixture and work on making the capital truly greenhouse neutral, CO2 neutral, rather than these phony offsets, and I look forward to working with it, Mr. Chairman. With your extensive background on it, I think we have some great opportunities if we just work together on this.

So thank you very much for the added time.

Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Bilbray.

Ms. Watson, I understand you wanted an equal amount of time. Would two minutes that we will yield to you, if you

2707 wish to pursue it with some documents for the record?

Ms. WATSON. Yes, because my State is involved, and we have tried to address pollution there, the largest State, 38 million people and all their cars. I think every family has 13 cars. So this is really important to me, and I am taking it personally, too.

When EPA makes decisions that don't meet the law and loses in court, environmental protection is delayed and the public indeed is hurt. These aren't the only cause to problems. A State must adopt each new Federal requirement into State law, and those efforts are wasted as well.

Now I have their letters that are addressed to the Chairman from Leo Drozdoff, the Administrator of the Division of Environmental Protection for the State of Nevada. Now, this isn't a partisan issue for Nevada has a Republican Governor. Administrator Drozdoff says, ''We appreciate your efforts to identify and quantify the impact of EPA's failed rulemaking attempts. Every time we are forced to develop programs that are clearly in conflict with the Federal environmental law, it is an opportunity wasted and environmental protections delayed. The resource implications to a small State like ours and the negative effect on our relationship with the EPA are enormous. These impacts will be felt for years and years to come.''

This is an extraordinary protest from a State Energy

2732	Policy Act, and, Mr. Chairman, I would like to have unanimous
2733	consent to enter this letter into the record.
2734	Chairman WAXMAN. Without objection, that will be the
2735	order.
2736	[The referenced material follows:]
2737	******

Chairman WAXMAN. The gentlelady's time has expired.

Mr. Cannon requested time as well.

Mr. CANNON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, let me just point out that you made the comment that on the ozone rule that you wondered if costs were taken into account in a surreptitious or inappropriate way. I think that is vitally important. That is the work of this Committee is to oversee those kinds of things. I would hope that we would be able to find those problems, not just suggest the existence of such problems.

Just finally, Mr. Johnson, suppose California had been allowed to have their CO2 lower standard, had the waiver granted, would that have made any difference as to CO2 in California or in the Country? Any significant difference?

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, it is an issue of debate, but certainly based upon what we know is that we have both a national and a global problem, and so automobiles and improving efficiency there certainly help, but since it is a global air pollutant, it is highly questionable how much effect it would really have. So again I have to say for the record, those are not the criteria.

Mr. CANNON. Right.

Mr. JOHNSON. The criteria I had to look at were, are there compelling and extraordinary conditions in California.

Mr. CANNON. But the request for the waiver had to be

2763 more symbolic than substantive?

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, again, it was a formal waiver
request, and certainly we did due diligence and held two
hearings. I had many, many briefings and certainly having a
50-page, or approximately 50-page, decision document on
waiver is unusual, if nothing else, in its size and all of
the issues that are there.

Mr. CANNON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Johnson, as we end your participation at this hearing, I want to tell you something very clearly. This hearing isn't about what you decide, it is about how you decide and the integrity of the process. I don't think you ought to leave this room satisfied that you have deflected questions and avoided to tell us information that we are entitled to have.

Judging by some of the responses I think you have given us today, I expect you to regard this part of the process with derision from many of us. We walk away from this hearing astounded that you, as a career EPA employee, are willing to be part of a process that makes a mockery of the rulemaking process, and that you are willing to come here and pretend that what really happened didn't happen.

In this case, we have the record to guide us. It tell us how EPA's best legal and scientific experts supported

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granting California's petition and adopting a new ozone standard for the environment. The record tells us you ultimately agreed with EPA's experts and gave those recommendations to the White House, and we know the White House overruled you.

Yet your testimony pretends that none of this happened, and it pretends you have reached the ultimate decisions independently and with a scientific and legal basis. Your staff knows this isn't true, and we know that it isn't true. As someone who has long fought for EPA and strong environmental protections, I can't adequately express how deeply this saddens me and how poorly it reflects on the EPA.

I thank the three of you for being here, and we are going to move on to our next witnesses. I call forward our second panel, Dr. Francesca Grifo. Dr. Grifo is a Senior Scientist and Director of the Union of Concerned Scientists, Scientific Integrity Program. She has over 20 years of experience directing science based projects and programs. She holds a Ph.D. in Botany from Cornell University.

Michael Goo is the Climate Legislative Director for the Natural Resources Defense Council. He has previously served as Majority Counsel for the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, Minority Counsel for the House Energy and Commerce Committee, and is Acting Assistant General Counsel at EPA.

Dr. Roger McClellan currently advises public and private organizations on issues related to air quality. He has previously served as Chair of EPA's Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee and as President of the Chemical Industry Institute of Technology.

