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STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE

STATEMENT OF
GENERAL KEVIN P. CHILTON
COMMANDER
UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND
BEFORE THE STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
ON UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND

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INTRODUCTION

Madam Chairwoman Tauscher, Ranking Representative Everett, and Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for the invitation to be here today. This is my first opportunity to appear before you as Commander of United States Strategic Command. I look forward to further strengthening our relationships in pursuit of our common enduring goal of protecting this great Nation. The men and women of United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) are committed to achieving this goal as well. They have performed superbly over the last year, demonstrating dedication across the breadth of our assigned missions both at home and abroad.

Under the superb leadership of my predecessor, USSTRATCOM underwent remarkable change in a very short period of time to stand up new organizations to address a broad range of mission assignments. USSTRATCOM is now in the process of maturing these organizations with an increased focus on day-to-day operations and integration. I am here today to provide my thoughts on the challenges we face, and to ask for your assistance to ensure USSTRATCOM possesses the means to accomplish our missions.

NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES

Many of our National security structures, processes, and capabilities were developed during the Cold War, shaped by DoD's focus on a singular, symmetric threat. The dangers of the past have evolved and are complicated by new sources of conflict and challenges to stability. These new and evolving challenges defy the primarily force-on-force solutions of yesterday; requiring more complex, and in some cases, elegant solutions tuned to each adversary and circumstance.

Our Nation faces four persistent and emerging global challenges. First are the challenges posed by established nation-states, some resurgent, others emerging, who seek to undermine or subvert US policy objectives.

Second, we note the continued rise of non-state actors, predominantly in the form of global terrorists rooted in extremist and violent ideologies. These new adversaries are distributed, networked, and fleeting. Enabled by information technology and financial support, they are able to maintain a global presence by recruiting, training, inciting, and directing attacks in a variety of ways, including through cyberspace.

Third, we continue to face the potential catastrophic use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). We believe the most dangerous threat to the US today is that of non-state terrorist groups acquiring and subsequently using weapons of mass destruction against the US.

Finally, we see both state and non-state actors attempting to supplant our advantage in various operational domains. The "global commons" of space and cyberspace are vitally important to our way of life. Our civil, military, and commercial activities are dependent upon access to cyberspace and space-based capabilities, and we can expect future adversaries to attack these dependencies. Our dependence on these capabilities and their associated vulnerabilities requires us to focus our efforts to ensure US freedom of action in these domains.

ASSESSMENT OF THE COMMAND

Following my confirmation, I conducted a review of USSTRATCOM's roles, missions, capabilities, and priorities. I discovered a command working arduously to execute a diverse set of global missions, each vital to the security of our Nation. On advice from Members of Congress, I toured our National Laboratories to better understand our nuclear stockpile. I also met with a number of Members of Congress and their staffs to determine how we might work together to resolve outstanding deficiencies in critical capabilities.

I believe USSTRATCOM's missions can be divided into two major categories. In the first category are global missions that require us to operate across

physical and/or functional boundaries. The three mission areas within this category are Strategic Deterrence Operations, Space Operations, and Cyberspace Operations. We have forces assigned to USSTRATCOM in each of these mission areas that execute operations every day. All of these missions are global in nature and are insensitive to lines drawn on a map.

The second category is comprised of those global missions where our purpose is not to operate across boundaries, but rather to knit together seams between boundaries. Today, USSTRATCOM is not assigned operational control of any forces within this category of missions. However, we have dedicated teams addressing the challenges of fielding and advocating for an integrated Missile Defense system; integrating Department of Defense (DoD) planning and advocacy efforts to better combat the threats posed by Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD); managing the allocation of DoD's high demand/low density Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets; and integrating Information Operations (IO) in support of all combatant commands. As our missions develop, we are placing emphasis on readiness, detailed planning, command and control, and execution; supported by robust, realistic, and periodic command-wide exercise programs.

