

U.N. PEACEKEEPING FORCES: A FORCE MULTIPLIER FOR THE U.S.?

HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND OVERSIGHT OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION

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CONTENTS

	Page
WITNESSES	
Steven Groves, J.D., Bernard and Barbara Lomas Fellow, The Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, The Heritage Foundation	6
Mr. Joseph A. Christoff, Director, International Affairs and Trade Team, Government Accountability Office	10
The Honorable James Dobbins, Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, National Security Research Division, RAND Corporation	32
The Honorable Timothy E. Wirth, President, United Nations Foundation	48
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING	
Steven Groves, J.D.: Prepared statement	8
Mr. Joseph A. Christoff: Prepared statement	12
The Honorable James Dobbins: Prepared statement	35
The Honorable Timothy E. Wirth: Prepared statement	51
APPENDIX	
Mr. Joseph A. Christoff: Revised prepared statement	82

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WEDNESDAY, JUNE 13, 2007

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS,
HUMAN RIGHTS, AND OVERSIGHT,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:13 a.m. in room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Bill Delahunt (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I thought I would inform the panel and the audience as to why there is the absence of Mr. Rohrabacher and my colleagues. It behooves me to note that, last evening, we were on the floor of the House voting until about 2:30 a.m., and I presume that some of the members have had difficulty rising early this morning. So, with the approval of the ranking member, who hopefully will join us shortly, let me proceed.

First of all, welcome to a very distinguished panel, and on behalf of my good friend and Ranking Member Dana Rohrabacher, I again extend a warm welcome to the four of you. This is truly a distinguished panel.

As you are aware, this hearing is about the effectiveness of the United Nations peacekeeping operations. With the ongoing war in Iraq, we need to seriously think about how we accomplish as a Nation our foreign policy objectives with global challenges such as the spread of nuclear weapons, the continued threat of al-Qaeda, thousands of civilians being killed and displaced around the world, constrained resources arising from historically high deficits, and a United States military stretched thin.

Engaging multilateral organizations can help the United States to safeguard our national interest at a lower cost to the United States and to the American taxpayer. I would submit that nowhere is this more evident than with United Nations peacekeeping. In military terms, they can be a force multiplier. In somewhat more colloquial language, they increase the bang for our buck.

A recent GAO report commissioned by Mr. Rohrabacher and myself found that if the United States were to conduct its own peacekeeping operation in Haiti, it would cost American taxpayers eight times as much as the United Nations mission does. Eight times. Let me repeat that. I have no doubt that without the United Nations' presence, we would have witnessed an orgy of violence on that tragic island. Secretary Rice remarked that "if there were not

Brazilians in Haiti as United Nations peacekeepers, there would be U.S. Marines.”

Of course, with the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States military is stretched to the breaking point. We read those reports on a regular basis. The fact of the matter is that, in Haiti, the United Nations is furthering our interest at a comparatively low cost, and the same goes for other U.N. operations around the world, whether in Lebanon, West Africa or the planned mission in Darfur.

It should be noted that yesterday it was reported that an agreement was reached which would authorize an expansion of up to 25,000 AU-United Nations peacekeepers from the current 7,000 in Darfur. Many on this committee have expressed concern about the ongoing genocide in that region, and this new development at least offers hope. Where would we be without the United Nations as an option?

Secretary Rice also observed that, in her words, United Nations peacekeeping is more cost-effective than using American forces, and, of course, America does not have all of the forces to do all of the peacekeeping missions, but somebody has to do them. “Well, the peacekeeping operation is the way that we do something, and we do it for other people’s forces.” Those are the words of Secretary Rice.

Furthermore, because it is a multilateral organization, the United Nations is often able to go where the U.S. would not necessarily be welcomed, but where we have a significant interest. For example, the U.N. mission on the Israeli-Lebanon border is seen as a more neutral force than would be an American deployment. In fact, if they were U.S. troops, I would expect that they would be facing daily combat and terrorist attacks. Instead, the U.N. mission seems to have kept the peace, at least temporarily.

I would also note that Prime Minister Olmert of Israel yesterday suggested the possibility of an international peacekeeping force on the border of Gaza and Israel. I have no doubt that the U.N. will continue to be asked to respond to international crises that would obviate the need for American military involvement.

Now, I have no illusions about the need for reform, continued reform, in terms of U.N. peacekeeping. I am well aware of its problems and believe that efforts to reform should be a U.N. priority. Like many others, I am clearly concerned about reports of abuse of women and children. The goal of reform should be to make peacekeeping more effective, not just to address the scandal of the day. I am particularly interested in ensuring that peacekeepers are held accountable for any harm that they cause to the very civilians that they are supposed to protect.

As a permanent member of the Security Council, the United States has backed the creation and the renewal of every U.N. peacekeeping operation. Nevertheless, even as we continue to authorize new missions, we are not paying our dues fully to support them; in fact, we are behind. But I know that the House Appropriations Committee has sought to make up for some of that shortfall.

This is not just an academic discussion. The United Nations is currently in the midst, as I said, of planning its largest peacekeeping operation ever: The mission in Darfur to stop the genocide.

I recognize the work that the administration has done so far to support this, and I know that other member states bear more responsibility than we for the delay in the deployment of this force, but U.N. peacekeeping must be fully funded so that we have a chance to be effective.

Now, before introducing our witnesses, let me turn to my good friend and ranking member, the late—well, I do not mean “late”—the gentleman from California for any remarks that he may wish to make.

Dana.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much.

Let me compliment the chairman for having been up last night, working as long as I was, and still being on time this morning. I hope that your sense of responsibility and my can of Red Bull will carry us through today.

We have a fundamentally different philosophy when it comes to multilateral approaches to solving problems in the world. I do not see the United Nations as being the positive force that you have observed. For example, when I see U.N. peacekeepers, generally I see that there are large numbers of troops that are ill-equipped and ill-trained, as compared to our own military; people from Third World countries sending troops to various other countries, who then have their nationals participate. Their effect on the mission and their actual ability to achieve the goals are so small compared to what American troops, who are well-equipped and well-trained, can do.

We have all heard about Abu Ghraib, you know, and let us just note that that pales in comparison to the monstrous crimes that have been committed under U.N. troop auspices in Africa, where millions of people have been killed while U.N. troops were present in Bosnia. One incident comes to mind where even Dutch troops were present while 8,000 people were slaughtered. But, of course, the world and others who are analyzing, you know, the nature of governments and activities like this in this world, focus on Abu Ghraib, while the world has forgotten these at least hundreds of thousands of people slaughtered while U.N. troops did not do their job. Again, of the troops that come, many of them are not well-trained, and they are not well-disciplined.

For example, the United Nations has had 7 years to implement operational management reforms recommended by the Brahimi report and over 2 years to implement the recommendations contained in the Ziad report on sexual exploitation and abuse by U.N. peacekeepers. Where is the reform?

How can we sit here and suggest that we are going to move toward a situation where we are more dependent on this type of cooperation with troops who conduct themselves in that way? It suggests, of course, that the United States troops do make mistakes. Let us note that, as to everybody involved in Abu Ghraib—as compared to slaughtering those other people, which was ignored—we actually kicked them out of the service, and there was heavy discipline and a public recognition of their misbehavior and their criminal activity. I do not see that happening with U.N. troops from other countries. I see just the opposite, where people are getting away with this sort of stuff. Now, with that in mind, can we

just say, yeah, we are going to save some money here by dealing through the U.N.?

I do not believe that we, the United States, should be sending troops to Darfur. I do not. I do not believe that. I do not believe we should be sending our troops all over the world to try to right every wrong. We should not be on the side of the evil or bad people who are doing things, but at the same time, we do not owe it to the world to send our troops everywhere and try to be the force that saves everyone. You know, we should at least be siding with those people who we consider to be more pro-democratic or some people who actually are more benevolent in certain areas as compared to other forces. But in Darfur, I will wait and see.

I am sure that we are going to be doing something there, or the U.N. will be doing something there. It will be interesting to watch, because the U.N. troops that have gone to other countries in Africa have not been effective, and I will be anxious to hear from the panel of why I am wrong on this. I am open-minded. I will listen to what you have to say. You know, I will. I will listen to it.

As I say, when I notice that so many of these horrendous failures of the United Nations have been ignored, failures that have cost the lives of hundreds of thousands of people, I do not have faith in the organization. Up until recently, the United Nations just turned its back on reforms that were necessary to cure the scandals. We finally got some action, but it took an enormous amount of time to get the executives at the U.N. to pay attention to the scandals that we, ourselves, on this committee were trying to bring forth to their attention.

So, with that said, I have a great deal of skepticism, but I am an honest person, and I think the American people are honest, and I am willing to listen.

I thank you. I am grateful to you for bringing a provocative topic that we can listen to and stir public debate about.

Thank you so much.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I thank the gentleman for his remarks.

I do agree with one of his observations in terms of sending American troops all over the world. I do not think we have any troops left to send anywhere, to be perfectly candid with you, but I would note that there are, as of December 31st, 2006, some 300 American personnel serving in U.N. peacekeeping, and I would note that there are 80,000 uniformed personnel from elsewhere, from other nations, who are serving in U.N. peacekeeping operations.

I think it is important to put that in context because I would suggest that not only are we saving precious taxpayer dollars, but we are saving American lives, because, as I indicated in my opening statement, I daresay, that if American military forces were stationed and deployed along the border between Lebanon and Israel, it would have incited terrorist attacks and clearly implicated American forces in yet another quagmire.

Let me begin by briefly introducing all of the witnesses here, and then we will go to opening statements.

Let me begin with Senator Wirth. He has a splendid resume here that would take a long time to read, but let me try to shorten it. He is the president of the United Nations Foundation and Better World Fund. He had the honor of serving from 1975 to 1987 as a

Member of the United States House of Representatives from Colorado. He then was elected to the Senate, where he focused on environmental issues such as global climate change and population stabilization. From 1993 to 1997, the Senator served as the first Under Secretary for Global Affairs at the Department of State. He has led the formulation of the U.N. foundation's mission and program priorities, which include the environment, women and population, children's health, and peace, security, and human rights. He is a graduate of Harvard, which clearly makes him a distinguished gentleman, and he holds a Ph.D. from Stanford.

Welcome, Senator.

Next is Ambassador Jim Dobbins. He is the Director of International Security and Defense Policy Center at the RAND National Security Research Division. Prior to this position, he served as Assistant Secretary of State for Europe. He was intimately involved in the Balkans during the conflagration that was occurring there. He is a Special Assistant to the President for the Western Hemisphere. We first met when he had the brief, if you will, for Haiti at a particularly difficult time in the history of that tragic nation. He was the special advisor to the President and Secretary of State for the Balkans. He was the Bush administration's representative to the Afghan opposition in the wake of 9/11, and he received his training at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service.

Welcome, Ambassador.

Joe Christoff is the Director of the Government Accountability's International Affairs and Trade Team. In this position he directs GAO's work at U.S. agencies. He is responsible for nonproliferation, export control and international security issues. He also leads the GAO efforts of reviewing reconstruction and security issues in Iraq.