Alan Raul is a Partner with Sidley Austin, and is Chair of the firm's Information, Law, and Privacy Practice Group, and he is also a member of the firm's Government and Internal Investigations Group and Appellate Group as well.

I welcome you to our hearing. It is the practice of this Committee that all witnesses testify under oath, so I would like to ask each or you to please stand while I ask you to raise your right hand.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Chairman WAXMAN. The record will indicate each of the witnesses answered in the affirmative.

Dr. Grifo, we want to call on you first.

For all of you, your prepared statements are in the record in full. We would like to ask you to try to limit your oral presentations to five minutes. The clock will indicate when it is red that the five minutes have expired. Please go ahead.

2835 STATEMENTS OF FRANCESCA GRIFO, SENIOR SCIENTIST, UNION OF
2836 CONCERNED SCIENTISTS; MICHAEL GOO, CLIMATE LEGISLATIVE
2837 DIRECTOR, NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL; ROGER O.
2838 MCCLELLAN, ADVISOR, TOXICOLOGY AND HUMAN HEALTH RISK
2839 ANALYSIS; AND ALAN CHARLES RAUL, PARTNER, SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP.

STATEMENT OF FRANCESCA GRIFO

Ms. GRIFO. Good afternoon, and thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the Committee. I am a Senior Scientist, as you said, and Director of the Scientific Integrity Program as the Union of Concerned Scientists, a leading science-based non-profit working for a healthy environment and a safer world.

I would like to thank the Committee for the opportunity to speak to you this afternoon about the problem of political interference in the work of Federal Government scientists.

The United States has enjoyed prosperity and health in large part because of its strong and sustained commitment to independent science.

As the Nation faces new challenges at home and growing competitiveness abroad, the need for a robust Federal scientific enterprise remains critical. Unfortunately, an

epidemic of political interference in Federal science threatens this legacy. Political interference in EPA's decision regarding the air quality standard for ground-level ozone is emblematic of the problem of manipulation, suppression, and distortion of science at the EPA.

You have already heard that EPA Administrator Stephen
Johnson issued the final ozone standard at an arbitrary level
inconsistent with the analysis of EPA scientists and
independent science advisors and, ultimately, not
sufficiently protective of public health. You have heard
that the White House pressured the EPA to consider economic
costs associated with tightening the ozone standard. The
law, as affirmed by a 2001 Supreme Court decision requires
the standard be based solely on best available science. EPA
leadership failed to meet that objective.

The White House's interference or meddling in the ozone decision is not a stand-alone incident. Time and time again White House officials or EPA political appointees have stepped in to second guess, manipulate, or suppress the work of EPA scientists, threatening the Agency's ability to protect human health and the environment.

In our investigation of EPA scientists, our survey conducted by Iowa State University together with us, hundreds of scientists report direct interference in their scientific work, fears of retaliation and systemic disregard for the

expertise of EPA's Advisory Committee. Our survey found that 889 scientists reported personally experiencing one of these events in the last five years. In essay responses, nearly 100 EPA scientists self-identified OMB, Office of Management and Budget, as the primary culprit in this interference. It is important to note that we didn't ask them about OMB. The question was much broader; they volunteered that.

Two hundred and thirty-two scientists had personally experienced frequent or occasional changes or edits during review that changed the meaning of scientific findings, not just routine edits but those that change the meaning. Two hundred and eighty-five scientists had personally experienced frequent or occasional selective or incomplete use of data to justify a specific regulatory outcome.

A hundred and fifty-three scientists had personally experienced frequent or occasional pressure to ignore impacts of a regulation on sensitive populations. Five hundred and thirty-six scientists felt that the Agency occasionally, seldom, or never heeds advice from independent scientific advisory committees. This result was markedly worse at the Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards which works closely with the advisory committees to set the NAAQS. Half of these respondents felt the EPA did not heed the advice of the advisory committees.

The White House has rewritten EPA's scientific documents

concerning climate change, pressured EPA scientists to support predetermined conclusions regarding the health effects of toxic mercury pollution, and pushed for rules that politicize the scientific findings contained in the OIRA's toxic database. Science has been mis-used on air pollution, asbestos, fuel efficiency, mountaintop removal mining, oil extraction, pesticides, plywood plant pollution, toxic selenium contamination, and on and on.

Fortunately, this is not a problem without a solution.

A suite of reforms are detailed in our report Interference at the EPA, but here are the most timely. The House and Senate overwhelmingly approved by partisan legislation to strengthen whistleblower protections for Federal employees. It is crucial that the final legislation now in Conference Committee contains specific protections for scientists who expose efforts to suppress or alter Federal research.

The EPA should increase openness in its decision-making process. If research results in analysis by EPA scientists are made public before they drop into, as the GAO put it, the black box of OMB, attempts to distort science will be exposed. The expanded breadth of the OMB must be pushed back. Questioning the scientific consensus of Agency experts is not OMB's proper role.

