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**ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON THE  
PRESIDENT'S STRATEGY FOR IRAQ**

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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

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JANUARY 17, 2007



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## **ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON THE PRESIDENT'S STRATEGY FOR IRAQ**

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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
*Washington, DC, Wednesday, January 17, 2007.*

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 1:20 p.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman of the committee) presiding.

### **OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES**

The CHAIRMAN. Welcome, ladies and gentlemen. This is the second Armed Service Committee hearing of the 110th Congress. First, I want to thank the members for doing a good job last week during the first hearing abiding by the five-minute rule. We will continue that effort and five minutes means five minutes, and I appreciate your cooperation along that line. I have to shorten up the time because I do know that two of our witnesses, Dr. Perry and Dr. Kagan, must leave at 4:15 and 4:30 respectively, as I understand it. And so we can get as many members to ask their questions in their five minutes, we are going to ask the presentations be limited to four minutes, if at all possible. I think you have been contacted on that. My favorite phrase is "Please do it in 25 words or less." We will take it in a few more than 25. But if you can do that, we will certainly appreciate it.

Last week the President appeared before the American people and outlined a plan in Iraq which includes the increase of American troops. The next morning, Secretary of Defense Gates and General Pace appeared before us and discussed the Administration's plan in greater detail.

Today we will hear perspectives on and alternatives to that plan. Joining us today is Dr. William Perry who was the Secretary of Defense when President Clinton was President, and, more recently, a member of the Iraq Study Group; Dr. Lawrence Korb who served as an Assistant Secretary of Defense from 1982 through 1985 and is at the Center for American Progress; and Dr. Frederick Kagan, former history professor at West Point, now a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. You all have their full biographies in front of you, and I am sure you will know that this is a very impressive trio that we have, and we look forward to hearing from them.

Over the last month or so, I have made a point to emphasize that under my chairmanship, this committee would redouble our efforts in pursuing oversight responsibilities under which we are charged

by the Constitution. This is an important hearing. It is part of that process. We have heard at some length the Administration's position on the way forward in Iraq. As we consider that position, it is also our responsibility to explore our alternatives. We must weigh the pros and cons of each. Now, while the President's choice may be limited, it does not relieve us of the obligation to fully explore the ramifications of that policy. Additionally, by challenging the Administration on the specifics of the plan, any plan, we compel them to defend it in detail, warts and all. And where those warts are serious flaws, this process will expose them.

The light we shine on them will enable us to explore those problems before we ask our service members to execute a flawed policy again.

No longer will this Congress allow any vague statement of a half-formed plan from this or any other Administration to pass by without serious questioning—and there will be serious questioning.

Furthermore, we are a government for the people and by the people. A robust hearing and oversight process gives the American people the opportunity to understand the full range of implications inherent in the policies of their government.

The war in Iraq is the single most critical issue facing our country today. The outcomes of this conflict will have repercussions that affect United States national security for decades and will reverberate throughout the Middle East and, of course, the rest of the globe. Therefore, it is important that we proceed in a way that allows us to refine our policies and develop the best plan possible while keeping our citizens fully informed.

At the hearing last week I was pretty clear about my concerns regarding the type of troop increase. I won't go back through them today, except to note that we have got a real problem on our hands. It is past time for the Iraqis to assume greater responsibility for their own security. And whatever we choose to do, it needs to contribute to the overarching goal of reducing our force levels there in the next several months. That is how we will continue to watch out for the welfare of our forces and hedge against strategic risk, which is a real problem before us.

Today we are looking forward to hearing what you think about the way forward in Iraq. We should not lose sight of the fact the President has made his choice on what to do and our options in this case are limited. Therefore, I hope you spend some time discussing the implications of his plan, your ideas for improving it, and ways to evaluate its success as we move forward.

And before I ask my friend and colleague Mr. Hunter, Ranking Member, for his comments, let me again remind you that I intend to adhere strictly to the five-minute rule, and I know last week you did a very good job in that regard, and I hope that we can do the same today.

I introduce now the Ranking Member, Duncan Hunter, my friend from San Diego, California. I got it right.

**STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REPRESENTATIVE  
FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON  
ARMED SERVICES**

Mr. HUNTER. I want to thank my good friend, the Chairman, Ike Skelton, and join with him in welcoming our guests to this very, very important hearing by the committee.

Last week President Bush and his advisers met with congressional leaders to discuss this new strategy for Iraq, and the President then outlined this plan of the American people both in an address to the Nation and in several media interviews. And after that, Secretary of Defense Gates and Chairman of the Joints Chief of Staff, Chairman Pace, provided more detail before the committee, including information about the strategy's three key pillars. In fact, General Pace referred to the strategy as a three-legged stool, so that if any one of these elements, political, military, or reconstruction is missing, the strategy cannot stand. I agree that to have a chance of success, any strategy or proposed alternative needs to rest on these elements, and I think we have received a lot of information about each. But I look forward to hearing your assessments of the Administration's new plan in these areas.

Gentlemen, from my perspective, we are on the second phase of a basic blueprint that we have used for 60 years to bring freedom to other nations, whether you're talking about Japan or the Philippines or El Salvador, and that is, you stand up the free nation or government, you stand up a military capable of protecting that free government, and, third, if you don't have an external force like the Warsaw Pact backing the division that stayed on the overfold of the gap for so many years, the Americans leave.

We are right now in the most difficult part of this challenge, which is standing up an Iraqi military apparatus capable of protecting that free government. And let me just lay out for you what I have taken from the President's statement with respect to the Baghdad plan, and I would hope that you could comment on this perspective and add to it or subtract from it if there are portions that you think we have missed in this plan.

But this plan involves the sectoring of Baghdad into nine sectors; the establishment of an Iraqi brigade in each of the sectors. The brigade may have two or three maneuver battalions, and backing up those battalions is an American battalion. And a recommendation that we have made to the President, a number of us have made, is to bring Iraqi battalions from the quiet areas of Iraq—that is, 9 of the 18 provinces that average less than one attack a day—and saddle them up and move them into the night and rotate them and move into Baghdad or the Sunni Triangle or Al Anbar.

As I understand it, three brigades that will be moving in for the Baghdad operation will, in fact, come from three of these provinces that are relatively quiet.

Now, my recommendation has been to the Administration that we could use this blueprint, this idea of having several Iraqi battalions in front, in operations in contentious zones, backed by an American battalion and, of course, utilizing embedded American forces to mentor and to advise down to the company level in the Iraqi battalions; but we could use that blueprint to stand up virtually the Iraqi force. That is the full 114 battalions that have been

described to us by the Department of Defense as having been trained and equipped by U.S. forces.

So I would like you to comment on that, on the prospects of using the Baghdad plan as a pattern to stand up the full complement of Iraqi forces. And I think if this works in Baghdad, that that has some promise.

You know, I have looked at the—and I am sure other members of the committee have also looked at the other commitments that the Iraqi government has made that the President has reported to us have in fact been committed to, but obviously have not been executed with respect to consolidation, the division of petroleum assets, and of course the modification of the deBaathification plan and other things such as handling the former officers in Saddam Hussein's military. And of course there are a number of elements of this plan that are controlled by the Iraqis and that will require execution by them, and we will see if they deliver on this plan.

I would simply say at this time we have a plan that the Commander in Chief—as the person who has been elected by the people of this country to carry out our military policies and to put forward those military policies—the President, has come up with this plan, and he is delivering reinforcements in the strength of 21,500 troops to the Iraq theater; 4,000 of those reinforcements to go to Al Anbar Province where the Marines have requested them, and I verified that in talking to Marine commanders. They do feel that they need those additional 4,000 Marines. And, of course, the remainder of the troops to be dedicated to the Baghdad plan and other operations in the Sunni Triangle and the Baghdad area.

It is my position that when you have a shooting war and the President of the United States, the Commander in Chief, is moving reinforcements to execute a plan in that war and to execute the strategy in that war, that it would be unthinkable for Congress, either body, to move to cut off the reinforcements to the American forces that are presently working in the war.

So I would like, along with your analysis of how you think this plan is going to work, your own observations as to whether or not you think that that is an appropriate move by the legislative body to move to cut off reinforcements or to cut off supplies for the troops that are in theater or the troops who are arriving in theater.

So I want to thank my great colleague, the gentleman from Missouri, for holding this hearing. I think it is absolutely timely, and I look forward to your comments.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman from California.

We welcome you, gentlemen, and if you can summarize in four minutes to give us time for questioning, we would certainly appreciate it.

Dr. Perry.

**STATEMENT OF DR. WILLIAM J. PERRY, CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND COOPERATION, STANFORD UNIVERSITY**

Dr. PERRY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you turn that on, please?



Dr. PERRY. I am going to submit my testimony for the record, if I may, and I will give only highlights from that testimony in my oral comments.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Dr. PERRY. In December, the Iraq Study Group (ISG), a bipartisan group formed by the Congress, concluded nine months of study and proposed a new way forward. Last week President Bush announced his new way forward that is significantly different from the ISG's recommendations. So in my testimony today, I will explain the differences in the two approaches and why I believe the ISG's proposal serves our country better.

We may never know whether the Administration's goal of achieving a democratic stable government in Iraq was, in fact, feasible since the Administration's attempts to do so, were burdened with serious strategic errors. The Administration failed to get support from regional powers, from key allies. They did not send in enough troops to maintain security after the Iraqi Army was defeated. They disbanded the Iraqi Army, police, and civil servants a few weeks after the Iraqi Army was defeated. And they pushed the Iraqi Provisional Government to establish a constitution and hold elections by the end of faulty processes, and not adequately protect minority rights, thus setting the stage for a bloody power struggle between Sunnis and Shi'as.

The cumulative effect of all of these strategic errors is a disastrous security situation in Iraq which continues to deteriorate. Each month, hundreds of U.S. military personnel are killed or wounded. Each month, several thousands of Iraqis are killed. Well over a million Iraqis have left the country, including large numbers of Iraqi professionals, and the violence is still trending up.

As grim as this situation is, it could become even worse when U.S. soldiers leave. But that could be true whether we leave a year from now or five years from now. In the face of this growing disaster, the Congress commissioned an independent bipartisan study charged to its consensus on the way forward in Iraq. Our report called for a change in mission, a reinvigoration of diplomacy in the region, a strengthening of the Iraqi government and the beginning of group redeployments.

The change in mission proposal was key to everything else in the report. We believe that we should try to strengthen the ability of the Iraqi government to stem the sectarian violence. We believe there was—we should continue our efforts to defeat al Qaeda in Iraq. We believe that we should reduce the commitment of our ground forces in Iraq and reestablish their readiness for other missions.

We recommended the following actions to carry out these missions:

First, shift the mission of U.S. troops from combat patrolling to training and embedding.

Begin pulling out U.S. combat brigades with the goal of having all out by the first quarter of 2008, except for a strong rapid reaction force needed for force protection and to continue the fighting against al Qaeda in Iraq.

Continue to support Iraqi forces with intelligence logistics in their support.

Provide both positive and negative incentives for the Iraqi government to accelerate the reconciliation process and oil revenue sharing so the Sunnis have a stake in a stable Iraq.

And, finally, mount an intense diplomatic effort to persuade friendly regional powers to assist economically, politically, and with training, and to put pressure on unfriendly regional powers to stop arming militias and fomenting violence.

If the recommendations of the ISG would be followed, many of our combat brigades would be out of Iraq this year. The Defense Department at that time would have a huge budget and management problem in restoring them to full combat readiness. This problem is of special concern to this committee because of your constitutional responsibilities. The Army, all of whose brigades were at high readiness level at the beginning of the war, is dangerously close to being broken, and low readiness levels invite contingencies. Indeed, our security may have already suffered because of the perception of Iran and North Korea that our forces are pinned down in Iraq.

We also need to reconsider the role of the National Guard, since the compact with these citizen soldiers has been shattered by extended deployments that have caused many of them to lose their jobs or even their families.

Last week, the President announced what he called a "new way forward" in Iraq. His strategy calls for adding more than 20,000 combat forces, the bulk of them who are employed in securing Baghdad.

When the ISG was in Baghdad, we discussed the Baghdad security problem with General Casey and General Chiarelli and asked specifically if they could increase the likelihood of success if they had another three to five American brigades. Both generals said no. They said that the problem of conducting combat patrols in the neighborhoods of Baghdad had to be carried out by Iraqi forces, and that bringing in more American troops could delay the Iraqis assuming responsibility for their own security, and that any solutions to the security problem required the Iraqi government to start making real progress in political reconciliation.

That assessment was consistent with what we had heard from General Abizaid in an earlier briefing in the United States.

I believe we should stay with the recommendations of our most recent commanders in Iraq and not send in more American combat forces.

The best chance of bringing down the problems in Iraq lies within the Iraqi army, and we can improve their chance of success by using U.S. ground forces to provide the on-the-job training that would result from embedding American troops in Iraqi combat units, as proposed by the Iraq Study Group. Moreover, none of this military action will be effective unless the Iraqi government moves promptly to carry out the programs of political reconciliation they have committed to do. This involves the sharing of powers and the sharing of oil revenues with the Sunnis. The Iraqi government has delayed carrying out these programs for almost a year now.

Our proposals: the Iraq Study Group proposal puts real pressure for timely action on the part of the Iraqi government. We are send-

ing in additional American troops, providing the Iraqi government with the rationale for further delays.

The President's announced strategy also entails diplomatic actions that are far less comprehensive than envisaged by the ISG, and none at all with Syria which plays a pivotal role in the region and with whom we could have considerable leverage.

In sum, Mr. Chairman, I believe that the President's diplomatic strategy is too timid, that his military strategy is too little and too late to effect the lasting and profound changes needed. His strategy is not likely to succeed because it is tactical and not strategic, because it does not entail real conditionality for the Iraqi government, and because it would only deepen the divide in our own country.

The ISG proposal has a better chance because it recognizes that the key actions needed in Iraq to effect lasting results must be taken by the Iraqi government and the Iraqi army and because it divides the incentives for those actions.

Most importantly, the recommendations of the bipartisan Iraq Study Group provide an opportunity for the Nation to come together again.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Dr. Perry, for your advice and your testimony today.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Perry can be found in the Appendix on page 59.]

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Korb.

**STATEMENT OF DR. LAWRENCE J. KORB, SENIOR FELLOW,  
THE CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS**

Dr. KORB. Thank you very much, Chairman Skelton. Mr. Hunter, it is a privilege to appear before this committee once again and in such distinguished company.

Let me begin by saying that because of why we went in and the way we went in, some of the reasons outlined by Dr. Perry, there are no good options. What we have to do as a country, as a government, is pick the least bad option. I believe that rather than surging militarily for the third time in a year, we need to surge diplomatically. Further military escalation, in my view, would mean repeating a failed strategy.

As you know, in the last six months we have surged twice in Baghdad; yet the violence and death of Americans and Iraqis have increased dramatically. An additional surge would only increase more targets, put more American lives at risk, increase Iraqi dependence on the United States, further undermine the precarious readiness of our ground forces, and, most importantly, would go against the wishes not only of the American people but the Iraqi people.

Rather than escalating militarily, I believe, and we at the Center for American Progress and my colleague Brian Katulis and I have been arguing since September of 2005 the United States must strategically redeploy its forces from Iraq over the next 18 months. This is the only leverage we have to get the Iraqis to make the painful political compromises necessary to begin the reconciliation process. These compromises involve balancing the roles of the cen-

tral and provincial governments, distribution of oil revenues, protecting minority rights.

Until that process is completed, let me put it very bluntly, we could put a soldier or Marine on every street corner in Baghdad and it will not make a difference.

A diplomatic surge would involve appointing an individual with the stature of a former Secretary of State, such as Colin Powell or Madeleine Albright, as Special Envoy. This person would be charged with getting all six of Iraq's neighbors—Iran, Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait—involved more constructively in stabilizing Iraq. It is important to note that these countries are already involved in a bilateral, self-interested, and disorganized way. And while their interests and ours are not identical, none of their countries want to live in an Iraq after our strategy deployment backs a failed state, or a humanitarian catastrophe that would lead it to become a haven for terrorists or hemorrhage of millions of more refugees streaming into their countries.

This high-profile envoy would also address the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the role of Hezbollah in Syria and Lebanon, and Iran's rising influence in the region. The aim would not necessarily be to solve all of these problems but, as a minimum, prevent them from getting worse and demonstrate to the Arab and Muslim world that we share their concerns about the problems in the region.

I think, finally, that the Congress must take a greater role in shaping Iraq policy. In terms of what Mr. Hunter said in the beginning, I think there are things that Congress can do and should do to take a greater role in shaping our Iraq policy. First of all, I think you can require clarification of the law that allows the President to mobilize guards and reserves for up to two years. In my view, the clock should start on 9/11. If a unit has been mobilized two years since then, before mobilizing that unit again, the President should come back to the Congress and demonstrate why that is necessary.

I think you should require a new national intelligence estimate (NIE) on Iraq's internal conflict. My understanding is last summer congressional leaders requested that the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) prepare an NIE that includes an assessment on whether Iraq is in a civil war. I think you should require recertification that the war in Iraq does not undermine the war against global terrorist networks. The joint resolution of 2002 that authorized the use of force in Iraq required the Administration to certify that the Iraq war would not harm the effort against terrorism.

And, finally, I think that you should require a transparent, verifiable plan that conditions funding for military escalation not for the troops that are already there, but on the performance of the Iraqi leaders to fulfill their commitments and responsibilities.

I think that if we go back and we look at the history of our involvement in Iraq when historians write about it, they will find that many of us failed in our obligations to speak up, whether it is the Congress, the media, the academic community, and I think it is time for people to speak up now before this problem gets any worse.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Korb can be found in the Appendix on page 65.]

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Kagan.

**STATEMENT OF DR. FREDERICK W. KAGAN, RESIDENT  
SCHOLAR, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE**

Dr. KAGAN. Mr. Chairman, honorable members, it is an honor for me to be here today to talk to you about this incredibly important topic. Congressman Hunter laid out a daunting list of topics that he would like us to address as well as our statements in four minutes. I will not be able to do that, but hopefully be able to discuss some of those issues in greater detail in questions.

I think this is a pivotal movement in American history. I think this is a pivotal moment in world history. I say that without any rodomontade. I really do believe that we have come to a bifurcation point in the history of the world. If we lose in Iraq, that is to say if we allow Iraq to descend into complete unfettered chaos, I believe that it is extraordinarily likely that the conflict there will spill over into Iraq's neighbors, involving them in instability, involving them in subsidiary wars, and potentially involving them in regional conflict with one another. That sounds like a nightmare scenario that one conjures up to make people feel consequences, but my explorations of this issue with experts who have looked into it in much greater detail than I convinced me that it is, in fact, a very likely outcome of our possible withdrawal or failure to accomplish a mission of stabilizing Iraq.

That would be a world-changing event. And I think that before we make the decision to constrain the President's options, before we make the decision to abandon this fight either because it is hopeless or we think it is hopeless, or because we think that we can accept defeat here in order to move on to other things, I think that it is incredibly important that we think very carefully through precisely what the consequences of our withdrawal will be. And I would urge this committee, as it continues its deliberations, to hold a number of hearings with regional experts to discuss in detail precisely what they think the consequences of American withdrawal would be, and why, and to paint that picture for you so that you have in it in your mind when you make your decision.

I think that is one of the elements that is at root in this debate, the question of whether it is okay for the United States to lose in Iraq so as to go on to do other things, or whether we have already lost in Iraq and therefore should simply cut our losses and move on.

I don't think that it is okay to lose for any of the reasons I have said, and I don't believe we have already lost. There continues to be a government in place in Baghdad. It is not functionally perfect by any means. It does not hold the legitimacy of the entire country, although we should remember that it is seen as legitimate to a very large proportion of Iraqis. It is not sufficient but it is a start. There are more than 130,000 Iraqi soldiers in Iraq, soldiers who are fighting, putting their lives on the line every day. They continue to come to work; that is a volunteer force in many senses because of the system of pay that imposes upon them monthly leaves. Iraqi soldiers effectively re-up every single month, it is a testament

to their determination that they continue to come back to the colors and put their lives on the line. Once again, it is by no means sufficient; but neither does it look to me like a situation where defeat has already occurred and there is no prospect for turning the situation around.