STRATEGIC DETERRENCE

During the Cold War, the US model for deterrence was based upon a robust capability to employ nuclear weapons via aircraft, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Known classically as "nuclear deterrence", this original Triad was designed to deter the Soviet Union. When combined with razor-sharp readiness and a bilateral dialogue that stressed both a mutual understanding of one another's capabilities and decision-making processes, the Triad underpinned the US deterrence posture that successfully kept the peace for over fifty years.

Although the strategic landscape has dramatically shifted since the end of the Cold War, the concept of deterrence and the need to deter adversaries

from attacking our vital interests is just as important in the 21st Century as it was in the last century. However, today's more complex strategic landscape demands excellence and nuance across a much broader set of national security challenges. To address these challenges, our model for deterrence has evolved. Today, strategic deterrence is embodied by a new Triad borne of the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review. The Triad now emphasizes the integration of offensive capabilities, both nuclear and conventional; defensive capabilities; and a responsive defense infrastructure, all enabled by intelligence, planning, and global Command and Control (C2). These efforts are ably led by our Joint Functional Component Command for Global Strike and Integration (JFCC-GSI).

The nuclear capability of the original Triad remains a vital part of our deterrence strategy. In light of this, USSTRATCOM is re-examining our oversight role of the Nation's strategic nuclear forces. We reviewed the US Air Force report of the Minot weapons transfer incident, as well as other independent investigative reports, and have implemented organizational and oversight changes to refocus USSTRATCOM on our nuclear mission responsibilities. We also intend to increase the oversight of Operational Readiness and Nuclear Surety Inspections of our assigned or gained units.

While our nuclear capability remains vital, our ability to integrate conventional long-range precision weapons is every bit as important. Although our conventional forces are second to none, we no longer have these forces forward-deployed permanently throughout the world. Therefore, it is prudent to have the ability to defeat attacks and eliminate high value targets at global ranges on short notice. We have a prompt global strike delivery capability on alert today, but it is configured only with nuclear weapons, which limits the options available to the President and may in some cases reduce the credibility of our deterrence.

The capability we lack is the means to deliver prompt, precise, conventional kinetic effects at inter-continental ranges. The ability to hold at risk sites in otherwise denied territory is a key element of our strategic deterrent capability. At present, the complex and evolving threat environment necessitates the rapid development and demonstration of a prompt conventional global strike capability. I appreciate past Congressional discussions concerning the need to fill our Prompt Global Strike (PGS) capability gap and wish to thank Congress for providing the Fiscal Year 2008 (FY08) resources as we continue to address this capability shortfall. The Air Force, Navy, and Army are coordinating with USSTRATCOM and the DoD Office of Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to conduct research, development, test, and evaluation of technologies which hold the greatest promise for new capability development. While we are making progress, we must place emphasis on a near-term solution to fill a gap that exists today.

RELIABILITY, SAFETY, AND SECURITY OF THE NUCLEAR STOCKPILE

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and DoD share responsibility for the reliability, safety, security, and effectiveness of the Nation's stockpile of nuclear warheads, and for the quality and responsiveness of the enterprise necessary to sustain it. I want to assure the Committee that as a member of the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC), I appreciate the concerns expressed by Congress with respect to both the status of our nuclear stockpile and the role nuclear weapons will play in our Nation's defense in the 21st Century. Congress has directed a number of activities in the coming year which will provide opportunities to further the national dialog on our strategic posture. We look forward to participating in this national discussion.

Our strategic nuclear forces have stood watch over the Nation for over fifty years, always prepared to conduct a mission we all hoped would never be necessary. Supported by weapons and infrastructure that were as modern as we

could make them, and military and civilian personnel that were ready 365 days a year, twenty-four hours a day, we succeeded in deterring our adversaries, assuring our allies, and preserving the peace.

Our Nation has invested heavily in increasing our scientific understanding and extending the life of nuclear weapons designed during the Cold War. To date, these efforts have successfully provided confidence in the reliability of our weapons without the need to conduct nuclear tests. Today the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) is working - our nuclear stockpile remains reliable, safe and secure. Our assessment is based upon a solid foundation of past nuclear testing and augmented by cutting-edge scientific and engineering experiments and analysis, advanced computing and simulation, and extensive flight tests of warhead components and subsystems.