EPA should adopt media communication and scientific publication policies that ensure taxpayer-funded scientists

2931 and their research are accessible to Congress and the public, 2932 and scientists need to be made proactively aware of these 2933 rights. 2934 Finally, there are two actions that can take place 2935 immediately: Administrator Johnson should send a clear 2936 message to all political appointees that he will not tolerate 2937 any attempts to alter or suppress Federal Research just as 2938 EPA Administrator William Ruckelshaus did 25 years ago. 2939 Administrator Johnson should pledge to operate EPA in a fish 2940 bowl. 2941 We would welcome a dialogue with Administrator Johnson, 2942 although as of this morning he has not responded to repeated 2943 requests to begin that conversation. We look forward to 2944 continuing our work with the 110th Congress to restore 2945 scientific integrity to Federal policymaking. 2946

Thank you.

2947

[Prepared statement of Dr. Grifo follows:]

2948 ******* INSERT *******

2949 Ms. WATSON. [Presiding] Thank you, Dr. Grifo.

2950 Mr. Michael Goo.

2951 STATEMENT OF MICHAEL GOO

Mr. GOO. Thank you, Chairman Waxman, and Ranking Member Davis and Mr. Issa for the opportunity for the opportunity to testify here regarding EPA's new National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone.

My name is Michael Goo. I am the Climate Legislative
Director for the Natural Resources Defense Council. NRDC is
a national non-profit organization of scientists, lawyers,
and environmental specialists dedicated to protecting public
health and the environment.

Before I turn to my scripted statement, I just wanted to make a couple of points here about some of what we have heard today. And Mr. Johnson won't admit talking to the White House about the ozone decision, but we have the EPA talking points from the meeting with the President, and they say that the seasonal form is the most scientifically defensible, and they say that the seasonal form is the most legally defensible.

And the question that we have is, what caused the Administrator to change his mind, quite literally overnight, so that the EPA staff had to scramble around to change the document within 24 hours?

And then just to also respond to a point, a chart was

put up. Administrator Dudley said that there would be no more attainment areas with the secondary standard set the same as a primary standard, but it is not just the form that regulates the stringency of the standard, it is also the level.

The CASAC--and I am not quite sure, Dr. Henderson didn't have the opportunity to comment on this--but the CASAC said that the level should be between 15 and 17, and the level was actually set at 21. Of course, therefore, it wasn't as much more protective than the primary standard.

Now let me turn to my prepared remarks. The first I just want to make with regard to ozone is that we now know that ozone kills people. We say that ozone results in excess or premature mortality. That is a fancy way of saying that smog kills people. Ozone pollution, also, so it is a host of other health effects--susceptibility to infection, asthma attacks, school absences, emergency room visits, and even overnight admission into the hospital--and these are real effects with real consequences for us, for our children, for our elderly, and our infirm.

The second point I wish to emphasize is that ozone pollution is ubiquitous. According to EPA, approximately 140 million Americans live in areas that violate the 1997 eight-hour standard, including more than 16 million children, more than 6 million people age 75 and older, and more than 9

2999 million people who suffer from asthma.

Putting these two facts together, it is clear that ozone is a major public health problem in the United States.

In my testimony, I have characterized the decision of the Administrator as a shameful distortion of the scientific and regulatory process for setting National Ambient Air Quality Standards. I say that from my vantage point as a former EPA attorney who spent more than four years developing and defending the standards set forth in the Clinton Administration, which were ultimately upheld by the United States Supreme Court.

Prior to this Administration in an unbroken line of cases extending back nearly 40 years, these standards were repeatedly upheld by the courts, and since its creation in 1977, nearly every Administrator prior to this one has made decisions regarding the National Ambient Air Quality Standards within the scientific boundaries set by the Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee.

This Administrator, despite very clear recommendations from CASAC, chose to disregard its advice. The Administrator had before him an enormous opportunity to advance the cause of public health protection in the United States. He had a voluminous scientific record documenting health effects at levels below the existing standard.

He had a unanimous recommendation from CASAC, and he has

a very clear directive from the Congress and the courts that he must set the standard to protect public health with an adequate margin of safety, erring on the side of caution. In short, he had all the elements that he needed to set a highly defensible standard that would have protected public health with an adequate margin of safety, and it distresses me to report that the Administrator squandered that opportunity.

The record is clear. The Administrator's decision is not based on the latest scientific evidence; it is not based on the recommendations of CASAC; it does not protect public health; and it does not include a margin of safety.

Somebody tried to defend this decision as a reasonable policy decision or attempt to justify the decision on the basis of vague notions of uncertainty, but to say something is a policy judgment, or to say that a decision is based on uncertainty has little by way of actual rationale.