Another viewpoint, which leads to criticism of the plan that our group at AEI proposed and also to the President's plan—and I would call the committee's attention to the fact that what we described is by no means identical to what the President will—well, what the Administration has been briefing. We will see what actually happens—is that there is another way to win; that success is possible if only we would motivate the Iraqis sufficiently, if only we would incentivize them to take responsibility for their own problems in their own country and step up in some way.

I would submit this is unrealistic. The Iraqi Army has been in existence for less than two years. They started from scratch. We can, if you like, debate the wisdom of the decisions that were made in 2003 to disband it. But those have become increasingly irrelevant with the passage of time. The fact is that we did disband it. We have tried to rebuild it from scratch. The problem is that we have never set as our military task in Iraq establishing or maintaining security or civil order for the Iraqi people. That is one of the first obligations of any occupying power, in my view. It is one of the first obligations of any government, and it is one of the key requirements of successful counterinsurgency techniques. I believe that it has been an error in our strategy all along that we have not prioritized Iraqi security. The question is: can we now find some way to turn that responsibility over to Iraqi security forces as they are constituted, with or without additional American forces embedded in them, to stipend and continue to train them in some way. In my view, it is not possible. And I think we must be very clear about what we are expecting the Iraqi forces to do and what it is reasonable to expect the Iraqi forces to do.

Clearing and holding prepared insurgent strongholds is a very high-end military task. It requires the very high ability to plan operations, very high abilities to coordinate various aspects of military and diplomatic and political and economic power, and a very high ability to operate with a very high degree of professionalism in a very dangerous situation and very complex situations. That is an extraordinarily high-level thing. It is something that our American soldiers are capable of doing and have done on numerous occasions. It is not something that is reasonable to expect a fledgling army to undertake, and I believe that it has already been an error in our strategy to say it is only when the Iraqis can accomplish such a task that we will be able to turn responsibility over to them.

Instead, I believe that we need to lower the bar for the Iraqis to a point where we can reasonably expect them to obtain it, and we do that by lowering the overall level of violence in the country to the point where the main responsibility on the Iraqi security forces is to sustain and maintain order that we have already largely helped them to establish. That is a task that I believe will be within their capabilities by the time we are done with this process. And it is why I and some of the members of our group have urged that we have a fundamental change in our strategic approach to Iraq.

This is not a question of tactics, this is a question of strategy. What we are saying is that rather than saying that our number one priority in Iraq is training and transitioning, we will say that our number one priority in Iraq at this moment is establishing the security that is an absolute precondition for any sort of transition.

I would add that it is also a precondition for the sort of political compromise that this committee quite rightly insists that the Iraqis must carry out. It is simply unreasonable and unrealistic to ask people or expect people facing the level of sectarian violence that is now ongoing in Iraq to make the hard compromise and make the hard choices that they will ultimately have to make. It is simply not going to happen in this security environment. We must first bring the security level to a much higher point, and then it will be possible.

And last, I would point out that if you peel this onion a little bit more, you will see that one of the things that we want to do is to encourage, shall we say, Prime Minister Maliki and his government to disarm the Shi'a militias, and this has become increasingly the test in the American political discussion about whether or not that government is serious. The problem is that as long as we are not providing security, as long as we are not protecting the Shi'a population, those Shi'a militias are seen as the protectors of the Shi'a population. It is very, very hard to imagine how Prime Minister Maliki could require those militias to be disbanded without having a reliable alternative to offer to the Shi'a population about how they will be protected from Sunni attacks.

I submit to this committee that if we change our strategy in Iraq and if we provide the additional forces necessary to carry out that strategy, it will be possible to reduce the level of violence to the point where the prime minister will gain the necessary leverage within the Iraqi political system to make the changes that we desire. Will he at that point do it? I can't promise the committee that, and we will have to see. What I am confident of is that the forces that we have proposed in our report to send to Baghdad, along with the change of strategy, can dramatically reduce the level of violence in the capital and create the possibility for a much more successful outcome.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

And, gentlemen, thank you for your excellent testimony and your thoughts as well as your wisdom.

At this point, I will reserve my questioning for a short time, and the gentleman from California, Mr. Hunter.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, following your lead and the fact that we didn't get through all of our membership in our last full committee hearing, I will reserve mine, too, and let us let our other members get their questions. And I have to leave for a quick emergency meeting, but I will come back and weigh in here as we get toward the end of the meeting.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Spratt.

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank all three of you for your excellent testimony.

One of the key issues before us is an eventual schedule of benchmarks or specific things that the Iraqi government is expected to

accomplish. What sanctions—because we have not specified any—but if we want to link these somehow to sanctions or to incentives, carrots or sticks, how could we do that and what would those sanctions or incentives be? The whole panel, any one of you.

Dr. KAGAN. Yes. I would say that it was a very excellent point that you make that we might want to consider carrots as well as sticks here. I think that too often we have had discussions of incentivizing Iraqis that really focus on threatening them. I would not threaten them with the withdrawal of our forces, which is the only thing right now which prevents Iraq from falling into full-scale sectarian civil war and sectarian genocide.

I think it would be appropriate to contemplate a series of packages, perhaps economically constructed packages, that we could offer to the Iraqis on the condition that they meet certain benchmarks. I think that would be a much better way to go. And remember, I would remind the committee that we are dealing with an allied government here in the Iraqi government, and it would be much better if we could find positive incentives for them to spur them along the path rather than be continually threatening them and hectoring them.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Korb.

Dr. KORB. The Iraqi government elections took place over a year ago. They promised that within four months they would make the modifications to the constitution. This is before the violence got out of hand. They didn't do it. The fact of the matter is that in the 13 months since they had their election, we have lost 13 battalions' worth of soldiers and Marines killed and wounded, while we have been waiting for them.

I believed a while ago, and I believe now, until you set a date certain to leave—and I would say over 18 months because if you go 18 months from now, this will mean we have been there longer than 5 years, which is certainly time enough for them to get their act together and fulfill our moral responsibilities for overthrowing that government—until you do, that they will not do these things, because they are tough. It is not because of violence. It is because they are difficult compromises to make. You are asking basically a Shi'a government to secede power to the Sunnis. They don't want to do that. And that is why I think that you have got to put the pressure on them.

In my testimony, I mentioned metrics that you could use to condition the funding for this surge, steps to disband the ethnic and sectarian militias, measures to ensure the Iraqi government brings justice to Iraqi security, personnel who are credibly alleged to have committed gross violations of human rights, and then of course taking steps toward the political and national reconciliation.

Mr. SPRATT. Secretary Perry.

Dr. PERRY. The positive incentives we can offer the Iraqi government is the training and strengthening of the Iraqi forces not only by training them, but by embedding some of our forces in their units. The negative is they must understand that we are done with street patrolling with the U.S. Army, and that we are going to be pulling our troops out on a schedule, and that they have to step up to the plate now.



As Mr. Korb said, they have to step up to the plate, which is power sharing with the Sunnis, which revenue sharing with the oil is a very difficult thing to do, which they do not want to do. We have to have pressure for them to do that.

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Saxton, please.

Mr. SAXTON. Dr. Perry and Dr. Korb, you have both indicated in slightly different terms that you favor setting some kind of a schedule for pulling out troops in order to put pressure on the majority Shi'a population and government to step up to the plate and do what they said they would do.

On the other hand, Dr. Kagan asked a very pertinent question and that is, should we pull our troops out, what is the effect of that? And I think that is a very serious question and one that we ought to contemplate thoroughly. We know that the Shi'a government—that the majority government, excuse me, is mostly Shi'a. And we know that there is a potential, if not a real level of support, from outside of Iraq; namely, from Iran and perhaps from Syria as well.

On the other hand, the Sunni minority finds favor in other countries, particularly to the south, the Saudis and Jordanians, and perhaps Egypt and other countries.

And so it seems to me that a pull-out of troops at this point could very well result in a broader conflict, in a more serious conflict than what we are seeing inside of Iraq today.

What do you think?

Dr. PERRY. Mr. Saxton, I think that the presence of our troops there is indeed holding down the violence. The violence would be greater if they were not there, and that if we pulled them out next week, the violence would increase. My concern is that that would be true if we pulled them out six months from now, a year from now, five years from now, if something is not done to deal with the political problem in Iraq. Until or unless the Sunnis feel that they have some stake in the government and some stake in the oil revenues, they are going to continue this—whether you call it sectarian violence or war, whatever you call it, it is causing huge grief in the country. That is the problem that has to be resolved, and anything we do has to be pointed toward resolving that problem.

My own belief is the only pressure we have on the Iraqi government to force them to take that move is the understanding that they are going to have to stand alone at some time in the future.

Dr. KORB. Congressman, when our troops leave, and they will have to leave at some date, as Dr. Perry said, we won't leave the region. We still have interest in the region and in the plan which we put forward. We can leave forces in Kuwait. The Kuwaitis welcome us because we liberated them in 1991. You can have a carrier battle group and Marine expeditionary force in the Persian Gulf, and if you take a look at what happened when we killed al-Zarqawi, the Iraqis gave the information to their forces, they gave them to us, we sent in an F-16 to get rid of them so we would still be able to apply power if something should happen. If Iran should try to invade or something like that, we would be able to take military action.

It is also important that we do a diplomatic surge, because once we say we are leaving by a date certain, the countries in the region know that they are going to have to cope with the chaos that is there. Even the Iranians don't want to see millions of Iraqi refugees streaming into their country. They don't want to see it become a haven for al Qaeda because al Qaeda is predominantly a Sunni group, and they are Shi'as.

Remember that the Iranians are cooperating with us in Afghanistan. Why? Because they share our goals? No. Because they do not want to see an Afghanistan run by the Taliban again because they saw that as a threat. They are building roads in Afghanistan. They are providing money. They provided intelligence to help us when we went into Afghanistan.

Dr. KAGAN. I want to say in response to these two comments, we have differing opinions about the objectives that the Iranians might have. I believe that the Iranian objective is regional hegemony, and I think there is a lot of basis for that belief. And I think a lot of countries in the region believe that. And I think their view of Iraq is very different from their view of Afghanistan. Remember, in the 1990's Iraq was the only state that posed an existential threat to Iran. I see no reason to believe that the Iranians will work to create a strong state in Iraq to create a threat to them.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Snyder.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Perry, one of the specific things you say in your opening statement, I forget the wording that you used, you state that you know that al Qaeda is there; while they were not there in any meaningful way, that they clearly are there now. They have a future hold. They have it, will be in a position of a sustained place to train, you know, if we leave.

Now, Dr. Korb's answer is that we can have F-16s or whatever. It seems like that that may be an unsatisfactory way of dealing with what you describe as a well entrenched foothold of al Qaeda now in Iraq. That is not how we dealt with the foothold that al Qaeda had in Afghanistan. Would you—I am playing devil's advocate with you on that. Would you amplify on that? I don't think it is going to be as clean as we would like it to be. We will see signs of al Qaeda's activity. We have troops in Kuwait. We will go in for a quick strike operation and take care of it. Will you—

Dr. PERRY. I want to be clear that the Iraq Study Group did not recommend pulling our forces out of Iraq. They recommended stopping the street patrols and moving our combat patrols out. But it also explicitly recommended keeping a strong rapid reaction force with two missions:

The first mission is exactly to your point. It is continuing the fight against al Qaeda in Iraq. And the second mission is providing ongoing support for the Iraqi Army, the air support, intelligence support.

So we see a relatively long-term role of the U.S. forces in Iraq, but in the support role of the Iraqi Army, except for specifically the fight against al Qaeda in Iraq that we wanted to have a strong combat force to carry out that mission.

Dr. SNYDER. The second point I wanted to bring up, again I will address to Dr. Perry and Dr. Kagan, I have been a bit frustrated. It seems the President and Vice President have been making state-

ments, and I assume they put their heads together. Well, those who criticize the President's plan need to show an alternative. Well, the Iraq Study Group is an alternative.

Dr. PERRY. It was intended.

Dr. SNYDER. In my facetiousness I said maybe. I should get a letter and sign it and send it to the President and say by the way, here is an alternative which is a bipartisan alternative co-headed up by very prominent Republicans and it is an alternative. There are alternatives out there to the President's plan, it seems to me, where this is pretty summarily rejected by the Administration. But have you all, as members of the Iraq Study Group, taken some offense when you hear Administration people talking about there is no alternative out there to the plan, to the President's plan?

Dr. PERRY. Well, I hope this alternative is in front of the American public as a real alternative. I want to also say that having this bipartisan group come to a consensus on this recommendation was not easy. It is a very difficult problem, and I think great credit to Jim Baker and Lee Hamilton, who brought that group together, to reach a unanimous conclusion. They did it because we felt it was necessary to have a consensus in order to have any support, any credibility with the American public that this would be a way forward to be considered.

Dr. SNYDER. I, like the Iraq Study Group, I don't understand why the President and his people are so dug in against expanding diplomatic initiatives with Iran and Syria. But playing devil's advocate again, the Iraq Study Group does acknowledge the possible need for a temporary surge. I don't think you used the word "surge," but you talk about the possible need for a temporary increase in troops.

Would you reflect on that? That was what you said in the Iraq Study Group.

Dr. PERRY. What we said in the Iraq Study Group was if our military commanders believed that a temporary surge could happen in the Baghdad situation, that we would not be opposed to it. We then talked with the military commanders, and they did not recommend that, as I mentioned in my testimony. None of the military commanders who were there at the time thought that was a good idea.

And in any event, what we are talking about is that the term "surge" to me and to the group meant a temporary increase in troops. What is being proposed now I don't see as being very temporary. It looks to me like a new level of deployment.

Dr. SNYDER. And Dr. Kagan, is 21,500 sufficient for what you think needs to happen?

Dr. KAGAN. Congressman, we proposed in our report a surge of five brigades into Baghdad, which I counted as about 25,000 troops. There is a lot of confusion about how many brigades we are counting. And I believe the total surge we advocated is 35,000 combat troops into Iraq, more than that when you add the support troops. I do believe that a surge of five additional combat brigades is sufficient to establish the objectives we laid out in our presentation, which is to establish security in the critical terrain in Baghdad and Sunni and mixed Sunni-Shi'a neighborhoods around the Green Zone.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McHugh.

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you very much.

Dr. Kagan, just to follow through on the point you were just making. I read your report. Refresh my memory. Are the numbers you are talking about in line about the current manuals and metrics associated with the counterinsurgency?

Dr. KAGAN. Congressman, they are. We looked at the areas that we thought critical to establishing security in Baghdad. We identified 23 districts with a population of approximately 2 million.

And we proposed a surge of American forces into Baghdad which would place a total of 50,000 or so combat troops in Baghdad, more when you included the support troops. And remember that support troops are very important in this conflict, and we did not take account of Iraqi forces which will also be there. That is sufficient to generate force ratios that are well within not only what is recommended in the recent U.S. counterinsurgency manual General David Petraeus put out, but were also successful in clear-and-hold operations in Tall Afar in September of 2005.

Mr. MCHUGH. Dr. Korb, I believe I heard you to say the only leverage we have is the active redeployment. Don't we as well, though, have some leverage on funding or the lack of funding in the future? Why would you not include that as something that could motivate the Iraqis to step forward and do the things that they need to do?

Dr. KORB. If you look at the reconstruction money that we allocated, that Congress has allocated, it is \$20 billion. Basically, it is very difficult to spend that correctly, as your inspector general has told us. But my view is, as long as you have close to 150,000 Americans there, they are crutched. They know they can keep the violence down. They can postpone the day of reckoning for them. The funding may be marginal. The problem for you is once the troops get in there, you have got to continue to fund them.

Mr. MCHUGH. I understand your point. But let me clarify. Is it not leverage to say to the Iraqis, say through a war supplemental, that we are portioning off that supplemental by, say, half; list some benchmark performance measures that I think all of us agree on, and say we will revisit continuation and fuller funding of that initiative and the completion of it based on your genuine effort? That way it is a future leverage rather than a more immediate one that you are talking about. Would that have no—

Dr. KORB. That might have a marginal impact, but I think the only card you have really left in terms of getting them to do these things is the presence of American troops because basically it is a crutch on which they can rely. And if you go back and you take a look since they have had their election, it is over a year and they haven't done anything. And the question becomes why haven't they taken even step one to do what they need to do? And in my view, basically it is because it is dependent on us. Remember that Generals Casey and Abizaid came before the Congress: more troops will increase the dependence. We don't need to do that.

Mr. MCHUGH. Well, I met with General Casey two days ago. I got back from Iraq yesterday, and he is in support of this. I want the record to show that as well is General Odieno. Whether or not he is right is another issue. That is why we are here today. But

he has kind of agreed on the direction and the opportunity that it provides.

Let me ask you another question. In all the meetings that we had in that visit from Prime Minister Maliki to the speaker of the Iraqi parliament to the national security adviser, foreign minister, and our ambassador as well as our military leaders, they said that deadlines and threats of withdrawal at a date certain do nothing more than encourage their enemies, the insurgents, particularly al Qaeda, to stick it out. Would you want to comment on that?

Dr. KORB. I think it is important that—the Intelligence Committee tells us that al Qaeda groups represent two to three percent of the people causing the violence. The main problem is the civil war. It has morphed into a civil war. Remember that 95 percent of the Iraqis don't support al Qaeda, and if we were to leave or announce a date certain, you would get less support for al Qaeda in Iraq from the Iraqi people. A lot of them are making common cause with them now because they want us to get out. Remember that more than 70 percent of the Iraqis want us out within a year; 60 percent think it is okay to kill—okay to kill Americans.

So I think when you look at the threat now, the main threat is a civil war. Our troops are primarily refereeing a civil war. They are not fighting al Qaeda. Al Qaeda is not their primary mission any more.

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Davis.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to all of you for being here.

Could you expand a little further on the notion that if in fact things stabilized, that the Iraqi government would be positioned to take advantage of that? What do you think would be the first steps that were taken; and if in fact those were not, do you think that then is an occasion for some of the negative incentives, if you will?

Dr. KAGAN. Well, I think that the first, in many respects, most important thing is increasing security in Baghdad would allow us—it would make it possible for the Maliki government to begin the process of bringing the militias under control. And I think what we need to see in Iraq as a matter of priority is a demobilization of Iraqi society, and what we have been seeing is a gradual mobilization for Iraq for civil war.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Could you be specific about how that would occur?

Dr. KAGAN. It is hard to see into the future how this would be done. It would depend on circumstances. I would hope in the first instance, Prime Minister Maliki would negotiate with Sadr and his guys and some of the fringe elements in the Jaish al-Mahdi, and work to have them demobilized. I think their falling of the need for them for defenders of the Shi'a would lead to a drop in recruitment, and some of their fighters would fall away to begin with. And I think ultimately Prime Minister Maliki would need to send his own reliable Iraqi security forces against the hard-core Jaish al-Mahdi fighters in order to clear them out.

In the worse case, I think we would end up having to support him in that effort. But those would be some of the most important results that I think would be made possible by establishing secu-

rity in Baghdad. They are absolutely not possible, in my opinion, until we have done that.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. And if I could just ask one more question and then I would love to have the others respond to that.

What is your definition of clearing them out? Where would they go? Would they be incarcerated in some way? What do you think realistically Maliki would do with them?

Dr. KAGAN. Well, I think that many of them would be detained. I think many of them would be incarcerated. I think some of them would be ultimately disarmed and returned. Many of them would be simply put in jail. I think it would depend on the magnitude of their crimes and the level of commitment to continue fighting, and that is something that has to be looked at on a case-by-case basis.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Dr. Korb.

Dr. KORB. A couple of things that it is important to keep in mind: that the Iraqi Army, which is certainly much better than the police, basically is not a multiethnic army. People are still loyal to their sects and tribes, which is why in the last surge that we had, Mr. Maliki ordered six battalions into Baghdad and only two showed up. I must say when Mr. Maliki appointed the new head of the Army, he ignored our recommendations and appointed a Shi'a general.