However, we are not confident that the SSP, or any conceivable weapon's life extension program will provide future USSTRATCOM Commanders the same level of confidence that I am pleased to express to you today. We recognize the current path of indefinitely relying on legacy nuclear weapons refurbished through a series of life extension programs entails accepting significant future risks to reliability, safety, security, and maintainability, as well as considerable expense.

Our legacy weapons were designed to maximize destructive capability while minimizing weight and volume, facilitating long range weapons delivery with great effect to deter a threat with a similar symmetric capability. Weapon performance margins, maintainability, and longevity, while important design criteria, were made a lower priority in the manufacture of these weapons to facilitate higher yield to weight ratios. These design trade-offs were acceptable at the time for several reasons. First, our nation maintained a robust nuclear weapons production infrastructure that was able to quickly fabricate large numbers of weapons. Second, we produced successive

generations of nuclear weapons every 15-20 years. Finally, we were able to routinely test our weapons.

As the threat to our nation has evolved, so have the requirements driving nuclear weapons design. Emergent states seek a nuclear weapons capability and non-state actors and terrorists seek to acquire nuclear weapons. Other declared nuclear powers continue to modernize their nuclear weapons, delivery platforms, and infrastructure. Conversely, the US has effectively eliminated its nuclear weapons production capacity and allowed its infrastructure to atrophy. We no longer produce successive generations of nuclear weapons and we have discontinued underground testing. Current US policy is to retain the fewest number of operationally deployed nuclear weapons required to meet national security objectives.

Over time, the environment degrades the functionality of both non-nuclear and nuclear weapons components, negatively impacting extremely tight performance margins that exist in our weapons today, thereby reducing weapon reliability. The highly optimized designs of our legacy weapons limit opportunities to improve safety and security standards through a warhead life extension strategy. A broad suite of modern safety and security features that were not available during the design and development of our legacy systems are available today and could be used to help prevent exploitation by terrorists, rogue nations or criminal organizations. Modern design technology will dramatically increase the maintainability of our stockpile which will serve to maximize long term reliability while minimizing long term costs. Finally, modern warhead designs offer a high potential for avoiding future nuclear testing.

In light of these changes in the strategic environment and the aging of our stockpile and its supporting infrastructure, we recommend pursuing an alternate weapon modernization strategy. This strategy should focus on improved weapon reliability, safety, security, and maintainability. These

are the priorities for 21st Century nuclear weapon design, not the 20th Century criteria of maximizing destructive capability and minimizing weight and volume.

If the nation is going to maintain a nuclear deterrent, the capabilities that support this deterrent should be second to none. We must care for the stockpile whether we possess one weapon or thousands. It is important to note that improvements to our aging infrastructure will be required whether or not we decide to pursue an improved warhead design. This cannot be accomplished without investment in requisite infrastructure and human capital. The last nuclear design engineer to participate in the development and testing of a new nuclear weapon is scheduled to retire in the next five years. The transition to a more modern stockpile will re-invigorate the design and engineering technology base - especially its human resources - and enable a more responsive and cost-effective infrastructure. A revitalized infrastructure will facilitate a reduction of the large inventory of weapons we maintain today as a hedge against strategic uncertainty and weapon reliability concerns, and will allow us to sustain our nuclear capability and expertise throughout the 21st Century.

Some contend that an effort to modernize our nuclear stockpile would lead to increased proliferation. We assert a modern stockpile designed to provide a reliable, safe, and secure nuclear umbrella will serve to dissuade and deter our adversaries, and assure our allies, reducing their perceived need for an indigenous nuclear program.

To facilitate an informed national debate of all of these issues, USSTRATCOM supports the continuation of the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) Design Definition and Cost Study to explore a replacement for aging warheads in the stockpile. Completion of this study during Fiscal Year 2009 in parallel with the planned Nuclear Posture Review will provide Congress and the Administration the information needed to effectively evaluate alternative

strategies for the long-term maintenance of the Nation's nuclear weapons stockpile. The information from this study is critical to developing a comprehensive nuclear strategy that meets future National Security requirements.

