Washington, DC – In response to questioning from Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton (D-NY) at today’s Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, Admiral Michael Mullen – nominated by President Bush to succeed General Peter Pace as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff – committed to keeping the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Congress informed, in classified sessions if necessary, about the process of contingency planning for any future redeployment of U.S. forces from Iraq.

Below is the transcript of Senator Clinton’s exchange with Admiral Michael Mullen, nominated to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and General James Cartwright, nominated to be Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff :

SENATOR CLINTON: Thank you very much, Admiral Mullen and General Cartwright. I appreciate greatly your committed service to our nation. And I also want to thank your families because I know they've served as well. Both of you have long and distinguished careers that have taken you around the world. And your families have been there with you and supporting you and supporting our country. So I appreciate that. As both of you are, I'm sure, aware, I have recently corresponded with Secretary Gates, requesting briefings for the appropriate oversight committees, including this one, on what the current contingency plans are for any future withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq. In my exchanges with Secretary Gates, I pointed out that the seeds of many of the problems that continue to plague us in Iraq, both in terms of troops and mission, were planted in the failure to adequately plan for the conflict and then properly equip our men and women in uniform. After an exchange of letters with Secretary Gates and Under Secretary of Defense Eric Edelman, this Thursday, the Department of Defense will brief this committee, in a closed session, on the status of planning for the redeployment of U.S. forces. In his letter, last week, to me, Secretary Gates stated, and I quote, "You may rest assured that such planning is indeed taking place with my active involvement, as well as that of senior military and civilian officials and our commanders in the field. I consider this contingency planning to be a priority for this department," end quote. Let me ask you both: Are you aware of the contingency planning that Secretary Gates referred to in his letter, Admiral Mullen?

ADMIRAL MULLEN: Yes, ma'am, I am.

CLINTON: And you also, General Cartwright?

GENERAL CARTWRIGHT: I'm aware. In my current job, I don't participate in it right now.

CLINTON: If confirmed, will each of you be involved, insofar as you know, in this contingency planning? Admiral Mullen?

MULLEN: Senator Clinton, in part of my Advanced Policy Questions, I was asked where I think we made mistakes. One of the things is that I -- one of the issues is I didn't think we planned it. We didn't have the planning that we should have had in place. If confirmed, I'm very committed to properly planning, to the best of my ability, every possible operation that we might be involved in. And that certainly includes the kind of contingency planning that you've asked about in your letters and to which the secretary has responded and of which I am aware and, to a certain degree thus far, have participated.

CLINTON: Thank you. General Cartwright?

CARTWRIGHT: I concur.

CLINTON: And I would ask each of you if you will commit to keeping this committee and the Congress informed, in classified sessions if necessary, about the process of contingency planning for any future redeployment. Admiral?

MULLEN: Yes, ma'am.

CLINTON: General?

CARTWRIGHT: Yes, ma'am.

CLINTON: And it is clear that -- as you pointed out in your advance questions provided to this committee -- that many of us have serious concerns about the quality of planning, the interaction between the military and civilian leadership with respect to planning, the decision-making process, certainly leading up to the invasion and then continuing in the years since. And I think that many of us will be looking to you as our chief military officers for our country to really focus in on this planning issue. I've been impressed with Secretary Gates' openness and willingness to interact with the Congress, to listen to the professional military leadership around him, but I'm looking for ideas about how to institutionalize that. I think that the lessons learned from the last years may be very difficult ones for any of us to learn and apply, but we have to be committed to doing so. And it does seem that the Congress is moving toward an effort to put down conditions for a phased redeployment. And obviously, whether that happens this year or next year, it's going to happen at some point. And none of us want to see the consequences of poor planning. The other issue here that is not, perhaps, strictly within the military's purview is the question of the thousands of Iraqi civilians who have been assisting us over the last years: the translators and interpreters, the cooks, the embassy employees. And recently Ambassador Crocker has raised very serious questions about what exactly our planning is for them. So I would suggest that perhaps that at least be considered in the contingency planning, because I think that is a continuing responsibility that we bear. And I would appreciate each of you taking that and moving forward. And I think that in your answers, Admiral Mullen, in the Advance Policy Questions, you say something that I think all of us agree with and that is, there is no purely military solution in Iraq. Does that lead you to the conclusion that even if our troops were to have tactical successes in parts of Iraq, as now is being reported in Al Anbar province, that we cannot consider our mission successful without political action and even, you know, some resolution of the differences among the various factions within Iraq?

MULLEN: Yes, ma'am. I think the lead issue is political reconciliation for that government and progress on the political leg of the security, economic and political three-legged stool that we've talked about. Absolutely has to happen.