So that gets me to ponder will he take action to a Shi'a group? And the record so far I think is not—is not encouraging. Remember, people talk a lot about training of the Iraqi military. Certainly training is important. But what about motivation? Are they motivated to fight and die for Iraq like the brave young men and women we bring into our service who are motivated to fight and die for this great country? That is still lacking, and it is not going to be there until you do these political compromises.

If you get the political compromise done, then there will be less reason for the violence. But those have got to come first and they have got to come sooner. We have waited a long time. We have been there longer than we were in World War II. So it is not like we came in, knocked them over and left. I mean, we are there a long time. We have given them these opportunities. And you have got to keep in mind what this is also doing to U.S. security around the world. We haven't mentioned it yet. We need troops in Afghanistan. General Eikenberry said that yesterday.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you. I want to give Dr. Perry a chance to respond as well, since the time is running out.

Dr. PERRY. I think it has been demonstrated that the U.S. Army, surge of U.S. Army troops, could establish security in Baghdad, as they did in Fallujah, as they did earlier in other cities. As soon as the U.S. Army troops left, the disorder came back again. What happened was the militia simply left the area, and then as soon as the U.S. soldiers left, they came back again. So maintaining security in Baghdad can only be done by a strong Iraqi Army, and that is why our emphasis was on strengthening the Iraqi Army.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bartlett.

Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. Chairman, 14 years ago I joined this committee in the minority, sitting in the lowest seat. Most hearings ended, and I never had a chance to ask any question. Remembering the

frustration of junior members, I want to yield my time to the lowest-ranking member on our side of the aisle, Mr. Geoff Davis from my first State, Kentucky.

Mr. Davis.

Mr. DAVIS OF KENTUCKY. I want to thank the distinguished gentleman from Maryland for the honor he has given me. I find it ironic Dr. Korb mentions World War II as an analogy for troop presence, since we still have troops in West Germany right now, and I know there are bigger pictures related to the Cold War for that.

I would like to step away from the immediate tactical and technical discussions on Iraq and go to a bigger question I observed personally on the ground in Afghanistan, Iraq, surrounding countries in the area, and that has to do more with the interagency process in conducting a classic counterinsurgency.

I am quite confident that our troops, many of them friends of mine for 30 years, will do their jobs to secure the areas from the kinetic perspective where they are sent in to do that. But my question becomes what next, from a localized standpoint of being able to use not only existing social networks but using the power behind the agencies that we have?

I have observed in numerous countries in combat arms, officers who are quite diligent, great, young noncommissioned officers serving in functions that effectively can be performed better by Department of Treasury, Department of Justice, Department of Agriculture in one case, and as well as the Department of State, given the personnel limitations there. One thing I would appreciate each of you commenting on for a moment is considering the symptoms that we have seen, that we are candidly discussing here and in other hearings, how should our national security apparatus be organized differently not to have some of the errors that have taken place promulgate themselves in the future?

Dr. PERRY. Mr. Davis, I think that is a great observation, and I welcome the opportunity to comment on it.

I think it is a deficiency in our government organization today in that we can send a first-class military operation out to a place like Bosnia or a place like Baghdad or a place like Afghanistan, but we do not have the same organization in the civilian infrastructure that has to go in behind them. We did not have that in Bosnia. We did not have it in Baghdad, and I do believe a reorganization is needed to allow that to happen not only in the United States, or as a way of bringing the Justice Department, the State Department and so on into this kind of an organization, but into our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as well, which similarly lacks it.

When we go into Baghdad or Bosnia with military, we go in with a professional team that has worked together, that has trained together and that is trained to do that job. When we go in with civilians after that, we go in with a pickup team that has not had the right kind of training, that has not worked effectively together, effectively with a military counterpart. And I think that needs to be corrected, and I think you are heading in the right direction.

I would encourage this committee to look for legislation that might push us in that direction.

Mr. DAVIS OF KENTUCKY. So you support expanding jointness, both from a personnel policy standpoint over the—

Dr. PERRY. Absolutely.

Mr. DAVIS OF KENTUCKY. Dr. Korb.

Dr. KORB. Yes, I agree because we are asking the military to do too much. And part of the reason is not only, as Dr. Perry said, that they work together, they have these skills, and they can order people into dangerous zones, where in the other agencies you are looking for volunteers to go. So I think we need to work more on that, and we need to send our best people over there. I believe, reading the book *Inside the Green Zone*, they were sending people there more based on political loyalty to them than confidence, and I think that has set back the effort even more.

Mr. DAVIS OF KENTUCKY. Dr. Kagan.

Dr. KAGAN. Congressman, I would first like to observe that whatever we have in terms of reforming an interagency, it is not going to happen this year. It is not going to happen by March, and it is not going to happen in time to affect the operations that are going to be underway in Iraq right now. And so what I would say is, unfortunately, I think in the short term we are going to have to continue to place the burden on the military, and I would encourage Congress to make the necessary authorizations to allow military commanders to do what is necessary in recognizing that. In the long term, the problem that you raised absolutely has to be addressed, but I would make one point to add to those of my colleagues.

It is a very different thing, knowing how to do something and knowing how to teach how to do something, and I am concerned that we have become so focused with making some sort of deployable State Department where you can pick a lot of people who know how to do the various things that you want to have done and send them over there, and the instinct of people like that is to do them. But if the issue is actually, in many of these cases, helping to teach the Iraqis how to do these things, that requires a different sort of training and a different sort of skill set, and so I think this problem actually is even deeper and more complex, and we will soon be figuring out how to get all of the agencies on the same sheet of music.

It actually goes to the question of creating an organization that is able to train new democracies, whether we have invaded them or not, and help them develop full democratic standards.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

I might mention at this juncture that what we know as Goldwater-Nichols—and I think you are making reference to what some of them term as Goldwater-Nichols II, which of course would be multiagency. I might point out that it started in 1982 and finally was passed into law by this Congress in 1986. It is a massive undertaking, I think, even more because only this committee and then our counterpart in the Senate dealt with Goldwater-Nichols, the original Goldwater-Nichols.

Mr. Cooper.

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to each one of the witnesses. And I want to make it clear for the record that each one of you disagrees with the President's strategy in Iraq for



different reasons, to be sure. I am still searching for a strategy that is as good as our troops.

The practical question that we have to face as a committee is what can we do to change the President's policy. He is the commander in chief. Former Secretary Perry said that his proposal was too little, too late, and of course prefers the Iraq Study Group's proposal. Dr. Kagan was saying that we need to put in more troops, and we need to have a different objective for those troops to secure the population. But as a practical matter, what can Congress do to change things? We can cut off money. We can condition money, but there is still just one commander in chief, and it seems to me that it is almost more difficult to have a more hawkish strategy than the President, as Dr. Kagan is suggesting, than it is to have a more devilish strategy. It is just the way the appropriations process works.

So I was wondering if Dr. Kagan had any practical suggestions as to what we could do to implement his sort of policy if the commander in chief has chosen not to implement it.

Dr. KAGAN. Well, I would say it remains to be seen what strategy exactly will be implemented in Iraq. And there is a name that has not been mentioned with sufficient prominence here but that needs to be, and that is Lieutenant General David Petraeus. We have spoken about General Casey and how he feels about things and General Abizaid and how he feels about things, but the commander who is going to implement this plan is General David Petraeus when he becomes the commander of the multinational forces in Iraq. I eagerly await what he has to say. He is a tremendously qualified officer, and I believe that at this moment the hopes of our Nation rest on his shoulders.

The President has committed to sending five brigades to Baghdad, which is what our group recommended, and he has said that he will change the strategy to focus on securing the population. Now, the Administration officials have subsequently briefed a variety of details of the plan. Honestly, it is a little hard to imagine why they have gone into quite so much detail in these circumstances before the new commander has taken power, but I believe that General Petraeus will use the resources that the President has committed to giving him, wisely, to pursue the new strategy that the President has given him. And I think that we should wait until we have heard General Petraeus' recommendation for going forward, and then I would recommend that the committee, Congress in general, and the Nation rally around this new commander who is, by far, our best hope in this dangerous situation.

Mr. COOPER. I too admire General Petraeus, but don't we have civilian control of the military in this country, and are not you urging General Petraeus to countermand the President's policy?

Dr. KAGAN. No. The President gave one speech in which he said that he was going to commit to sending five brigades to Baghdad and that he was going to have a change in strategy. Various Administration officials have subsequently briefed a variety of details to that plan, some of which bring concern to me. It very clear that those are the sorts of details that the commander on the spot would be the one who is in the best position to make recommendations. And I am not suggesting that General Petraeus will do anything

the President is uncomfortable with, but I do believe that we should wait until General Petraeus has made his recommendations to the President about how he would like to proceed before we evaluate the strategy.

Mr. COOPER. If each of the gentlemen would help me understand which would be a greater blow to American prestige this spring—continuing problems in Iraq or surprise Taliban successes in a spring offensive in Afghanistan, due primarily to weak NATO forces and a lack of U.S. troops.

Dr. KORB. I think Afghanistan is much more important to the security of the United States than Iraq is. After all, that is where the attacks of 9/11 occurred. That is the central front in the war on terror. We cannot let that fail. We cannot let that fail.

So, if you ask me if I had to say which would be a greater threat, it would be a renewed effort by the Taliban that has great gains. Iraq is primarily a civil war now. I do not see Iraq, as I mentioned before, as mainly a haven for al Qaeda, and everything I know about Iraq tells me that once we are out of there, the Iraqis are not going to be supporting al Qaeda.

Mr. COOPER. Dr. Kagan, any thoughts for what we should do in Afghanistan?

Dr. KAGAN. Well, the situation in Afghanistan is very grave, and I am very concerned about it. But I think that for all of its significance in the war on terror, its significance to America's national security pales in comparison to the consequences for our Nation of the possibility of real defeat in Iraq and the collapse of the Middle East entirely. Afghanistan does not pose that sort of existential threat to our security at this point, but I do believe that disaster in Iraq does.

Mr. COOPER. I thought you said in your testimony that you predict the President's plan would fail, at least as it is currently outlined, unless General Petraeus changes it.

Dr. KAGAN. I have serious concerns about elements of the plan that have been briefed by members of the Administration. I do not take those to be canonical statements of what will happen when the new commander has made his recommendations to the President.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Jones of North Carolina.

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

I sit here as a Member of Congress for three and a half years, now going on four years, and I am amazed where we are. And I want to just read—and then I have got a couple of questions, and I would like for—I am not going to give the name of the person I am quoting at this time, but all three gentlemen, I have great respect for you, and thank you for sharing your knowledge and expertise with this committee and with the American people. This is the quote.

“You will never find in my lifetime one man that all of the Iraqis will coalesce around. Iraqis are too divided among sectarian, ethnic and tribal loyalties, and their loyalties are regional, not national.”

Does that sum it up pretty well, in your opinion, of the situation with the chaos in Iraq?

Dr. KAGAN. Congressman, I do not think it does. I think that the situation is more complex than that, and I think that a lot of people have been trying to portray Iraq as a country that exists in three divided areas that hold the loyalties of their populations. Something like 10 million Iraqis, I believe is the figure, live in mixed cities. Many of them, especially before the sectarian violence occurred, had been living in mixed neighborhoods, living door-to-door with Shi'a, Sunni, Turkmen, Arab, and so on.

Mr. JONES. Dr. Kagan, let me just real quick—because the time will go fast and I do have a lot of respect for you. I might disagree but have a lot of respect. I think it was in the 1920's that the English said, you know, "We have done all we can do." This was Army General Jay Garner who made that statement, and I think he does bring some credibility because he was the first U.S. official in charge of postwar Baghdad. Now, whether you agree or not, I mean—but the point is that, as Dr. Perry has said and as Dr. Korb has said, if we do not understand that this is not going to be won as a political—it is going to be won politically speaking, rather than with war. And I sit here in amazement of how, after four years, we are still falling over ourselves, not the military—God bless them—and I hope the new leadership in Iraq maybe will bring us some direction so that we can transition to the Iraqis. But I listen to Dr. Korb, and he is saying that, you know, it is hard to motivate these people. Well, I think that is exactly what General Garner was saying.

I think that the Iraq Study Group and Dr. Perry—I think you all came forward with some very fine recommendations. I think, Dr. Korb, you have as well in your group, and I just hope—and then I want to ask the question and I will stop. I just hope that this Administration, which has said so long that I am going to listen to the military in the field and, yet this surge of 22,000 troops—I do not know what we are doing to these young men and women but making them referees in a civil war. The only thing different about being a referee in this war versus a referee on a football field is they get shot and killed and wounded. I guess my—I will go to you, Dr. Korb.

Can you give—I mean, you definitely believe that we cannot motivate because of the differences in the tribes and that what we have to do is to seriously consider some type of redeployment with support?

Dr. KORB. Well, I agree this is something we should have thought of before we went in there. And what happened is the way we went in, we unleashed these feelings, these ideas that had been there all along, ever since the British were in there, and now we are having to live with that, and that is why I think two things.

One, we have got to put them on notice they have got to move to deal with these things. If they do not, it is going to be their problem, not just ours anymore. And as Dr. Perry said, at some point you have to leave, and if they have not done this, the violence will break out again because they are dealing with disputes that go back over 1,000 years, and we need to realize that.

When I was in Iraq, I was talking to somebody in Hilla, and it was at the university, and he said something to me. He said, You are saying the same things that the British said when you came

here. You know, "we came as liberators, not occupiers." It was very interesting. I went back and looked it up, and he was correct.

Mr. JONES. Mr. Marshall.

Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate each of your individual views concerning the way forward where Iraq is concerned, but at this point, I am certainly more interested in what the President has proposed and what each of you think of that proposal.

Dr. Kagan, just a minute ago in response to Mr. Cooper's questions, you indicated that as different Administration officials had fleshed out what the President had to say in his speech, you were concerned about some of those details.

Would you be specific about the details you are concerned about and what your concerns are?

Dr. KAGAN. Yes, Congressman.

Listening to the testimony last week, the Administration has been briefing that the Iraqis will be in the lead of this operation, and it has briefed a great deal of detail about the tactical arrangements for that, including who will be actually knocking on doors and what the role of the American forces will be, how American forces will be deployed throughout Baghdad. And in addition, there has been some briefing about the force flow into Iraq with suggestions made that the initial increase would only be two brigades in Baghdad with three other brigades on standby. I am very concerned about all of these things.

I think that this is an operation where we cannot rely necessarily on the Iraqi security forces, as they are, to do an adequate job here, that there are going to be some places—

Mr. MARSHALL. I am going to have to go ahead and interrupt here. So do you think—I mean I also know you do not think 20,000 is a sufficient number. Your initial recommendation was 30,000, something like that?

Dr. KAGAN. Well, again, the numbers are very complicated because the Administration has been briefing brigades at a certain level, and I think that, in fact, what they are saying is there will actually be more forces going into Iraq, more than 20,000.

Mr. MARSHALL. So your expectation is that a larger American force, not dependent upon Iraqis taking the lead and doing some of the things that you are a little concerned they may not do or may not do very effectively, that a larger American force could accomplish dampening the sectarian violence and calming Baghdad.

Dr. KAGAN. Congressman, I believe that it is the force that we recommended in our report, which was five American combat brigades, in addition to those already in Baghdad, partnered with such Iraqi forces as are available.

Mr. MARSHALL. How would you use the Iraqi forces?

Dr. KAGAN. Well, you would partner with them, and that would mean that you would use them to plan operations together. They would conduct operations together, but they would not necessarily always be in the lead. There would be some circumstances where American forces might be in the lead in the planning.

Mr. MARSHALL. And the reason why the American forces would take the lead is because the planning is too difficult for them to figure out; or do you really have in mind that there is a tough target

that is well-defined, that a truly talented, capable, conventional force needs to hit?

Dr. KAGAN. There will be circumstances in both natures. But also I am concerned about the number of Iraqi forces showing up, and we wanted to design a plan that would be able to succeed even if the Iraqis did not show up in the numbers that we hoped that they would.

Mr. MARSHALL. You contend that we are heading in the wrong direction by focusing upon trying to get Iraqis in the lead, training Iraqis, trying to push them out front, embedding with them, that sort of thing, and that, in fact, what we should do is change the nature of this and say, "Look, we the United States, the coalition forces, are going to provide security for that country," and at the time you said that, you said there are examples in history where that has been done by an army constrained by our rules, with an indigenous population where we largely do not speak the language and cannot even drink the water.

Could you give me the examples where that has been accomplished?

Dr. KAGAN. Certainly, Congressman. We did that in Tall Afar in September 2005 with a great deal of success.

Mr. MARSHALL. So Tall Afar is what you are relying upon?

Dr. KAGAN. Yes. We have also been undertaking similar operations in Ramadi. We undertook similar operations in Baghdad itself, and Sadr City in 2004.

Mr. MARSHALL. Now, Ramadi, I was just there over Christmas. The brigade that is principally responsible now for tackling Ramadi has lost 75. As of Christmas, it had lost 75 soldiers. It had over 500 wounded. And yet the brigade was quite optimistic about the future, not because they felt they were capable of taking care of this situation but because the local sheiks had suddenly decided within the last couple of months to team up with the Americans. And the brigade commander said this: If you turned on the cellphone communication in Ramadi and gave me 100 Silverado pickup trucks and 1,000 weapons that I can turn over to this newly established police force—because that is how they are funneling these folks through—these guys will take care of al Qaeda in this area to provide security.

Dr. KAGAN. Congressman, when I was talking about al Qaeda, I was talking about bringing a greater degree, granted a far from perfect degree, but a greater degree of security to Ramadi. And the units that are there have been accomplishing that largely by moving in among the local population, partnered with Iraqi units, and conducting joint patrols. That has been a lot of the methodology there, and it has shown some success.

Mr. MARSHALL. I went out on patrol myself in Ramadi three years ago, and I have been following Ramadi. I have been there ten times now and focusing on Al Anbar and Ramadi, and the first optimistic news I have heard about Ramadi came from that brigade commander talking about Iraqis doing this, not American forces.

Is my time—I am sorry. My time is up.

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Davis from Virginia.

Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony today.

Dr. Perry, I noticed in your prepared testimony and in what you said, that you noted your criticism of the President's plan for Iraq and you called his approach more tactical than strategic, and that you questioned the ability of this new plan to hold the Iraqi government accountable. And I think you also warned that it would only deepen the divide within the country, if I am correct.

Is there one recommendation that either you personally or the Iraq Study Group would make; and, if so, what would it be? In other words, what is the greatest omission that you see from the President's plan? And then let me ask one other quick question so I do not run out of time.

Secretary Gates was in the other day, testifying, and he has proposed an additional 92,000 troop increase. So let us assume you were Secretary of Defense again. Would you support that 92,000 increase in troop strength?

Dr. PERRY. If I were, would I what?

Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. The 92,000 increase in troop strength; not in Iraq, but an increase in troops, period.

Dr. PERRY. The answer to your second question is yes.

As to the first question, I think the President's proposal was not likely to succeed because it puts an emphasis on American troops coming in for security rather than for strengthening the Iraqi army, which is our only long-term way, our strategic way of accomplishing the mission, and because it does not put pressure on the Iraqi government to make a political reconciliation that is absolutely necessary for stabilization in that country.

Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Let me ask you quickly—and I hate to interrupt—but how would you propose that we put that sort of pressure on the Iraqi government for political as well as for strengthening—

Dr. PERRY. The only way I know of doing that is by telling them this is going to be their problem sooner rather than later. We are going to start to move our combat patrols out of there. Again, I am not suggesting pulling American forces out of Iraq. I think we have a great stake in Iraq. I am saying we should stop the combat patrols in Iraq, turn that over to the Iraqi army, use our forces to support the Iraqi army and to help train them better.

Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Dr. Kagan, you or Dr. Korb, do you have any comments on that as well?