NATIONAL COMMAND AND COORDINATION CAPABILITY (NCCC)

The strategic environment is fundamentally more complex than it was when our current point-to-point nuclear command and control (C2) system was developed more than fifty years ago. For example, the threat that some states will acquire and deploy ICBM technology, combined with our ability to counter these threats with missile defense systems, demands a C2 capability that rapidly and efficiently provides assured and responsive connectivity between national leaders. This scenario reduces our decision time to mere minutes and calls for a C2 capability that extends beyond legacy Cold War systems and capabilities. We have set a course to modernize our single-purpose and aging C2 system to allow for secure, enduring, and continuous communications under current scenarios as well as those emerging threats that we are likely to confront.

Our strategy is to sustain our legacy nuclear C2 system while expanding our capabilities to address a broader scope of military challenges. We are transforming the circuit-based, point-to-point communications systems that comprise our legacy nuclear command and control capability to a system that fully leverages new information technologies. Furthermore, we are focusing resources and efforts to implement a C2 architecture that provides global C2 capabilities, as well as systems that can be seamlessly integrated with the broader, national capabilities that support the President and senior leaders. We are working diligently to ensure our ability to provide end-to-end C2 under the most stressful scenarios envisioned.

Our concept of operations calls for the enduring and survivable ability to conduct operations from geographically dispersed locations through

collaborative access to data, services, and information. The evolution of our legacy nuclear command and control system will undergo careful evaluation and review to ensure no reduction in capability. It is imperative that as we assess and deploy our new systems and capabilities, they be subjected to rigorous testing to ensure interoperability with other on-going initiatives to enhance national and senior leader communications capabilities.

SPACE OPERATIONS

During the 20th Century, the nation approached space as a new frontier. Our focus was to win the exploration race and to understand and develop our capabilities in this ultimate high ground. Today, we depend upon space-based capabilities to conduct commerce, advance our interests, and defend our Nation. To this end, USSTRATCOM's Joint Functional Component Command for Space (JFCC-SPACE) conducts space operations on a daily basis.

Increasingly, space-based capabilities enable all other war-fighting domains. In the 21st Century, the mindset of space as purely an "enabler" must change. We must view our activities in the space domain in the same way we regard activities in the domains of land, sea, air, and cyberspace. As space-based capabilities provide critical support to forces in other domains, space operations must also receive support from forces outside the space domain.

The Chinese kinetic Anti-Satellite test (ASAT) conducted in early 2007 made it clear that space is not a sanctuary. We can expect similar challenges in the future. To ensure our freedom of action in space we need to maintain an acute awareness of the objects in space, and the terrestrial threats that could interrupt or deny our space operations. Our adversaries understand our dependence upon space-based capabilities, and we must be ready to detect, track, characterize, attribute, predict, and respond to any threat to our space infrastructure.

Space protection requires robust Space Situational Awareness (SSA). While sustaining our current space surveillance systems, we need to simultaneously improve our sensor coverage of the space domain with a mix of ground and space-based sensors, and improve the data transmission architecture and equipment necessary to fuse the data we collect into useable information. Additionally, we must continue to foster collaborative data-sharing with our allies to enhance global coverage. The analogy of a 1000 ship navy built through a coalition of nations can be applied to space, and the ability to leverage and expand space partnerships with our allies holds the potential to dramatically improve Space Situational Awareness.

Global satellite communication to include nuclear command and control, uninterrupted position, navigation, and timing, missile warning, intelligence collection, and environmental observation are essential space-based capabilities required by the war-fighter and the Nation. These existing space-based capabilities must remain viable while conducting research, development, and fielding of replacement capabilities. We must also ensure that the current space-based capabilities we provide to the Nation can be either adequately defended or delivered by alternate means in times of crisis. We ask for funding support to ensure there is no interruption in the provision of these capabilities to our war-fighters and our Nation.

Assured access to space will remain an imperative for the US. Today, the dominant threat to access does not come from an external threat, but from the need to properly sustain and modernize our launch ranges at Vandenberg and Cape Canaveral. We ask for continued attention to and appropriate investment in these mission assurance programs.

