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McCain Speech to Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund Corporate Council Second Annual Luncheon
October 18, 1999
Bethesda, MD - U.S. Senator John McCain today delivered the following remarks to the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund Corporate Council at their Second Annual LuncheonSince the Senate rejected the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the president and vice president, and other administration officials have subjected the American people to an extraordinary barrage of propaganda. The most serious, and most dishonest of their charges is that the defeat of the Treaty is the most recent example of the extreme partisanship of Republicans - partisanship that now threatens the very security of the United States.
Not surprisingly, I am offended by that accusation. I, and many of my Republican colleagues, have, on dozens of occasions, proved that the old adage that politics should stop at the water's edge still holds some relevance in the Clinton era. On Kosovo, Bosnia, Vietnam, NAFTA, the WTO and many other serious international questions, I have sided in large part with the Administration over the opposition of some Republicans. So have any number of Republican members of Congress.
I cannot say that partisanship has not influenced some of our opposition to Administration policies. However, to the extent that national security issues have been overly politicized in recent months, the president - who too often has conducted a poll tested, photo op foreign policy - deserves much, maybe even most of the blame. And that is most certainly the explanation for the defeat of the CTBT.
Let's be clear, this Treaty was bad for the United States. The fact that is would have prevented us from ever testing the safety and reliability of our nuclear defenses was reason enough to insist that the Treaty at least be reviewed and re-ratified every several years.
Moreover, we lack the technological capability at the present time to verify compliance with a test ban. That's another argument for delaying this treaty at least until technology catches up to the treaty's purpose.
Most absurd, is the president's argument that countries like Iran, Iraq, and North Korea will now feel free to pursue their nuclear ambitions. When have they not felt free? Rogue states will act in what their leaders perceive as the best interests of their regimes. These leaders are highly unlikely to restrain their ambitions out of respect for the arms control opinions of what is euphemistically called the "world community." Indeed, none of these countries had joined the CTBT, nor are they likely to. But even if they had, their word is worth virtually nothing.
-- North Korea was busy building nuclear weapons even though it was a signatory to the NPT.
Other nuclear states, Pakistan and India have not signed the CTBT and can also be expected to act in what their leaders perceive as their national interest.
-- The administration was caught flat-footed when India tested, but it strongly warned Pakistan not to follow suit - to no avail.
Equally absurd is to suggest that the recent military coup in Pakistan is an example of things that might happen in the absence of Senate ratification of an arms control agreement. The military has ruled Pakistan for half its history.
As the world's leading democracy, we should support the restoration of civilian rule in Pakistan, but we should not automatically assume that the new regime would engage in nuclear brinkmanship with India. And the idea that the CTBT would have somehow affected tensions in the subcontinent is laughable.
We surely have an interest in helping prevent a fourth Indian-Pakistani war. It is conceivable that such a war could go nuclear. The CTBT would have done precisely nothing to prevent that. We should, as we have only in recent months, encourage a relaxation of tensions, especially with regard to the Kashmir flashpoint. The Administration ignored this problem until India and Pakistan tested.
And as we urged the early restoration of democracy in Pakistan, we should do what we can to ensure the current military regime be moderate in its approach to its neighbor (first indications are that it might be more moderate than its democratic predecessor. Already they have announced troop pullbacks from the border.)
We should not isolate Pakistan, but encourage it to be pro-Western and reject Iran style fundamentalism or Afghani chaos. Let's not repeat the mistake of imposing the same kind of counterproductive sanctions we did after Pakistan tested.
Again, the CTBT has nothing to do with developments in the Asian subcontinent, and the administration's hints that it does threaten the formulation of a serious policy to address instability there.
The CTBT was a flawed arms control agreement - not a referendum on the U.S. role in the world. Internationalism is not just about UN debts, foreign aid and multilateral arms agreements. Internationalism is recognizing that our interests and values are at stake globally, and acting to secure them. The CTBT would not have done a thing to protect our interests or advance our values. Indeed, it would have placed them at greater risk. That is the reason that committed Republican internationalists from Henry Kissinger to Jeane Kirkpatrick, from Richard Lugar to Richard Perle, opposed it.
Faced with the choice of rejecting or accepting it, Senate Republicans, like Ronald Reagan at Reykjavik, chose the politically difficult course of rejecting it, and by so doing put the national interest over our immediate political interest. I am proud that we did.
I admit, I would have preferred that we spare the president the international embarrassment of rejecting the centerpiece of his second term foreign policy. I would have preferred that we not vote at all on the Treaty, had the president sincerely promised not to seek some political advantage for himself and the vice president by submitting the Treaty for a vote closer to the 2000 elections.
Republicans were concerned that the president intended to use the treaty as a political weapon against them, and understandably we wanted an airtight assurance that he would not. As we can all see in the president and vice-president's post-vote behavior, our concerns were very well founded.
The president erupted in hysterical warnings that nuclear Armageddon was at hand. And the vice- president practically raced into a studio to tape a political commercial denouncing Republicans for endangering children and small animals in our desire for nuclear winter.
Of course, the president was largely absent from the debate until the last days of its consideration. He insisted on a vote, and then that there be no vote.
The vice president was completely absent from the debate. I do not know of a single senator who was called or written to by Vice President Gore urging his or her support for the CTBT. He entirely abdicated his responsibilities as the administration's self-proclaimed leading arms control thinker, but then, sensing political advantage over Bill Bradley, decided he would play one on television.
-- I have always found it more useful to support a treaty before it is actually voted on.
-- But better late than never, I suppose.
If the vice-president sincerely wants to enhance the treaty's prospects in the future, he should think about debating its merits, rather than disparaging the motives of its opponents. That's why I challenged him yesterday to debate me on the subject. I re-issue that challenge today.
Only through fair and open discourse, and not through 30 second attack ads, will the American public learn if their security would have been enhanced or endangered by ratification of the treaty. Only then would they learn just who is responsible for politicizing a national security debate. Only then would they learn the importance of the United States leadership in the world, and just who is genuinely committed to enhancing that leadership.
Thank you.
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