Dr. KAGAN. Well, I think it is very important to understand what the problem is here, and I think we are trying—we are moving dangerously in the direction of saying this is a civil war and therefore it is not our problem, and we do not have to deal with civil wars. And I would like to make a couple of points about that if I may.

The first is that we have, in fact, successfully refereed civil wars in the recent past in Bosnia and Kosovo, and the consequence of that refereeing was to keep a region, which looked for a moment as though it was going to explode, completely stable to the point where you can now go to luxurious resort hotels on the Croatian coast, which did not look like something that was going to be very likely in 1995. That is a tremendously important thing.

In other places such as Rwanda, Somalia, and Afghanistan where we said, well, we do not do civil wars and we are not going

to intervene, the consequences were wider regional problems, terrorist spin-offs and a continuing cycle of violence throughout the area.

This is a civil war. We do have to be concerned about that. But I do not think that we can simply decide that because it is a civil war, therefore our concerns should end; therefore, that is not something that we should be responsible for. On the contrary, because it is a civil war, it becomes that much more dangerous and that much more urgent that we respond to it effectively.

Dr. KORB. I support the increase in the number of troops. I think that is long overdue, something we should have done right after September 11th, because we have overextended the forces now in Iraq and Afghanistan. In fact, for the President to implement his surge, he is extending the tours of people and sending units over that have not really been home in as much as a year.

I agree with Dr. Perry that basically we have got to give them an incentive to make these political compromises. Yes, it is true that we went to Bosnia, but before we went there we had the Dayton Peace Conference, in fact, where we got the parties together to come up with a framework. And in my prepared testimony, I recommended that part of what we should do is get these people together in a Dayton-style conference to begin to iron out their difficulties, because that is the first step.

The difference between a civil war—the key about a civil war as opposed to al Qaeda is when we say this is the central front in the war on terror, that is al Qaeda; it is not a civil war. And that is where I think you have to be very careful about what you are talking about.

The congressional resolution authorized us to go in and get rid of Saddam Hussein and see if there are weapons of mass destruction. It had nothing to do with settling the 1,000-year conflict between the Sunnis and Shi'as.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Udall, please.

Mr. UDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I want to commend you for holding what I think is the first discussion—if not, it is certainly one of the first discussions—that considers all of the alternatives that are in front of us in this region of the world. And I think all of us who sit up here on the dais do so today in the interest of, frankly, not having a conversation about losing or failing or winning, but how do we regain our strength and our status and apply our leverage not only in this part of the world but in other parts of the world. And I want to thank everybody involved today. I think we have set aside most of the sound bites, and we are attempting to have a very substantive discussion.

I think Congressman Cooper pointed out we have three very viable alternatives worth discussing here today, and I have associated myself more with the Iraq Study Group's recommendations than Dr. Korb's. But in the interest, Dr. Kagan, of giving you full hearing today, there is a school of thought—and picking up on Dr. Snyder's earlier devil's advocate point of view—that what President Bush has proposed could succeed militarily, but it actually puts us further behind the eight ball politically because it would embolden the Shiite majority. Because we, I think advertently and inadvert-

ently, cannot help but pressure the Sunnis increasingly in the plan that is in front of us and that therefore provides the Shi'a with less reason to amend the constitution to bring the Sunnis into the government, and we actually, in fact, could push the country closer to civil war and, in the process, push the Sunni into the arms of al Qaeda.

Would you care to comment, Dr. Kagan?

Dr. KAGAN. Well, yes. I do not think that that is true. I think we have already seen—we have been pressing consistently on the Sunni insurgency. I think we have not been doing it effectively enough. I think it is very important to point out that the purpose of the operation that we propose in our report is not to press on the Sunni community but to bring security to Sunni and mixed Sunni-Shi'a neighborhoods in Baghdad. This is not a program of going after the Sunnis. This is a program of ending the violence in the neighborhoods that are suffering most from it right now, and I think that that is a very different thing.

And I also think that the reconstruction element of the plan, which we try to highlight in our report, is extremely important because it would have us bring significant reconstruction efforts into Sunni neighborhoods to emphasize that this is not, in fact, an assault on the Sunni population, but an effort to bring them security and to improve their quality of life.

So, no; on the contrary, I think it will help in the process of bringing the Sunni back into the process, and I think we have seen that already in Al Anbar where we have been consistently pressing on the Sunni insurgency, and we are seeing the movement of some Sunni sheiks to attempt to renegotiate and to reengage.

Mr. UDALL. I think it strikes many of us here on the committee that it is a little too late and too little when we hear about reconstruction efforts and job creation because, for the last three years we have heard that those efforts were underway and yet they have borne no fruit. That is an editorial comment from me, obviously.

If I might, I would like to direct a question to the entire panel.

Experts suggest that we do not have one war, one conflict in Iraq; we maybe have as many as five. And although we hear about the counterinsurgency doctrine being better understood and applied—and incidentally, I think we have to do more of that in a broad-based way. And if I were to hold this Administration responsible in that regard, it would be that I do not think the American people fully understand the nature of the global counterinsurgency that we have to muster, which I think is a better way to characterize what we face instead of the Global War on Terror, but that is another conversation.

The counterinsurgency doctrine, Dr. Kagan, that you suggest will work in a counterinsurgency setting; but we have a civil war, and I am not convinced that a counterinsurgency doctrine works in the context of a civil war. And I would be interested if the panel would respond, all three of you.

Dr. KAGAN. Well, it seems to me that the first premise of the counterinsurgency that I am focusing on is the question of establishing security for the population. I think that applies to counterinsurgency. I think that applies to peacekeeping operations. I think that applies to ending civil wars. It is the approach that



we used in Bosnia. You cannot use a Dayton approach here because you do not have a Sunni leadership that is sufficiently coalesced that you can negotiate an accord with it in the same way. That is something that we have to make possible.

But what is very clear to me, not only from a counterinsurgency but also from a variety of civil war lessons in the past 15 years, is that as long as violence persists at a very high level, there simply is little to no prospect of serious political accommodation that can be long-lasting. This is the basis of my disagreement with Dr. Korb and possibly with Dr. Perry.

The question is, what order do you have to do things in? And my considered opinion, based on the examples that I have looked at, is you first have to establish a basic level of security. They think you first have to use a political process. That is the basis of our disagreement.

Mr. UDALL. Dr. Korb, would you comment, please?

Dr. KORB. I think you are quite right. There is not just one conflict going on, but we focused—the President focused in his remarks on al Qaeda. You have got violence between different Shi'a groups. You have got Arabs versus Kurds. There is no unity among all of the Sunni groups, so you have got several conflicts going on there at once, and I think it is important to keep that in mind.

The next is our goal is not to, quote/unquote, win the war in Iraq, whatever that means. Our goal is to prevail in the struggle against the violent extremists. And I think at the end of the day, you have to sit down and say, “Our trying to solve the problems between the Sunnis and the Shi'as, is that helping us prevail against these people or is it creating more enemies?”

The British Ambassador to Italy, shortly after we invaded Iraq, said that that was the best recruiting tool that al Qaeda has, was our going in there. And there is no doubt about people getting training there and applying it in Afghanistan, if you look at the number of similar tactics that are being used there.

So I think you have to take a look at it in that sense, and that is why I recommend setting a date certain, keeping your troops in the region to prevent anything that would harm our interests. And while a civil war between the groups would certainly not be something we would like, there are civil wars going on all over the world, and I think what we have to keep in mind is that that is something the international community should be concerned about, something we should try and do something about, whether it is Darfur, for example, or if it should break out when we leave Iraq. But our interest is to make sure it does not become another haven for al Qaeda, and it is also in the interest of the countries in the region that it does not become a failed state, because if nothing else, there will be millions of refugees that they will have to deal with. And I do think you can work those with all of the countries, and as the Iraq Study Group mentioned, you have got to get Iran involved. They were helpful to us in Afghanistan, and they have been helpful in the initial phases in our invasion of Iraq.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me remind the members of the committee that because we did not reach the members in the front row when Secretary Gates testified before, we will begin with the front row

when Secretary Gates does return in several days, just in case you lose heart today.

The gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Akin.

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. A couple of quick questions and maybe a thought or two.

First of all, Dr. Kagan, you said that right off the bat we had made a big mistake, and that was that we did not create stability, social stability, to start building on. At the time I was over there, I thought that was the main objective of our troops was to try to create stability and a working environment where we could get civic works and things done. How do I misunderstand what you are saying, first of all?

Dr. KAGAN. Congressman, to my knowledge or to the knowledge of the various military officials that I have spoken and consulted with, it has never been the primary objective of the American military forces in Iraq to establish or maintain civil order in that country. It has always been our purpose to train an Iraqi force to do that and to put that Iraqi force in the lead in accomplishing that mission. And we have been extremely reluctant to undertake that mission overall in Iraq for all of the reasons that General Casey has given, which I believe are worthy of consideration, but which I think are not sufficient to overcome the urgent need to provide security for the Iraqi population.

Mr. AKIN. It is just a different way of looking at it. It seems to me that we were trying to provide the social order until we had the people trained. At least that was my understanding.

Now, second of all, if I were one of the terrorists over there, al Qaeda, the first thing I would consider doing would be to start a civil war. What a simple thing. You just go in and make it look like somebody did it. You get everybody stirred up, and it makes it ten times harder for the Americans. Can't we assume that that is something—that they are going to create civil war and take advantage of that situation? Is that not something we should assume they are going to do?

Anybody who wants to answer that.

Dr. KAGAN. Well, Congressman, that is exactly what happened. Zarqawi told us, he told the world, that his objective was to create civil war in Iraq. He was going to do that by establishing the Shi'a. He believed that it would benefit the Sunni population, his part of the Sunni population, for a civil war to occur because he thought he could use it as a tool to mobilize the Sunni population.

Mr. AKIN. Okay. So let us agree that is what has been happening. Now, the anecdotal stories that I hear from my son, who is at Camp Lejeune and who is now on his way over to Iraq with the Marines—in the stories of our training the Iraqi troops, it seems like to me, is that we are starting in that training process with all of the rules against us.

First of all, their enlistments are so short. They go home every weekend. The first thing they described was we gave them cold weather clothing. They take them home and sell them on the black market, and then they come back and complain they are cold at night. They will work fine as long as they are in a place where nobody is shooting anything, but if we send them to where there is some action, then three-quarters of them do not show up for work.

And then some of their social habits are indescribable in public, but there are some technologies, very basic technologies used in bathrooms, that they do not seem to understand, and they will not clean up after themselves, and just the overall sense of people in a military unit.

It just seems like we do not have the discipline to train people who can really do a tough mission. Does anybody want to comment on that?

Dr. KORB. Well, as somebody said, they have the real all-volunteer military. You can volunteer in, and you can volunteer out anytime that you want—

Mr. AKIN. Anytime you want.

Dr. KORB [continuing]. And I think that that is the point I was trying to make. It is motivation for those people, and they are not motivated because there is not an Iraqi nation, that Congressman Jones was referring to before, that they all feel devoted to and want to sacrifice their lives for.

Dr. KAGAN. Congressman, I would like to take issue with the portrayal of these Iraqi security forces and people who simply do not show up when people are shooting at them.

I have heard the briefings, heard the reports from the commander of the operation in Tall Afar, read Bing West's magnificent book about his own experiences in Fallujah. And it is absolutely not the case that Iraqis are unwilling to risk their lives, and they are perfectly capable of fighting ferociously against great odds in a number of circumstances. And I think that Dr. Korb has this thing turned on its head.

They do go home every month, and they come back every month. The enormous majority of them come back every month. They are continuing to re-up on a continual basis, even as the security situation is deteriorating, even as their families are threatened because they are part of the Iraqi security forces, even if they are asked to do more and more dangerous things.

Mr. AKIN. I guess the point that I was hearing was—and there may be—I do not deny that there are probably some people who are like that.

My question is do we have the rules set up for when somebody volunteers, that we can hold their feet to the fire; that if you are really going to be in this thing, now you are going to have to do these various things? And my sense was, at least in the case of many of them, we did not have that rule set up ahead of time that this is an army, and it is going to be run like an army.

Dr. KORB. The majority of units are no more than 50-percent manning at any one time, and that is why when they tried to get six battalions to go into Baghdad, only two came.

Mr. AKIN. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Courtney, please.

Mr. COURTNEY. Mr. Chairman, I pass right now.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Courtney passes.

Mr. LOEBSACK.

Mr. LOEBSACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thanks to the three of you for coming and testifying today. I appreciate your testimony and the different points of view expressed today as well.

But I do want to state—I was unable to do so at the last meeting, I had to leave early—the people of Iowa I have had the honor and the privilege and the responsibility to represent in the short time that I have been here in Congress and on this committee, have truly grave reservations about what is happening in Iraq, as I think the majority of the American people do at this time. Many of us have been opposed to what we consider, quite frankly, a misadventure from the start, and we grow wearier of the Administration's lack of a coherent plan as each day passes.

And I just want to state for the record that Iowa has carried a very heavy burden in this war. We have one of the highest per capita rates, death rates, of any state. And we had a young soldier from Ottumwa killed just in the past couple of weeks, as well, in my district. The policies have placed tremendous strains, then, on families and friends in Iowa, as has been the case across the country. And with that in mind, many of us have stated that we are not in favor of a continued presence here in Iraq on the part of the United States. And I will go one step further than Dr. Korb has, and I would make the argument that we should be gone within the next year. With all of that in mind, I do have a couple of questions, a couple of points, I guess, for Dr. Kagan.

You mentioned that you do not want to see a failed state. I do not think anybody wants to see a failed state in Iraq. Clearly, stakes are high, there is no doubt about it. But if you could, sort of lay out what a “failed state” is for you, because we have talked a little bit about what it might mean—refugees falling across borders, what have you. Is this simply a power vacuum or is it something more than that?

And also I guess I wanted to just make a comment about your mention of Bosnia, and you can correct me if I am wrong. We will have to maybe have a dispute about Bosnia as a relevant comparison to Iraq, because I believe that the Dayton Accords took place with respect to Bosnia at a time when there really was already pretty much an equilibrium reached among the three parties in that civil war, because that did not happen until 1995. That war had been going on for quite some time, and there had been Croats killing Bosnians and Bosnians killing Serbs and Serbs killing both, and what have you. And as far as the territory was concerned and who was controlling what, it was pretty much stabilized, if I remember correctly, by the time the Dayton Accords were actually agreed to. Maybe I am overstating the case a little bit.

So I do not think the comparison between Bosnia and Iraq is entirely apt in this case. We may have to disagree about that, but talk about what it means to have a failed state in Iraq and if it is simply a power vacuum—and it may be more than that—but your concern about al Qaeda falling into the power vacuum. Address, if you would, what Dr. Korb has said, for example, about only two to four percent of the problems in Iraq are al Qaeda. And if the sheiks, in fact, in Ramadi are cooperating with us—they have finally decided that al Qaeda is their enemy, and the Shi'a are not likely to support al Qaeda either—what is the concern in that sense?

Dr. KAGAN. Congressman, I have never said that I think the major reason—or I have not said in recent months that I think the

major reason to be concerned about Iraq is because of al Qaeda. And I think that Dr. Korb is narrowing our interests in the region too tightly to say, if this is not directly a fight about the Global War on Terror, then we do not have interests here.

I think it is demonstrably not the case that American interests around the world are confined strictly to whether or not something is directly related to the Global War on Terror.

A "failed state" for me in Iraq is not simply a power vacuum. I think that we have seen the emergence of sectarian war mobilization going on at a very primitive level right now. I think that if we pull out now, what you will see is the collapse of the Iraqi government, the collapse of the Iraqi armed forces, the dramatic strengthening of the militias on both sides, sectarian cleansing on a vast scale, and efforts at genocide, which I really believe will occur, refugee flows across borders which will have the effect of destabilizing neighboring states.

Remember that even Saudi Arabia has a significant Shiite minority. There are already about 900,000 Iraqi refugees in Jordan. All of that will intensify. And what I fear is that you will find that the neighboring states will begin to intervene militarily in the Iraqi cauldron out of sheer self-defense, in addition to self-interest, and I fear that you can readily get to a regional conflict which we would not be able to watch with equanimity. There certainly are civil wars around the world, and some of them we do not intervene in, but I find it very hard to imagine how we could say that we can watch, you know, with unconcern a civil war in the Middle East.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Forbes.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, gentlemen, for being here this afternoon and for your expertise and knowledge.

After listening to your testimony, it is clear to me that each of you has valid points, and it would be difficult to concur with any position that would say that if someone did not agree with everything you said, they would be totally wrong. We are kind of like the President; we have to extract the most valid points from each of you to help formulate a plan. Now, I am going to try to be precise in the four and a half minutes or so I have left, and I hope that you can in your answers.

Dr. Perry, I want to ask you, did you concur with the Iraq Study Group report's conclusion that said that a premature withdrawal of troops would lead to, one, greater human suffering, two, regional destabilization, three, the threat to global economy, and four, it could eventually lead to the U.S. having to return to Iraq?

Dr. PERRY. Yes, I concur with that conclusion and all other conclusions and recommendations of the report. I signed off on the report entirely.

Mr. FORBES. But that part of it you did agree with, and based on your testimony today and what you said the generals told you when you were in Iraq about additional troop levels in Baghdad to try to stabilize Baghdad, you really do not oppose the need for more security forces in Baghdad to stabilize the violence. You were just concerned that additional U.S. forces could delay Iraqi forces from taking charge. Is that a fair statement?

Dr. PERRY. That, and I want the role of the U.S. forces to be strengthening the Iraqi forces rather than going out on street patrols.

Mr. FORBES. Good.

Dr. Korb, as to Iraq itself, geographically Iraq itself, there really is not any difference between redeploying and withdrawing troops. We are talking about taking troops out of Iraq, and it is just the semantics of where you put them after you pull them out of Iraq.

Is that a fair statement?

Dr. KORB. Well, I am using the same word that President Reagan used when I worked with him when we left Lebanon—

Mr. FORBES. I am just asking you whether—

Dr. KORB [continuing]. Because you are staying in the region, and you are putting—you are not leaving the region.

Mr. FORBES. But you are taking troops out of Iraq, fair?

Dr. KORB. Correct.

Mr. FORBES. And you would concur with the fact that your recommendation, whether you call it withdrawing or redeploying troops, would be in opposition to what the study group recommended, would it not?

Dr. KORB. That is correct.

Mr. FORBES. Dr. Kagan, I am going to ask you two questions. You indicated that failure in Iraq could have a tremendous negative impact, I believe, on the surrounding countries. And I am not going to ask you to describe all of them, but could you tell me in a nutshell the negative impact you think could occur in Saudi Arabia if we fail in Iraq and what, if any, impacts that could have on world oil supplies?

And second—and this is something maybe you could submit to us later—could you supply to us at some point in time the matrix of how you come up with the number of troops—the total troop forces we need in Baghdad, but for today's testimony, the Saudi Arabia portion?

Dr. KAGAN. Yes, Congressman, I can, although we described that process in detail in our report, and I can certainly highlight those sections to you, and I would be happy to explain more fully.

I do believe that what you will see is refugee flows pushing toward Saudi Arabia and also a tremendous amount of pressure within Saudi Arabia to support the Sunni population in Iraq as it comes under increasing attack by mobilized Shi'a groups. I think this can all have the effect of destabilizing the Saudi government, which is none too stable to begin with. And obviously it goes without saying that destabilization of the Saudi government or the collapse of the Saudi government would have a dramatic effect on world oil supplies simply because of the proportion of those supplies that come from Saudi Arabia. I think you can also see a radicalization of Saudi Arabia even beyond its current stage if this actually does become a full-scale regional Sunni-Shi'a conflict. There is already, as we know, significant pressure in that direction within Saudi Arabia, and I think you would find that intensified, the broader that conflict becomes.

Mr. FORBES. If I could address the troop levels for just one moment, I know we have heard the numbers 20,000, 25,000, 30,000. Can you tell me, based on your analysis, the total troop levels,

whether it is Iraqi, U.S. troops, or even police forces, that you believe you would need, based on the population currently in Baghdad, to stabilize Baghdad itself, total forces?