I want to compliment him publicly for that specific work. It has greatly added to the public discourse, and it has been an essential component of information for Members of Congress.

He has testified before numerous congressional committees on these and other international affairs issues. He has a master's degree from American University and a B.A. in Public Policy from the University of Ohio. He, too, is a graduate of Harvard's Senior Executive Fellow programs and the MIT program on national security issues.

Joseph, welcome once more.

Steve Groves joined The Heritage Foundation in 2007 as the Bernard and Barbara Lomas Fellow at the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom. Mr. Groves is responsible for developing and running the Freedom Project, advancing Anglo-American leadership on global freedom issues, including human rights. From 2003 to 2006, Mr. Groves was senior counsel to the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations chaired by Senator Coleman of Minnesota. Mr. Groves holds a law degree from Ohio Northern University College of Law and a bachelor's degree in history from Florida State University.

Welcome, Steve.

Why don't we begin with the testimony by Mr. Groves. We will go back this way, and we will end up and have Senator Wirth as the cleanup here.

I understand that we are going to have votes around 11 o'clock. We do not use a gavel in this particular subcommittee, so you take your time, but at the same time, I would ask you to be aware of that 11 o'clock bell.

Mr. Groves.

STATEMENT OF STEVEN GROVES, J.D., BERNARD AND BARBARA LOMAS FELLOW, THE MARGARET THATCHER CENTER FOR FREEDOM, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION

Mr. GROVES. I will try to speak quickly.

Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Congressman Rohrabacher. Thank you for inviting me to testify this morning.

With southern Lebanon lurking in the near past and Darfur, as you mentioned, looming over the horizon, the issues relating to the utility and proper role of United Nations peacekeeping are ripe for debate.

Now, the title of today's hearing implies that U.N. peacekeepers could represent a force multiplier to U.S. Armed Forces. Now, "force multiplier" is a military term. It is a term describing a capability that, when added to and employed by a combat force, significantly increases the combat potential of that force and thus enhances the probability of success. U.N. peacekeepers, however, have not demonstrated in recent history an ability to reliably and adequately support United States combat operations, most notably in Somalia in 1993.

That being said, there are limited circumstances in which U.N. peacekeepers may qualify as a force multiplier under a very broad interpretation of that term. For example, U.N. peacekeeping missions may serve certain purposes in locations around the world where the United States has national interests, such as Haiti, as you mentioned, but they are situations where the United States has, for one reason or another, declined to intervene with its own armed forces.

The relevant issue today does not concern the semantics of whether or not U.N. peacekeepers are a force multiplier, but rather whether and under what circumstances U.N. peacekeeping serves the vital national interests of the United States.

Now, what qualifies as a "vital national interest" today in the post-9/11 world may not have necessarily qualified in the pre-9/11 world and vice versa. What is important is that the U.S. has benefited from the placement of U.N. forces in locations that otherwise may have required U.S. military intervention, which has, in turn, allowed U.S. forces to deploy elsewhere in the world where our vital national interests are actually at stake.

But our analysis cannot end there. Merely because in some limited circumstances U.N. peacekeeping serves U.S. interests, it does not follow that American taxpayers should be called upon to shoulder an increase in the level of U.S. contributions to U.N. peacekeeping operations or that they should pay any peacekeeping arrearages that are allegedly owed. That conclusion assumes that the status quo of U.N. peacekeeping operations is acceptable, which it is not. There are many problems with the current state of U.N. peacekeeping operations, all well documented in reports such as those issued by the U.S. Government Accountability Office and by

the U.N.'s own Office of Internal Oversight Services, including a recent finding that \$265 million worth of peacekeeping procurement contracts were subject to waste, fraud or abuse. But those problems pale in comparison to the main reason that the U.S. should not accept the status quo, and that is the persistence, as you mentioned, of sexual exploitation perpetrated by U.N. peacekeepers.

The instances of sexual exploitation have been widely reported and need not be described in detail here today, but suffice it to say that the irony of those abuses should not be lost on anybody in this room. It is beyond comprehension that U.N. peacekeepers who have been sent to protect the most destitute and desperate populations on Earth should use their position of power to sexually exploit those who have already been victimized by their circumstances.

Now, the worst punishment faced by U.N. peacekeepers who have been accused of sexual misconduct has been to be repatriated to their home countries, and this is apparently all the U.N. is empowered to do. Offending peacekeepers rarely face discipline, much less criminal prosecution, upon their return home. The U.K. *Independent* newspaper recently found that of 200 U.N. personnel who have been repatriated for sexual offenses over the past 3 years, none have been prosecuted in their home countries. That is what is unacceptable.

Now, there is a solution to this travesty, and the solution is for the United Nations to amend the Status of Forces Agreements that it enters into with member states that contribute peacekeeping personnel. Status of Forces Agreements, or SOFAs, memorialize the terms and conditions for the deployment of troops to peacekeeping missions. SOFAs generally place the responsibility upon troop-contributing countries to prosecute their own personnel for crimes committed during peacekeeping missions. However, there are no mechanisms available to the U.N. to either enforce or to monitor those provisions of the SOFA. So SOFAs should, therefore, be amended to require troop-contributing member states to investigate, prosecute and punish their nationals when there is credible evidence of criminal wrongdoing. Member states must be required to report to the U.N. on the status of its investigations and prosecutions as well as on the final disposition of all credible allegations. States that fail to fulfill their SOFA commitments should be barred from providing troops to peacekeeping missions, plain and simple.

The U.N. should also maintain a database of the names of peacekeeping personnel who have been accused, charged or convicted of crimes committed while serving in a peacekeeping mission. That is so that offenders are not permitted to participate in future operations.

Now, these changes will not guarantee that peacekeepers will not abuse local populations, but they will give strong incentives to contributing member states to take action against offenders, which is something they apparently have little interest in doing under the status quo.

In conclusion, it is premature to discuss whether and under what circumstances U.N. peacekeepers qualify as a force multiplier for the United States or whether peacekeepers could serve U.S. national interests. It is certainly premature to debate whether U.S.

taxpayer dollars should be used to increase or to augment our contributions to peacekeeping activities or to pay alleged arrearages. U.S. taxpayers do not want to continue to underwrite sexual abuse in the world's most desperate, war-torn nations. Only after the Status of Forces Agreements are amended and the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations has been reformed so that it may perform its duties at the highest level of professionalism, should those matters be addressed and debated.

Thank you very much and I look forward to answering any questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Groves follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF STEVEN GROVES, J.D., BERNARD AND BARBARA LOMAS FELLOW, THE MARGARET THATCHER CENTER FOR FREEDOM, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify this morning. With southern Lebanon in the near past and Darfur looming ahead, the issues relating to the utility and proper role of U.N. peacekeeping operations are certainly ripe for debate.

"FORCE MULTIPLIERS" AND U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS

At the outset, the term "force multiplier" should be dispensed with when assessing U.N. peacekeeping capabilities. "Force multiplier" is a military term defined as a capability that, when added to and employed by a combat force, significantly increases the combat potential of that force and thus enhances the probability of success. Force multipliers can be a technologically advanced weapons system, or simply holding the "high ground" during a military engagement.

The key term within the definition of force multiplier, however, is *combat*, which is why U.N. peacekeepers are not now and will not for the foreseeable future be a force multiplier for U.S. armed forces. U.N. peacekeepers have not shown the ability to reliably and adequately support U.S. operations in today's combat environment.

Part of the reason why U.N. peacekeepers cannot qualify as force multipliers is that they usually operate under an unclear or insufficient use of force mandate. Inadequate use of force mandates have had disastrous consequences in the past, such as the decision by U.N. forces to stand down in the face of atrocities and massacres in Rwanda in 1994 and Srebrenica in 1995. U.N. peacekeepers that, for whatever reason, have failed to defend themselves have been taken as hostages by hostile forces, as occurred in Sarajevo in 1995 and Sierra Leone in 2000. When U.S. forces most needed the assistance of U.N. troops—in Somalia in 1993—their performance was less than stellar by most accounts. These incidents do not inspire much confidence in U.N. peacekeeping capabilities.

That being said, U.S. administrations have often relied upon U.N. peacekeepers to serve certain limited purposes around the world where the United States has interests, but has declined to intervene with its own armed forces. If the U.N. peacekeepers qualify as a force multiplier, it is under those circumstances. In sum, U.N. peacekeeping forces are not a "force multiplier" unless you define that phrase broadly enough to include any instance that U.N. peacekeeping forces would be utilized instead of U.S. forces, which could in turn be deployed elsewhere in the world.

In the final equation, the debate over the utility of U.N. peacekeepers does not turn on semantics. The real question to be answered is not whether U.N. peacekeepers could possibly be a "force multiplier" for U.S. armed forces, but rather whether and under what circumstances U.N. peacekeeping serves the vital, national interests of the United States.

What does or does not qualify as a vital, national interest of the United States is a subject of debate among experts in international relations and military affairs. What qualifies as a vital, national interest to the United States in the post-9/11 world may not have qualified in the pre-9/11 world, and vice versa. Suffice to say for purposes of the present hearing that the United States has benefited from the placement of U.N. forces in locations where the world may have otherwise called for U.S. military intervention, which has in turn allowed U.S. forces to deploy elsewhere in the world where our vital national interests are actually at stake.

THE STATUS QUO IS UNACCEPTABLE

But the analysis does not end there. Merely because in some, limited circumstances U.N. peacekeeping serves U.S. interests it does not necessarily follow that American taxpayers should be called upon to shoulder an increase in the level of U.S. contributions to U.N. peacekeeping operations, or that they should pay any peacekeeping “arrearages” allegedly owed. That conclusion assumes that the status quo of U.N. peacekeeping operations is acceptable.

There are many problems, however, with the current state of U.N. peacekeeping operations, all well-documented in reports such as those issued by the U.S. Government Accountability Office and the U.N. Office of Internal Oversight Services. The U.N. peacekeeping program has more than quadrupled in size since 1999 without a commensurate strengthening of its internal control mechanisms. An internal U.N. audit of one billion dollars worth of peacekeeping procurement contracts found that at least \$265 million of those expenditures was subject to waste, fraud, or abuse.

Yet all other problems relating to peacekeeping operations pale in comparison to the main reason for not accepting the status quo—the persistence of sexual exploitation perpetrated by U.N. peacekeepers. The many instances of sexual exploitation are well known and need not be described in detail here, but suffice to say that the irony of those abuses should be lost on nobody. The fact that U.N. peacekeepers—who have been sent to protect the most destitute and desperate populations on Earth—should use their position of power to sexually exploit those who have already been victimized by their circumstances is beyond comprehension.

U.N. peacekeepers must be held accountable for their criminal acts if the U.N. is to be viewed as a force for peace and security around the world. In the past, peacekeepers who have been credibly accused of sexual misconduct or other crimes have, at worst, simply been repatriated to their home countries where they face no punishment. This is apparently all the U.N. is empowered to do. The results are sadly predictable. An analysis done by the U.K. Independent newspaper in January found that while nearly 200 U.N. personnel have been repatriated for sex offences over the past 3 years, none appear to have been prosecuted by their home countries.

