Thank you, Ambassador Burns, for your kind introduction. Ambassador Burns continues a long-line of outstanding American diplomats to call Spaso House home. We are fortunate to have him in the service of our country and to have him leading this vital post.

 

I am honored to have the opportunity to address this gathering commemorating the 200^th Anniversary of relations between Russia and the United States. It is a great pleasure to be with many Russian and American friends who have contributed to my understanding of the U.S.-Russian relationship and to the success of initiatives with which I have been involved. It is a special point of pride to be here with my friend and legislative partner, Sam Nunn. Sam has been an inspiration to me, as I am sure he has been to many of you. As a leading voice in U.S. foreign and defense policy, he has achieved a level of credibility and respect that few Americans in our history have ever matched.

 

Celebrating two centuries of U.S.-Russian relations is more than a historical exercise. The policies of American and Russian leaders, from Thomas Jefferson and Alexander I, through the leaders of the Cold War period, have reverberated for decades. Such longevity in one of the most important bilateral relationships in the history of the world underscores the sacred trust with which we are charged. This anniversary should remind us that our actions will be judged according to an exacting historical standard. It should remind us that the fundamental purpose of diplomatic relations is nothing less than the preservation of peace, security, and opportunity for future generations.

 

All of us here have witnessed critical events in U.S.-Russian relations. As a United States Senator for more than 30 years, I have been fortunate to have had opportunities to influence some of those events. Thirty years is a long term of service in the United States Senate. Yet in the context of an enduring 200-year relationship, it has been just one short chapter. Even within the narrow historic scope of my own Senate seat, I do not possess a monopoly of interest in Russia. The Indiana Senate seat that I occupy was held one hundred years ago by Albert J. Beveridge, who was considered to be one of the foremost American experts on Russia of his time. Without the benefit of air travel, Senator Beveridge toured the length of Russia all the way to the Pacific Ocean, shortly before the Russo-Japanese War. His writings describing his travels were published in scholarly books and popular periodicals. He was an insightful observer of his times, but he could not have predicted the twists and turns of the Twentieth Century, anymore than we can predict what will happen one hundred years from now. 

 

Although our powers of prediction have their limits, we are nonetheless bound as leaders to devote our energies and skills to securing the best possible future for our nations. I am certain that the path to peace and prosperity for both Russia and the United States depends on how we resolve standing disputes between our countries and whether we take advantage of opportunities to join together to solve international problems.

 

Through the long decades of the Cold War, even amidst strident ideological rhetoric and geopolitical contention, there was a sense that the commonalities between the American people and the Russian people could produce strong bonds if they were allowed to develop. Both nations were linked closely to Europe, but possessed independent cultural identities that supported rich literary, musical, and artistic traditions. The national experiences and mythologies of both nations were profoundly influenced by the development of vast, resource-rich wildernesses. Our cultures deeply value exploration and technical achievement, epitomized by our space programs and other scientific endeavors. Both Russian and American societies revel in the competition and challenges that come with being enthusiastic sporting countries. The populations of our two great multi-ethnic nations have unlimited potential that would be accentuated by a more stable and productive relationship between our governments.

 

Viewed from this perspective, the Cold War hostility of the past might be seen as an interruption of a more natural cooperative bilateral relationship founded two centuries ago. Yet some commentators have questioned whether our nations are now returning to a Cold War footing. We have disagreements over energy security, democracy, human rights, Iran, Kosovo, Georgia, and Moldova, just to name a few items frequently in the headlines. We even disagree about previously well-accepted foundations of stability, like the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty.

 

While acknowledging divergent views on many issues, we cannot afford to succumb to pessimism. The United States and Russia have too much at stake and too many common interests to allow our relationship to drift toward conflict.

 

At the heart of our common endeavors must be a joint response to the threat from weapons of mass destruction. As we celebrate 200 years of U.S.-Russian relations, Senator Nunn and I are also here to celebrate 15 years of successes for the Nunn-Lugar program. Sam and I understood that a unilateral effort would not succeed and challenged the United States and our former enemies to work together. The program succeeded in convincing Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan to remove all of the nuclear weapons from their territories. In addition, it became the primary tool through which the United States works with Russia to safely destroy its massive nuclear, chemical and biological warfare capacity. Together, the United States and Russia have eliminated more nuclear weapons than the combined arsenals of the United Kingdom, France and China. Beyond dismantlement, Nunn-Lugar has provided an operational basis for the expansion of cooperative relations between Russia and the United States. Even during moments of tension between our countries, the Nunn-Lugar program remained a constant. Both sides recognized the importance of this endeavor to our mutual security.

 

The same motivations that brought U.S. and Russian leaders together in 1992 must be brought to bear on the nuclear issues of today. I have never considered Nunn-Lugar to be merely a program, or a source of funding, or a set of agreements. Rather, it is a concept through which, we as leaders who are responsible for the welfare of our children and grandchildren attempt to take control of a global threat of our own making. It is an engine of non-proliferation cooperation and expertise that can be applied to many situations around the world.