Dr. KAGAN. To stabilize the entire city?

Mr. FORBES. The entire city.

Dr. KAGAN. Well, based on historical forums, you would need a total of about 120,000 troops to stabilize a population of 6 million. We proposed a plan that does it in phases which we think is appropriate based not only on what forces we can make available but even more on the political situation in Baghdad and the country.

Mr. FORBES. After the President's plan, can you tell me the total number of forces that you believe would be in Baghdad?

Dr. KAGAN. According to the President's plan, he is going to be adding—if they add all five brigades, as the President has said they will, that would be approximately 25,000 additional forces to the 25,000 that are already there, which would be 25,000 American combat forces—I am sorry—50,000 American combat forces immediately in the city, supported by Iraqi forces, Iraqi police, several tens of thousands. It is very hard to know the precise number.

Mr. FORBES. General Pace—

Mr. ANDREWS [presiding]. The gentleman's time has expired. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Sestak.

Mr. SESTAK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Doctors, thanks for your time today. I had one quick question, hopefully for each.

First, Dr. Kagan, in your executive summary that you provided to us, you said that the political process has failed, and then you turned to the military. It is a military that some have said have been strained almost to the breaking point, and you said that what needs to be accepted is that there be increased, longer deployments for the active forces and more deployment for the National Guard and reserve. You say that the replacement equipment for our troops over there, of which 40 percent of our equipment in the Army is already there, needs to be made up by taking the equipment away from our active forces here at home that are not deployed at the moment, as well as the guard and reserve forces that are here at home not presently deployed. You then say the military industry needs to gear up urgently and replace all of that equipment and that we need to increase our reconstruction fund at the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).

My understanding is we have got \$100 billion sitting over in the OMB to come over here in addition to \$70 billion already paid this year, so that the cost of Iraq will almost double, not quite, from \$8 billion a month to \$14 billion a month.

General Pace was over here, and there are generals who are asking for more troops in Afghanistan, and when asked about are we still able to meet what we did a few years ago—have an Army, a military, that could deploy nearly simultaneously to two major conflicts—the general said we could. It would not be pretty. He also expressed concerns about Chad and many, many other issues around the world.

At what point do you step back, as you all talk strategically and tactically, and place Iraq in the overarching strategic security global environment of which America is concerned and say, “When does

it cost too much for Iraq?" Our overall strategic benefit, if China emerges and others—is it is about time that we pay attention and invest elsewhere in our security interests, more along the lines of where Dr. Korb is.

Dr. KAGAN. Congressman, I think it is a good question, and I think it is something that I have considered and what we have considered in the process of the report.

What we are talking about is the prospect, in my view, of imminent defeat in Iraq if we do not take dramatic action to reverse the situation along the lines of what we are proposing, or the possibility that other scenarios will arise elsewhere that will require more forces that we may or may not have available. So it is not simply a question of an equal play here that, you know, things might go bad in Iraq or they might go bad elsewhere, and we have to hedge.

We have in mind for you a very high likelihood that things will go very, very badly indeed in Iraq, that will cost our national security enormous amounts, both in terms of money and in terms of troops in subsequent deployments and subsequent threats to our security against contingencies that might arise elsewhere. And I would submit that you can go too far.

You can go just as wrong in making the mistake of not committing to the war that you are actually fighting at the moment, and losing, in the name of remaining prepared for contingencies that might or might not materialize as you can in focusing so much on the war that you failed to match those contingencies.

Now, I fully support the recommendation for increasing the size of the ground forces. I have been pressing that since 1997. And I think, honestly, the Administration does not go far enough. But I do think that winning this war, or at least not losing it at this moment, that there is no greater task that we have right now.

Mr. SESTAK. Thank you. I gather it is a matter of judgment. I think we have gone beyond that point.

Dr. Perry, I had the honor of working for you way down in the bowels at the Pentagon, in the basement, when you were Secretary of Defense. I was one—as the old saying goes, one of those 20,000 ants that are in a log in the Department of Defense, going down this river, and each of them are thinking they are controlling the Pentagon, but at all times we knew it was you, and it is a real honor to ask you a question, sir.

Sir, the pressure you talked about placing on Iraq, the incentives to be placed upon them, positive and negative, so that eventually they kind of accept that they must do this reconciliation program, when is it that you personally would say that incentive, that pressure, becomes a date certain? I know you did not—the Iraqi survey group is not there, but when is it for you to say would that day come?

Dr. PERRY. I have a hard time putting a date on that, but I would say if they have not really produced something by midyear, I would think we have failed in our pressure.

Mr. SESTAK. Thank you.

Dr. Korb, if I could ask you—

Mr. ANDREWS. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. SESTAK. Thank you very much.

Mr. ANDREWS. The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Miller.



Mr. MILLER OF FLORIDA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Perry, thank you for your long service both in and out of public service and, reading from your bio, all the way back to occupied Japan. And I will say that during your various services under Democrat Administrations, especially under the Clinton Administration as Secretary of Defense, what was your perception during that time with a Republican-controlled Congress and a Democratic Administration where Congress began to meddle, if you will, or put congressional prohibitions on the commander in chief's ability to deploy forces as he would wish to do so?

Dr. PERRY. I like that question, Mr. Miller.

I can answer quite honestly that, as the Secretary of Defense, I found the pressure from Congress, particularly from a Congress controlled by the opposite party, to be very difficult. It made my job very, very difficult. But as I look thoughtfully at it, I would say our Administration benefited by the very tough pushback that we got from Congress on everything we did. It made us work doubly hard to be sure that what we were doing could stand up under scrutiny.

I think that Congress' role of oversight and really tough oversight is a very important role, and I say that even from somebody who has suffered from it when I was in the Administration.

Mr. MILLER OF FLORIDA. In 1996 you recommended that the President veto the defense authorization bill because it included several billion dollars of additional spending, and also there were contingency plans that were affected by what Congress wanted to do at that time.

Would you recommend a veto if you were in the same position today, if Congress recommended doing something that the President is entitled to do by the Constitution?

Dr. PERRY. I would have to consider in a very special case specifically what the issue was, but I do think that even in the case where the Administration is recommending a veto, they are influenced by the action of the Congress, even if they successfully veto it. They do. The Congress does have a profound influence on the Administration's action, and I would encourage the Congress to exercise that role.

Mr. MILLER OF FLORIDA. But you did not like the Congress' exercise.

Dr. PERRY. Of course I did not like it. It was a pain in the neck, but it made me a better Secretary.

Mr. MILLER OF FLORIDA. Dr. Korb, if I understood you correctly, you said something about a certification—let's see if I wrote it. It says you believe some type of certification is required to ensure that operations in Iraq do not detract from the Global War on Terror. I guess my question is how would anyone certify what you are proposing, and what exactly does the certification mean?

Dr. KORB. Well, this was in the resolution that Congress passed in 2002, and I think what the President would have to say is, "Is our being in Iraq creating more members of al Qaeda or is it not? Is it drawing our Army down so much and our ground forces down so much that they cannot do the things that they need to do? What is it doing to the war of ideas that we are waging with people who might be attracted to violent extremists like al Qaeda?"

Those are the things that I think the President should certify. And after all of that, I go back and read that that was the intent of Congress, because many in Congress were concerned that Iraq was not the central front in the war on terror, that it was a diversion from dealing with groups that caused the problems that led to 9/11.

Mr. MILLER OF FLORIDA. Dr. Kagan, with the polls against the war in Iraq and the surge in Iraq and the media certainly fanning those flames, if you will, do you think the insurgents expected President Bush to go counter to what the polls showed and actually talk about a surge?

Dr. KAGAN. Congressman, I do not, and I believe—I actually disagree also—I am glad you brought this up so I can say that I disagree with my colleague's view that the Iraqis think we are going to be there forever.

I think, on the contrary, most Iraqis have looked at us as having one foot out the door and ready to go at a moment's notice, and I think you have already seen some of the dominant games, beginning within the Shi'a community, about who is going to run the post-U.S. Iraq, which they think is coming very imminently.

I do not think that anyone over there expected us to reaffirm our commitment or recommit the necessary troops to succeed. I believe the insurgents will be surprised and dismayed, and I think that it will change the Iraqi political situation fundamentally and in a very positive direction.

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you. Gentlemen, your time has expired.

The gentlewoman from Florida, Ms. Castor, is recognized.

Ms. CASTOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all for your expert testimony today.

At the outset of President Bush's war in Iraq, he proclaimed that he would assemble a large coalition force from other countries and that he would ask other countries throughout the world to carry part of the load. And here we are, almost 4 years later, over 3,000 American deaths, and the burden remains primarily on young Americans and National Guard and reserve troops. American taxpayers have now been asked to pay almost \$400 billion to support President Bush's effort.

The Iraq Study Group explained in the report that most countries in the region are not playing a constructive role at all, and last week, when I listened to President Bush's speech, he did not mention any other nation or even that he would ask any other country to assist in the escalation of forces or in a supporting role, and he continues to resist any diplomatic or political effort.

How do you explain this resistance to political and diplomatic efforts, and do you view it as another one of these strategic errors that you mentioned early on in your testimony?

Dr. PERRY. I do view it as a strategic error from the beginning and an error which has been sustained through the years.

We have a coalition in Iraq, but the United States comprises almost 90 percent of those coalition forces, both in numbers and in casualties, so it is not an adequate coalition, in my mind. At this date, I think it is unrealistic to expect we are going to get other nations to provide troops to Iraq. The allies who are there now are moving in the other direction. They are planning to leave. What we

can reasonably expect, though, from the regional powers is economic and political assistance and assistance in training Iraqi forces. Those things we have every right to expect and I think we have the leverage to try to get.

Ms. CASTOR. Dr. Korb.

Dr. KORB. The person I think who sums up what you are trying to say best is Dr. Francis Fukuyama from Johns Hopkins, one of the original supporters of the war. And he said, if you had told the American people in early 2003 that the United States would go to war in Iraq—over 3,000 dead, 23,000, 24,000 wounded, spend \$400 billion to \$500 billion so Iraq could have an election—and these are Dr. Fukuyama's words—you would have been laughed out of the ball park. Americans supported the war for reasons that turned out not to be true. They were also told there would be a multilateral effort. That is why they used the term "coalition" all the time.

I think what was most interesting is, after President Bush's speech announcing that we were going to send more troops, our British allies said they are going to continue to cut down the number of their troops. And that is why I think, as I mentioned in my testimony, it is so important to get the countries in the region involved, because it is not just our problem to the extent that it is also their problem; and if they do not work constructively on it, they are also going to have to live with the consequences.

Ms. CASTOR. Dr. Kagan.

Dr. KAGAN. Congresswoman, I think that it would be both right and desirable for the Administration to make a significant effort to engage our regional allies and our worldwide allies in assisting us with this project. I think we have received some assistance. I think that we have not received as much as we might like. I think it is very important to keep in mind the British are drawing down—excuse me—because the British Army is significantly more restrained than ours is. There are very few armies in the world, actually, that are capable of sending significant forces to Iraq. Let me say very few armies, I believe, would actually want to have sent forces to Iraq. And so from that perspective, we are suffering from the fact that the west has generally disarmed itself and has not begun to rearm in the face of a new challenge.

I do think that it is reasonable to expect that assistance from our allies and states around the world and stability in the Middle East to help sustain this effort economically, and I would like to see the Administration make the renewed effort to help to achieve that kind of support.

Ms. CASTOR. Dr. Kagan, I have a few other things. How do you explain the resistance, though, of the Bush Administration and to President Bush even speaking out and mentioning it during a speech when we all expected him to announce some change of course in Iraq, and included in that change, of course, some diplomatic outreach?

Mr. ANDREWS. The gentlewoman's time has expired. You may briefly answer the question.

Dr. KAGAN. Thank you.

I have been a consistent critic of the way the Bush Administration has fought this war in a variety of ways, and so it is not for

me, I think, to try to explain why the President has made one decision or the other.

Mr. ANDREWS. The gentleman from Minnesota, Mr. Kline.

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, gentlemen, for being here.

Just in the couple of moments before we dropped the gavel and started the hearing, I was thinking to myself and mentioned to you what an extraordinary group of intellectuals and intelligent Ph.Ds, if nothing else, we have got accumulated here. And it is interesting that the three of you, with your experience and your education and your attention to this issue, you disagree. All three of you have different ideas. And we 535 Members of Congress, many of us are going to have different ideas as well.

And I think it was the gentleman from Tennessee Mr. Cooper who said that we, for better or for worse, that we have one commander in chief, and the first person in charge of fighting the war, and considering how hard it is to get a consensus, it is probably not a bad thing.

A couple of comments, because I didn't imagine fighting the war by a 535-person committee. It is not going to work.

Dr. Korb, just a comment. I think you said that in quoting or observing the comments of a British diplomat and Italian, the best recruiting tool that al Qaeda had was our going into Iraq. I would submit that probably the best recruiting tool now would be American defeat in Iraq. If you are really going to recruit large numbers of jihadists, do you think that is possibly correct?

Dr. KORB. No, I don't, because I think what would happen when we leave Iraq is al Qaeda will still be there, and they can't win either.

Mr. KLINE. You don't think there would be celebrating in the streets, gunfire and so forth?

Dr. KORB. No.

Mr. KLINE. You and I disagree about that as well.

Dr. Kagan, you talk about the importance of the new military commander coming into Iraq, and we have an entire new team, don't we, defense team coming in. I think that I was told by General Pace that General Casey did ask for more troops, and in an earlier discussion with you I know that General Casey was involved in this planning, but it is General Petraeus. He is the man who is going to have to execute this, and General Odierno, because we have a new team over there. If we are going to have a new way of doing business, we probably need some new leadership. Looks like we are doing that.

You have been critical of the Administration and—as am I in talking about the tactics that we are going to use. It is sort of a three up and one back, and, you know, this many on this side of the river and that many on this side of the river. And I think that is a mistake in trying to be too detailed in those tactics.

Having said that, could you talk a little bit about the tactics that are involved in your approach here? I know, for example, that you wanted to do this sequentially, perhaps putting Sadr City off. Can you talk about that? We only have a couple of minutes. Talk to us about that.

Dr. KAGAN. I am very reluctant to have us taking on Sadr City as the first order because I think it is impossible to keep the two

major Shi'a blocs, which is to say the Jaish al-Mahdi Army and the Badr Corps, separated as they are now separated as rivals for control of a post-U.S. Iraq. I think if we actually invaded Sadr City in the Fallujah-type way right now, we would clear it out, but we would probably unite them.

Instead, I would propose to focus on the Sunni-Shi'a neighborhoods and hold them with U.S. forces, partner with Iraqi forces if possible and literally sweeping through the entire neighborhood going house to house as we have done before. The difference would be sustaining the hold more than the few weeks that have been customary in past such operations.

Mr. KLINE. Let me interrupt. I wish we had ten minutes for each of you with these things, but I know the guy sitting up there now, he has got his finger on that red button.

Just very quickly, if you were to employ the sort of approach that you had put forward, you wouldn't have an equal distribution of Iraqi and U.S. troops, and by the way, the Iraqi troops, in accord with the Iraq Study Group, are now going to have embedded U.S. troops down to the company level. So you are going to have U.S. troops involved in this even with the Iraqi lead, per the Iraq Study Group, but that would change that number mix, wouldn't it, of the number of troops, in response to, I think, the gentlewoman's question earlier about how many troops it would take. Can you do that in about the 10 seconds that are left?

Dr. KAGAN. Certainly. We would not have equal numbers because some districts are more important than others, and some are more dangerous. We use metrics sort of coming up with an average based on what we thought on a hard district was. But you certainly would not have a common mix because you don't face a common challenge, and you would identify the critical terrain in Baghdad that it is most important to secure first and your efforts in having force ratios there. And once you have established the clear there, then you would move on to other areas.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. The gentlelady from Arizona, Ms. Giffords.

Ms. GIFFORDS. Thank you, gentlemen, for being here.

As a new Member of Congress, I listened very clearly to what President Bush had to say last week, and we heard both from Secretary Gates and General Pace. This morning Madeleine Albright came to testify in our Foreign Affairs Committee, and, again, as a new member listening to both sides of the aisle, the really good questions that have been asked, it has been pretty enlightening, and for me personally this plan the President has put forth is not enough, and in the words of the chairman himself, it is too little too late.

I would like the three of you to address what I heard is a real absence in force in the terms of ministries that exist in Iraq. Madeleine Albright talked about a surge in—not in troops, but diplomacy. But if the three of you would address whether or not we could or should bring in first other countries to help with the rebuilding process in terms of banking, health and human services, in terms of the environment, in terms of commerce, and whether or not it is fair that the Pentagon be shouldering the breadth of this rebuilding effort. Other departments here in the United States,

other countries do step forward not in troop numbers, but in other areas to help rebuild.

Dr. PERRY. I think it is a very good point. As I commented earlier, I do not think it is reasonable to expect these regional powers to provide troops in Iraq at this stage. I do think it is quite reasonable to ask them to do the things you have described. They can provide economic assistance, they can provide training assistance, they can provide political assistance, and all of that would be enormously helpful. And I think we have the leverage to get them to do these if we use our diplomacy properly.

Dr. KAGAN. I would like to say I think it is highly desirable to bring in all of the assistance that we can, and I think we should make every effort to do that.

Ms. GIFFORDS. I think the number of questions, though, if we can't, shall we throw up our hands, or do we have to try to do the best we can with what we have.

Dr. KAGAN. If we can't get other states to step in as appropriate—and we must recognize the complexities of that because, of course, Iraq's neighbors all have interests. They are not, you know, just simple innocent bystanders. So it is appropriate to ask some of them to do some things, not other things. If we can't get them to step up, in my view, this remains a critical, vital national security interest of the United States and something that we have to do. And, likewise, if the other agencies are not, in fact, able or willing to step up, I don't think—we can talk about the unfairness of it, and it is indeed unfair and it is something we should try to address, but we—I am not prepared to say we should abandon the effort, because I think it is too important, the dangers are too high of failure to say, well, we gave it the best shot, but the other people didn't step up, so we have to walk away. I am not suggesting that you are saying anything like that. But I think it is important to keep in mind that whatever fairness dictates, there is also a reality; and we have to be prepared to deal with what are the consequences of various decisions including withdrawing or abandoning this project because we are frustrated that other people won't help us.

Dr. KORB. You don't have any good options because ignoring General Shinseki's advice, hyping the intelligence and all of those things, and so no matter what course you pick, there are going to be risks. And I think what you try and do is minimize the risk because there are no guarantees.

I think it would be good to let other agencies get involved. The problem is it is late, just like the counterinsurgency is too late. You should have done that in the beginning; you didn't. Because we are not dealing with an insurgency. Now it is more of a civil war, and as we all wish General Petraeus a lot of luck in giving him a chance to implement the next manual he put out, it is for the next war, not for this war. And, again, when it is clear that we are no longer going to stay in Iraq beyond whatever that date is, and we are not going to have any permanent bases in Iraq, the countries in the region, as well as countries in Europe, know that it becomes their problem as well as ours. Right now they are content to let us stand back and bear the burden because we are willing to. I mean,

when we said we will stand down when Iraqis stand up, that basically put no timetable on it.

As I read the President's speech, he talked about how important it was, and we couldn't fail, but then he said, "Well, our patience is not unlimited." Well, what happens if they don't do it? Is he willing to let us fail in what they think is that critical to our interests? There is that inconsistency. And that is why I think that unless you set a date, and I think, you know, 18 months would be a reasonable amount of time, you are not the—the situation is not going to get appreciably better.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Gingrey.

Dr. GINGREY. Thank you.

Dr. Korb, I want to address my question to you. You said in your testimony, you said you didn't think there were any good options. You said we ignored General Shinseki. You said what the President is planning is too little, too late. In fact, you said you weren't in favor of the plan, that you didn't think it would work.