That is simply unacceptable. At a minimum, any member state that contributes troops or personnel to a peacekeeping mission should be required to cooperate with investigations into abuse or misconduct leveled against those personnel. Such investigations may be carried out within the nation where the alleged crime occurred by local law enforcement, or if the capacity there is lacking, by U.N. authorities.

To combat sexual exploitation, the U.N. should implement mandatory, uniform standards of conduct for military as well as civilian peacekeeping personnel participating in U.N. missions. It is not enough (as is currently being proposed) to merely amend the existing “peacekeeper’s pocket guide,” which has clearly been ignored by offending peacekeepers for many years.

Rather than amend the pocket guide, the U.N. should amend the so-called “Status of Forces Agreements” that are entered into by and between the U.N. and each member state that contributes peacekeeping personnel to U.N. missions. Status of Forces Agreements memorialize the terms and conditions of the troop commitment. While these Agreements generally place the responsibility upon the troop-contributing countries to prosecute their own personnel for crimes committed during the peacekeeping mission, there are no enforcement mechanisms available to the U.N. to monitor that provision. Indeed, prosecutions for crimes committed by peacekeeping personnel when they return to their home countries are few and far between.

The U.N. must require that member states commit in their respective Status of Forces Agreements to investigate, try, and punish their personnel when credible evidence of wrongdoing exists. The Agreements should require member states to report on the status of prosecutions of personnel against whom credible allegations of misconduct were made. The member states must also commit to inform the U.N. of the outcome of such prosecutions. States that fail to fulfill those commitments should be barred from providing troops for peace operations. In addition, the U.N. must maintain a database of the names of all peacekeeping personnel who have been accused, charged, or convicted of crimes committed while employed in a peacekeeping mission so that the offender is not permitted to participate in future peacekeeping operations.

These new requirements will not guarantee that peacekeepers will not abuse local populations, but it should give strong incentives to contributing member states to take action against offenders, which is something they apparently have little interest in doing under the status quo.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it is premature to discuss whether and under what circumstances U.N. peacekeeping could serve as a "force multiplier" for U.S. armed forces or even whether peacekeepers could complement the vital national interests of the United States. It is certainly premature to discuss whether U.S. taxpayer dollars should be used to increase our contributions to peacekeeping activities or pay alleged "arrears." The United States cannot be seen as the underwriters of sexual abuse in the world's most desperate, war-torn nations. Only after the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations has been reformed in such a manner that it may perform its important duties at the highest level of professionalism should those matters be addressed.

Thank you.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Mr. Groves.
Joe Christoff.

**STATEMENT OF MR. JOSEPH A. CHRISTOFF, DIRECTOR,
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND TRADE TEAM, GOVERNMENT
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE**

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Mr. Chairman and Mr. Rohrabacher, thanks for inviting me back to talk to the committee today about the work that we completed for both of you last year. Our work at that time compared the costs of a U.N. peacekeeping mission in Haiti to the potential costs of a similar United States mission. We chose Haiti as a case study because both the United States and the U.N. have conducted operations in that country.

The current U.N. mission in Haiti is to provide security, to assist the government and to protect human rights. We used U.N. cost data in Haiti to develop comparable data for a United States operation, and the Joint Staff validated our assumptions as reasonable. We assumed deployment of the same number of military, civilian and police personnel. While our analysis cannot be generalized, it does provide useful insights into the costs and effectiveness of U.N. and U.S. peacekeeping troops.

Overall, we found that it would cost the United States twice as much as the U.N. to conduct a similar peacekeeping operation in Haiti. While the U.N. budgeted \$428 million, we estimate that a similar U.S. operation would cost \$876 million. The difference is primarily the result of higher U.S. costs for civilian police, military police, and facilities. Let me just briefly discuss each of these cost factors.

First, the estimated costs of deploying American police is \$217 million, or about eight times the \$25 million budgeted by the United Nations. Compensation rates for U.S. police include higher costs for salaries, special pay, and training; whereas, the U.N. pays police a standard daily allowance.

Second, the U.S. military in pay would cost \$260 million compared with \$131 million for the U.N. It costs the U.S. more for military salaries, equipment, and ammunition.

Third, U.S. facilities would cost twice as much as the U.N.'s because U.S. standards require a secure Embassy compound for U.S. civilians.

We also looked at several factors that could change U.S. costs, such as using reservists rather than active duty personnel, deploying troops faster or conducting the mission at a higher tempo. Each scenario would increase U.S. costs. For example, using reservists would cost an additional \$477 million.

Costs, however, is not the sole factor in determining whether the United States or the U.N. would lead a peacekeeping operation. Each offers strengths. Each offers limitations.

Traditionally, the U.S. military has provided quick deployment, a unified command-and-control structure, and well-trained and equipped personnel. For example, two United States-led peacekeeping efforts in Haiti were recognized as accomplishing their objectives rapidly and with minimal loss of life. However, ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have resulted in shortfalls in reservists who would be needed for peace operations. These include military police, engineers, and civil affairs experts. Also, the high operational tempo and the harsh conditions in Iraq and Afghanistan are taking a heavy toll on the military's equipment.

Now let us turn to the U.N. The United Nations' multinational character gives it a reputation for impartiality that a single nation may not have. For example, 41 countries contributed military and police personnel to the U.N. mission in Haiti during its first year. The U.N. can tap into a large network of humanitarian agencies and development banks. It can thus coordinate international assistance with its peacekeeping missions, and the U.N. has access to international civil servants with nation-building experience and diverse language skills.

However, the U.N.'s limitations include slow deployment, limits on command and control, and training and equipment standards that vary by country. The U.N. does not have a standing army, a police force or the needed equipment to deploy a force quickly. For example, during the first 12 weeks of the Haiti mission, the U.N. deployed only 30 percent of its authorized military troops and police.

The U.N. has limitations on the command and control of its peacekeeping forces. Troops are under the control of their own country, which diffuses the unity of command. In addition, while the U.N. sets standards of behavior, contributing countries must discipline their own troops. In 2003 and 2004, the U.N. had nearly 1,200 alleged cases of misconduct or crimes by its peacekeepers.

Finally, while many developing countries provide well-equipped troops with high professional standards, the U.N. reports that some troops have arrived without rifles, helmets or other necessary equipment.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement. I am happy to answer your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Christoff follows:]

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

Testimony
Before the Subcommittee on International
Organizations, Human Rights, and
Oversight, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery
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Wednesday, June 13, 2007

PEACEKEEPING

**Observations on Costs,
Strengths, and Limitations
of U.S. and UN Operations**

Statement of Joseph A. Christoff, Director
International Affairs and Trade



GAO
Accountability Integrity Reliability
Highlights

Highlights of GAO-07-998T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives

Why GAO Did This Study

As of June 2007, more than 100,000 military and civilian personnel are engaged in UN peacekeeping operations in 15 locations in Africa, Europe, Asia, the Americas, and the Middle East. In 2006, the United States provided the UN with about \$1 billion to support peacekeeping operations. Given that thousands of U.S. troops are intensively deployed in combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, UN peacekeeping operations are an important element in maintaining a secure international environment.

As requested, this testimony discusses (1) the costs of the current UN mission in Haiti compared with the estimated cost of a hypothetical U.S. operation and (2) the strengths and limitations of the United States and the UN in leading peace operations.

This testimony is based on our prior report and information we updated for this hearing. To estimate U.S. costs, we developed parameters for a U.S. mission similar to the UN mission in Haiti, which the Joint Staff validated as reasonable. We then applied DOD's official cost estimating model. However, it is uncertain whether the United States would implement an operation in Haiti in the same way as the UN.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/gettrpt?GAO-07-998T

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more information, contact Joseph A. Christoff at (202) 512-6979 or christoff@gao.gov.

June 2007

PEACEKEEPING

Observations on Costs, Strengths, and Limitations of U.S. and UN Operations

What GAO Found

We estimate that it would cost the United States about twice as much as it would the UN to conduct a peacekeeping operation similar to the UN mission in Haiti. The UN budgeted \$428 million for the first 14 months of the mission. A similar U.S. operation would have cost an estimated \$876 million. Virtually the entire cost difference can be attributed to cost of civilian police, military pay and support, and facilities. First, civilian police costs are less in a UN operation because the UN pays police a standard daily allowance, while U.S. police are given salaries, special pay, and training. Second, U.S. military pay and support reflect higher salaries and higher standards for equipment, ammunition, and rations. Third, U.S. facilities-related costs would be twice those of the UN and reflect the cost of posting U.S. civilian personnel in a secure embassy compound. When we varied specific factors, such as increasing the number of reserve troops deployed, the estimated cost for a U.S. operation increased.

Cost is not the sole factor in determining whether the United States or the UN should lead a peacekeeping operation. Each offers strengths and limitations. Traditionally, the United States' strengths have included rapid deployment, strong command and control, and well-trained and equipped personnel. However, ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have reduced personnel and equipment readiness levels and resulted in shortfalls for military police, engineers, and civil affairs experts. The UN provides broad multinational support for its missions, with a UN Security Council mandate and direction for its operations. The UN also has access to international civil servants, police, and senior officials who have nation-building experience and diverse language skills. Finally, the UN has fostered a network of agencies and development banks to coordinate international assistance with peacekeeping missions. However, the UN has traditionally had difficulties in rapidly deploying its forces and ensuring unified command and control over its peacekeeping forces.

Cost Estimate for a U.S. Operation and UN MINUSTAH Budget



Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense and State Department cost data.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the results of the work we completed for this subcommittee on the cost of a United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operation versus the cost of a similar U.S. operation. As of May 2007, more than 100,000 military and civilian personnel are engaged in UN peacekeeping operations in 15 locations in Africa, Europe, Asia, the Americas, and the Middle East. In 2006, the United States provided the UN with about \$1 billion to support peacekeeping operations out of a total peacekeeping budget of about \$5.5 billion. Given that U.S. troops are intensively deployed in combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, UN peacekeeping operations are a key element in maintaining a secure international environment.

My testimony today focuses on (1) the costs of the current UN mission in Haiti compared with the estimated cost of a hypothetical U.S. operation and (2) the strengths and limitations of the United States and the UN in leading peace operations. This testimony is based on our prior report¹ and information we updated for this hearing. We reviewed classified and unclassified information, but we used only unclassified information in this statement. We selected the UN mission in Haiti as a case study because both the United States and the UN have conducted operations in that country, thus providing comparative information on their two approaches. However, it is uncertain whether the United States would implement an operation in Haiti in the same way as the UN, given operational, structural, and doctrinal differences. While the results of the review cannot be generalized to other U.S. and UN operations, we believe this report provides useful insights into the costs and effectiveness of unilateral and multilateral peacekeeping missions.

