Senator Clinton: I really appreciate Senator Webb's line of questioning because it really illustrates the continuing difficulty we have in sorting out what it is that's happening on the ground. What I am concerned about is whether we are losing time to be able to get that figured out. I think we are really at a tipping point in Afghanistan. I felt that when I was there last month. And I hope that the Administration's commitment to new troops, the effort to get NATO more focused, the hope that we can strengthen the Karzai government, all has to happen simultaneously in order to take on these challenges. Whether it be a new offensive this spring or the growing strength of the drug lords.

I wanted to switch gears for a minute though because there are many things that have been spoken about that are very clearly difficult for America to influence. But I want to talk about force protection for our forces and their quality of life because we are putting more in, number one, and number two, I think we all believe the violence will increase. Whether we will see an explosion of violence that brings other elements of the Afghan society into it, as we saw after the bombing of the mosque in Samara, I don't know. But clearly, with the up-tick in suicide bombers and some of the other activities that we are seeing there is going to be a big push to escalate the violence.

Earlier this month the 82nd Airborne Division assumed responsibility for the combat mission from the 10th Mountain Division, which is based at Fort Drum in upstate New York. As subordinate units from the 82nd moved into position, 10th Mountain Division 3rd Brigade combat teams were displaced to Jalalabad. And what we're getting in reports back to Fort Drum--in fact a February 26 Fort Drum news release highlights the issue I want to discuss with you. There is a Sergeant First Class who is quoted by saying the amount of people on the FOB and the amount of billeting didn't coincide. In other words, soldiers were living in a variety of very difficult and challenging living conditions.

My concern is that with a build up in offensive capability coming from Pakistan and other areas within Afghanistan--whether we're also leaving our troops more exposed than they need to be, particularly in these forward operating bases--it is disconcerting to extend a brigade by four months, which is what we did with the 10th Mountain Division and make further demands, if we don't have some adequate planning and execution for their logistical needs. We are getting reports that we don't have enough bunkers, force protection barriers, check point security systems, artillery radar systems, UAVs and other critical equipment for expanding the mission as I think the majority, certainly speaking for myself, agree we must do. The deficiencies in the GAO report highlighted equipment shortages in the CENTCOM areas of operations. I have referred to that earlier in hearings focused on Iraq because that was a constant source of complaint on my recent trip and in my discussions with a lot of the soldiers and Marines who have returned from their deployments.

So I think that it would be incumbent upon you General and others to make sure we don't have shortages in resources as we are adding more American troops. And that we have the services and logistics for the arriving troops. And again, I see this as an issue of force protections primarily.

What I wanted to ask about is an article in today's New York Times that NATO and American forces knew there was a suicide bomber in the Bagram area before the suicide bomb attack that killed 23 at the main gate. Probably all of us have been at Bagram and we know the security checkpoints one goes through. We know, obviously that the Vice President was there and that the timing of the suicide attack, some have said, at least contributed to the sell off in the stock market. Whether it did that or not, it was a serious and concerning incident. Apparently, according to this article, the Afghan police chief in the area said he had not been informed of the possible threat. I would like to ask the General first and then the Ambassador. Is there a reason why the Afghan police forces would not have been notified? And what mechanisms exist for coordinating with Afghan forces when intelligence threats are received? How would you analyze what happened or what went wrong here?

General Lute: Well Senator, I'm aware of the same reports today that you refer to. It is not usual that specific threats would not be coordinated with all elements that could address them, to include the Afghan police. I do know that there are force protection mechanisms in place around Bagram and every place else that we have Americans stationed that feature close coordination with local officials. So this caught me a bit short as well and I really can't explain it today until I have some time to look into it. The other point though I'd make, is that--without crossing into the classified realm--is that with a suicide bomber roughly every third day last year in Afghanistan, so over 100 suicide bombers last year, most of them acted without any specific indications in terms of time and place. So, while there may well have been a report, it was probably not specific in terms of time and location. And of course that doesn't lead us far in terms of what we might do by way of prevention.

Senator Clinton: I think it would be useful General, to perhaps submit some additional information to the committee after you have conducted further inquiry.

General Lute: Fair enough. Will do so.

Senator Clinton: Ambassador, do you have anything to add?

Ambassador Edelman: No. I really don't, Senator Clinton. I saw the same story in the Times today, but like General Lute, I didn't have any awareness that there had been a specific intelligence report. So we'll check into it and get back to you.

Senator Clinton: Let me also ask that with the changes in command that have occurred recently with General McNeil, the overall Senior NATO Commander, with our Ambassador in Afghanistan, scheduled to leave, with our Ambassador in Pakistan leaving, I think we're really going to regret the disruption of all these relationships. I've suggested to the White House that they at least try to get some permanent presence with a high-level Presidential envoy to move back and forth between Afghanistan and Pakistan. There's so much disagreement and misunderstanding, as well as different perspectives about what should be in the interest of both of these leaders and their countries. But I'm just worried that what we're seeing as an unraveling situation that will accelerate because there is no, there's nobody there who has any on going relationship base.

And I'm also concerned about the command changes and adjustments about lines of authority in Afghanistan, and again General, maybe you could get back to us on this. Who authorizes targets to be bombed? Who gets priority for Medivac assets? Who gets priority for artillery support or receives logistics and what priority? What rules of engagement are now actually in effect? We've had these problems with NATO countries sending in troops but having different rules of engagement. Where does that stand now and who sorts out all of the potential disagreements among the various troops?

General Lute: Senator, the 32,000 troops--to include 15,000 Americans that are part of the NATO structure, so ISAF-- are under one set of rules of engagement. They're approved by the North Atlantic Council. General Jones is the resident expert in this room in terms of the specifics, but all those troops operate under the same rules. What distinguishes some national contributions inside that structure from others is that some are assigned missions that don't take them into the combat realm. So there are some forces inside that 32,000 NATO force structure that conduct PRT, Prevention Reconstruction Team missions, and not combat operations. But they, none the less, operate under the same ROE. As for all your, the list of different forms of support, casualty evacuation, close air support, logistic and so forth, those are all today coordinated by four star NATO Commander, who happens today to be a U.S. Commander, General Dan McNeil out of Kabul.

Senator Clinton: Just one final follow up. Are they the same rules of engagement that we had in Iraq prior to this latest escalation?

General Lute: They're not precisely the same, but they're very close.

Senator Clinton: There were many complaints about the rules of engagement, at least for our forces in Iraq and they've been changed because of the escalation. But I'd like to know what the differences are.

General Lute: The key difference in Baghdad I think-- is the place in particular that you are citing--was that before this recent change in azimuth, in Iraq, there were political constraints on locations inside Baghdad and some political party affiliations inside Baghdad, which prohibited, or at least inhibited our operations against them. Those have been removed and we don't suffer that same problem in Afghanistan.

Senator Clinton: Thank you.

Ambassador Edelman: Senator Clinton, if I might also address some of the understandable concerns I think you raised about continuity with some of the changes. I think there are some mitigating factors. One is that General McNeil, of course, is going back for a second tour in Afghanistan. So although he is new to his current job and responsibilities, he does have a familiarity with the key players like President Karzai and others. And I think General Freakley is there for some period of time in a U.S. duel-hatted Deputy. So there are some, I think, mitigating circumstances there.

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Read more about Senator Clinton's visit to Afghanistan.

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