The question is, what is the policy, and in what direction does any alleged uncertainty cut? Is the policy to honor the latest scientific evidence and the recommendation of CASAC erring on the side of safety? I would submit that the record before us makes clear the answers to those questions.

In the end, these standards will be replaced by ones that reflect the science and the law, but in the meantime our citizens' lungs and their health will suffer as a result.

3049	Chairman Waxman, I commend your efforts and the efforts
3050	of your staff to bring this deplorable situation into the
3051	light of day. Thank you.
3052	[Prepared statement of Mr. Goo follows:]
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3053	****** INSERT ******

3054 Chairman WAXMAN. [Presiding] Thank you very much.
3055 Dr. McClellan?

3056 STATEMENT OF ROGER MC CLELLAN

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Mr. MCCLELLAN. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, and distinguished members of the Committee. I am Roger McClellan, an independent advisor in air quality issues. My home is in Albuquerque, New Mexico. I appreciate the invitation to present my views on EPA's recent review and revision of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for ozone. I ask that my written testimony be entered in the record as though read in its entirety.

Let me summarize. For more than four decades I have been contributing to the development of science needed to address important societal issues concerned with air quality. I am proud to have served on many EPA scientific advisory committees from the origin of the agency to the present time under administrations of both parties.

This included service on the Clean Air Scientific

Advisory Committee, which I chaired 1988-1992, and on panels
that have considered all the criteria air pollutants. I

served on the Ozone Panel that advised a 1997 standard. I

did not serve on the most recent Ozone Panel, however, I have
closely followed the standard-setting process that led to the
final rule announced by Administrator Johnson on March 12th,
2008, focusing on the primary or health-based standard.

As you know, every standard has four interrelated elements: an indicator, an averaging time, a numerical level, and a statistical form. It is important that these always be considered in their entirety.

Throughout the review process leading up to the final rule, there has been debate over the numerical level of the eight-hour or averaging time standard with ozone as the indicator. In my opinion, much of the debate was premature and focused on the outcome desired by some parties, a lowering of the standard even before the review of the science was complete. This resulted in a blurring of the boundary between the role of science and judgment in the setting of the standard.

With publication of the proposed rule for the ozone standard, the debate intensified. That included repeated reference to the CASAC recommendation the primary standard be set within a specific narrow numerical range, 0.060 to 0.070 ppm. In my opinion, the CASAC panel moved from the science arena into the policy arena with its strident advocacy of an upper bright line value of 0.070 ppm for the primary standard.

CASAC's selection of this narrow range and an upper bright line value followed the template that CASAC had been used, used with the pm 2.5 standard. In that case CASAC, the panel I served on, advocated setting the pm 2.5 annual

standard setting at 13 to 14 micrograms per cubic meter--a view that I dissented from--and the 24-hour standard at 25 to 35 micrograms per cubic meter.

The Administrator made policy judgments in setting the 24-hour standard at a level of 35 micrograms per cubic meter, a drastic reduction from the previous, and reaffirmation of the annual standard at a level of 15 micrograms per cubic meter.

CASAC argued, with the exception of myself or another, that he had made a political choice and ignored the science. In the case of ozone, Administrator Johnson made a policy judgment. set the ozone standard at 0.075 ppm average over eight hours. The value was actually consistent with the original advice of his own staff, 0.075 ppm up to a level slightly below the current standard which we know was 0.080, but with rounding could have been up to 0.084.

Again, CASAC argued he made a political decision and ignored the science In my view, the CASAC panels have not fully understood nor communicated the extent to which the recommendations they communicated to the Administrator represented their interpretation of the science and their personal policy preferences on the numerical level of the standard.

Even before the final rule for ozone was announced, CASAC scheduled the teleconference to develop unsolicited

advice to the Administrator. This clearly moved CASAC from the scientific advisory arena into the political arena. This was evidenced by panel members noting the importance of getting the record right for the courts and the suggestion that the Administrator should have resigned rather than cooperate with OMB and the White House.

The panel's letter on that teleconference continues to suggest that somehow science and scientists alone can establish the appropriate standard or, at a minimum, dictate the upper bound acceptable for a policy decision. The Clean Air Act does not call for a standard-setting committee with the Administrator merely serving as a rubber stamp for the committee's judgments. The Clean Air Act wisely calls for a Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee to provide advice to the Administrator on policy judgments that under the Clean Air Act are the exclusive responsibility of the Administrator.

In my opinion, the Administrator has appropriately exercised his authority in making policy judgments on both the revised pm 2.5 and ozone standards, making selections from among an array of scient-based options. The basis for his policy decisions are well documented in both final rules, including consideration of both the science and personal judgments of CASAC. They are also consistent with the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Clean Air Act.