In light of those comments and your testimony, I want to let you know that yesterday I was at Bethesda to visit a Navy corpsman, a native, a petty officer corpsman from my district in Palace Springs, Georgia, Dustin Kirby. This corpsman was shot by a sniper in the face on Christmas Day with a .30-06 type rifle, equivalent of a deer rifle. Lost half his tongue and all of his jaw. And after the President made his speech last week, his parents watched—he was in surgery for 20 hours, so he didn't get to see that speech. What he thought about the naysayers not wanting to proceed with the plan—and I want to read to you his comments and then get you to comment on it.

And this is what Dustin Kirby said: "In my opinion, sir, we have made great sacrifices. Men and women are wounded for the rest of their lives. I would like to think it was for something. That is, perspective from those on the ground, I feel we have taken one step forward, two steps back, and all of our sacrifices appear to be in vain, and that, sir, appears to be a tragedy. If you could bring everyone home and actually accomplish something, I would be all for it; but if not, let us get the job done by changing our rules of engagement. We are also restricted and our hands tied behind our backs. The argument is that the armed forces fight a war where they can't find the bad guys because they don't fight face to face the way Marines and soldiers are trained to do. But it is not my place to argue with the taxpayers of the United States Government; only follow orders given to me and react to the given situation that I've been trained to do. But as I said, I worry about my Marines, and I am not there to take care of them."

And then he went on to say that he felt the President's plan would give us at least one last chance at victory.

Now, what do you say, Doctor, to his wife Lauren, his mom Gail, his dad Jack, and his brother and sister when you talk about wanting to either withdraw or deploy? You can couch it in whatever terms you want to. But what do you say to this family when you leave them with that sacrifice on the ground?

Dr. KORB. Well, I think I say the same thing to those I served with in Vietnam. We followed our orders, and we should have been commended for our service, and I commend him for his sacrifice.

I commend him for doing what the country asked of him to do. You asked me my opinion about what is the best way to go, I can give you my opinion.

If I thought that the President's plan would lead to victory, I would support it. But I know that the President told us on October 25th of this year we were winning, no doubt about it. Then he said after the election, "Well, I only didn't mean that. I just said that for the election." I also know from the interviews that the President has given to 60 Minutes and to the News Hour basically that he knew last summer that things were not going well, and yet he waited this long to come up with a different strategy, and I would say, why did you wait so long? Was it the political process? What was the reason that you waited so long? I hope it was not.

I would also say to him that I have the greatest respect for anybody who puts the uniform of the country on like I did, because when I was growing up, I had deferments, and I won't mention the political leader who took them when I was—

Dr. GINGREY. Let me interrupt. With all due respect to this Monday-morning quarterback, and I understand that hindsight is 20/20, but at this point, don't you think, Doctor, that we ought to give these troops—that we owe them, we owe their moms and dads, those 3,000 dead and many more injured like this soldier, this corpsman, this Navy corpsman; don't you think we owe it to them to give it one last opportunity at a knock-out blow so we can put them on the ropes and get us off the ropes?

Dr. KORB. As I say, if I thought it would enhance American security, lead to less loss of American lives, I would support it. I don't. I think it is going to lead to more death, and I don't think it is going to bring us any closer to victory.

Dr. GINGREY. Sure, doctor, and of course you might be wrong. You may be right, and at that point in time, maybe this entire committee would agree with you. But I think we need to give them that one last opportunity.

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Shea-Porter.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I was a military spouse, and my husband is a Vietnam-era veteran, and I understand that young man's dilemma. However, I am not certain that the question should be phrased like that because I think it is more important to ask the people of our country is it worth it, and that is what we are doing here to try to find out. Is it worth it for other people's children to continue to die to justify somebody else's damage or death? And so I think this is—these are the questions that we need to take very seriously today.

You mention, Dr. Kagan, that this war, if we lost it, would be a world-changing event, and I would point out to you that it already is a world-changing event, and that Vietnam was a changing event also. And the argument that I am hearing now that if we don't win, we will see everything fall apart is exactly the same argument that I recall during the Vietnam era, that everything would fall apart. We would have the domino effect, that Southeast Asia would be controlled by the Soviets, that China would intervene. So I think we need to be cautious about our prediction because every prediction to date has been wrong.



I would like to say I am not certain why we have not been able to win the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people. Seventy percent of the country wants us out of there. Sixty percent say it is okay to kill an American. Now there is internal discipline and external controls, and so far all of the United States has been able to accomplish are these external controls, and I am not sure why we don't have the internal discipline there after all of the money that we have spent, after all of the efforts our brave soldiers have given.

And I would also like to take some offense saying that we never had a mission to secure Iraq, Dr. Kagan, because I think those brave soldiers worked very hard to provide security for the Iraqis. It hasn't happened, and this is a question that I would like to ask each one of you.

Is the reason we have been unable to win the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people because we are perceived as occupiers, that the mission was wrong from the beginning; and is there any chance at all that they are going to stop seeing us as occupiers and work together?

And my follow-up question is what and who is the political center for Iraq, and when do you expect them to emerge, if they emerge, to start taking control of the country from the factions?

So I would like to ask each one of you to answer that, please.

Dr. PERRY. Yes, they do see us—it is not the whole problem, but it is an important part of the problem. I think for us to have a chance for success, we have to be able to, as quickly as possible, to turn the security problem over to the Iraqis. I do not think they are ready to do that now. I think our primary role ought to be strengthening the Iraqi Army so they can take over that security function. Only when they do that, we can start to get out of there, will the image of Americans in Iraqi minds change.

Dr. KAGAN. In the first instance I would say I think Iraq—how Iraqis see us is secondary to how they see their own government. I would agree with you we have not achieved success in that measure. I am less interested in the question of how much they like us than whether they can come together to form a government that is stable. So I think we can get a little confused about what the purpose of hearts and minds actually is.

I did not mean to imply any denigration of the efforts of our fine soldiers in Iraq. What I have—what I was saying simply was they were not given the correct strategy from the outset. The strategy that they were given was train and transition and stand up and stand down. I would submit to you that is a large part of the reason why we face antipathy in Iraq.

One of the obligations of an occupying power, and we were one before the sovereign Iraqi government came into being, is to provide security for the people. If you are going to have forces in another country, there is going to be a certain amount of resentment. That can be offset if you provide the number one deliverance that those people want, and that is security. We have not been doing that because of the strategic mistake, the decision not to focus on that, and I think as we begin to turn that around and provide the number one deliverable that we can provide that justifies our continued presence in Iraq, I think you will find attitudes in Iraq turning around.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. We have seen our troops go door to door. They have gone block to block and worked their way through the neighborhoods. If they weren't trying to secure the neighborhoods, what were they doing at two and three o'clock in the morning? I believe they were trying to secure the neighborhoods for Iraq's people, but—

Dr. KAGAN. The problem is they left almost immediately thereafter in the belief we could return responsibility for maintaining Iraqi security over to Iraqi forces, who were not able to accomplish that mission.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady.

The gentleman from California is now recognized.

Mr. HUNTER. I want to apologize to our guests for having to step out for quite a while, but it has been a very instructive hearing, and I want to compliment the Chairman for putting this together.

Let me go to where I think there is—some value can be—some real value added to the mission in terms of the Baghdad operation and just get your take on this.

We are going to have nine sectors in which—in Baghdad in which each sector will have an Iraqi brigade which will be several maneuverable battalions, in some cases two or three, and they will be backed up by the embedded troops, embedded in the company level, but also by an American battalion. And the American battalion will be there to back up, to help to mentor and, as the Iraqis hit their stride that has become operationally proficient, to trade out with another Iraqi battalion.

I think that this could be a pattern, a blueprint for standing up the Iraqi military in total. And, again, if you look at the Iraqi battalions in the way they are dispersed across the country, in nine of the provinces you have less than one attack a day, relatively peaceful provinces. You had—and the number should be a little higher now—but you had, as of the last month, some 27 Iraqi battalions in these peaceful provinces.

We have been standing up the country if you—if you look at the progress maps essentially in terms of geography. That is, this area is now an area in which the Iraqi forces are now in the lead, and that implies that you have battlefield competency in the Iraqi forces that are in that area. But what it may mean, that the Iraqi forces in that particular area simply don't have any opposition. They are in an area that is relatively quiet, and it doesn't require them to be combat proficient.

And my recommendation is this: is that we use this Baghdad plan, three-to-one plan, if you will, or two-to-one plan where there is three Iraqi battalions up front doing the operation up front and American backup, and as the Iraqi battalions become operationally proficient, bringing out the American battalion or turning it over to another Iraqi battalion so that you end up with an Iraqi-controlled vital space.

Now, what that would do is develop the stand-up of the Iraqi military based not on geographical control, which it is based on now, at least apparently from the reports in the briefings that we have now received, but it would be a capability-based stand-up of the Iraqi military. That is, at the end of four or five or six months, every Iraqi battalion could be given a combat tour, an operational

tour, and I think we all agree that nothing stands up the military operationally like operations—like actually going out and working the operations, working the missions, especially when you are hooked up with a unit which has some capability.

So, for example, as you worked in combat in Baghdad, and you have three Iraqi maneuver battalions up front, you might want to trade out after several months one of the battalions and bring up a battalion from a quiet area from the north or the south. Let them operate until they have had their operational tour and then rotate them out.

What that will tell us is whether or not you have battalion commanders who will respond when they are called by the Ministry of Defense and told to saddle up, number one, whether they will come; whether they will move out, saddle up their troops, bring them into the area of operation (AO) and operate.

Number two, it gives you a chance to develop unit cohesion, to develop combat effectiveness, to develop an adherence to the chain of command, all the things that produce an efficient military.

So that is a recommendation that I have made to the Administration. I would like your take on it. Do you think that that would be a blueprint for standing up for the Iraqi forces so that regardless of the number of car bombs that are going off, and regardless of all of the externals that we have talked about, we could have at the end of four or five or six months an Iraqi military every battalion of which has some modicum of combat or operational experience? That is my question.

Dr. PERRY. First of all, I am not sure that we have enough troops in Baghdad to accomplish what you are talking about. I tend to believe the numbers of troops proposed in Dr. Kagan's report to be closer to the number needed.

But assuming that we do have enough troops, then we will be able to establish the security in the region of the problem, though that security will go away as soon as the American troops leave, unless—and this is the big unless—unless the Iraqi battalions are able to sustain that security; and that depends on their having much more proficiency and discipline and motivation than they have demonstrated in the past. The key to that, I think, is the embedding of the American troops down to the company level.

So I am sort of halfway where you are, Mr. Duncan, in that I believe that any chance to succeed does revolve around this embedding plan.

Dr. KORB. Our concern is that you mentioned, Mr. Hunter, whether they will all show up and whether they will follow orders if the orders go against their sect, because I understand these units are as—not as multiethnic as we might like. What I read in the newspaper, they are talking about bringing down Kurdish brigades; for example, how that will play if they have to go into a Sunni area.

Mr. HUNTER. Let us presume, Dr. Korb, that they do show up. I mean, we all agree if the team doesn't show up for the ballgame, you are probably not going to win it. But let us presume that they do keep their commitment and they arrive on time at the AO, so you have got a green Iraqi battalion, and you have got two experienced Iraqi battalions and an American backup battalion.

Dr. KORB. I am also concerned, as I mentioned, about the new Iraqi general that is in charge. From what I read, he is not the one that the United States would have liked to have put in charge of this operation. So I am worried about, you know, the orders that, you know, that they might give. And then even if they are—if they do show up, will they act fairly and responsibly in terms of the things that they are supposed to do? Are they—have they been infiltrated by some of the insurgents? Those are the—are they going to get the right orders from the top? Those are the things I would worry about as well.

Dr. KAGAN. I would agree with you absolutely that it is a priority in training the Iraqi army that they be brought in to conduct operations alongside of our troops rather than simply being pushed out to conduct operations on their own with or without Americans embedded in them, and I think the partnership training, the training the Iraqi forces get through partnership, is the best possible training and the fastest way to get that army stood up.

The specifics of the proposal you made I think are a little bit complicated. Some of the regions that are peaceful may be peaceful because there are Iraqi army forces there, and we want to be careful not to denude those forces where they are necessary. So that should be something that is done on a case-by-case basis.

I am also not convinced that the force ratios would work across the city. I want to make sure we maintain adequate American forces in those neighborhoods, that we would be rotating Iraqi units through so we could ensure that stability and security was maintained even if there was some sort of slips, even if some of the Iraqi units didn't show up, even if they didn't perform adequately, because I think the core responsibility in the first instance is maintaining security, and that will give us the opportunity to conduct all of the sort of training of the varieties you are discussing.

So I think that is the sine qua non, and as long as you can ensure that, then we can talk about the varieties that you are discussing.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Hunter.

The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Johnson.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Kagan, you were a supporter of this war effort from its inception; were you not?

Dr. KAGAN. I supported the invasion of Iraq, yes, I did.

Mr. JOHNSON. And we were told that there was a danger of weapons of mass destruction, and that is why we needed to go into Iraq; isn't that correct?

Dr. KAGAN. Among other things, yes, although I supported it for more complicated reasons than that.

Mr. JOHNSON. But the point is there were no weapons of mass destruction; isn't that correct?

Dr. KAGAN. Apparently not.

Mr. JOHNSON. And then the second reason is the alleged imminent danger to the U.S. from Iraq's support for terrorism. That was the other reason given for us going into Iraq in the first place; isn't that correct?

Dr. KAGAN. Yes, although, again, there are other reasons why I supported the war that were different than the ones that the Administration laid out.

Mr. JOHNSON. Bottom line, I think your testimony has been that the war in Iraq has acted as a cesspool of development for al Qaeda terrorist activity. And we have also been given a third reason once those two reasons came up empty for going into Iraq, and the third one was that we needed to create a democratic government in Iraq, correct?

Dr. KAGAN. Yes. That was another reason the Bush Administration gave us.

Mr. JOHNSON. And we have not been able to create a democratic government in Iraq over the last 4-1/2 years for \$400 billion and 3,000 American deaths; isn't that correct, Dr. Kagan?

Dr. KAGAN. We have not fully succeeded in establishing a democratic government even though we have had elections.

Mr. JOHNSON. And I understand that we were told that the American invasion would be a cakewalk, and we would be greeted as liberators, and we could rebuild Iraq at a cost of \$1.5 billion a year, and that we would start reducing our troop strength, which would be down to about 30,000 troops by the end of 2003. And of course none of that has happened, and it looks like we are, according to you, Dr. Perry, involved now in a quagmire, I think is what you mentioned in your report which I have been—

Dr. PERRY. It is—it did not originate with me.

Mr. JOHNSON. And quagmire is defined by the dictionary, I believe it was Webster's, an area of soft, muddy land that gives way underfoot. And also it says it is a marsh, and a "marsh" is defined as an area of low wetland, a swamp. And it appears to me that we are embedded deeply in a muddy swamp, in a quagmire, and we are spinning our wheels. And there are those who would say that we need to increase troop strength by 22,500 people, and that would suddenly enable the United States to do what it has been unable to do in the last 4 years or so.

Would it be fair to conclude, Dr. Kagan, that the Bush Administration has bungled this war effort?

Dr. KAGAN. Congressman, I have been a consistent critic of the way the Bush Administration—

Mr. JOHNSON. Would you say that?

Dr. KAGAN. Yes. They have made important mistakes in this war to date.

Mr. JOHNSON. Actually now with those three things that were given as the reasons for going into Iraq now having been found to be erroneous, or actually two things, and then the third has been badly mishandled, badly executed, establishing democracy in Iraq, one could say that this was a mission that was doomed to fail from the outset because it was wrong in the first place.

Dr. Korb, you stated in your report that at this point it looks like—bear with me. You said that Iraq now has more than 300,000 members in its security forces which do not lack the necessary training to quell the violence. In fact, some of them have had more training than the young soldiers and marines the United States has sent to Iraq.

Would you explain that statement, please?

Dr. KORB. What I am saying there, people basically focus on the training. In my view, it is motivation. We are not asking the Iraqi military to take on the Soviet military and the planes of Europe. We are asking them to do police work. And basically I think the question really is do they want to do what they need to do? And as I pointed out, we take young men and young women, we send them to three months of training, we send them to war. So in many cases, some of the people there have had less training than some of these Iraqi units.

And so that is my point. We are not asking them to do major conventional battles. We are asking them to do police work, go in and control the situation, and they simply don't want to do that.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman from Georgia.

Let me inquire of our panel. I was told, Dr. Perry, you had to leave at 4:15.

Dr. PERRY. Yes, 4:15.

The CHAIRMAN. I think we will proceed until 4:15. And I know some will not have the opportunity to ask questions, but we have done the best we could, and people have lived by the five-minute rule, so I compliment them.

Mr. Franks.

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Chairman Skelton, Ranking Member Hunter. Thank you, gentlemen, for being here.

Sometimes in a complex debate it is important to return to the very basic equation and paradigm. And, Dr. Kagan, or is it Mr. Kagan, my first question is to you. Let me preface it by some comments Mr. Bush made in 2005. He said that militants, in this case talking terrorists, militants, insurgents believe that controlling one country will rally the Muslim masses, enabling them to overthrow all moderate governments in the region and establish a radical Islamic empire that spans from Spain to Indonesia. With greater economic and military political power, the terrorists would be able to advance their stated agenda to develop weapons of mass destruction to destroy Israel, to intimidate Europe, to assault the American people and to blackmail our government into isolation.

Do you—Mr. Kagan, do you believe that that is a—at the time, 2005, those words were spoken and it represented essentially an accurate perspective of the intentions of terrorists including al Qaeda, and how that—has that changed today?

Dr. KAGAN. Well, I do believe that it demonstrated an accurate portrayal of their intentions. I think they expressed their intentions on a number of occasions going back to the 1960's, and as recently as 2004 and 2005 in exchanges from al-Zarqawi. I think that it is the intention of al Qaeda, I think that is the parallel intentions of the parallel movements in Iraq, and I think it remains the intentions of today.

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you. I certainly believe that you are correct.

Let me, if I might. There were some parallels made to Vietnam and some discussions surrounding Vietnam. Let me first say to you that I honor you for your service in Vietnam, for the courage that you showed, and for making the sacrifice that you did on the basis of trying to protect human freedom.

And I would submit to you that it was not people like yourself that lost the war in Vietnam. It was people in the halls of this Con-

gress that lost the war in Vietnam with the debate not so unlike some of the challenges that we are facing here today.

With that said, when the Americans did withdraw from Vietnam, and I know there were great, great differences, the fact was that not thousands, not tens of thousands, not hundreds of thousands, but millions of people died, most of them innocent Cambodians. And we fought then an enemy that was not of the terrorist mindset, but that was of a Communist mindset that was committed to the slow domination of the world, and that culminated in the fact that the Soviet Union grew very, very strong, and if not for one Ronald Reagan that had the courage to stand up against them and see that collapse, I wonder where we would be today. Now, that is the only parallel I will make with Vietnam.

I will say to you that I believe that if we fail in Iraq, I believe the implications are profound. I think if we succeed in Iraq, it could sow the seeds of freedom in that region and turn the whole of humanity in a better direction.

Might I ask your perspective, if you think the President's plan here is defective, and you certainly have every right to do that, but if you do, can you give me or this panel your—just your general plan of what might work to win in Iraq? And by that I mean by allowing the government enough strength to stand on their own; not stopping all the bombs, but enough to survive on their own so that what happened in Vietnam does not happen there.

Dr. KORB. Congress didn't lose the war in Vietnam. I think it is very important to say that. The fact of the matter is you were trying to create two states where there was only one state. And we never had a government that we backed in South Vietnam that enjoyed the support of the people. It wasn't the fault of the people fighting the war. It wasn't the fault of the things done here. It was basically trying to do something that was impossible to do.

Now, I have said here today, and I will say it again, that what we are talking about in Iraq has a certain semblance to Vietnam. Let me quote somebody who will surprise you, William Buckley, the editor of the *National Review*. He said, had we not left Vietnam when we did and realized that we couldn't achieve our objectives, we would have lost the Cold War. He also said, if we don't do the same in Iraq, we are not going to win the war on terror. And—

Mr. FRANKS. Because I am out of time, what is your plan to win in Iraq?