To compare UN and U.S. costs to implement a comparable peacekeeping operation, we obtained budget data for the first 14 months of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). We developed a scenario for a U.S. operation in Haiti that used the same deployment schedule as the UN, with the same number of military, civilian, and police personnel and aircraft over the same period. Officials from the Joint Staff validated this scenario as reasonable. We used DOD's Contingency Operation Support Tool to estimate military costs. DOD requires that this model be used to

¹GAO, *Peacekeeping: Cost Comparison of Actual UN and Hypothetical U.S. Operations in Haiti*, GAO-06-331 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 21, 2006).

generate estimates for all U.S. contingency operations, and it is used as the basis for the supplemental appropriation requests to Congress.¹ To estimate civilian costs, we used historical data and formulas from the Department of State. To assess the relative strengths and limitations of U.S. and UN forces, we analyzed UN and U.S. reports, including information on UN- and U.S.-led operations in Haiti, Iraq, and Afghanistan. We interviewed officials from DOD and State to get their perspectives on the strengths and limitations of UN- and U.S.-led operations. We conducted our work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Summary

We estimate that it would cost the United States about twice as much as it would the UN to conduct a peacekeeping operation similar to the UN mission in Haiti. The UN budgeted \$428 million for the first 14 months of the mission, of which the United States was responsible for \$116 million. A similar U.S. operation would have cost an estimated \$876 million. Virtually the entire cost difference can be attributed to three major elements: civilian police, military pay and support, and facilities. First, the estimated cost of deploying U.S. civilian police is \$217 million or about 8 times the \$25 million budgeted by the UN for international police officers. Compensation rates for U.S. police include higher costs for salaries, special pay and training, whereas the UN pays police a standard daily allowance. Second, we estimated that U.S. military pay and support would cost \$260 million, compared with \$131 million in the UN budget, and reflects higher salaries and higher standards for equipment, ammunition, and rations. Third, U.S. facilities-related costs would be twice those of the UN, reflecting the cost of posting U.S. civilian personnel in a secure embassy compound. Several factors could affect the estimated costs of a U.S. operation, including the mix of reserve and active duty troops and the rate of troop deployment. When we varied these factors—for example, by increasing the number of reserve troops deployed—the estimated cost for a U.S. operation increased.

Cost is not the sole factor in determining whether the United States or the UN should lead a peacekeeping operation. Each offers strengths and limitations. Traditionally, the United States' strengths have included rapid deployment, strong command and control, and well-trained and equipped

¹ *Department of Defense Financial Management Regulations*, 7000.14-R, vol. 12, Ch. 23, para. 2304.


personnel. However, ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have reduced personnel and equipment readiness levels and resulted in shortfalls for military police, engineers, and civil affairs experts. The UN provides broad multinational support for its missions, with a UN Security Council mandate and direction for its operations. The UN also has access to international civil servants, police, and senior officials who have nation-building experience and diverse language skills. Finally, the UN has fostered a network of agencies and development banks to coordinate international assistance with peacekeeping missions. However, the UN has traditionally had difficulties in rapidly deploying its forces and ensuring unified command and control over its peacekeeping forces.

Background

Both the UN and United States have a long history of conducting operations to promote peace and stability. The UN has undertaken more than 60 peacekeeping missions since 1948 and states that it has negotiated more than 170 settlements that have ended regional conflicts. As of June 2007, 15 UN peacekeeping operations were ongoing in Africa, Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and the Americas.³ As shown in figure 1, the number of military troops and police in UN peacekeeping operations has steadily increased from 29,140 personnel in 1996 to 83,071 in 2007, with a record number of peacekeepers deployed around the world by March 2007. The United States has led and participated in many peacekeeping operations, such as in Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans; as of April 2007, there were 310 U.S. military and police serving in UN operations. In contrast to the relatively few U.S. troops and police in UN operations, the United States has about 145,000 troops in Iraq and about 27,000 in Afghanistan in stability operations as of April 2007.

³Ongoing UN Peacekeeping Operations as of June 2007 include missions in Jerusalem, India/Pakistan, Cyprus, Syria, Lebanon, Western Sahara, Georgia, Kosovo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Liberia, Côte D'Ivoire, Haiti, Sudan, and Timor-Leste. Political missions supported by DPKO include missions in Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, and Burundi.

Figure 1: UN Military and Police Deployed to Peacekeeping Missions




Source: GAO analysis of UN data.

The United States is the largest financial contributor to UN peacekeeping, with payments of more than \$1 billion in 2006. In total, the United States pays 25 percent or more of the annual peacekeeping budget. (Figure 2 provides information about U.S. contributions to UN peacekeeping.) The UN annually assesses the United States about 26 percent of the UN peacekeeping budget (including higher percentages before 2006). However, U.S. legislation capped payments in 1995 at 25 percent, resulting in arrears. Congress has lifted the cap for some years.⁴ According to the Department of State, the amount of U.S. arrears for UN peacekeeping since 2005 is \$117 million. This amount reflects arrears as of June 2007. In addition, the United States, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, approved many UN peacekeeping missions and activities prior to 2005. According to the Department of State, U.S. arrears for these peacekeeping efforts total \$505 million, but State does not have legal authority to pay for them.

⁴The cap level changed in 2001 due to legislation and remained at around 27 percent from 2001 to 2005. The cap returned to 25 percent in 2006.


Figure 2: U.S. Payments for UN Peacekeeping



Source: GAO analysis of UN and State Department data.

Since 1993, the UN has maintained a nearly constant peacekeeping presence in Haiti to help stabilize the country, combat crime, and support elections (see figure 3). Since 1994, the United States has led two military interventions and one humanitarian mission to help stabilize the country. The primary task of the current UN mission in Haiti is to provide a secure and stable environment, assist the transitional government with Haiti's political processes, protect human rights, and support the Haitian National Police. Authorization for the mission is set to expire in October 2007, but the UN Security Council has renewed MINUSTAH's mandate since 2004. UN reports cite MINUSTAH's role in attempting to create a relatively stable security environment in most of the country. However, the overall situation is still volatile and sporadic armed violence continues.

Figure 3: U.S. and UN Operations in Haiti



Note: Operations Uphold Democracy and Secure Tomorrow were military interventions to provide security in Haiti and restore government control, Operation New Horizons was a humanitarian mission to develop infrastructure and provide medical and dental services.

The UN has spent about \$891 million from the inception of MINUSTAH in 2004 to June 2006. For the UN's current fiscal year for peacekeeping, ending June 30, 2007, the UN budgeted about \$491 million. (See table 1 for details on budgeted and actual UN expenditures for MINUSTAH.) The current budget of \$491 provides for 7,500 military personnel, 1,000 police in formed units, 897 civilian police, and 1,771 civilian officials and staff.

Table 1: Budgeted and Actual UN Expenditures for MINUSTAH (U.S. Dollars)

Fiscal year of MINUSTAH operations	Budgeted by UN	Expended by UN
05/01/04 to 06/30/04	\$49,259,800	\$34,556,100
07/01/04 to 06/30/05	\$379,046,800	\$377,235,300
Total for first 14 months of operation	\$428,306,600	\$411,791,400
07/01/05 to 06/30/06	\$516,488,500	\$479,636,600
07/01/06 to 06/30/07	\$490,636,200	N/A
Total cost for MINUSTAH	\$1,435,431,300	\$891,428,000

Source: GAO analysis of UN budgetary data.

Estimated Costs for a U.S. Operation Are at Least Twice the Cost of a Similar UN Mission

We estimate that it would cost the United States about twice as much as it would the UN to conduct an operation similar to the UN mission in Haiti. Virtually the entire difference is attributable to the higher cost of civilian police, military pay and support, and facilities. The difference also reflects the additional cost of ensuring high U.S. standards for training, troop welfare, and personnel security. If the United States were to deploy a higher percentage of reserves rather than active duty troops, deploy more quickly, or operate at a higher intensity, U.S. costs would be higher.

Estimated U.S. Costs Are Higher in Major Categories

From May 1, 2004, to June 30, 2005—the first 14 months of MINUSTAH—the UN budgeted costs for the operation totaled \$428 million.⁵ This budget assumed a phased deployment of 6,700 military personnel, 750 police in formed units, 872 civilian police officers, and 1,184 civilian administrators and staff. It also included the cost of operational support, equipment, facilities, and transportation.⁶ Financial responsibilities of the U.S. for MINUSTAH for the first 14 months were about \$116 million.

Using the same basic parameters of troop and staff deployment in Haiti for 14 months, we estimate that a comparable U.S. operation would cost about \$876 million, slightly more than twice as much as the UN. Table 2 details the differences between the UN and a hypothetical U.S. operation in major cost categories.

⁵For a detailed discussion of the methodology used to construct the U.S. operation cost estimate and alternate scenario cost estimates, see appendix I of *Peacekeeping: Cost Comparison of Actual UN and Hypothetical U.S. Operations in Haiti*, GAO-06-331 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 21, 2006).

⁶The UN cost estimate does not include the general overhead costs incurred to support all peacekeeping missions, such as the costs of running the Department of Peacekeeping Operations at the UN headquarters in New York and the UN logistics base in Brindisi, Italy. We likewise did not include DOD overhead costs in the U.S. operation estimate.

Table 2: UN and U.S. Costs for a Peacekeeping Operation in Haiti (U.S. dollars in millions)

Major cost categories	Budgeted UN cost	Estimated U.S. cost	Difference between UN budget and U.S. estimate
Transportation	\$94	\$100	-\$6
Facilities and related costs	100	208	-108
Medical/health costs	5	22	-17
Military personnel pay and support	131	260	-129
Civilian personnel (non-police)	63	46	17
Civilian police	25	217	-192
Miscellaneous	10	23	-13
Total cost	\$428	\$876	-\$448

Source: GAO analysis of DOD and State Department cost data.

As table 2 illustrates, the costs for civilian police, military pay and support, and facilities account for most of the difference between the two operations. These differences are explained below.

- Civilian police.* The UN budgeted \$25 million to deploy 872 civilian officers for MINUSTAH, while we estimate that it would cost the United States \$217 million to deploy the same number of civilian U.S. police officers. The UN provides a daily allowance for police and does not reimburse countries contributing police for the officers' salaries. U.S. costs, however, include salaries, special pay, benefits, equipment, and special training.
- Military pay and support.* The UN budgeted \$131 million for pay and support of military troops, while we estimate it would cost the United States \$260 million for the same number of soldiers. The UN costs are based on a monthly payment of up to \$1,400 per soldier to contributing nations for basic pay and allowances, clothing, equipment, and ammunition. U.S. costs include pay and allowances for troops, as well as clothing, arms, protective gear, and rations. U.S. costs provide a higher standard of living for U.S. soldiers and higher standards for equipment, nutrition, health, and morale.
- Facilities.* The UN budgeted \$100 million for facilities-related costs, while we estimate that the cost to the United States would be \$208 million. The UN budget includes acquisition and construction of troop and civilian housing and equipment and supplies. U.S. facilities must meet State Department security standards, which include posting civilian staff within secure U.S. embassy or consulate compounds. Also, U.S. agencies with


staff in these compounds would be required to contribute to State's Capital Security Cost-Sharing Program.⁷

**Alternative Military
Assumptions Generated
Higher U.S. Cost Estimates**

According to U.S. experts, changes in the underlying planning factors significantly affect the estimated cost of a U.S. operation. Based on consultations with the joint staff officials and other experts, we analyzed how the cost of a U.S. operation would vary if we (1) changed the mix of active duty to reserve soldiers from 85 percent active to an entirely reserve force, (2) assumed U.S. forces would fully deploy within 60 rather than 180 days, and (3) increased the intensity of the operation. As figure 4 shows, each of these changes increased the estimated costs for a U.S. operation.