3154 He did not consider cost, however, he did exercise 3155 judgment appropriately in deciding how low is low enough in setting the numerical level of both standards from among an 3156 3157 array of science-based options. There is no scientific methodology that can be used as a substitute for the 3158 3159 Administrator's judgment. 3160 I welcome the opportunity to address any questions you 3161 may have. [Prepared statement of Mr. McClellan follows:] 3162 3163 ***** INSERT ******

Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. McClellan.

Mr. Raul?

3166 STATEMENT OF ALAN CHARLES RAUL

Mr. RAUL. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Issa, members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify today to provide my views on the authority of the President to influence the decisions of his subordinates in the Executive Branch. It is an honor to appear before you.

I am testifying today in a personal capacity based on my interest and background in administrative and constitutional Law. I am currently engaged in private law practice and have previously served as General Counsel of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, General Counsel of the Office of Management and Budget, and as Associate Counsel to the President.

Until recently, I also served in a part-time capacity as Vice Chairman of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board.

My views here are focused only on the general issue of presidential authority to influence and direct the regulatory actions and decisions of the Executive Branch under Article II of the Constitution. It is my view that the President is and should be in control of the Executive Branch, but, importantly, this does not derogate or diminish Congress' power to set policy by legislation and to oversee the Executive's execution of the laws.

Rather, the unitary Executive means that it must be the President and not some relatively unknown subordinate, narrow agency, or obscure technical committee who is responsible to the public to take care that the laws are well and faithfully executed. In short, the unitary executive concept promotes more effective rulemaking by bringing a broader perspective to bear on important regulatory decisions and enhances democratic accountability for regulatory decision-making by pinning responsibility on the President to answer to the public for important regulatory actions taken by his or her Administration.

Setting standards requisite to protect public health and welfare is inherently a policy exercise because Congress and the courts acknowledge that government regulations cannot, and need not, achieve zero risk. Indeed, it is the President's responsibility, not just his right, to ensure that Executive Branch regulatory decisions, to the extent Congress has left the Executive with some discretion, reflect the President's own policy judgments. That way the public can hold the President accountable for important regulatory judgments or, alternatively, look to Congress for stronger, smarter, or more specific laws.

If the EPA Administrator does not agree with the President, he or she may resign or be replaced, but there are no grounds to complain that the President's position is undue

interference. The reasons why the Constitution established a powerful president are well known. In short, the framers were acutely conscious of the debilitating weaknesses that resulted from Executive by Committee during the Revolutionary War and under the Articles of Confederation. They clearly understood that putting one person in charge of the Executive Branch would promote accountability.

The Constitution adopted a unitary Executive in order that the American people would know exactly whom to credit or whom to blame if the laws were not faithfully and effectively discharged. If responsibility is diffused, then the ability of the public to influence and choose their government is diluted, and presidents of both parties have asserted the right to oversee and direct the actions and decisions of their regulatory agencies.

Former Chief Judge of the D.C. Circuit, Patricia Wald, who served as Assistant Attorney General for Legislative Affairs in the Carter Administration and was appointed to the D.C. Circuit by President Carter, strongly supported the power of the President to direct his or her subordinates in the Executive Branch. In 1981, she offered the leading opinion on Presidential Control over Rulemaking, Sierra Club v. Cassel. Interestingly, Judge Wald was joined in that opinion by then Judge, now Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg.

Judge Wald addressed arguments advanced by environmental

plaintiffs who claimed that President Carter had improperly interfered with EPA rulemaking in order to impose weaker pollution controls than the technical staff at EPA desired. She categorically rejected this criticism of President Carter's decisive role. Echoing Alexander Hamilton, Judge Wald opined that preserving the President's flexibility to direct his or her subordinates was so important that it was not legally required for the Executive Branch to publicly disclose the details of White House and Presidential contacts.

Similarly, President Clinton further codified and solidified the process and desirability of Presidential control over Executive Branch rulemaking, and you have heard testimony earlier today about Executive Order 12866, which required that Agency regulations be consistent be consistent with the President's priorities and the principles set forth in the Executive Order.

As you heard also, President Clinton, himself, was personally involved in improving the 1997 ozone standard that was a precursor of the standard involved today, and just as is the case with the current ozone rule, as was the case with President Carter's sulfur and particulate matter rules that Judge Wald addressed, EPA ultimately chose in 1997 a pollution standard that was more lenient than the one favored by Agency staff and recommended by the CASAC Committee of

3264 | Scientific Advisors.

I would submit that it makes sense as a matter of public policy to acknowledge and respect the President's ultimate dominion over the Executive Branch. If Federal Regulations do not serve the public well, either because they are too restrictive or too permissive, or simply not well designed, the President and Congress, of course, should take the blame. If the regulations are reasonable and accomplish the public's goals efficiently, then the President and Congress should receive the credit.

Technical advisors are essential to the rulemaking process, but the buck has to stop with the person who answers to the people. That is the President.

Thank you for considering my views.

[Prepared statement of Mr. Raul follows:]

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3280 Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Raul.