Dr. KORB. My plan basically is to win the war on terror. My plan is basically to make the best of a bad situation that was created by giving false reasons and then not doing it correctly. When General Shinseki told us how much we needed to stabilize the country after the overthrow of Saddam, we didn't follow that advice. Had we done it, I think things would have been better. So what I am saying is we are where we are because of decisions that have been made.

Now, what you have to do, victory will be the Iraqis making those painful political compromises. And the best lever we have, in my view, is to set a date certain which will put them on notice and also the countries in the region that they are going to have to deal with the problem as well.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlemen.

Well, we almost made it. We have time for one more Member to question. And if it is any consolation to those that did not get a chance to ask questions, I have been there before, so I know just how you feel.

So I will call on Ms. Gillibrand, and with that, we will thank the panel, and I will have a closing comment.

Mrs. Gillibrand.

Mrs. GILLIBRAND. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for coming to talk to us today about these very important issues. This was indeed the number one issue in the 2006 elections, and we were all sent here to find answers, and you are helping us to do that.

When we had Secretary Gates and General Pace come in to testify, both of them said that the President's plan could not work unless there was significant progress on the political and on the economic development of Iraq. And all of you have talked a bit about those issues.

And I watch your impressions and thoughts on your best advice to the President right now on how to focus our efforts on the political and the economic front. Certainly, it has been discussed to have a congressional resolution saying that we won't have permanent bases in Iraq, and we won't have a claim on the oil as a way to set the stage for diplomacy.

And we have also had discussion, and the President mentioned in his speech, the issue of the Iraqi oil revenues. We were unable to get clear answers in our last hearing about the current state of the oil revenues and how indeed they will be effectively transferred to the Iraqis, and then, once transferred, how they can be divided among the three sectarian groups, and then there can be some oversight to make sure that that is maintained.

And second, the reconstruction contracts. Currently most of the reconstruction contracts are being handled by Americans; if we can shift them effectively to the Iraqis so their 20-year-olds are rebuilding the roads and the schools and hotels and working to rebuild their own country.

And then third, many of you talked about a regional peace summit to actually bring in our allies and countries that we are not necessarily allied with to begin to participate.

Can you speak to how we can increase the likelihood of this transformation taking place, and what actions the President can take on your best recommendation to make this a possibility of success, because both the general and the Secretary of Defense said it can not succeed if we don't have movement on the economic and the political front.

Dr. PERRY. I think my best judgment on how we have our best chance of success in Iraq is really embodied in this Iraq Study Group report, which I helped write and whose recommendations I agree with.

All three of the points that you made, I think, are things that are important to do and things that we could do. And, again, I emphasize that whatever we do there, the emphasis has to be on the political and economic—this problem cannot be solved by the military alone, certainly cannot be solved by the U.S. military alone, and every general that I have talked with has that view.



Dr. KORB. I think we have to conclude this cannot be won militarily, so, therefore, you have to make the political compromise, as I have talked about.

You also have to do more in improving the lives of Iraqis. We ought to allow them to do the reconstruction rather than have American or foreign firms do that. I would give money to the provincial governments allocated so the reconstruction money to the provincial governments is based upon them meeting certain criteria for doing things in their own districts, but get it down to the local level.

One of the problems we have in Iraq is because we are such a powerful country, people there could not believe that we didn't do it right when we got there. They thought there must have been—you know, we must have done that on purpose. It wasn't the case, but that is what they believed.

So I do think we have got to do those things, but I don't think anything will happen until the political compromises are made, because they are going to keep fighting until those things are done.

Mrs. GILLIBRAND. One thing we agree on is giving the Iraqis a notice period about a redeployment and when that will take place, and allowing our military leaders to consult on what that time period will be. But do you agree that it is a way to incentivize the Shi'a, in particular, to come to the table to make compromises? Because right now we are protecting their government. We are building their security forces. Do you think that leverage actually would have an impact?

Dr. KORB. I hope so, but I don't know any other leverage than we have right now. Look, Mr. Maliki dissed the President of the United States in Jordan. I mean, he dissed him. He didn't show up. Okay. He then, after the President gave a speech, didn't come out the next day to the press conference. Okay.

So that is what I am saying to you. These are the people that our sons and daughters, husbands and wives are fighting and dying for, okay, and that is what concerns me. That is why I think we have got to put them on notice that this thing can't go on forever.

Dr. KAGAN. I must say, since I only have a few seconds, I am very concerned about the ethical position of attempting to incentivize people by threatening them with limitless genocide. I really do feel that when you start to talk about pressing the Iraqis to do things by threatening to withdraw forces and allowing it to collapse into chaos, I am very uncomfortable with the moral, ethical position that is entailed in that.

Mrs. GILLIBRAND. Don't you think there is a difference, however, if you are using leverage to bring parties together to compromise?

Dr. KAGAN. If you are serious on carrying through on that threat, then I think you have to follow the moral and ethical argument all the way through.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady, and I thank all of you for your patience. Sorry we didn't get to complete the entire list. But we are very grateful, Dr. Perry, Dr. Korb, Dr. Kagan, for your being with us. Some of the finest strategic figures are sitting right before us today. And we are very, very thankful for your testimony, for your straightforwardness, and for being of great assistance to

us. You have been very helpful in helping tell about the challenges that we have in that sad country of Iraq, and we appreciate your being with us and the education that you have given us as well as the American people today.

So with our gratitude, we will close the hearing. Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 4:20 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

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**A P P E N D I X**

JANUARY 17, 2007

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**PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD**

JANUARY 17, 2007

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**Testimony to the House Armed Services Committee**  
**William J. Perry**  
**January 17, 2007**

Our nation is being torn apart by the controversy over the American military presence in Iraq. Words like “quagmire” and “fiasco” are being used to describe our situation in Iraq. For those of us that lived through the Vietnam War, the term “quagmire” recalls one of the saddest periods in American history. And I, for one, would not like our country to have to go through another period like that with its poisonous divisions. But I believe that is likely to happen if we “stay the course” in Iraq. It has become clear to the American public that we need a new way forward in Iraq. In December the Iraq Study Group (ISG), a bipartisan group formed by the Congress, concluded nine months of study and proposed a new way forward. The ISG proposal recognized that the key actions needed in Iraq must be taken by the Iraqi government and the Iraqi Army, and provided the incentives for those actions. The ISG proposal also recognized that we needed to begin the redeployment of our overstretched ground forces in order to meet our security responsibilities outside of Iraq. Perhaps most importantly, the recommendations of the bipartisan ISG provided an opportunity for the nation to come together on Iraq. Last week President Bush announced a new way forward in Iraq that does not follow the ISG recommendations. He has instead chosen a course of action that is not likely to succeed because it is tactical not strategic; because it does not entail real conditionality for the Iraqi government; and because it will only deepen the divide in the country. So in my testimony today I will explain the differences in the two approaches, and why our study group members unanimously believed that the ISG proposals were in the best interests of the United States.

But before I discuss the ISG and its new way forward, I will first look back to consider how we fell into the quagmire in Iraq.<sup>1</sup>

The administration gave three reasons for the invasion of Iraq. The first was the alleged imminent danger from Iraq’s WMD programs. I believe that military action to stop an illegal nuclear program would have been warranted, but it would have been targeted against nuclear facilities, and not entail the occupation of Iraq. In any event, there was no imminent or even gathering danger from Iraqi nuclear weapons or other WMD. It appears, in fact, that the UN inspections had been working.

The second reason was the alleged imminent danger to the US from Iraq’s support of terrorism. Military action to defeat Al Qaeda could have been justified, as it was in Afghanistan. But while Al Qaeda used Afghanistan as a training area, it had no significant presence in Iraq prior to the invasion, and had no relationship with Iraq’s government.

The third reason was to bring stability to the Mideast by creating a democratic government in Iraq. Certainly a democratic government in Iraq would have been a blessing to its people and a boon to the region. But the task of imposing a democratic government in Iraq

<sup>1</sup> References for my assessment include “Squandered Victory”, Larry Diamond; “Assassin’s Gate”, George Packer; “Fiasco”, Tom Ricks; and “State of Denial”, Bob Woodward.

turned out to be substantially more difficult than the administration imagined. Indeed, it is not clear that any strategy could have fully succeeded in achieving a democratic, stable government in Iraq. But we may never know whether it was possible, since the administration's attempts to do so were burdened with serious strategic errors.

In particular, four errors were the most consequential:

- The administration failed to get support from regional powers and from key allies. As a consequence, US forces comprise almost 90% of the coalition, as opposed to about 50% in Desert Storm or Bosnia.
- The administration did not send in enough troops to maintain security after the Iraqi army was defeated. Thus, after the Iraqi army was defeated and Iraq broke out in looting, the US did not have enough troops to maintain control, giving the insurgency a chance to gain a foothold.
- The administration disbanded the Iraqi army, police and civil servants a few weeks after the Iraqi army was defeated. As a result, 500,000 angry young men were turned loose on Iraqi towns with weapons and no jobs, and Iraq was left with no security force except for the undersized coalition military force.
- The administration pushed the Iraqi provisional government to establish a constitution and hold elections, but in a faulty process that did not adequately protect minority rights, thus setting the stage for a bloody power struggle between Shias and Sunnis.

The cumulative affect of all of those strategic errors is a disastrous security situation in Iraq, which continues to deteriorate:

- Each month hundreds of US military personnel are killed or wounded.
- Each month thousands of Iraqis are killed or wounded.
- Well over a million Iraqis have left the country, including large numbers of Iraqi professionals.
- The violence is still trending up.
- Coalition forces at present levels are able to hold down, but not stop the violence.

As grim as this situation is, it could become even worse when US soldiers leave. But that could be true whether we leave a year from now or 5 years from now.

In face of this growing disaster, the US Congress commissioned an independent bipartisan study charged to reach consensus on a way forward in Iraq. Jim Baker and Lee Hamilton were named as the co-chairmen and each of them selected four other members from his own party. Additionally they recruited forty expert advisors. Neither the members nor the advisers received any compensation. We met two to three days each month from March to August of last year.



A very important part of our fact-finding was consulting with the Iraqi government. So we went to Baghdad in September, and spent four days meeting with all of the top officials of the Iraqi government, as well as our military commanders in Iraq.

After we returned from Iraq, we spent six intensive days trying to reach a consensus. This process was very difficult, and it is a tribute to our co-chairmen that we were able to succeed. All of our members were motivated by the belief that Iraq posed a serious problem for our country, and that to be of constructive help we had to reach a bipartisan consensus on how to move forward.

The ISG report was released to the public on 6 December. It called for a change in mission, a reinvigoration of diplomacy in the region, a strengthening of the Iraqi government, and the beginning of troop redeployments.

The change in mission proposed was key to everything else in the report. We believed that we should try to strengthen the present government's ability to hold off a full-scale civil war. We believed that we should continue our efforts to defeat Al Qaeda in Iraq. Although Al Qaeda was not a significant factor in Iraq before the war, it has since established a strong foothold, specializing in mass killings. We believed that we should reduce the commitment of our ground forces in Iraq and reestablish their readiness for other missions. The US has important security responsibilities outside of Iraq, which cannot be met if our ground forces are tied down in Iraq for the indefinite future.

Some of the actions needed to accomplish these missions are internal to Iraq:

- We need to accelerate the training of the Iraqi army and police force.
- We need to shift the mission of US troops from combat patrols to training and imbedding so that they can provide role models and on-the-job training for Iraqi soldiers.
- We need to begin pulling out US combat brigades, with the goal of having all except a strong rapid-reaction force out by the first quarter of 2008.
- We need to maintain a strong rapid reaction force in Iraq for the vital tasks of force protection and the fight against Al Qaeda in Iraq.
- We need to continue to support Iraqi forces with intelligence, logistics, and air support.
- And we need to provide both positive and negative incentives for the Iraqi government to accelerate the reconciliation process and oil revenue sharing so that Sunnis have a stake in a stable Iraq.

Other needed actions are external to Iraq.

- We need to get friendly regional powers to assist economically, politically, and with training.
- We need to put pressure on unfriendly regional powers to stop arming militias and fomenting violence.
- And we need to invigorate the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, since that conflict is having an indirect, but important effect on the violence in Iraq.

If the recommendations of the ISG were to be followed, many of our combat brigades would be out of Iraq by the first quarter of next year. As our Army combat brigades and Marine units return to their bases in the US, the Defense Dept. will have a huge budget and management problem in restoring them to full combat readiness. This problem is of special concern to this committee because of the constitutional responsibility of the Congress in constituting and equipping our armed forces. The Army, all of whose brigades were at high readiness levels at the beginning of the war, is dangerously close to being broken. Today, less than a third of these forces are at readiness levels needed to meet other military contingencies. And low readiness levels invite such contingencies; indeed, our security may have already suffered because of the perception of Iran and North Korea that our forces were tied down in Iraq. The Defense Department also needs to reconsider the role of the National Guard, since the compact with these citizen soldiers has been shattered by extended deployments that have caused many of them to lose their jobs or even their families.

Last week the president proposed what he called a new way forward in Iraq. I fully agree with the president's assessment that failure in Iraq could have serious consequences for security in the region and, ultimately, American security. And I agree that we should make a serious effort to avoid such a failure. But I firmly believe that the bipartisan proposal made by the ISG gives us a better chance of avoiding that failure than does the president's proposal. The new way forward proposed by President Bush differs from that recommended by the ISG in several important respects. It calls for adding more than 20,000 combat forces, the bulk of them to be employed in securing Baghdad. When the ISG was in Baghdad, we discussed the Baghdad security problem in some detail with General Casey and General Chiarelli. In particular, we noted that Operation Together Forward (designed to establish security in Iraq) was not succeeding, and asked if they could increase the likelihood of success if they had another 3 to 5 American brigades. Both generals said no. They argued that the problem of conducting combat patrols in the neighborhoods of Baghdad had to be carried out by Iraqi forces, and that the job of Americans was to train them, including on-the-job training to increase their proficiency. They said that they believed that bringing in more American troops could delay the Iraqis assuming responsibility for their own security. They also said that there was no purely military solution to Baghdad's security. Any solution to the security problem required the Iraqi government to start making real progress in the programs of political reconciliation that they had earlier committed to do. And they argued that more American troops tended to fuel that part of the insurgency that was fighting against American occupation forces. Finally, they noted that bringing in more American ground forces would be unlikely to have positive results on Baghdad's security, but likely to have negative results on the

readiness of American ground forces. This assessment was consistent with what we had heard from General Abizaid in an earlier briefing in the US.

Subsequent to our discussions in Baghdad, the president has replaced these generals and adopted a new strategy that is contrary to the advice they gave us. I note that the situation in Iraq has dramatically changed with the intense sectarian violence that was sparked by the bombing of the Blue Mosque about a year ago, and that our recent commanders' assessments reflect on-the-ground experience of this intensification. Consequently, I believe we should stay with the recommendations of our most recent commanders in Iraq, and not send in more American combat forces. The best chance of bringing down the violence in Iraq, if indeed it still can be done, lies with the Iraqi army, and we can improve their chance of success by using US ground forces to provide the on-the-job training that would result from imbedding American troops in Iraqi combat units, as proposed by the ISG. Moreover, none of this military action will be effective unless the Iraqi government moves promptly to carry out the programs of political reconciliation they have committed to do—this involves the sharing of power and the sharing of oil revenues with the Sunnis. The Iraqi government has delayed carrying out these programs for almost a year now—not surprisingly given their desire to maintain full control of the government, and given the political difficulty of implementing these programs even if they wanted to. The ISG proposal puts maximum pressure for timely action on the part of the Iraqi government, whereas sending in the additional American troops provides them a rationale for further delays that effectively avoid making the fundamental changes that are necessary.

Finally, the ISG proposed a comprehensive diplomatic initiative involving all of the neighboring countries. We fully recognized that these diplomatic goals would not be easy to achieve. They would require the dedicated efforts of the best American diplomats, both in and out of government. And even with such an effort, we would not succeed in all of our diplomatic goals. But we will never know how much, in fact, can be accomplished through diplomacy unless we give it such a dedicated effort. Two noteworthy precedents of successful American diplomacy in the face of equally daunting odds were the diplomacy by the first Bush administration that facilitated a peaceful ending of the Cold War, and the diplomacy by the Clinton administration that ended the Bosnian War. The president's announced strategy entails diplomatic actions far less comprehensive than envisaged by the ISG, and none at all with Syria, which plays a pivotal role in the region and with whom we could have considerable leverage.

In sum, I believe that the president's diplomatic strategy is too timid, and his military strategy is too little and too late to effect the lasting and profound changes needed. The ISG proposal has a better chance because it recognizes that the key actions needed in Iraq to effect lasting results must be taken by the Iraqi government and the Iraqi Army, and because it provides the incentives for those actions. Most importantly, the recommendations of the bipartisan ISG provide an opportunity for the nation to come together on Iraq.

The president has chosen not to follow the recommendations of the ISG. He has instead chosen a course of action that is not likely to succeed because it is tactical not strategic; because it does not entail real conditionality for the Iraqi government; and because it

will only deepen the divide in the country. But the Congress by its actions can still seize the opportunity to bring the country together in dealing with the tragedy unfolding in Iraq.

**Testimony of  
Lawrence J. Korb  
Senior Fellow, The Center for American Progress  
Before The  
House Armed Services Committee  
January 17, 2007**

Chairman Skelton and members of the House Armed Services Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you once again to testify about the President's strategy for Iraq. I cannot think of a more critical issue facing the nation at this time.

It is important to note right up front that, because of numerous mistakes made during the last 46 months, no good options now exist. As the Iraq Study Group (ISG) report noted, the situation in Iraq is "grave and deteriorating," and no one can guarantee that any course of action in Iraq at this point will stop the sectarian warfare, the growing violence, or the ongoing slide toward chaos. Inaction is drift, and sticking with the "current strategy" is not an acceptable option

In 2003, the Bush administration made a fundamental strategic mistake in diverting resources to an unnecessary war of choice in Iraq and leaving the mission unaccomplished in Afghanistan. This error has allowed the Taliban to reconstitute in Afghanistan, weakened the position of the United States in the world, and undermined the fighting strength of U.S. ground forces. It also diverted critical U.S. resources from effectively addressing the Iranian nuclear threat, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the situation in Lebanon.

Today, the United States once again finds itself at a strategic crossroads. This time, however, there are at least nine key lessons of the past four years of failure that make choosing the right path forward abundantly clear. These nine lessons point to the obvious—it is time to strategically redeploy our military forces from Iraq and begin a diplomatic surge not a further military escalation as the president has proposed.

**1. The fundamental security challenge in Iraq is a violent struggle for power among empowered Shiites, embittered Sunnis, and secessionist Kurds.** The United States cannot solve Iraq's problems militarily. No matter how long the United States stays or how many troops are sent, Iraq will never become a stable, peaceful state unless the Iraqis themselves make the painful political compromises necessary to create a new Iraq.

These compromises are hard because they involve balancing the power of the provincial and central governments, sharing oil revenues, and protecting minority rights. Only when the reconciliation process is complete will the Iraqis be willing to disband their militias and cease their support for the insurgency. Until then, American forces, augmented or not, can no longer stop the civil war.

More than a year after its most recent national election, during which time the United States has lost the equivalent of 13 battalions killed or wounded soldiers and Marines, Iraq's leaders remain internally divided over critical issues of political and economic sharing. The national unity government has not achieved sufficient progress on addressing the key questions that drive Iraq's violence. A fundamental challenge in today's Iraq is that too many Iraqi political leaders are hedging their bets: they halfheartedly support the national government while simultaneously maintaining their independent power bases through ties to militias and other groups based on sect or ethnicity.

War is the continuation of politics by other means. Since Iraq's current government is neither taking control of the chaos swirling around it, nor settling disputes over key issues that might bring an end to the sectarian bloodbath, more and more Iraqis are turning to violence.