⁷The Capital Security Cost-Sharing Program was developed to accelerate the building of 150 new secure embassies and consulates around the world and to ensure that all agencies with overseas staff assign only the number of staff needed to accomplish their overseas missions. Each agency's assigned cost is based on its total overseas personnel. See Pub. L. No. 108-447, 118 Stat. 2808, 2920, Div. B., sec. 623 (2004). See also GAO, *Embassy Construction: Proposed Cost-Sharing Program Could Speed Construction and Reduce Staff Levels, but Some Agencies Have Concerns*, GAO-05-32 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 2004).

Figure 4: Impact of Three Cost Factors on Base Estimate for a Hypothetical U.S. Operation



Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense and State Department cost data.

Specifically, the changes resulted in these increases in each category:

- By deploying an all reserve force, the estimated U.S. cost would increase by \$477 million. The increase is because DOD must begin to pay full active duty military salaries to reservists when they are activated for an operation. Officials from the Joint Chiefs of Staff confirmed that this is one of a number of possible scenarios of a U.S. operation.
- By fully deploying U.S. troops in 60 days, U.S. costs would increase by about \$60 million due to additional military pay and support for all troops deployed during the operation's initial months. Joint Staff noted this as a possible U.S. option for Haiti.
- DOD measures the intensity of a military operation, or operational tempo, on a scale from 1 to 3. The higher the number, the more heavily the forces use equipment and the higher the operations and maintenance costs. By increasing the operational tempo from 1.5, which is typical for

peacekeeping, to 2, U.S. military costs would increase by \$23 million due to increased expenses such as fuel.

U.S. and UN-Led Operations Each Have Strengths and Limitations

Cost is not the only factor in deciding whether the United States or the UN should lead a peace operation. The United States and the UN each have strengths and limitations that could affect the success of an operation. The traditional strengths of a U.S.-led operation stem from the well-established U.S. military infrastructure, which provides rapid deployment capabilities, unified command and control, and well trained and equipped personnel. However, operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have led to shortages in key personnel and strained troop and equipment readiness. Also, in some locations a U.S.-led force may not be perceived as being impartial. Among the strengths of a UN operation are its multinational participation and extensive experience in peace operations, but the UN has limitations in deploying a force, ensuring it is adequately equipped, and providing strong command and control.

U.S. Military Has Elements Critical for Peacekeeping, but Faces Shortages of Personnel and Equipment

Traditionally, U.S. operations have benefited from the advantages of a strong and well-established military that has provided quick deployment, a unified command and control structure, and direct access to well-trained military personnel and equipment. For example, two U.S.-led peacekeeping efforts in Haiti were recognized as accomplishing their objectives rapidly and with minimal loss of life. In the 1994 mission in Haiti, the United States provided leadership to multinational forces and ensured adequate troops and resources were available to carry out the operation.

The following strengths of the U.S. military have led to successful U.S. peacekeeping efforts.

- *Rapid deployment.* According to a 2000 UN report, the first 6 to 12 weeks following a ceasefire or peace accord are often the most critical for establishing a stable peace and a credible new operation; opportunities lost during this period are hard to regain. UN and U.S. officials have stated that a key strength of the U.S. military has been its ability to rapidly deploy in part because it has traditionally emphasized readiness of the forces as a major objective. DOD systematically measures the readiness of its forces and produces the Joint Quarterly Readiness Review to monitor its readiness posture. This has helped the United States rapidly deploy in past operations. For example, in 1994, the United States deployed an operation in Haiti within 60 days of the issuance of a UN Security Council

Resolution. The 20,000-member force quickly established itself in 500 locations throughout Haiti and achieved its primary goals within 76 days.

- *Unified command and control.* According to the UN, clear and cohesive command and control, including communications and intelligence are critical for effective operations. According to Joint Staff officials, operations in Haiti were effective because the United States used its cohesive command and control structure, a reliable communication system, and good field intelligence. With regard to intelligence, the United States can draw upon the extensive resources of the U.S. intelligence community, consisting of an array of agencies, departments, and offices throughout the U.S. government. For example, the Defense Intelligence Agency, with more than 7,500 military and civilian employees worldwide, produces and manages foreign military intelligence for warfighters, defense policymakers, and force planners in support of U.S. military planning and operations. The Central Intelligence Agency and the U.S. Navy, Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force, among other organizations, also provide intelligence support to U.S. military operations.
- *Tradition of well trained and equipped personnel.* A key element of DOD's mission is to train and equip its personnel to a high standard and DOD spends considerable amounts to do so. As of 2006, DOD was spending more than \$17 billion annually for military schools that offer nearly 30,000 military training courses to almost 3 million military personnel and DOD civilians. With regard to equipment, DOD spends billions every year to purchase and maintain equipment. Since fiscal year 2002, Congress has appropriated about \$38 billion to the Army for the reset (repair, replacement, and modernization) of equipment that has been damaged or lost as a result of combat operations. In addition, DOD uses soldiers and contractors to repair vehicles and other equipment where the equipment is located.

However, ongoing operations in Iraq have challenged U.S. capabilities in key areas. Specifically, current shortages of the critical personnel skills and equipment needed for operations are a limitation that could affect U.S. ability to lead a peacekeeping force. A second limitation of a U.S.-led force is perceived lack of impartiality in some locations.

- *Current shortages of critical skills and equipment.* Our work has shown that ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have challenged DOD's capabilities and created a continuing high demand for certain combat

specialties, including military police, engineers, and civil affairs experts.⁸ Many of these skills reside heavily in the reserve military component due to current force structuring practices. DOD policy restricts the duration of deployment and activation of reserve forces. As operations in Iraq and Afghanistan continue and the number of deployed reservists increases, it is likely to become increasingly difficult for DOD to identify reserve personnel in high-demand areas who are eligible to deploy. We reported that the Army National Guard and Army Reserve, for example, are already stretched to a point where their readiness for additional deployments, or homeland security crises, has been degraded.⁹ In a January 2007 report, we stated that current operations are also taking a heavy toll on the condition and readiness of the military's equipment due to strain created by the high operational tempo and harsh environmental conditions of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.¹⁰

- *Perceived lack of impartiality.* In some locations, a U.S.-led force may not be perceived by the local people and neighboring countries as an impartial and fair force. These two qualities, according to the UN and U.S. officials, are key to gaining the confidence and trust of the people. State and DOD officials stated that Lebanon is a good example. These officials considered several options for assisting Lebanon, following the 2006 hostilities with Israel, including a U.S.-led peace operation, a NATO-led one, or a modified UN operation. U.S. officials concluded that either a U.S. or a NATO-led operation would be perceived by some factions in Lebanon and by neighboring countries as a threat and a potentially hostile force. Thus, the UN operation was considered the most politically feasible option and the UN Security Council, with U.S. support, expanded the UN peacekeeping force in Lebanon.

⁸GAO, *Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight*, GAO-07-308SP (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 9, 2007).

⁹GAO, *Force Structure: DOD Needs to Integrate Data into Its Force Identification Process and Examine Options to Meet Requirements for High-Demand Support Forces*, GAO-06-962 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 5, 2006).

¹⁰GAO, *Defense Logistics: Preliminary Observations on the Army's Implementation of Its Equipment Reset Strategies*, GAO-07-439T (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31, 2007).

UN Has Multinational Participation and Extensive Experience, but Has Limitations in Rapidly and Effectively Deploying Its Initial Force

The UN's strengths in peacekeeping are rooted in the multinational character of its operation as well as extensive experience with peacekeeping and related nation building. The UN has developed a structure for coordinating international organizations involved in nation building and has access to a pool of experienced and skilled international civil servants, including personnel with diverse language capabilities.

- *Multinational participation.* As of May 2007, 115 countries had military troops or police serving in UN operations. According to State and DOD officials, this multinational character and the UN Security Council mandate provide international legitimacy and direction for its operation. MINUSTAH also demonstrates the multinational character of UN operations. During the first year, MINUSTAH was comprised of 7,624 military staff and police personnel from 41 countries, with the United States contributing 29 military and police personnel.
- *Experienced peacekeeping officials.* The UN has developed a cadre of senior officials who have gained experience with peacekeeping and nation-building activities over many missions. The international nature of the UN also provides access to a large pool of civil servants and security personnel with native language speaking abilities and translation skills. As of May 2007, almost 5,700 international civil servants were deployed to UN peacekeeping missions with 12,400 local civilian staff and some 2,000 UN volunteers supporting these operations.
- *Structure for coordinating international assistance.* The UN has fostered a network of humanitarian agencies and development banks that UN peacekeeping missions can draw on to coordinate the extensive humanitarian and developmental activities related to operations with broad, integrated mandates that include nation building. In Haiti, for example, MINUSTAH has established a framework for coordination that is integral to the mission's organization. With UN sponsorship, official donors in this network, including the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, have pledged over one billion dollars in development assistance.

The UN has several limitations in leading peace operations. Three of these are the lack of capacity to deploy quickly, limits on its command and control of forces, and considerable variance in the training and equipment standards of its multinational force.

- *Limited ability to deploy rapidly.* The UN has traditionally had difficulties in rapidly deploying the military and civilian positions needed for peacekeeping missions. According to the UN, the first 6 to 12 weeks

following a ceasefire are critical for establishing a stable peace presence. However, the UN does not have a standing army, a police force, or the needed equipment to deploy a force quickly. For example, during the first 12 weeks of MINUSTAH, only 30 percent of the authorized military troops and police in formed units were deployed by the UN to Haiti.

- *Limits on command and control.* The UN also has limitations on the command and control of its peacekeeping forces. According to DOD officials, the participation of multiple nations diffuses the unity of command, as each troop contingent is under the command of its national authority. The UN force commander is not assured that an individual or contingents will follow his orders. Command and control is also an issue for disciplinary actions against UN peacekeeping troops involved in criminal, sexual, or other misconduct. The UN sets standards of behavior, including prohibiting peacekeeping troops from criminal activities and sexual exploitation. The involvement of peacekeeping personnel in these activities has been documented in several operations' and the UN had nearly 1,200 cases of alleged misconduct or crimes by peacekeepers in 2003 and 2004. However, troop-contributing countries are responsible for disciplinary actions against their own troops. According to the UN, there is widespread perception among international observers that peacekeeping personnel rarely if ever face disciplinary charges. The UN is taking several steps to address this problem, such as developing specific standards of behavior for all UN troops and a model memorandum of understanding on conduct for all troop contributing countries. However, individual countries are still responsible for discipline of their own troops.
- *Varying equipment and training levels.* The equipment and training of military and police personnel provided to UN operations by contributing countries often varies. Developing nations are currently the largest contributors of personnel to UN peacekeeping operations. The UN states that, while many developing countries provide well-equipped troops with high professional standards, there are also situations in which the countries contributing troops cannot meet the equipment standards agreed to with the UN. The UN reports that some troops provided by contributing countries have arrived without rifles, helmets, or other necessary equipment. DOD officials stated that during previous operations in Haiti, the United States provided some equipment, provisions, and military supplies to UN troops that were deployed with insufficient equipment. Training levels vary widely by country with some troops having little previous training in peacekeeping operations. The United States, through the Global Peace Operations Initiative, is helping train troops from member UN nations that contribute to UN peacekeeping.