We will now proceed to questions, and to start off the questioning, I want to recognize Ms. Watson.

Ms. WATSON. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. And, Mr. Goo, I felt your passion in your testimony. I am very passionate, too, because my grandfather, in coming here--once into California I am speaking of--and once he got here he found he had to go over and live in Arizona. When he came back, he fell dead in the streets leaving a widow with seven children. The oldest is my mother. So that was before we had the Clean Air Act.

I spent 17 years as the Chair of Health and Human Services in the California State Senate. We fought viciously with those who did not want to clean up the air because they felt it would impact on, I guess, their profits.

So you have expressed grave concerns that Administrator Johnson's decisions on the new ozone standards were not based on science and the law. In your view, is this failure to base an EPA decision on science and the law an isolated incident? And could you put this in context in terms of this Administration's overall record of implementing the Clean Air Act?

Mr. GOO. I would be glad to, Congresswoman Watson. This is not an isolated instance at all, far from it. What we have seen in the past eight years is a concerted attempt to

effectively dismantle the Clean Air Act through implementation and enforcement, and we have seen it in a number of instances from new source review to Mercury pollution, to the National Ambient Air Quality Standards and their position on greenhouse gases.

As I mentioned and as you note, air pollution is very serious business here in the United States. More Americans die from air pollution than die from drunk driving and HIV/AIDS put together, and most of that is from particulate air pollution, which I would mention as a good example of the same kind of decision-making that we have seen where the Administrator chose to disregard the clear advice of the Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee.

The very next decision that we will be seeing in the National Ambient Air Quality Standards area will be with regard to lead and known toxic air pollutants. We are concerned that the next decision with regards to lead may resemble the past two National Ambient Air Quality Standards.

Ms. WATSON. Let me just ask you this. Have you seen this disregard for the scientific input as a problem for the Agency over a period of time?

Mr. GOO. I think over the last eight years, this has been a very difficult time for people at the Agency. If you look at the depositions and you look at the record that Chairman Waxman has compiled, you see that any number of

staff, career staff attorneys, were saying things like, I 3330 3331 have never seen this in the last 30 years. It has been 3332 extremely distressing. The career staff at EP are extremely dedicated, and they 3333 are dedicated to the science and to pubic health protection. 3334 3335 They have not been well served in this Administration. Ms. WATSON. Well, I want to thank you very much. 3336 3337 the same exact way. California is my State, and I want to 3338 thank you. The Clean Air Act says that the EPA must use its 3339 understanding of science to protect people's health and lives 3340 from air pollution. Disregarding the law and the science subjects people in our environment to grave harm. 3341 3342 My family was affected by the fact that we didn't have these standards, and I lost a grandfather whom I never knew. 3343 3344 So the rejection of our request in California hit us very, 3345 very hard. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for this time. 3346 3347 Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you, Ms. Watson. 3348 Mr. Cannon? 3349 Mr. CANNON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Goo, how many 3350 people die of AIDS each year? 3351 Mr. GOO. I don't have the precise figure, but I will get 3352 it for you. More than 45,000 people die of particulate matter pollution from power plants alone in the United States 3353 3354 each year.

3355 Mr. CANNON. We are going on with a very short number of minutes, sir, two minutes each, so if you don't mind, I am 3356 3357 just going to ask some pretty quick and clear questions. 3358 Dr. Grifo, how many members are there in the Union of Concerned Scientists? 3359 Ms. GRIFO. We have members who are citizens and 3360 3361 scientists from across the Country, roughly 200,000 that work 3362 actively with us. Mr. CANNON. How many of those are scientists, have a 3363 Ph.D. in science? 3364 Ms. GRIFO. I can tell you that for our particular issue, 3365 3366 the scientific integrity issue, we have an activist list of 3367 15,000 scientists from across the Country. The broader one, I can get you that exact number. 3368 3369 Mr. CANNON. I would actually appreciate that, and how many of the members, broader membership of UCS, are 3370 Government employees? 3371 3372 Ms. GRIFO. I don't know, but I can potentially find that 3373 out. 3374 Mr. CANNON. I would appreciate that. And of those who are active scientists but not Government employees, do you 3375 3376 have any idea how many receive Government contracts?' 3377 Ms. GRIFO. I am sorry? Mr. CANNON. How many receive contracts or money from the 3378 3379 Federal Government to do research?