CLINTON: It appears that the political progress is not occurring. And this is something that our chairman has been particularly focused on, really from before the invasion and certainly consistently since: the failure to establish and then to achieve benchmarks when we had the occupying authority and in the years since we have seen an Iraqi government established. And, well, I have to ask, you know, in your Advance Policy Question responses, in what you have talked about today, given the lack of political progress since the escalation began -- despite what may be admittedly short-term advances with the surge strategy – how do we expect to obtain any evidence of political movement in the absence of a very different attitude and capacity of the Iraqi government; that were we to be there, as you suggested, for years instead of months, do you have any suggestions as to what more could be done to force or require the political resolution that is so necessary?

MULLEN: I think it's been clearly stated within the last year that they need to make progress in terms of amnesty, de-Baathification, an oil -- a revenue-sharing law, constitutional reform, relationships with the provinces and that progress there has not been good. At least that's the current assessment. I, at this point, would -- what I was asked to do was really wait until Ambassador Crocker, who has the lead on this aspect of it, comes back with General Petraeus and reports in September. I still maintain that if we aren't making progress in that realm, the prospects for movement in a positive direction are not very good. But waiting until then I think is important.

CLINTON: Well, I agree with your assessment. I obviously reached that conclusion some time ago in terms of the assessment as to what the Iraqis themselves are actually willing to do. I think you could make a very strong case that the Iraqis are not ready to put violence aside as a tool for the various agendas they're pursuing: sectarian, political, personal, commercial. There's a lot of activity going on here. And it does seem to me that either sooner, in my view, which is the appropriate outcome, you both most likely will be confirmed, which I think is a great tribute to you both for your service to this country -- will be faced with implementing a new approach, a sort of post-surge approach. And I think that the political problems that the Iraqis are failing to address will, unfortunately, require that we take a different strategic attitude toward Iraq, and that the results will have to be carefully monitored because, obviously, there are consequences no matter what we do. I guess the final thing that I would -- two final points, if I could, Mr. Chairman. The concerns that many have -- and regardless of where one stands on how much time we should provide or not -- the concerns that we all share are the consequences for our troops and for the Iraqi people that will flow from a decision to redeploy: if we redeploy out of Baghdad and concentrate on Al Anbar; if we redeploy into the north and concentrate on shoring up the Kurds, that they're not subjected to most likely Sunni and external problems. You know, whatever the combination of actions might be, it will be incredibly important that it be managed and implemented as carefully as possible because of the difficulty of withdrawing troops and equipment. And everybody who has briefed me on this basically comes to the same conclusion: that this is as dangerous as going in. And we know that if our only way out is through the south into Kuwait, it is especially dangerous because the increasing chaotic situation in the south, with various Shiite factions vying for control, will make us, unfortunately, have to navigate an even more dangerous exit. So I guess I would just underscore this: that this has to continue and has to be focused. And, finally, I think that the work that you will have to supervise not only is operational, of course, but may very well be doctrinal. I mean, it took quite some time to rewrite and revise and update the counterinsurgency manual. The doctrines that the former Secretary of Defense would quite often, sort of, refer to or throw out seemed not to be based on very much work or, frankly, institutional support and infrastructure. And so I think that there is not only a very difficult strategic and operational side of this, but also a doctrinal side. And I would strongly recommend that when you assume your new positions -- since you'll be consumed by the day-to-day operations, because no matter what happens it's going to be incredibly intense, I would predict, both politically here in Washington but on the ground and militarily and politically in Iraq -- that you think about, and perhaps in conjunction with this committee and others, coming up with some process to look at a lot of these doctrines and assumptions that, I think, clouded judgment and undermined the careful thought that should go into any difficult and dangerous set of decisions, such as we were making as a country. So I don't think it's something that either of you will have the time to focus on, but under your supervision and monitoring, I think it is extremely important that we really understand where we're headed with a new kind of enemy, with a different kind of warfare, with a global threat. Because we will withdraw from Iraq. We will certainly do it, I believe, almost regardless of what happens in the next year with this president, as soon as we change presidents. And how we do it, how we're prepared for it. But then we're going to have a lot of other problems that we face globally that we'll need some clear thinking on. So I wish you both well, and I thank you for your service.

SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN, SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE: Thank you, Senator Clinton. And thank you, also, for your initiative, which is one many of you've taken -- just the latest to urge this committee to get that briefing that you referred to on preparations and planning for a phased reduction and redeployment of our forces. It will take place at some point; in the view of many of us, sooner rather than later. But in any event, it will take place. And we very much appreciate your suggestion that there be a briefing. And it will take place, as you indicated, this week.

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