 

The Nunn-Lugar concept cannot be imposed on nations. For a cooperative endeavor like Nunn-Lugar to work, new opportunities for partnership must be pursued creatively and relentlessly. If the concept is to reach its full global potential, there is no room for bureaucratic obstruction, which, at times, has afflicted both the U.S. and the Russian governments. The United States and Russia should be sending the clear message that we are willing to go anywhere and undertake any conversation in pursuit of preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This is a mission that benefits all nations, but it has particular importance to the United States and Russia. Both of our nations have been the victim of terrorism that has deeply influenced our sense of security. Neither nation has completely come to grips with this phenomenon or what it means for our international role. 

 

Despite the tremendous progress realized by the United States and Russia, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction remains the number one national security threat facing our countries and the international community. Our nations continue to lack even minimal confidence about many foreign weapons programs. In most cases, there is little or no information regarding the number of weapons or amounts of materials a country may have produced, the storage procedures they employ to safeguard their weapons, or plans regarding further production or destruction programs. We must pay much more attention to making certain that all weapons and materials of mass destruction are identified, continuously guarded, and systematically destroyed.

 

We should not assume that we cannot forge cooperative non-proliferation programs with critical nations. The experience of the Nunn-Lugar program in Russia has demonstrated that the threat of weapons of mass destruction can lead to extraordinary outcomes based on mutual interest. No one would have predicted in the 1980s that American contractors and DOD officials would be working with their Russian counterparts to destroy thousands of strategic systems. If we are to protect ourselves during this incredibly dangerous period, we must create new non-proliferation partners and aggressively pursue any non-proliferation opportunities that appear. Ultimately, taking the long view, a satisfactory level of accountability, transparency, and safety must be established in every nation with a WMD program.

 

The important track record built by the U.S. and Russia has already produced results beyond the borders of the former Soviet Union. In 2002, new leaders in Albania discovered sixteen tons of chemical weapons that a previous government had failed to declare under the Chemical Weapons Convention. These chemical agents posed an enormous danger to Albanians should they have leaked, and to the rest of the world if they fell into the hands of terrorists or criminals. The government in Tirana recognized the risk and promptly sought assistance. Using personnel and expertise developed through the Nunn-Lugar program, all sixteen tons of chemical weapons have been safely destroyed. Our success in Albania is due in great part to the important lesson learned from cooperating with Russian colleagues. 

 

Albania was an important test, but even bigger cases await our attention. The U.S. and Russia should be exploring how the Nunn-Lugar experience can be applied in North Korea. While difficult diplomatic work remains, we must be prepared to move forward quickly if the Six-Power Talks succeed.   If negotiations yield an agreement from Pyongyang to eliminate its weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, the Nunn-Lugar program represents a ready-made framework for beginning the weapons elimination process.

 

The Nunn-Lugar program would have a different orientation in North Korea than it does in the former Soviet Union, but the program has the authority, flexibility, and experience to adapt to the Korean situation. Equally important, Moscow and Washington have proven that former enemies can work together to achieve shared security benefits. Such a track record will be critical to a successful diplomatic process on the Korean peninsula.

 

Russia and the United States also must come together to address the threat posed by Iran’s nuclear weapons program. For too long, our governments have been at odds over how to respond to Tehran’s behavior. The differences in our approaches have narrowed recently, and there are prospects for continued cooperation between Moscow and Washington within the UN Security Council.

 

Another key for our bilateral relationship is Russian membership in the World Trade Organization. On November 19, 2006, the U.S. and Russia signed a bilateral market access agreement that details U.S. requirements for Russia’s accession to the WTO. Russia is now negotiating to combine bilateral access agreements into a formal multilateral draft Protocol for Accession that the WTO General Council must approve before Russia can become a member of the WTO. The final multilateral agreement will integrate Russia into the international, rules-based trading system and help lock in the reforms needed to improve Russia’s long-term economic potential.

 

The United States and Russia business relationship is expanding significantly. Last year, U.S. exports to Russia increased by 20 percent to $4.7 billion in a broad range of merchandise and service markets. The U.S.-Russian bilateral agreement contains provisions improving cooperation in the areas of piracy, counterfeiting, border control, protection of pharmaceutical test data, and intellectual property rights. 

In the last Congress, I introduced a bill to exempt Russia from the Jackson-Vanik sanctions and to authorize the President to grant permanent normal trade relations to Russia. The Jackson-Vanik amendment must be revoked if WTO approval is to move forward. This relic of the Cold War is no longer applicable to the modern Russian government and administration. For more than 8 years, Russia has satisfied the requirements of Jackson-Vanik. It has facilitated free emigration, and it has signed a bilateral trade agreement with the United States allowing for the application of normal trade relations status. Granting permanent normal trade relations will improve confidence in the Russian investment climate and promote enhanced economic relations between the U.S. and Russia. 

 

After 200 years, the goals of the U.S.-Russian diplomatic engagement remain the same. We want our relationship to contribute to the basic security and prosperity of Russians and Americans. Our policies toward one another have frequently been characterized by ambiguities and difficult choices. But I believe we can make progress on areas of collaboration that are essential to our common interests.   Each of us is likely to have opportunities to influence the direction of U.S.-Russian relations. I remain optimistic that we will summon the courage and perseverance required to move our nations toward mutual successes.

 

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