We must also continue to make investments in the human capital that will enable USSTRATCOM to face the challenges of tomorrow. These challenges require the development of a cadre of space professionals, in all Services, with the requisite skill, talent, training, and focus that will ensure our

ability to develop new or improved capabilities and operate and defend them in the future.

CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS

Like space, cyberspace is a unique global domain in which the US must maintain freedom of action. It serves as a world-wide neural network, a conduit that links human activity and facilitates the exchange of information at speeds measured in milliseconds. Potential adversaries recognize the US reliance on the use of cyberspace and constantly probe our networks seeking competitive advantage.

In this emerging war-fighting domain, USSTRATCOM, through the Joint Task Force for Global Network Operations (JTF-GNO) and the Joint Functional Component Command for Network Warfare (JFCC-NW), in partnership with the Joint Staff is leading the planning and execution of the National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations. In this role, we coordinate and execute operations to defend the Global Information Grid (GIG) and project power in support of national interests.

Over the last year, the Defense Department has sought to enhance the security of the GIG by improving personal identification and authentication measures, standardizing operational security procedures and software, and reducing access to non-mission essential web sites. While generally effective, these defensive measures require augmentation to defeat sophisticated adversaries. As the cyber attack on Estonia demonstrated, the Defense Department must also plan and train to operate the GIG while under attack. USSTRATCOM is actively planning and executing operations to detect and counter attacks on the GIG while coordinating responses with other DoD and interagency elements.

For as much as USSTRATCOM has accomplished in this domain, cyberspace operations is the least mature of USSTRATCOM's operational mission areas. Our challenge is to define, shape, develop, deliver, and sustain a cyber

force second to none. We pledge to continue to work with Congress as we continue to develop future resource and manpower requirements. As we continue to define the necessary capabilities to operate, defend, exploit, and attack in cyberspace, we ask for increased emphasis on DoD cyber capabilities. Our most immediate challenge is adequately trained personnel. USSTRATCOM needs a dedicated and highly trained force provided by the Services to conduct network warfare. As we continue to develop our cyberspace capabilities, we look forward to the day when we have trained and equipped Service organizations (e.g. brigades, battalions, wings, groups, and squadrons) assigned to USSTRATCOM to conduct network warfare.

INFORMATION OPERATIONS

The Joint Information Operations Warfare Command (JIOWC) remains the center of excellence for DoD Information Operations (IO). Through JIOWC, USSTRATCOM has refocused our IO efforts to reinforce and support our three global missions of strategic deterrence and space and cyberspace operations. Specifically, we shifted from regionally focused efforts centered on individual combatant commands to concentrate on integrating Strategic Communication planning, Operations Security (OPSEC), Military Deception (MILDEC), and Electronic Warfare (EW) capabilities to enable USSTRATCOM's global mission sets. Additionally, USSTRATCOM recognizes that controlling the use of the electromagnetic spectrum and ensuring its constant availability to friendly forces is not only of fundamental importance to all three of our operational missions, but to every other combatant command. To that end, we have undertaken a DoD-wide effort to identify joint EW effects requirements, highlighting Service-level EW capabilities and gaps in order to provide joint solutions for ensuring global electromagnetic spectrum access.

MISSILE DEFENSE

Missile technology continues to proliferate, thereby increasing the need for a credible missile defense capability as an essential element of

America's National Security Strategy. Missile defense systems raise our adversaries' ballistic missile development costs by reducing their systems' effectiveness. In addition, our missile defenses enhance deterrence by denying adversaries the benefits they might seek by threatening the US or our forces and allies with a missile attack.

Our missile defense systems must be ready to defend against a missile that launches and lands in the same combatant commander's region; a missile that launches from one region and lands in an adjacent region; or is launched from one region, overflies an adjacent region and lands in a third region. It is our responsibility to ensure concepts of operations, the design and integration of sensor suites, missile warning systems, and the mechanics of battle management systems all address these scenarios.