Conclusion

The costs, strengths, and limitations of the United States and the UN are important factors in considering who should lead a peacekeeping operation. A U.S. peacekeeping operation, as illustrated by the specific example in Haiti, is likely to be much more expensive than a UN operation. This one example cannot be generalized across all operations. However, many of the cost elements, such as police and military costs, are likely to be more expensive for a U.S.-led operation, regardless of location. The higher cost for a U.S. operation pays for a force that has traditionally deployed rapidly, operated effectively, and maintained high standards for equipment and training. However, combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past six years have strained U.S. troops, equipment, and readiness, limiting U.S. ability to lead a peacekeeping intervention. In some situations, a U.S.-led force would not be perceived as an impartial and fair force, further limiting its ability to conduct operations. The UN has certain strengths in leading a peacekeeping operation, including multinational participation and international legitimacy, access to international civil servants needed for peacebuilding activities, and a structure for coordinating international assistance. However, the UN has traditionally had difficulties in rapidly deploying its forces and ensuring unified command and control over its peacekeeping forces.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I will be happy to answer any questions you or the members of the subcommittee may have.

GAO Contacts and Acknowledgments

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Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Mr. Christoff.
Ambassador Dobbins.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JAMES DOBBINS, DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY CENTER, NATIONAL SECURITY RESEARCH DIVISION, RAND CORPORATION

Ambassador DOBBINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Anybody looking at the American occupation of Iraq for the first couple of years could be forgiven for thinking that this was the first time we had ever done something of this sort. It was one unanticipated challenge after another. It was one improvised response after another.

In fact, as you know, this was not the first time. In fact, it was the seventh time in a little more than a decade that the United States had liberated a country and then tried to rebuild it. We had gone into Kuwait in the early 1990s, and then we went into Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and, finally, Iraq. Of those seven countries, six are Muslim. The only one that is not is Haiti. So, when the American Army went into Iraq in 2003, there was no army in the world with more experience in nation-building, and there was no Western army in the world with more experience operating in a Muslim environment than the American Army.

So one has to ask how we can do this so often and yet do it so badly. The short answer is that, for most of that decade, we simply did not take the mission seriously. We did not regard it as a core mission of the U.S. military, and we did not professionalize our performance.

At RAND, we have tried to remedy this, to some degree, by studying the American experience with nation-building over the last 60 years, going back to the German and to the Japanese occupations, and we have also looked at the U.N. performance, and we have compared the two records. We looked at eight American missions, the ones I have mentioned, and we also looked at a similar number of U.N. missions beginning with the U.N. operation in the Belgian Congo in the early 1960s and then the more recent post-Cold War missions, which most of us are familiar with, and we evaluated the experiences against two criteria, very simple criteria. First, is the place still peaceful today, or is it not? Did the war resume? Secondly, is the place democratic today or not? We did not make a judgment there. We just used Freedom House ratings for countries as to whether they were more or less democratic.

The U.S. score was 50/50. That is, of the eight missions we looked at, four of those societies were peaceful and democratic—Germany, Japan, Bosnia, and Kosovo—and four were not, or at least not yet. Those included Haiti, Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan. The U.N. record on peaceful was actually seven out of eight. That is, seven of the countries in civil war had not resumed. As for the eighth, the Belgian Congo, the war had resumed, but only 30 years after the U.N. left, so it was not a complete waste.

On democracy, rather surprisingly, the U.N. scored six out of eight. That is, six of the eight countries that we looked at were judged by Freedom House as more democratic than not.

So it is not a bad record, and it is worth asking why the U.N. scored better than the U.S. on this test. One reason, of course, is we could have chosen different cases, and if we had, we would have gotten different results. We did not pretend this was a scientific sampling.

The second reason is that the U.S. cases were much harder. They were bigger. They were tougher. They were peace enforcement, not peacekeeping. There was opposition. In many cases, the U.S. had to invade to get there in the first place.

The third reason is also important, and that is that the U.N. simply had become more professional over the last 15 years, and the U.S. had not. The U.N. took this as its primary mission. They developed a cadre of people who go from one mission to the next and have experience in prior missions, and they reward those people and keep them on staff, and they developed an ongoing doctrine which slowly improved; whereas, the United States tended to treat each mission as if it were the first one it had ever done, and, worse than that, we tend to treat each of them as if it were the last one we are ever going to do, and we do not internalize the experience and draw on it the next time in the ways that we should.

Now, the administration has recognized that the American occupation of Iraq was not managed as well as it could be, and they have instituted a number of very important reforms. They have created an office in the State Department to do stabilization and reconstruction. The Secretary of Defense put out a directive making stabilization operations a core mission of the U.S. military, something, incidentally, that Bill Clinton probably would have been impeached for if he tried to do, and the White House has issued a directive establishing an interagency structure for managing these. These are important reforms, and in many ways they go beyond what the Clinton administration did in preparing for these operations, and this needs to be recognized.

Unfortunately, there is the chance that the American people are going to draw a different lesson from Iraq, and it is not that we need to do it better next time, but that we need to not do it again next time. And there is a real danger that we will turn away just as we turned away from counterinsurgency after Vietnam, that we will turn away from stabilization operations after Iraq and choose not to do this rather than to do it better.

Of course, my own view is that there are two lessons from Iraq. One is, sure, do not invade large, hostile, Middle Eastern countries on the basis of flawed intelligence with small, narrow coalitions. But there is another lesson. Iraq may have been a war of choice, but Afghanistan was not, and both of them left us with heavy nation-building burdens, and we are not going to be able to avoid this all the time. Therefore, I do think we need to get better.

Now, the tragedy is that, while most people's views of nation-building tend to be governed either by the early failures like in Somalia and the U.N. in Bosnia, as Congressman Rohrabacher has mentioned, and then by the most recent setbacks in Afghanistan and Iraq, the fact is that the record is actually pretty good. We got a lot better through the 1990s—we, the international community—at these things, and there are a dozen countries around the world that are at peace today and living, in most cases, under democratic

governments because the U.N. or NATO or the American peacekeepers went in and separated the combatants, and disarmed the contending parties, and oversaw the holding of elections, and installed democratically elected governments, and then stayed around long enough for those governments to consolidate themselves. So places like Namibia, Mozambique, Liberia, Sierra Leone, El Salvador, East Timor, Bosnia, and Kosova are all at peace today because of the success in nation-building and because of the increased professionalization that has taken place through a decade of very intense experience in the field.

What is absolutely remarkable is that, between 1993 and 2003, the number of wars in the world was cut in half, mostly civil wars. There were half as many still going in 2003 as there were in 1993. The number of people being killed went down even further. There were 130,000 people killed in 1993 as a result of conflicts. There were only 27,000 killed in 2003. What is even more remarkable is that these numbers have continued to go down since 2003 even despite the continued killing in Darfur and Iraq, and the reason that they have continued to go down is that, while the numbers in Iraq and Darfur are horrifying, even larger cuts in the level of conflict have been realized in sub-Saharan Africa where, incidentally, the United States is not doing any peacekeeping, and where the U.N. is doing all of the peacekeeping.

The fact is people are not killing each other in the Congo today, and the Congo is nearly 10 times bigger than Iraq, and the lives being saved as the result of peacekeeping in sub-Saharan Africa is a much higher number than the lives being lost in the conflicts that are still going on. So this has turned out to be a cost-effective, genuine and generally successful enterprise; although, it certainly has its setbacks and its spectacular failures.

The U.N. has limitations. It does not do invasions. If you are going to have to invade a country, you are going to have to go to a national coalition or to an alliance. The U.N. is not going to do it for you. The U.N. has never deployed more than about 20,000 troops in a single country. If you need more than that, you will have to go to NATO or to the U.S. or to somebody else, but within those limitations, the U.N. is likely to be the most cost-effective option, as the GAO Report suggests.

So it does not solve all of your problems. Peacekeeping does not stop genocide. Peacekeeping does not stop WMD proliferation. Peacekeeping does not stop aggression. Peacekeeping does not stop those kinds of things. It can prevent them from reoccurring, but it does not stop them. If you are insistent on stopping them, then you will have to go to some more muscular option, and that will probably require a nationally-led coalition, but in cases where the fighting has stopped and you do not want it to reoccur, U.N. peacekeeping is by far the most cost-effective option.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Dobbins follows:]

TESTIMONY

A Comparative Evaluation of United Nations Peacekeeping

JAMES DOBBINS

CT-284

June 2007

Testimony presented before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs'
Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight on
June 13, 2007

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Statement of James Dobbins¹
The RAND Corporation

A Comparative Evaluation of United Nations Peacekeeping²

Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight
United States House of Representatives

June 13, 2007

Mr. Chairman, I understand that the purpose of these hearings is to consider the importance the United States should attach to United Nations peacekeeping and nation building activities. In my testimony, I will compare United Nations performance in this area to that of other international organizations, to ad hoc multinational coalitions, and to that of the United States itself. In doing so, I will draw upon personal experience, having had the opportunity to oversee five successive nation building operations for the Clinton and Bush Administrations. Since leaving government in 2002 to join the RAND Corporation, I have continued to study the subject, co-authoring three volumes, the first of which examined eight American led nation building operations, the second eight UN led operations, while the third provided a guide for the management of future such missions.³

I will conclude with just a few words on the Oil for Food scandal, which has done so much to color American opinion of the United Nations over the past several years.

Choosing the Right Institutional Framework

Modern nation building requires a mix of military and civilian capacity, and of national, multinational and international participation. It therefore necessitates trade offs between unity of command and broad burden sharing. Both are desirable, but each can be achieved only at some expense to the other. For dangerous, highly demanding operations in which forced entry and

¹ The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are the author's alone and should not be interpreted as representing those of RAND or any of the sponsors of its research. This product is part of the RAND Corporation testimony series. RAND testimonies record testimony presented by RAND associates to federal, state, or local legislative committees; government-appointed commissions and panels; and private review and oversight bodies. The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.

² This testimony is available for free download at <http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT284>.

³ *America's Role In Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq*, Dobbins et al, RAND 2003, *The UN's Role In Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq*, Dobbins et al, RAND 2005, *The Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building*, Dobbins et al, RAND 2007.

conventional combat are likely to be necessary, the desire for unity of command normally prevails and nationally led coalitions of the willing are the preferred instrument. For sustained long-term commitments in reasonably secure environments considerations of burden sharing are more likely to predominate, leading to a more prominent role for international institutions. This mix can shift over time. A number of missions have begun with a nationally led entry phase, followed by an internationally led consolidation and transformation phase.

