

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNTIL RELEASED BY THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

STATEMENT OF
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FOR INTEGRATION OF CAPABILITIES AND RESOURCES
BEFORE THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICE COMMITTEE – READINESS
SUBCOMMITTEE, AND SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY
FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
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Reset Testimony

Mr. Chairmen, Ranking Members and distinguished members of the Readiness and Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Sub-committees, it is a privilege to appear before you representing the brave men and women, Sailors and civilians of the United States Navy. We appreciate the long standing support we have received from both sub-committees.

I. Overview

We remain a nation at war -- a Long War against violent extremists. On any given day, approximately 30% of our ships and more than 42,000 of our Sailors are deployed worldwide. There are over 12,000 sailors ashore (including Individual Augmentees supporting ground forces in core mission areas and new capability areas) and 17,000 at sea in the U.S. Central Command region alone engaged in the Global War on Terror (GWOT). To date, more than 41,000 Navy Reservists have been mobilized in support of the GWOT, and on any given day there are more than 20,000 Navy Reservists on Active Duty, providing essential operational support to their supported Navy, and Joint, commands.

Naval forces provide a significant part of the nation's worldwide rotational military presence and an increasing portion of the required support for ground units in Operations Enduring Freedom / Iraqi Freedom (OEF/OIF). These operations support our nation's interest by continuing deterrence, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions, expanded maritime interception operations, and counter-piracy and counter-drug patrols.

Readiness remains excellent and the Navy remains committed to ease the burden on those forces on the ground. However, this support has come with a price. Some of our uniquely skilled forces, particularly Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) forces and Naval Construction Force (Seabees) are operating under demanding turn-around-ratios. Moreover, accelerated equipment wear due to increased OPTEMPO, sustained high intensity theater operations and environmental factors on our civil engineering support equipment and expeditionary aircraft (EA-6B, MH-60, P-3, EP-3, and F/A-18C/D) continues to be of concern.

While we continue to engage this fight, we must also contend with traditional threats from regional powers who possess robust conventional, and in some cases, nuclear capabilities. Our number-one priority remains those Sailors and Marines forward-deployed, but to maintain a strategic reserve, we must simultaneously ensure we have the equipment to pace the future threat.

II. Challenges

While overall Navy readiness is excellent, the challenge for the Navy today is to remain capable of conducting traditional naval missions while simultaneously enhancing our ability to conduct non-traditional missions in order to ensure that naval power and influence can be projected from the sea, across the littorals, and ashore, as required.

Navy's support of OIF, OEF and the GWOT continue to require a higher OPTEMPO than was planned for during peace-time operations. In the near-term, this translates to greater operational costs (maintenance, parts and fuel). For the longer-term, this translates to shorter life-spans and the potential for decreased future force structure, which will diminish future force readiness and capability.

For at-sea operations, deployed steaming days-per-quarter have increased. In 2006, the Navy requested Supplemental appropriations to cover the cost of additional steaming days and flight hours associated with the GWOT. Congress has been responsive.

In the near-term, this increased steaming has increased operational costs for maintenance, parts, and fuel. Longer-term impacts are under close evaluation, but ships, aircraft and ground equipment returning from the war will require depot-level attention to remain responsive to emerging threats.

Predictably, the equipment used by Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) units, such as the Seabees and EOD, is wearing out at rates greater than design due to operations in Iraq, Kuwait, Horn of Africa, and Afghanistan. Moreover, Seabee and Explosive Ordnance Disposal units deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan require improved self-protection against improvised explosive devices (IED). Ongoing operations in Iraq have demanded

new vehicles to protect troops against the array of explosive devices they encounter. Mine Resistant, Armor Protected (MRAP) vehicles have been developed to better withstand these threats, and are being delivered to the ground forces.

We must replace or recapitalize our rapidly aging equipment that is operating at higher-than-expected operations tempo (OPTEMPO) and in harsh environments. Resetting equipment today will preclude unacceptable gaps in the near-to-midterm.

III. Reset the Force

The FY 2007 Title IX supplemental request included \$0.7 billion in Navy reset and allocated against the highest priority requirements. The FY 2007 Supplemental request includes \$2.4 billion towards Navy reset requirements. The FY 2008 GWOT request includes \$2.6 billion of Navy reset requirements.

Past supplemental funding has mitigated some of the Navy's costs, but it has been focused more on the "costs of war" and not resetting the force. "Costs of war" are the costs associated with personnel, personnel support, operations and transportation. Reset includes depot-level maintenance and procurement (force protection, weapons and ordnance, and aviation).

Reset Defined

Our current estimate of reset costs is based on the recently updated definition by the Department of Defense, stating:

"Actions taken to restore units to a desired level of combat capability commensurate with the unit's future mission. It encompasses maintenance and supply activities that restore and enhance combat capability to unit and pre-positioned equipment that was destroyed, damaged, stressed, or worn out beyond economic repair due to combat operations, by repairing, rebuilding, or procuring replacement equipment. These maintenance and supply activities involve Depot (Sustainment) and Field Level (e.g., Organizational and Intermediate) repairs/overhauls centrally managed to specified standards. Included

are Procurement, RDT&E, and Operation and Maintenance funded major repairs/overhauls and recapitalization (Rebuild or Upgrade) that enhance existing equipment through the insertion of new technology or restore selected equipment to a zero-miles/zero-hours condition."

