Thank you, Mr. Chairman.  Ambassador Burns, it is a pleasure to see you again.

Let me take this opportunity to congratulate you on your well-deserved promotion.  I look forward to working closely with you in your new capacity, as was the case during your tenure as Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs.  

This hearing could not be more timely as we learn from news reports this morning that Iran test fired nine long and medium range missiles today, with one of those estimated to have the capacity of reaching Israel and U.S. bases in the region.
 
The official Iranian news agency quoted the air force commander of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards as saying:  "Our hands are always on the trigger and our missiles are ready for launch."

Statements such as these should come as no surprise, however.

Almost three decades ago, Iranian radicals took control of that country and clearly demonstrated the nature of their regime by seizing the U.S. embassy and holding 52 Americans hostage for 444 days.

I understand some of those courageous Americans held hostage are sitting in the audience today. They have yet to receive the necessary support from our own State Department, in their efforts to hold the Iranian regime accountable for their ordeal of 444 days.  I ask Undersecretary Burns to help us correct this situation.

Today, the regime in Tehran remains a repressive autocracy, committed to dominating the Persian Gulf and surrounding states through military coercion and political subversion, to promoting terrorism worldwide, and to undermining our vital national security interests.

The greatest danger is, arguably, its long-standing covert nuclear weapons program.
Six years ago, the existence of this program was revealed to the world and to the great surprise of the regime in Iran, which believed it had successfully hidden its illicit activities from teams of international inspectors for almost two decades.

According to the IAEA, Iran's repeated deceptions and breaches of its international obligations include work on manufacturing nuclear weapons.

In fact, it was recently reported that Iran has continued to make progress on highly sophisticated equipment whose only real use is for weapons-related purposes.

Among the IAEA’s discoveries are blueprints for constructing a nuclear warhead that experts believe may have been sold to Iran in the 1990’s by the network of A.Q.Khan, the “father” of Pakistan's nuclear bomb and the head of a smuggling network that sold nuclear plans, technology, and materials to North Korea and Libya, among others.

These revelations give added urgency to two concerns highlighted by the IAEA in its May 2008 report on the Iranian nuclear program.

The first is that Iran has made significant progress in constructing and operating the centrifuges needed to enrich uranium to weapons-grade levels.

The second is that Iran's refusal to cooperate fully with the IAEA inspectors in answering questions regarding a number of issues such as:
• studies on high explosives testing for nuclear warheads, and
• the development of missiles capable of carrying those warheads.

As today’s news reports clearly show, Iran already has short and medium-range missiles capable of reaching U.S. forces and allies in the region and is also pursuing long-range ballistic missiles to enable it to reach Europe and possibly  the U.S..

Notably, Iranian officials were present at the July 2006 North Korea missile tests, which included the firing of two long-range Taepodong-2 missiles—estimated by U.S. intelligence agencies as having a potential range reaching as far as Alaska.

Three UN Security Council resolutions have been adopted that require Iran to suspend uranium enrichment and reprocessing efforts but require only minimal sanctions for Iran’s failure to adhere to its nonproliferation obligations.

At the same time, the regime’s strategy of delay, manipulation, and selective threats has succeeded in securing inducements from the rest of the world.

Earlier this month, Javier Solana, the European Union’s foreign policy chief, was back in Tehran, presenting his latest offer from the P5 +1 groups of nations.

This most recent offer to Iran includes expanded cooperation in telecommunications, agriculture, and civil aviation, but also nuclear fuel guarantees and assistance in building a light water nuclear reactor! 

Yes, we are offering Iran nuclear assistance for peaceful purposes as a means of convincing the Iranian leadership to give up a nuclear program, which they claim is for peaceful purposes.

This conflicting approach is reminiscent of another six-nation process involving another rogue regime of proliferation concern. 

That is, of course, North Korea. The Six-party Talks on North Korea’s nuclear program that recently resulted in the President’s announcement that he intends to remove North Korea from the list of state-sponsors of terrorism, in exchange for a declaration by North Korea that fails to address:
• the number of plutonium weapons it produced,
• the assistance provided to Syria and other state-sponsors of terrorism, and
• North Korea’s uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities.
 
The similarities are there and are frightening.

Although we rightly focus on Iran’s nuclear program, there are other threats as well.
 
Among the most important is the Iranian regime’s status as the world’s leading state sponsor of Islamist militants, which it uses to undermine governments and countries in the region and beyond.

One need look no further than the 1994 bombing of the AMIA Jewish community center in Buenos Aires, Argentina to understand Iran’s reach half a world away.

Extensive evidence links the planning of the horrific attacks to the Iranian regime, and the execution of the attacks by the extremist group, Hezbollah, which is based in Lebanon, supported by Syria, and sponsored by Iran.

In fact, following investigations by the government of Argentina, it was concluded the AMIA bombing “was organized by the highest leaders of the former government of… Iran”.

The AMIA attacks resulted in the death of 85 people, and more than 300 wounded.

This demonstrates the clear and direct threat the Iranian regime poses to our national security.

I would appreciate your describing the steps the Administration is taking to develop an effective strategy to counter the Iranian regime’s expanding reach.

Finally, let me briefly turn to the subject of our relations with Russia and the Russian Federation’s assistance to Iran.

On May 13th, the Administration submitted to Congress the proposed U.S.-Russian nuclear cooperation agreement.

Yet, at the same time, it was asking for an extension of the waiver of provisions in the Iran/North Korea/Syria Nonproliferation Act that prohibit payments for Russian spacecraft used by U.S. for the International Space Station. 

The waiver is needed because the President cannot certify that the Russian government has taken satisfactory steps to prevent Russian assistance and transfers to Iran of technology and materials for missiles, and for both conventional and unconventional weapons programs.
 
Given this contradiction, on June 5th, several of my Republican colleagues and I, including a number on this Committee, sent a letter to President Bush asking him to withdraw from Congressional consideration, the proposed nuclear cooperation agreement with Russia.

I look forward to discussing this and other issues concerning the Iranian threat.