Many international institutions have the capacity to contribute to nation building operations, but only a few are structured to deploy military forces. These include the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Union, and the African Union (AU). The UN has the widest experience. NATO has the most powerful forces. The European Union has the widest panoply of civil capabilities. The African Union possesses none of these advantages.

Among international organizations, the United Nations has the most widely accepted legitimacy and the greatest formal authority. Its actions, by definition, enjoy international sanction. Alone among organizations, it can compel its member governments to fund such operations, even requiring contributions from those opposed to the intervention in question. The United Nations has the most straightforward decision making apparatus, and the most unified command and control arrangements. The UN Security Council is smaller than the equivalent NATO, EU, or AU bodies. It takes all decisions by qualified majority; only five of its members have the capacity to block decisions unilaterally. Once the Security Council determines the purpose of a mission and decides to launch it, further operational decisions are largely left to the Secretary General and his staff, at least until the next Security Council review, generally six months hence. In UN operations, the civilian and military chains of command are unified and integrated, with unequivocal civilian primacy and a clear line of authority from the UN Secretary General through his local civilian representative to the local force commander.

The UN is a comparatively efficient and cost effective force provider. In its specialized agencies, it possesses a broad panoply of civil as well as military capabilities needed for to nation-building. All UN-led operations, of which up to two dozen are routinely underway at any one time, are planned, controlled, and sustained by a few hundred military and civilian staffers at UN headquarters in New York. Most UN troops come from Third World countries whose costs per deployed soldier are a small fraction of any Western army. As of this writing, the United Nation deploys over 80,000 soldiers and police in nineteen different countries for a cost of some \$5 billion per year. This makes the United Nations the second largest provider of expeditionary forces in the world, after the United States but ahead of NATO, the EU or the AU. The UN spends

in one year on all nineteen of these missions about what it costs the United States for one month's operation in Iraq.

Needless to say, the UN also has its limitations. While the UN Security Council is more compact than its NATO and EU counterparts, it is regionally and ideologically more diverse, and subject to blocking in the face of strong East-West or North-South differences, as proved to be the case with Kosovo in 1999. On the other hand, the Kosovo operation was the sole occasion, since 1989, where NATO or the EU were agreed upon an intervention but the UN Security Council was not. Since 1989 the UN Security Council has agreed to launch more than forty operations, while the NATO Council has agreed to three and the EU Council a similar number. In 2002, the United States and the United Kingdom actually calculated that they had a better hope of securing UN support for their invasion of Iraq than they did of gaining endorsement from either NATO or the European Union.

The broad latitude enjoyed by the UN Secretary General and his local representatives in the operational control of blue helmeted operations facilitates unity of command, but serves to limit the willingness of some nations to contribute. NATO and the EU procedures offer troop-contributing members much greater day-to-day influence over the use of their contingents than do those of the UN. Western governments accordingly favor these institutions for peace enforcement missions, where the level of risk to their units is high.

Similarly, the austere nature of UN headquarters staffing for peacekeeping operations keeps costs down, but limits the organization's capacity to plan and support large or highly complex missions. As a practical matter, the United Nations' capacity to mount and sustain expeditionary forces tops out at about 20,000 soldiers, or a reinforced division. These forces always require permissive entry. The United Nations does not do invasions, although it has frequently authorized others to conduct them.

NATO, by contrast, is capable of deploying powerful forces in large numbers, and of using them to force entry where necessary. But NATO has no capacity for to implement civilian operations; it depends upon the United Nations and other institutions or nations to perform all the non-military functions essential to the success of any nation building operation. NATO decisions are by consensus; consequently, all members have a veto. Whereas the UN Security Council normally makes one decision respecting any particular operation every six months, and leaves the Secretary General relatively unconstrained to carry out that mandate during the intervals, the NATO Council's oversight is more continuous, its decision-making more incremental. Member governments consequently have a greater voice in operational matters, and the NATO civilian

and military staffs correspondingly less. This level of control makes governments more ready to commit troops to NATO for high-risk operations than to the United Nations. It also ensures that the resultant forces are often employed conservatively. National caveats limiting the types of missions to which any one member's troops may be assigned are a fact of life in all coalition operations, but have lately proved even more pervasive in NATO than UN operations. NATO troops are much better equipped than most of those devoted to UN operations, and correspondingly more expensive. The resultant wealth of staff resources ensures that NATO operations are more professionally planned and sustained, but the proportion of headquarters personnel to fielded capacity is quite high and correspondingly more costly.

EU decision-making in the security and defense sector is also by consensus. The European Union has a leaner military and political/military staff than NATO, in part because it can call upon NATO, if it chooses, for planning and other staff functions. The EU, like the UN, but unlike NATO, can draw upon a wide array of civilian assets essential to any nation building operation. Like NATO, EU soldiers, are much more expensive than their UN equivalents. EU decision making mechanisms, like those of NATO, offer troop contributing governments more scope for micro-managing military operations on a day-to-day basis than do the UN's.

Half or more of all nation-building operations take place in sub-Saharan Africa. Several African organizations, most recently the African Union, have organized peacekeeping missions. No AU member country has the capacity to conduct large-scale expeditionary operations. The African Union's efforts therefore tend to be even more dependent upon U.S. and European support than those of the United Nations. In consequence, the United States and its European allies may end up paying a larger share of the bill for AU than UN operations despite their lack of membership in the former organization. While AU interventions may be more acceptable to the host countries concerned than ones headed by the UN, NATO or the EU, this is probably for the wrong reason, the receiving government opting for the weaker presence.

The U.S. and UN Ways of Nation Building

Over the years the United States and the United Nations have developed distinctive styles of nation building derived from their very different natures and capabilities. The United Nations is an international organization entirely dependent upon its members for the wherewithal to conduct nation building. The United States is the world's only superpower, commanding abundant resources of its own, and access to those of many other nations and institutions.

UN operations have almost always been undermanned and under resourced. This is not because UN managers believe smaller is better, although some do, but because member states are rarely willing to commit the manpower or the money any prudent military commander would desire. As a result, small, weak UN forces are routinely deployed into what they hope, on the basis of best-case assumptions, will prove to be post-conflict situations. Where such assumptions prove ill founded, UN forces have had to be reinforced, withdrawn, or, in extreme cases, rescued.

Throughout the 1990s the United States adopted the opposite approach to sizing its nation-building deployments, basing its plans on worst case assumptions and relying upon an overwhelming force to quickly establish a stable environment and deter resistance from forming. In Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo, U.S.-led coalitions intervened in numbers and with capabilities that discouraged even the thought of resistance. In Somalia, this American force was too quickly drawn down. The resultant casualties reinforced the American determination to establish and retain a substantial overmatch in any future nation building operation.

In the aftermath of the September 2001 terrorist attacks, American tolerance of military casualties significantly increased. In sizing its stabilization operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the new American leadership abandoned the strategy of overwhelming preponderance (sometimes labeled the Powell doctrine after former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell) in favor of the "small footprint" or "low profile" force posture that had previously characterized UN operations.

In both cases these smaller American-led forces proved unable to establish a secure environment. In both cases the original U.S. force levels have had to be significantly increased, but in neither instance has this sufficed to establish adequate levels of public security.

It would appear that the low profile, small footprint approach to nation building is much better suited to UN-style peacekeeping than to U.S.-style peace enforcement. The United Nations has an ability to compensate, to some degree at least, for its "hard" power deficit with "soft" power attributes of international legitimacy and local impartiality. The United States does not have such advantages in situations where America itself is a party to the conflict being terminated, or where the United States has acted without an international mandate. Military reversals also have greater consequences for the United States than the United Nations. To the extent that the United Nations' influence depends more upon the moral than the physical, more upon its legitimacy than its combat prowess, military rebuffs do not fatally undermine its credibility. To the extent that America leans more on "hard" rather than "soft" power to achieve its objectives, military reverses strike at the very heart of its potential influence. These considerations, along with recent

experience, suggest that the United States would be well advised to resume super sizing its nation building missions, and leave the small footprint approach to the United Nations.

The United Nations and the United States tend to enunciate their nation building objectives very differently. UN mandates are highly negotiated, densely bureaucratic documents. UN spokespersons tend toward understatement in expressing their goals. Restraint of this sort is more difficult for American officials, who must build Congressional and public support for costly and sometimes dangerous missions in distant and unfamiliar places. As a result, American nation-building rhetoric tends toward the grandiloquent. The United States often becomes the victim of its own rhetoric, when its higher standards are not met.

UN-led nation building missions tend to be smaller than American, to take place in less demanding circumstances, to be more frequent and therefore more numerous, to define their objectives more circumspectly and, at least among the missions studied, and to enjoy a higher success rate than American-led efforts. By contrast, American led nation building has taken place in more demanding circumstances, has required larger forces and more robust mandates, has received more economic support, has espoused more ambitious objectives, and, at least among the missions studied, has fallen short of those objectives more often than has the United Nations.

In the first volume of our RAND study of nation building we looked at eight American led cases, and rated four of them as successful, the criteria being whether the society in question was currently peaceful and democratic. Germany, Japan, Bosnia and Kosovo rated as successes. Somalia, Haiti, Afghanistan and Iraq were rated not successful, or at least not yet. In the second volume we looked at eight U.N. led cases, and determined that seven were currently peaceful, and six democratic. These cases included the Congo, which was neither, Cambodia, which was peaceful but not democratic, and Namibia, Mozambique, El Salvador, East Timor, Eastern Slavonia, and Sierra Leone, which were rated as peaceful and more democratic than not.

There are three explanations for the better UN success rate. One is that a different selection of cases would produce a different result. Second is that the U.S. cases were intrinsically the more difficult. Third is that the United Nations has done a better job of learning from its mistakes than has the United States over the past fifteen years.

Throughout the 1990s the United States got steadily better at nation building. The Haitian operation was better managed than Somalia, Bosnia better than Haiti, and Kosovo better than Bosnia. The U.S. learning curve was not sustained into the current decade. The American Administration that took office in 2001 initially disdained nation building as an unsuitable activity

for U.S. forces. When compelled to engage in such missions, first in Afghanistan and then Iraq, the Administration sought to break with the strategies and institutional responses that had been honed throughout the 1990s to deal with these challenges.

In contrast, the United Nations has largely avoided the institutional discontinuities that have marred U.S. performance. The former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, was Undersecretary General for Peacekeeping and head of the UN peacekeeping operation in Bosnia throughout the first half of the 1990s, when UN nation building began to burgeon. He was chosen for the top post by the United States and other member governments largely on the basis of his demonstrated skills in managing the United Nations' peacekeeping portfolio. Some of his closest associates from that period moved up with him to the UN front office while others remained in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. As a result, UN nation building missions have been run over the past 15 years by an increasingly experienced cadre of international civil servants. Similarly in the field, many peacekeeping operations are headed and staffed by veterans of earlier operations.