Major Elements of Navy's Reset

Aircraft

The main focus of aviation reset costs is replacement of aircraft lost in the OIF/OEF Theater of Operations as well as aircraft "stressed" due to excessive (beyond design) use in GWOT operations. Additionally, modifications / upgrades ensure capabilities are preserved or new required capabilities are included to meet operational commanders' GWOT requirements.

Navy's aging, "legacy" aircraft are showing significant wear from the increased OPTEMPO directly associated with OIF and OEF. The expected service life (ESL) of an aircraft is a function of the designed flight hours and the actual fatigue life expended (FLE) through operational missions (launches, recoveries, extreme operational environment, etc). This increased OPTEMPO has accelerated airframe attrition due to their reaching ESL sooner than designed, and therefore has moved retirement dates for legacy aircraft forward.

One third of the Navy's legacy TACAIR fleet, F/A-18 A-D series aircraft, is currently operating beyond design limits, and the bulk of the fleet, F/A-18 C/D series aircraft, are operating at an average flight hour expenditure rate 30% greater per year than planned.

Similarly, the entire EA-6B fleet is operating at an average of 120% design ESL (an average aircraft age of 24 years.) The EA-6B was designed and planned to be in service for 20 years.

The P-3 and EP-3 fleets have approached fatigue life expended limits, and are now being closely monitored under a "hazardous risk index" program. The average age of our P-3 fleet is 27.6 years and the average age of our EP-3 fleet is 33.6 years. Both aircraft were expected to serve 30 years.

Resetting Naval aviation includes repairing and replacing damaged or destroyed aircraft, and getting more capable and reliable aircraft into the operational deployment cycle sooner. Production lines to replace legacy aircraft lost in support of GWOT are no longer active; therefore, it is necessary to replace those aircraft with modern, more capable platforms.

Aviation Reset in Supplementals. The FY 2007 Supplemental and FY 08 GWOT Reset request would fund the procurement of 27 aircraft to replace legacy aircraft EA-6B, F/A-18 A-D, MH-60 due to excessive airframe stress from GWOT operations. Additionally, funds are requested for modifications/upgrades to ensure capability is preserved or new required capabilities meet operational commanders' GWOT requirements. The request includes aircraft modifications designed to replace or upgrade capabilities required to support GWOT operations. An example of these desired modifications include the ICAP III upgrade to the legacy EA-6B aircraft, detailed below:

An upgraded ICAP III system to transform the electronic warfare capability and situational awareness in the EA-6B as well as an enhanced USQ-113 Jamming Capability upgrade that will modify existing hardware to enhance the jamming effectiveness of the system

The FY 2007 Supplemental request contains \$825 million in aviation reset, and the FY 2008 GWOT Reset request contains \$1,136 million. Table 1 below lists the major Navy aviation reset end-items contained within both supplemental requests. This list is not all inclusive.

Major Aviation Reset End Items in FY07 and FY 08 Reset	
<i>FY07 Supplemental</i>	<i>FY08 GWOT Reset</i>
6 - EA18G	12 - F/A-18 E/F
ICAP III Upgrade	6 - MH-60R
Low Band Transmit (LBT)	3 - MH-60S
Data Link for ATFLIR pods	ICAP III Upgrade
USQ-113 Upgrade	Low Band Transmit (LBT)
Add'l Tactical Common Data Link Sys	GPS & Radio upgrades
	EA-6B software upgrade

Table 1
Navy Ground Equipment

Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) provides task-organized combat support and combat service support forces with sufficient capability and capacity to meet the requirements for major combat operations, the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and homeland defense. The primary units operating under NECC are discussed here:

Naval Construction Force. Seabees provide expeditionary engineering (combat construction) to Navy and Marine Corps operating forces. Seabee civil engineer support equipment (CESE) in CENTCOM is being used an average of 14 times more than in a peace-time deployment. The OPTEMPO of some equipment, like generators, is 50 times more (Table 2). The high temperatures, airborne dust and harsh road conditions experienced in theater are also contributing to the rapid degradation of equipment.

Increases in Utilization for Essential U.S. Navy Seabee Equipment Employed in OIF	
CATEGORY	OPTEMP Ratio OIF/Pre-OIF
MTRV	2:1
Grader	5:1
Dump Truck 15 Ton	12:1
HMMWV	12:1
Wheeled Loader	13:1
Generator 30 KW	22:1
Well Drilling Rig	41:1
Water Distributor 2000 Gallon	43:1
Generator 60 KW	54:1

Table 2

- Explosive Ordnance Disposal. The EOD OPTEMPO in direct support of counter IED missions has increased by a factor of 40 compared to pre OIF/OEF (Table 3). Consequently, associated standard operating equipment used to "render safe" these terrorist devices such as remote control vehicles, Bomb suits, radiographic imagers, special explosive driven neutralization tools and armored vehicles are being used, consumed and destroyed at a much higher rate than initially planned. In addition, these teams are frequently the targets of terrorist and insurgent groups.