Ms. GRIFO. I don't have any way of knowing that, sir. We 3380 do not take any Government money at the Union of Concerned 3381 Scientists. 3382 3383 Mr. CANNON. I know you don't, but many of your 3384 scientists do. Let me just point out that when you have a taxpayer-funded research, and priorities change because times 3385 3386 change, you are going to have complaints from scientists. 3387 Are you familiar with the Congressional Research Service's review of the study that you quoted in your 3388 3389 testimony? 3390 Ms. GRIFO. I got it about 15 minutes ago. Mr. CANNON. You should read it, because I think it 3391 points out that your study is--3392 Ms. GRIFO. I did read it, and I am happy to respond to 3393 anything in it. It is all completely refutable. 3394 Mr. CANNON. Pardon me? 3395 Ms. GRIFO. I have. I am happy to respond to any of 3396 3397 this. Mr. CANNON. It would be hard for you to respond. 3398 3399 too short a time, but you are talking about 5,810 people that were surveyed, were asked questions that were EPA scientists. 3400 3401 You had about almost 1,600 respondents and 700 complaints. I think that this whole--you should look at that, because I 3402 think it deeply undermines the credibility of your 3403 statistical inclusions about this Administration and the 3404

integrity of science, which I think is largely driven by financial interests, and the transition that is happening in society, and the change priorities that we have in America.

Thank you, and, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Ms. GRIFO. If I may respond. I would like to direct you to page 5 of the CRS Report where it says, ''Consequently, there are no issues related to sampling errors as there was no probability sample.'' Page 6 of the CRS Report where it says, ''This is not an issue here, however, this is not a sample survey but a census.'' And page 7 of the CRS Report where it says, ''The UCS Report does provide sufficient information for any analyst to examine it and highlight some of those limitations.''

Chairman WAXMAN. Mr. Bilbray?

Mr. BILBRAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, let me first point out that I support the waiver for greenhouse gases for California, and I look forward to working with you at offering some legislation that will authorize that and the Clean Fuel Strategies of California and exempt us from the Federal restrictions.

But I think we need to recognize that a lot of people--this would be the first time a State would have the ability to regulate outside of its jurisdiction because in our California strategies, we are talking about restricting the importation of certain electricity across the State

boundary, which is absolutely new, and we need to take a look 3431 at that. Now the Concerned Scientists. I want to pose a question 3432 3433 here. There were 71 issues that you took with decisions that the Administration had, and you feel that there was undue 3434 political influence on these decisions? 3435 3436 Ms. GRIFO. I am sorry, what are you referring to? Mr. BILBRAY. You listed 71 different times that you felt 3437 there was undue political influence and some political agenda 3438 pushed by the Administration in their decisions, in your 3439 3440 testimony. 3441 Ms. GRIFO. Seventy-one? I don't think I used the number 3442 71. Mr. BILBRAY. Well, there's a list on your testimony. My 3443 question is, in all of this, have the Concerned Scientists 3444 taken a position about the use of ethanol in our fuel stream 3445 and its environmental and health risk? 3446 Ms. GRIFO. Sir, that is a different program at the Union 3447 of Concerned Scientists, and I can certainly put you in touch 3448 3449 with them. Mr. BILBRAY. Well, ma'am, let me just tell you 3450 something. I have 71 here that has been given to me by your 3451 3452 testimony. There is--3453 Ms. GRIFO. Can you point what the 71 is? 3454 Mr. BILBRAY. Page 25.

Ms. GRIFO. Oh, in the A to Z. It is actually almost 90 now, yes.

Mr. BILBRAY. Okay, 90. In that list, I don't see ethanol and its environmental damage that the largest State in the Union is trying to outlaw, eliminate, and you guys have sort of walked away from it, but in the same population issue I see, you know, four or five issues on abortion or birth control in here. I have to be frank with you--as how you walk away something that is as much of an environmental problem as ethanol, but then talk about the morning-after pill, or abstinence programs as being your major concern.

I will challenge you to abandon your political prepositions and work with us at addressing real science and threat issues. But this testimony here, this and what I would say was the lack of scientific way of approaching your so-called survey, wouldn't you agree that if you were doing this kind of survey, you would, from a scientific point of view, there is no way an environmental regulatory agency would accept that survey as being a substantive document.

Ms. GRIFO. First of all, I think the CRS did accept it as a substantive document. That is the thrust of what is said here, and each of the pieces in here--well, we can go through them one by one, and I am happy to talk about them.

But the point of the A to Z guide is, if you have documentation of political interference in science, I would

love to see it. Everything in the A to Z guide has primary 3480 3481 documentation. If you have it, we will analyze it, and we 3482 will put it up there. Mr. BILBRAY. Well, then, I would ask that over almost 20 3483 years a group that claims to be scientific, where do you 3484 stand on forcing the State of California continue to burn 3485 ethanol as fuel when the science says it is bad? 3486 Ms. GRIFO. That is not the issue of this hearing, I am 3487 3488 sorry. Chairman WAXMAN. Mr. Issa? 3489 Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I will be brief. 3490 3491 I would ask unanimous consent that the -- I know it is in the record, but at this point in the record, the Congressional 3492 Research Service Report be, in fact, put into the record. 3493 3494 Chairman WAXMAN. Without objection, that will be the order. 3495 3496 [The information follows.]