As we move forward in the next year, USSTRATCOM, through our Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC-IMD) is leading a collaborative effort with geographic combatant commanders to develop a global integrated missile defense concept of operations that will lay the groundwork for our future Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) Command and Control architecture. We are also examining the merits of incorporating cruise missile defense capabilities into the BMDS Command and Control architecture to address this growing threat in a cost-effective manner. We continue to support DoD and Department of State (DoS) efforts to deploy the BMD mid-course radar and Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) capabilities in Europe, which are an integral part of the transition from limited defensive operations against a North Korean ICBM attack to an architecture capable of defending the US and Europe from missile attacks originating from Southwest Asia as well.

The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) had an excellent year. In 2007, MDA conducted five successful AEGIS Standard Missile flight tests (one in conjunction with the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force) and four Terminal

High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) flight tests. Additionally, they conducted one Near-Field Infrared Experiment (NFIRE) test on-orbit, and one Network-Centric Airborne Defense Element (NCADE) air-to-air test. In September 2007 a successful ground-based midcourse interceptor test was conducted using operational crews. In July 2007, the early warning radar at Fylingdales Royal Air Force base completed a major hardware and software upgrade to improve detection, object classification, and precision tracking of ballistic missiles launched against the US. This site, along with the site at Beale AFB is now equipped with the Upgraded Early Warning Radar (UEWR), making both sites critical components of the BMDS. These modernizations contribute significantly to the accuracy, and hence effectiveness, of missile defense tracking information and provide a single configuration that will enhance the sustainability of these radars.

The BMDS was exercised extensively throughout 2007. Between April and August, operational war-fighters exercised missile defense operations in six joint and combined combatant command level exercises. These efforts dramatically increased the level of operational war-fighter involvement in the development and fielding of the BMDS.

In the coming year, multiple BMDS exercises and tests, complemented by the development of the global integrated missile defense concept of operations will serve to validate our ability to ensure the efficient, coordinated, and prioritized use of limited missile defense resources. In support of the development of critical capabilities, USSTRATCOM has also continued to perform its advocacy responsibility for the global missile defense mission area, in full collaboration with the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and the combatant commanders.

As our missile defense system continues to mature, it will continue to influence our adversaries' perception of the economic and political cost they must incur to pursue missile technologies. While missile defense as a

defensive shield is important, its ability to assure allies, dissuade competition, and deter adversaries is equally vital. To achieve these goals, we need your continued support.

I would like to emphasize that the recent successful operation to intercept the decaying satellite was not a test of our missile defense system. Some components of the system underwent a one time modification to facilitate accomplishment of this mission. However, these components are being returned to their original configurations to continue defending against the ballistic missile threat.

COMBATING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (CWMD)

For more than half a century we lived in a world in which a few major powers possessed nuclear, chemical, and/or biological weapons. The US has led efforts to encourage nuclear-capable nations to secure their materials and technology, as well as encourage those nations retaining chemical and biological weapons to disavow them as the major powers did long ago. While we have had some successes, such as Libya, and more recently, progress with North Korea, a number of nations continue to possess or seek weapons of mass destruction. Additionally, some nations with WMD capability are experiencing political unrest, thus placing their weapons at risk of capture by those hostile to the United States and our allies.

Presidential direction, the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the recently publicized Inspector General report on DoD Initiatives for CWMD made it clear the US requires an integrated approach to deterring our adversaries and protecting our Nation from those who would employ WMD against us.

While every regional combatant command is assigned the mission to counter weapons of mass destruction in its geographic area of responsibility, it is USSTRATCOM's responsibility to integrate the family of DoD CWMD plans and to advocate within DoD for desired CWMD capabilities from a global perspective.