Resolving Iraq's civil war requires a new political strategy, such as a Dayton style peace conference supported by the international community and Iraq's neighbors. As Generals Abizaid and Casey, the commanders conducting the war, and the majority of Iraq's elected leaders agree, additional military escalation, as proposed by the president, runs a high risk of only inflaming Iraq's violence and increasing American casualties and Iraqi dependence on the United States.

**2. The open-ended U.S. combat deployment fosters a culture of dependency in Iraq.**

Iraqi leaders will have no incentive to undertake these painful steps unless the United States and the international community apply significant pressure on Iraq's leaders. The

best way to press Iraq's leaders is to set a plan that aims to complete the U.S. military mission by a certain date, thereby creating incentives for Iraq's leaders to settle their disputes and assume greater control of the country. Given our moral obligation to the Iraqis and the practical considerations involved in redeploying about 150,000 troops, a reasonable target date for completing the U.S. combat mission should be 18 months from now, or the summer of 2008. If the Iraqis do not make these difficult choices over the next 18 months, they will have to live with the consequences. It would then be their problem, not just ours.

In the weeks before his dismissal, even former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, a fervent supporter of staying the course and only standing down when the Iraqis stand up, and a key figure responsible for the Iraq quagmire, finally admitted that last October, "The biggest mistake would be not to pass things over to the Iraqis. It's their country. They are going to have to govern it, they're going to have to provide security for it, and they're going to have to do it sooner rather than later."

Further military escalation, or a so-called "surge" or augmentation of additional U.S. troops, would only continue to prevent Iraqis from taking greater responsibility and settling their disputes.

### **3. Iraq's neighbors are already involved in Iraq and must be part of the solution.**

Iraq's six neighbors—Iran, Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait—are already involved in some fashion in Iraq. This involvement is bilateral, self-interested, disorganized, and not channeled toward a constructive purpose that benefits the common good of all Iraqis, in large part because of the internal divisions among Iraqis on full display in the daily violence in Iraq's streets. Moreover, the spillover effects of Iraq's civil war on the region have been growing throughout 2006 and into 2007, with Jordan, Lebanon and Syria receiving about 2 million Iraqis fleeing the violence. Leaders throughout the region, not only on Iraq's borders, fear the ripple effects of the chaos on their immediate horizons.



To end Iraq's civil war, the country's neighbors need to be involved more constructively. These countries have an incentive to participate, and one way to increase those incentives is to send a clear signal that the United States is setting a target date for completing its military mission in Iraq and will not maintain any permanent bases in Iraq. None of the countries in the region including Iran, want to see an Iraq that becomes a failed state or a humanitarian catastrophe that would lead to it becoming a haven for terrorist groups like al-Qaeda or sending millions of more refugees streaming into their countries.

Even U.S. adversaries such as Syria and Iran will have to alter their policies once the United States begins to redeploy its military forces from Iraq. Both countries recognize that, with the United States mired in the Iraq quagmire, it has reduced its ability to confront Damascus and Tehran. These countries will continue to have every incentive to work together to keep U.S. forces bleeding as long as we keep increasing our forces.

Moreover, despite the fact that Syria and Iran do have different agendas than the United States and are contributing to the problems in Iraq, both of these nations have demonstrated a willingness to act in their own self-interest even if the United States is also a beneficiary. For example, in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the Syrians contributed troops to the American-led coalition that evicted Iraq from Kuwait. In 2001, the Iranians worked with us by providing extensive assistance on intelligence, logistics, diplomacy, and Afghan internal politics that helped to oust the Taliban from Afghanistan. The Iranians also developed roads and power projects and dispersed more than \$300 million of the \$560 million it pledged to help the Karzai government. Moreover, in 2003, the Iranians sent Washington a detailed proposal for comprehensive negotiations to resolve bilateral differences.

The administration's refusal to deal with Syria and Iran, without preconditions, not only harms U.S. strategic interests in the Middle East—it is deadly. To refuse to talk to Syria and Iran unless they change their foreign policies means that many Americans will die needlessly. This lack of confidence in the U.S. ability to assert its interests diplomatically only further weakens the U.S. position in the Middle East.

As 2007 begins, the absence of a new diplomatic and political strategy is a missing link in getting Iraq's neighbors to play a more constructive role.

**4. The U.S. must deploy its full diplomatic weight to address the problems in Iraq and the Middle East.** A new political and diplomatic surge is necessary to address Iraq's civil war and the growing instability in the Middle East. So far, the United States has not deployed all of the assets in its arsenal to address the growing strategic challenges in the Middle East. It is still relying too much on its military power rather than integrating its military component with the diplomatic component.

Sporadic trips to the region by Secretary of State Rice are necessary but not sufficient. The Bush administration should send a signal of its seriousness by appointing an individual with the stature such as that of former Secretaries of State Colin Powell or Madeleine Albright as special Middle East envoys. Former presidents Bill Clinton and George Bush have advanced U.S. interests and improved the U.S. standing in the world by addressing the aftermath of the 2004 Asian tsunami. Individuals like Colin Powell and Madeleine Albright can help the United States address the geo-strategic tsunami that has been unfolding in Iraq and the Middle East during the past four years.

As special envoys, the former secretaries could spearhead a new, forceful diplomatic offensive aimed at achieving peace in Iraq and making progress on other key fronts in the Middle East, including efforts to address the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the role of Hezbollah and Syria in Lebanon, Iran's rising influence in the region, and the concerns that many traditional allies, such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia, have about the shifting dynamics in the region.

This diplomatic surge must also focus on getting support and assistance from other global powers like European countries to provide more political and economic support in Iraq than they have over the last four years. U.S. diplomats must make clear to the world that

no nation anywhere in the world can escape the consequences of continued chaos in the Middle East.

**5. Further U.S. military escalation in Iraq will not make Iraq more secure.** Doubling down on a bad hand as we have done repeatedly by sending more troops to Iraq will not change the outcome. Statements by President Bush and other top officials that the United States is “not winning but not losing,” are misleading. In asymmetrical guerilla warfare, the insurgents win if the occupying power does not. The situation in Iraq has reached a point at which even former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, a leading advocate of invading and staying the course, has acknowledged that military victory is no longer possible in Iraq.

The additional 21,500 U.S. troops that would be sent in over the next five months represents a marginal increase in the U.S. combat presence in Iraq, not a decisive number. Even if the United States had the necessary number of men and women with the technical and language skills available to operate as a true stabilizing force or to embed with the Iraqi units—which it does not—the additional troops would likely be unable to significantly improve Iraq’s security situation, certainly not without a major shift in political and diplomatic strategy.

Iraq now has more than 300,000 members in its security forces which do not lack the necessary training to quell the violence. In fact, some of them have more training than the young soldiers and Marines the United States has sent to Iraq. Iraq’s security forces are not tasked with fighting a major conventional war against a significant military power. Rather, what they need to do is essentially police work to stop Iraqis from killing other Iraqis.

The central problem with Iraq’s security forces is not skill building or training. It is motivation and allegiance. Most of the 10 divisions in the Iraqi Army are not multiethnic. They are staffed and led by members of their own sect. The problem is that the units are reluctant to take military action against members of their own groups who are perpetrating the violence.

Case in point: Only two of the six Iraqi battalions ordered to Baghdad this fall by the Maliki government actually showed up. What leads us to believe that three brigades now promised will show up or take military action against their own sect? And what will we do if they fail to fulfill their promises? Moreover, many of the security forces have been infiltrated by the insurgents and criminals who tip off the enemy and that are supervised by corrupt and incompetent ministers who purge the most effective commanders. As a result, the units then often employ the weapons and tactics furnished by the United States against their sectarian enemies, not those of the Iraqi state.

During the last six months the United States has increased, or “surged,” the number of American troops in Baghdad by 12,000, yet the violence and deaths of Americans and Iraqis has climbed alarmingly, averaging 960 a week since the latest troop increase. This “surge,” known as Operation Together Forward, failed to stem the violence. This past October, Army Major General William Caldwell IV said that the operation “has not met our overall expectations of sustaining a reduction in the levels of violence.”

As U.S. military commanders in Iraq have acknowledged, the United States could put a soldier or Marine on every street corner in Baghdad and it would not make a difference if the Iraqis have not begun the reconciliation process.

Sending more troops now will only increase the Iraqi dependence on us, deplete our own strategic reserve, force the United States to extend the tours of those already deployed, send back soldiers and Marines who have not yet spent at least a year at home, and deploy units that are not adequately trained or equipped for the deployments. Colin Powell, the former Secretary of State and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, summarized the situation on December 19, 2006, when he said that the active Army was just about broken and he saw nothing to justify an increase in troops.

Powell's comments echo those of Lt. General Peter Chiarelli, the Deputy Commander of the Multi-National Corps in Iraq, who said that deploying more U.S. forces will not solve Iraqis problems.

A further U.S. military escalation will not tackle these core problems and would likely further exacerbate the situation and make the challenges more difficult to address.

**6. The U.S. military escalation in Iraq will undermine the fight against global terrorist networks.** The brave soldiers and Marines are not fighting the violent extremists who supported the attacks of September 11. They are essentially refereeing a civil war. It is time to redeploy U.S. military assets where a real military surge is desperately needed, like Afghanistan.

As President Reagan found out in Lebanon in the 1980s, U.S. military forces cannot serve as referees in a civil war. It is a no-win situation militarily. The United States will end up serving as little more than a lightning rod for the blame. According to recent measures of Iraqi public sentiment, more than 80 percent of the Iraqis believe that American troops are responsible for the violence and 60 percent think it is acceptable to kill Americans. A majority of Iraqis want U.S. troops out of the country within a year.

If Iraqi leaders veto requests by U.S. military commanders to take on Shiite militias as happened this fall, and if Iraqi judges are frequently demanding the release of captured insurgents, U.S. troops will continue to face an impossible situation—no matter how qualified and motivated they are. As Sen. Gordon Smith (R-OR) recently noted, a policy that has U.S. soldiers and Marines patrolling the same streets in the same way and being blown up by the same bombs day after day is absurd.

The al-Qaeda insurgents are no longer the main problem in Iraq. We are not (if in fact we ever were) fighting them over there so we will not have to fight them here. Military intelligence estimates they make up less than two percent to three percent of those causing the chaos. Only five percent of the Iraqis support the philosophy of al-Qaeda, and

once U.S. forces leave, the Iraqis will turn against al-Qaeda as they have in the past. The vast majority of the violence is caused by nearly two dozen Shiite militias and Sunni insurgents who are maiming and killing each other mainly because of religious differences that go back over a thousand years. Meanwhile, the real al-Qaeda problem in places like Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Somalia is not being addressed adequately.

A phased strategic redeployment of U.S. troops from Iraq should include sending 20,000 additional troops to Afghanistan leaving an Army brigade in Kuwait, and a Marine Expeditionary Force and a carrier battle group in the Persian Gulf. This will signal to the countries in the region that we will continue to be involved. Moreover, this force will have sufficient military power to prevent Iraq from becoming a haven for al-Qaeda or being invaded by its neighbors. A good example of how this would work is illustrated by the killing of Zarqawi, the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq. Iraqi citizens provided the intelligence to Iraqi security forces, who in turn informed us. The United States then sent F-16's to bomb the hideout, something that we could do after we implement a strategic redeployment.

**7. Many of the proponents for the proposed U.S. military escalation of 21,500 troops got us into the Iraq quagmire.** The Congress and the American people should ignore the advice of those who got us into this mess in the first place and pay attention to those who cautioned us not to get involved in this misadventure, among them General Colin Powell, Vice President Al Gore, and Senator Barack Obama.

Supporters of U.S. military escalation in Iraq in 2007 are among the same pundits and so called experts who assured the country and the American people that the U.S. invasion was necessary; that the war would be a cakewalk; that we would be greeted as liberators; that we could rebuild Iraq at a cost of \$1.5 billion a year; that we could reduce our troop strength to 30,000 by the end of 2003, In addition many of these same experts did not speak up for General Shinseki before the invasion; made misleading assertions about mushroom clouds, yellowcake, and ersatz meetings in Prague; and told us as late as 2005

that the situation in Iraq was positive and in 2006 that we needed a surge of as many as 80,000 more troops.

Now many of these same pundits, who apparently seem to have no sense of shame about their previous errors, are telling us to ignore the bipartisan recommendations of the Iraq Study Group to begin to withdraw troops, open a regional dialogue with Iran and Syria, and take a comprehensive diplomatic approach to the region. Instead, they want to throw more good money after bad, by sending more troops to achieve their version of victory in Iraq, i.e. a stable democratic Iraq that will transform the Middle East.

**8. The 110<sup>th</sup> Congress has a Responsibility to the American People.** Any new proposal must have the support of the American people and the international community. It is difficult, if not impossible, for the U.S. to wage a war of choice effectively if it does not have the support of the American people. After all it is they who must send their sons and daughters, husbands and wives into the conflict and spend their hard earned dollars on waging this conflict.

The American people made it clear in the Congressional elections and in recent public opinion polls that they do not favor further military escalation but want a diplomatic surge, and want us to begin to withdraw.

Similarly without international support, the ability of the U.S. to get other nations to share the human and financial burdens declines. Even our closest allies, the British, refuse to join us in the latest military escalation and will continue to withdraw. By May the British will reduce the number of their soldiers and Marines from 7,000 to 3,000. In 2003, there were more than 20,000 coalition troops in Iraq. Today there are less than 10,000. Even when the American people supported the initial invasion they did so on the condition that it be multilateral

The president may say that he does not have to listen to the American people. The Congress should not let him ignore this most fundamental principle of democracy.

When Congress reconvenes, the Bush administration will submit a supplemental funding request to the defense budget of at least \$100 billion to fund the cost of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan through the end of FY 2007. This is in addition to the \$70 billion bridge fund Congress has already provided, bringing the total cost of the wars for this fiscal year to \$170 billion, more than \$14 billion a month, the vast majority of which is for Iraq.

The 110<sup>th</sup> Congress should heed the American people and fulfill their obligation to protect American security by preventing a military escalation in Iraq. They can fulfill this obligation in several ways, and one vehicle will be the supplemental funding request President Bush will present to Congress for an additional \$100-\$150 billion to fund military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. As a co-equal branch of government, Congress can place conditions for funding additional deployments to Iraq. While Congress should not move to cut off funds for troops already deployed, it can exercise its constitutional powers to halt President Bush's proposed military escalation with amendments to the budget request:

**A. Require clarification on the law that allows the president to mobilize Guard and Reserve units for up to two years.** Congress can condition funding for a military escalation on a measure that makes clear that the total mobilization of Guard and Reserve units beginning on 9-11 cannot exceed two years in total, even if they are not consecutive. This will prevent the administration from calling up Guard and Reserve units for a second time without Congressional approval.

**B. Require a new National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq's internal conflict.** Last summer, Congressional leaders requested that the Director of National Intelligence prepare a National Intelligence Estimate that includes an assessment on whether Iraq is in a civil war. The 110<sup>th</sup> Congress can condition funding for a military escalation on receiving this updated estimate and submitting a declassified version to the American public.



**C. Require re-certification that the war in Iraq does not undermine the war against global terror networks.** The joint resolution, of 2002 authorizing the use of force in Iraq, required the Bush administration to certify that the Iraq war would not harm the effort against terrorism. Congress can condition funding for a military escalation on a re-certification that the Iraq war does not undermine the war in Iraq.

**D. Traunche funding and assistance on Iraqi performance.** The 110<sup>th</sup> Congress can require a transparent, verifiable plan that conditions funding for a military escalation on the performance of Iraqi leaders to fulfill their commitments and responsibilities. Congress can mandate that the Bush administration may not obligate or expend funds unless periodic verification and certification is provided on key metrics for progress, including: (1) steps to disband ethnic and sectarian militias; (2) measures to ensure that Iraqi government brings to justice Iraqi security personnel who are credibly alleged to have committed gross violations of human rights; and (3) steps towards political and national reconciliation.

**9. We must change course now.** The United States cannot wait for the next president to resolve the problems in Iraq. In fact, we have already waited too long. Nor should they heed the dictates of a president who has misled us about this war for almost four years, most recently on October, 24<sup>th</sup>, 2006 when he told us we were winning the war, constantly reinvents history, and now has proposed yet another strategy for victory. We now know that the president knew that the situation in Iraq was deteriorating six months ago, but waited until after the election to change course. The 110<sup>th</sup> Congress has a special responsibility to assert its constitutional role and make sure that the Bush administration does not sink the country deeper into Iraq's civil war by escalating failure.

A U.S. military escalation in Iraq as proposed by President Bush holds little hope for stabilizing the country, risks doing permanent damage to U.S. ground forces, and would

undermine U.S. efforts to defeat the global terrorist networks that attacked the U.S. on 9/11. Choosing this course would be, as Sen. Smith notes, absurd and maybe even criminal. The only responsible path forward is a new, forceful strategy that marshals the right assets for the challenges the United States faces in Iraq, in the Middle East, and around the world and redeploys our forces strategically over the next 18 months.

*The Center for American Progress has not received any federal grants for the past three years.*

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**DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD**

JANUARY 17, 2007

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## Choosing Victory – A Plan for Success in Iraq

Frederick W. Kagan  
Resident Scholar, AEI

### Executive Summary

- Victory is still an option in Iraq, and it is vital to America's security. Defeat will lead to regional conflict, humanitarian catastrophe, and increased global terrorism.
- Iraq has reached a critical point. The strategy of relying on a political process to eliminate the insurgency has failed. Rising sectarian violence threatens to break America's will to fight, and it will destroy the Iraqi government, armed forces, and people if it is not rapidly controlled.
- We must adopt a new approach to the war and implement it quickly and decisively.
- Three courses of action have been proposed. All will fail.
  - Withdraw immediately. This approach will lead to immediate defeat. The ISF are entirely dependent upon U.S. support to survive and function. If U.S. forces withdraw now, they will collapse and Iraq will descend into total civil war that will rapidly spread throughout the region.
  - Engage Iraq's neighbors. This approach will fail. The basic causes of violence and sources of manpower and resources for the warring sides come from within Iraq. Iraq's neighbors are encouraging the violence, but they cannot stop it.
  - Increase embedded trainers dramatically. This approach cannot succeed rapidly enough to prevent defeat. Removing U.S. forces from patrolling neighborhoods to embed them as trainers will lead to an immediate rise in violence. This rise in violence will destroy America's remaining will to fight, and escalate the cycle of sectarian violence in Iraq beyond anything an Iraqi army could bring under control.
- We must act to restore security and stability to Baghdad, which has been identified as the decisive point.
- There is a way to do this.
  - We must change our focus from training Iraqi soldiers to securing the Iraqi population and containing the rising violence. Securing the population has never been the primary mission of the U.S. military effort in Iraq, and now it must become the first priority.
  - We must send more American combat forces into Iraq and especially into Baghdad to support this operation. A surge of seven Army brigades and Marine regiments to support clear-and-hold operations starting in the Spring of 2007 is necessary, possible, and will be sufficient.
  - These forces, partnered with Iraqi units, will clear critical Sunni and mixed Sunni-Shi'a neighborhoods, primarily on the west side of the city.
  - After the neighborhoods have been cleared, U.S. soldiers and marines, again partnered with Iraqis, will remain behind to maintain security.
  - As security is established, reconstruction aid will help to reestablish normal life and, working through Iraqi officials, will strengthen Iraqi local government.
- This approach requires a national commitment to victory in Iraq:
  - The ground forces must accept longer tours for several years. National Guard units will have to accept increased deployments during this period.
  - Equipment shortages must be overcome by transferring equipment from non-deploying active duty, National Guard, and reserve units to those about to deploy. Military industry must be mobilized to provide replacement equipment sets urgently.
  - The president must request a dramatic increase in reconstruction aid for Iraq. Responsibility and accountability for reconstruction must be assigned to established agencies. The president must request a substantial increase in ground forces end strength. This increase is vital to sustaining the morale of the combat forces by ensuring that relief is on the way. The president must issue a personal call for young Americans to volunteer to fight.
- Failure in Iraq today will require far greater sacrifices tomorrow in far more desperate circumstances.
- Committing to victory will demonstrate America's strength to our friends and enemies.