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3497

Mr. ISSA. And I, for one, will take CRS's independent study and certainly would welcome the Union of Concerned Scientists to submit to us where they think that somehow it is factually wrong. However, I would suggest in the future that if you want to do a survey, do a survey, but if you want to do polling, that there are science practices that would allow for it.

Really, I would just like to take this limited amount of time and say to Dr. McClellan, you are here--and to Mr.

Raul--you are both here on your own dime, you are both experts, and, historically, can you give us, briefly, in the remaining time a contrast between today and the period of time in which you served. because, quite candidly, I wasn't here during the Clinton Administration and then a Republican majority.

But I would like to have a contrast because I would like to understand, do you believe that there is somehow a rabid change in the way the Administration works with your former agencies, or is it substantially the same, and we are simply seeing it different because we see it through different eyes?

Mr. MCCLELLAN. Thank you for the question. I would be very pleased to address that.

As I noted in my opening remarks, I have been associated with the EPA and its advisory structure from the beginning of the Agency. At the time the Agency was created, I was chair

of a committee, which was Advisory to the U.S. Public Health Service. That function was brought into EPA, and thus I became a part of the Science Advisory Board at its beginning.

I will have to say that controversy has been a part of the fabric of the EPA since its origins, and it has been a part since the passage of the Clean Air Act, which preceded the Agency. Indeed, one of the first activities I participated in was a visit to Research Triangle Park in the early 1970s as we were putting in place the first Air Quality Standards. We went there based on concerns that came to the surface with a headline story in the L.A. Times about the question of whether scientists were being pressured to come to a particular viewpoint.

Periodically, over time we have seen these controversies. It is natural because you have science, and scientists are not without their own emotions and their own judgment. We are passionate about the use of our science.

Mr. ISSA. I appreciate, and--

Mr. MCCLELLAN. I don't see a big spike.

Mr. ISSA. Thank you. And Mr. Raul, just very briefly so we can go to a vote, I am afraid.

Mr. RAUL. Well, I think there has not been as much change as it may appear, listening to only one hearing. I think President George W. Bush has not been a potted plant with respect to environmental rulemaking in his

3548	Administration, nor have his predecessor presidents been
3549	potted plants. President Clinton was very involved,
3550	President Reagan, President Carter, all very involved in
3551	rulemaking.
3552	President Reagan, of course
3553	Chairman WAXMAN. We are going to have to
3554	Mr. RAUL. Sure.
3555	Chairman WAXMAN. I think if you would put the rest in
3556	for the record, I would very much appreciate it.
3557	[The information follows.]
3558	****** COMMITTEE INSERT ******

3559 Mr. ISSA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WAXMAN. Mr. Raul, even though you assert that the President can direct the Administrator's decision, do you agree that the President must follow the law?

Mr. RAUL. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WAXMAN. And so when the President intervenes and makes a decision on the secondary--or when he intervened and made a decision on the secondary ozone standard, does the decision still have to meet the requirements of the Clean Air Act?

Mr. RAUL. Absolutely.

Chairman WAXMAN. And the Clean Air Act requires EPA

Administrator to identify the level of air quality requisite
to protect the public welfare from any known or anticipated
adverse effects associated with the presence of such air
pollutants in the ambient air.

Mr. Goo, is it your position that scientific evidence available to the Administrator and the President that the secondary ozone standard was set at a level requisite to protect the public welfare?

Mr. GOO. No, it is not my opinion. The unanimous recommendation of CASAC was that the form of the standard, not the eight-hour standard, the basic point here is that plants and foliage respond differently than human lungs do. The eight-hour standard was set to protect human lungs and

human respiratory function. The secondary standard--3584 Chairman WAXMAN. Well, whoever set that standard, 3585 whether it was in fact the President or the Administrator, 3586 you don't think it fits with the science? 3587 Mr. GOO. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. 3588 Chairman WAXMAN. And therefore the Clean Air Act. 3589 3590 Mr. GOO. Right. Chairman WAXMAN. And, Dr. Grifo, your survey is 3591 important because it provides us with a big picture of 3592 political interference with the work of scientists at EPA. 3593 3594 Almost 1,600 EPA scientists filled out survey questionnaires 3595 and sent them to the Union of Concerned Scientists, and the 3596 cases were EPA political appointees and inappropriately involved themselves in scientific decisions, or interference 3597 with political appointees from other parts of the 3598 Administration like the White House and EPA scientists, who 3599 3600 were directed to inappropriately exclude or alter technical information from EPA scientific documents. 3601 This survey shows that there has been a serious problem 3602 3603 of political interference with the working EPA scientists under the Bush Administration. That I think is unacceptable 3604 3605 and has to stop. I thank the four of you very much for your testimony, 3606 3607 and we will keep the record open in case there are other 3608 thoughts you want to submit to us for the record, or

questions that members may seek to ask.

That concludes our hearing. We stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:58 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]