We do this through the USSTRATCOM Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (SCC). Last year the Department's concept plan to integrate and synchronize CWMD operations and activities was approved by the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF). This plan provides the blueprint to coordinate world-wide CWMD operations by supplying an effects-based template for regional combatant commanders to use in tailoring their regional CWMD plans, operations, and activities. USSTRATCOM has enhanced DoD's operational capability suite by initiating the standup of a Joint Elimination Coordination Element (JECE) to conduct operational level WMD-Elimination planning (including deliberate, crisis action, and adaptive planning), joint training, command and control, and elimination operations exercises in support of joint force commander requirements. The JECE focuses on the activities and operations necessary to train and prepare joint forces and command and control elements to conduct WMD-Elimination missions. Recently deployed in support of US Pacific Command's major force exercise, Ulchi Focus Lens, the JECE performed admirably, supporting the formation of the first Joint Task Force Headquarters for the elimination of WMD.

In our advocacy role, leveraging the Defense Threat Reduction Agency's (DTRA) WMD expertise, SCC completed the CWMD Joint Integrating Concept (JIC) outlining the future integrated architectures and capabilities (2015-2027) for the CWMD mission. We have used this visionary document as the foundation for development of the first CWMD Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) requirements document which provides a holistic prioritization of current combatant command capability needs.

Over the past year, Congress supported our top two capability needs; technologies for detecting shielded nuclear materials at standoff distances, and a joint effort with United States Special Operations Command to develop a CWMD intelligence predictive assessment capability. USSTRATCOM continues to support DTRA through the integration of interagency activities with the

Departments of Energy, State, Homeland Security and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to accelerate research and development efforts for critical standoff detection capabilities. Timely response to nuclear and radiological events through enhanced sample collection, packaging, transport, and precise data analysis is required to establish attribution, thus contributing to deterrence.

We ask for your continued support in helping us build on the successes realized through Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) programs and the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) initiative, the DTRA CWMD mission portfolio, and the Chemical/Biological Defense Program. These programs enhance the capacity and capability of partners and allies to better secure and govern their own countries. By building global partnerships, the US enhances the development of resident counter-proliferation capabilities. This strategy facilitates the interdiction and elimination of WMD by other nations, promotes regional stability, presents a consolidated front to the threat, and enhances US security by eliminating threats far from our shores.

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE (ISR)

In 2007 USSTRATCOM and our Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (JFCC-ISR) led ISR planning in support of the operational surge in Iraq. The planning, allocation, execution, and assessment of ISR missions have been vital to the improvement of the security situation in that region. We continue to improve our global ISR management processes. As the sophistication and volume of war-fighter ISR needs continue to grow, so does the need to employ DoD's limited ISR assets in close coordination with the rest of the nation's surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, as well as those of our allies.

To that end, we have invested significant effort in strengthening DoD's internal and external organizational relationships to enable more efficient ISR operations. When we assessed strategies to achieve a more efficient ISR

enterprise, the need to integrate National and Defense ISR capabilities to satisfy the Nation's intelligence requirements became clear. In October of 2007, the DoD took a major step toward improving the Defense ISR Operations Enterprise by integrating the functions performed by JFCC-ISR and the Defense Joint Intelligence Operations Center (DJIOC) to form the Defense Intelligence Operations Coordination Center (DIOCC). The DIOCC serves as the primary focal point for interface with the recently established National Intelligence Coordination Center (NIC-C) and is part of a strategy to help ensure our limited surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities are aligned with the Nation's and the Department's strategic priorities. These changes reflect the direction, concurrence, and collaboration of the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI).

In addition to improving our organizational approach, we are reviewing USSTRATCOM's intelligence structure. When USSTRATCOM established joint functional component commands, some of its key intelligence functions were divested. We are reviewing our intelligence support requirements at the component and headquarters level to better posture intelligence support for each of USSTRATCOM's mission areas.

CONCLUSION

We live in a world where threats to our safety and security emerge and change daily. USSTRATCOM's missions and capabilities support our national objectives of protecting and defending the homeland, assuring our allies, dissuading undesirable competition, and deterring and when necessary, defeating our adversaries. The men and women of United States Strategic Command form a responsive war-fighting command with a global perspective that is in the fight today, and perhaps even more importantly, is uniquely positioned to anticipate, prepare for, and deter future crises.

I appreciate the opportunity to share my thoughts with you and I look forward to partnering with you in the future as we work together to ensure our Nation is secure. Thank you.