Increases in Utilization for Essential U.S. Navy EOD Equipment Employed in OIF	
CATEGORY	OPTEMP Ratio OIF/Pre-OIF
EOD PGI	40:1
Bomb Suits	40:1
Dive gear/compression	20:1
NBC	20:1
Surface Ordnance/Demo	35:1
Comms Gear	40:1
HMMWV	25:1
Generators 15/30KW	25:1
Robots	80:1
RCV	60:1
JERRV	100:1

Table 3

The FY 2007 Supplemental request contains \$461 million in ground equipment reset, and the FY 2008 GWOT Reset request contains \$560 million.

Major equipment types requested for the Seabees and EOD include:

- Tactical vehicles: Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected (MRAP) vehicles are requested to replace current HMMWV lacking adequate armor protection.
- Construction Equipment: Request includes bulldozers, scrapers, concrete mixers, graders and loaders and support equipment such as air compressors, generators, and welders.
- Also requested are special purpose trucks to support containers, panel boards, reverse osmosis units and other pieces of minor equipment.

Table 4 provides a list of major Seabee and EOD end-items contained within both supplemental requests. This is not all inclusive.

EOD & Seabee Major Ground Equipment Reset End-Items in FY07 and FY 08 Reset	
<i>FY07 Supplemental</i>	<i>FY08 GWOT Reset</i>
389 - MTRV (Seabee)	214 - MRAPs (Seabee)
540 - HMMWVs (Seabee)	200 - HMMWVs (Seabee)
194 - Earth Moving Equip (Seabee)	39 - Trucks (EOD)
49 - HMMWVs (EOD)	

95 - MRAP (EOD)	
52 - Trucks (EOD)	
24 - 60 KW Generator	

Table 4

Weapons/Ammunition

With the direct support to combat forces comes an increased need to replace ordnance (JSOW, Tomahawk, SLAM-ER) expended during OIF/OEF and to replace unserviceable small arms and weapons. Additionally, an increase in training requirements in recent years to match the front lines roles of Seabee and EOD units increased ammunition requirements for the training, sustaining and deploying of these Sailors. This increased use of weapons coupled with the harsh desert and maritime conditions on deployment, as well as decreased parts support for older weapons models, are accelerating wear of barrels and other components, requiring greater than expected require replacement.

The FY 2007 Supplemental request contains \$227 million in weapons and ammunition reset, and the FY 2008 GWOT Reset request contains \$209 million. Table 5 provides a list of major end-items contained within both supplemental requests. This list is not all inclusive.

Major Weapon and Ammunition Reset End Items in FY07 and FY 08 Reset	
<i>FY07 Supplemental</i>	<i>FY08 GWOT Reset</i>
30 - JSOW	123 - Tomahawk
60 - MK 38 Mod 2 Gun Mounts	1 - AMRAAM
Replace/provide var small arms, wpns	9 - SLAM-ER kits
	Replace/provide var small arms, wpns

Table 5

Depot Maintenance

As a traditional rotational force, Navy's maintenance strategy incorporates organic, intermediate, and depot level repairs to sustain equipment as needed to achieve its combat capability across the span of its expected service life. The unique operating environment and wartime OPTEMPO of our current conflict results in accelerated maintenance costs at all repair levels. Greater-than-peacetime Organizational and Intermediate maintenance costs incurred while operating or preparing for operations in theater and at the higher OPTEMPO are addressed in supplemental requests. Additionally, operating in the desert, high-heat

and high-particulate, environment has been harsher than conditions originally envisioned when the equipment was designed and built.

All levels of maintenance, including depot level maintenance, required to return the equipment to a ready for tasking status following its redeployment is characterized as a reset maintenance requirement. Reset maintenance requirements are dynamic when considering the possible variance in battle-damage equipment and changing strategies of both friendly and insurgent forces.

The FY 2007 Supplemental and FY 2008 GWOT Reset request funds for aircraft, ships and support equipment for maintenance performed at the depot level facility, to include cost to overhaul, clean, inspect, and maintain organic equipment to the required condition at the conclusion of the contingency operation or unit deployment. Major components include airframe rework, engine rework, aeronautical components, ship operating systems, ground command and control equipment, and countermeasures.

IV. CONCLUSION

Reset requirements will continue as equipment is used more extensively than originally anticipated, and high OPTEMPO operations continue. Replacement equipment and aircraft are essential to preclude near-to-midterm capability and capacity gaps in these areas. Deferring reset requirements will equate to increased risks in the future.

We must avoid allowing these costs of combat operations to reduce the capability and capacity of our Navy, the nation's Strategic Reserve. The press recently reported that half of the Royal Navy is to be "mothballed" to cover a series of expensive procurement projects and hidden costs associated with Britain's ground forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. We must not fall victim to this same reasoning, particularly as we increase the number of ground forces in the United States. We must not endanger the nation's Strategic Reserve provided by our Navy.