The United States, in contrast, tends to staff each new operation as if it were its first, and is destined to be its last. Service in such missions has never been regarded as career enhancing for American military or Foreign Service officers.

Is Nation Building Cost Effective?

In addition to the horrendous human costs, war inflicts extraordinary economic costs on societies. On average, one study suggests, civil wars reduce prospective economic output by 2.2 percent per year for the duration of the conflict. However, once peace is restored, economic activity resumes and in most cases, the economies grow. Studies that look at the cost and effectiveness of various policy options to reduce the incidence and duration of civil wars find the post-conflict military intervention to be highly cost-effective, in fact, the most cost-effective policy examined.⁴

Rand studies support that conclusion. The UN success rate among missions studied, seven out of eight societies left peaceful, six out of eight left democratic, substantiates the view that nation building can be an effective means of terminating conflicts, assuring against their reoccurrence, and promoting democracy.

⁴ Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "The Challenge of Reducing the Global Incidence of Civil War," Centre for the Study of African Economies, Department of Economics, Oxford University, "Copenhagen Challenge Paper," April 23, 2004.

The sharp overall decline in deaths from armed conflict around the world over the past decade also points to the efficacy of nation building. During the 1990s deaths from armed conflict were averaging over 200,000 per year. In 2003, the last year for which figures exist, this number had come down to 27,000, a fivefold decrease in deaths from civil and international conflict. In fact, despite the daily dosage of horrific violence displayed in Iraq and Afghanistan, the world has not become a more violent place within the past decade, rather the reverse. Rather remarkably, this decline in the number of wars, and the number of casualties from such wars has continued to go down since 2003, despite the numbers killed in Iraq, Afghanistan and Darfur, largely due to successful UN peacekeeping in sub Saharan Africa, where casualty rates have gone down even more dramatically over the past four years than they have gone up in those three conflicts.⁵

The cost of UN nation building tends to look quite modest when compared to the cost of larger and more demanding U.S.-led operations. At present the United States is spending some \$4.5 billion per month to support its military operations in Iraq. This is about the same as the United Nations will spend to run all 18 peacekeeping of its current peacekeeping missions for a year. This is not to suggest that the United Nations could perform the U.S. mission in Iraq more cheaply, or perform it at all, but simply to underline that there are 18 other places where the United States will probably not have to intervene because UN troops are doing so at a tiny fraction of the cost of U.S. operations elsewhere.

Continuing Deficiencies

Even when successful, UN nation building only goes so far to fix the underlying problems of the societies it is seeking to rebuild. Such missions can be divided into three distinct phases: first, the initial stabilization of a war torn society; second, the recreation of local institutions for governance; and third, the strengthening of those institutions to the point where rapid economic growth and sustained social development can take place. Experience over the past fifteen years suggests that the United Nations has achieved a fair mastery of the techniques needed to successfully complete the first two of those tasks. Success with the third has largely eluded the United Nations, as it has the international development community as whole.

Despite the United Nations' significant achievements in the field of nation building, the organization continues to exhibit weaknesses that decades of experience have yet to overcome. Most UN missions are undermanned and under-funded. UN-led military forces are often sized and deployed on the basis of unrealistic best-case assumptions. Troop quality is uneven, and has

⁵ Human Security Center, University of British Columbia, *Human Security Report 2005: War and Peace in the 21st Century* and the *Human Security Report, 2006*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005 and 2006.

even gotten worse as many rich Western nations have followed U.S. practice and become less willing to commit their armed forces to UN operations. Police and civil personnel are always of mixed competence. All components of the mission arrive late; police and civil administrators arrive even more slowly than soldiers.

These same weaknesses have been exhibited most recently in the U.S.-led operation in Iraq. There it was an American-led stabilization force that was deployed on the basis of unrealistic, best case assumptions and American troops that arrived in inadequate numbers and had to be progressively reinforced as new, unanticipated challenges emerged. There it was the quality of a U.S.-led coalition's military contingents that proved distinctly variable, as has been their willingness to take orders, risks, and casualties. There it was that American civil administrators were late to arrive, of mixed competence, and never available in adequate numbers. These weaknesses thus appear endemic to nation building, rather than unique to the United Nations.

Conclusions

Nation building is tough work. Difficulties encountered by the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq put earlier UN failings in some perspective. UN-led nation building operations have been smaller, cheaper and, at least among the sixteen operations covered on our RAND studies, more successful than American. On the other hand, American-led operations have taken place in more demanding circumstances. Several, indeed, came in the wake of failed UN efforts, as occurred in Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia. Experience demonstrates that neither the United States nor the United Nations is yet fully equipped for these tasks, and both have much to learn. The most serious limitation on the UN's capacity for nation building, overall budget aside, is the increasing reluctance of First World governments, heavily influenced by the negative American example, to commit their forces to UN operations. It is important, nevertheless to recognize that despite these shortcomings UN and U.S.-led nation building efforts have saved millions of lives and freed many societies from war and oppression.

Assuming adequate consensus among Security Council members on the purpose for any intervention, the United Nations provides the most suitable institutional framework for most nation building missions, one with a comparatively low cost structure, a comparatively high success rate and the greatest degree of international legitimacy. Other possible options are likely to be either more expensive, e.g., U.S., European Union or NATO-led coalitions, or less capable, e.g., the African Union, the Organization of American States, or ASEAN. The more expensive options are best suited to missions that require forced entry or employ more than 20,000 men, which so far has been the effective upper limit for UN operations. The less capable options are suited to

missions where there is a regional but not a global consensus for action, or where the United States simply does not care enough to foot 25 percent of the bill.

Although the U.S. and UN styles of nation building are distinguishable, they are also highly interdependent. It is a rare operation in which both are not involved. Both UN and U.S. nation-building efforts presently stand at near historic highs. Demand for UN-led peacekeeping operations nevertheless far exceeds the available supply, particularly in sub-Saharan African. American armed forces, the world's most powerful, also find themselves badly overstretched by the demands of such missions. A decade ago, in the wake of UN and U.S. setbacks in Somalia and Bosnia, nation building became a term of opprobrium leading a significant segment of American opinion to reject the whole concept. Ten years on, nation building appears ever more clearly as a responsibility that neither the United Nations nor the United States can escape. The United States and the United Nations bring different capabilities to the process. Neither is likely to succeed without the other. Both have much to learn not just from their own experience, but from the other's. It is hoped that this study and its predecessor will help both to do so.

The Oil for Food Scandal

I shall conclude with just a few words on the Oil for Food scandal, which has done so much to color American opinion of the UN in recent years. Outrage over the diversion of UN-supervised Oil for Food money in Iraq seems to have missed three critically important points. First, no American funds were lost. Second, no UN funds were lost. Third, the Oil for Food program achieved its two objectives: providing food to the Iraqi people while preventing Saddam Hussein from rebuilding his military threat to the region, and in particular from reconstituting his weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs.

The Oil for Food program was part of a comprehensive set of UN-mandated sanctions designed to prevent Hussein from reconstituting a threat to his neighbors. The program allowed an average of \$7 billion per year in Iraqi oil revenues to be used to purchase food and medicine for the Iraqi people but not to purchase weapons or WMD-related technology for the Hussein regime.

It is now clear, based upon the most exhaustive American post-intervention examination, that the UN sanction regime, including both the UN weapons inspectors and the UN-administered Oil for Food program, fully met this core objective. At the direction of the UN Security Council, and as a result of the international embargo and international inspections, Iraq destroyed its WMD stockpiles in the early 1990's, did not acquire new such weapons and did not even reconstitute a program to develop nuclear weapons. More broadly, UN sanctions resulted in a steady decline in

Iraq's military capabilities from the end of the first Gulf War in 1991 to the day of the American-led intervention.

At the same time the Oil for Food program served its humanitarian goal of feeding the Iraqi people, if not perfectly, at least so effectively that Washington asked the UN to maintain the program in effect for six months after the United States took power in Baghdad.

It is clear that Hussein and his henchmen certainly took advantage of inadequate UN oversight to siphon off large sums of money from the program, but the money was Iraqi to begin with, and the amounts siphoned off were never enough to undermine the purpose for which the sanctions were in place. It is also clear that unscrupulous non-Iraqi businessmen, sometimes perhaps with the knowledge of their governments, connived in these diversions and drew illegitimate profits from them.

The bad news, therefore, is that the UN proved unequal to the task of preventing a rogue regime from stealing some of its own money. The good news is that this same UN machinery proved equal to the task of preventing that same regime from fielding WMD, developing nuclear weapons and reconstituting a military threat to its neighbors. Most observers would conclude that the UN, however inadequate its financial oversight, certainly got its priorities right.

The UN sanctions regime against Iraq, including the Oil for Food program is worth close scrutiny not because it was a scandal, although scandal there was, but because taken as a whole, it is the most successful use of international sanctions on record. Documenting the why and wherefores of that success is as important as correcting the shortfalls that allowed a rogue regime, in connivance with unscrupulous international businessmen, to siphon funds from UN-administered Iraqi accounts.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Ambassador.
Senator Wirth.

**STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE TIMOTHY E. WIRTH,
PRESIDENT, UNITED NATIONS FOUNDATION**

Mr. WIRTH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is always a delight to be with Ambassador Dobbins, with whom I would associate my remarks entirely. It is also noteworthy to hear the facts and figures that Ambassador Dobbins put on the table and that Mr. Christoff put on the table, and I would like to put another fact on the table, if I might, to start out.

As we meet this morning, the United States has already spent more this week in Iraq than it will spend all year long on U.N. peacekeeping around the world, and it is only Wednesday. This is a relatively small amount of money given our obligations around the world, and it is important, it seems to me, to understand this context.

Mr. Chairman, the U.N. works when the U.S. wants it to. The U.N. has always been a key element of U.S. foreign policy, and when the U.S. pays attention and pays its bills, the U.N. is both a bargain and an opportunity as outlined by two previous panelists this morning, and of special note, of course, is peacekeeping. Let me briefly elaborate.

One constant of the U.S.-U.N. relationship has been consistently strong public support for the U.N. during its 60 years. We were, of course, the driving force behind its founding, and are its host and, I would argue, have been not only its greatest financial supporter, but also its greatest beneficiary. Opinion polls show that Americans value the U.N., see it as an important vehicle for sharing the burdens of American responsibilities around the world, and with characteristic skepticism of government, Americans want the U.N. to continue to reform and to renew itself.

If this consistent public support for the U.N. is a familiar variable in the U.S.-U.N. relationship, the centrality of the U.N. to the U.S. global interests has only grown, and that is clear with all of the challenges that we face today not only with the peacekeeping operations described earlier, but with poverty alleviation and development especially in Africa; global disease from AIDS to the bird flu; climate change with its concomitant economic, political and environmental components; emerging humanitarian crises from refugee flows out of Iraq to natural disasters like the 2005 tsunami. The U.N. is central to all of these issues, as you know, Mr. Chairman, and, therefore, central to U.S. interests.

Today's panel outlines the successes and the challenges of peacekeeping which have been well-described by my colleagues.

On burden-sharing, Mr. Christoff made that point very clearly. I would just add he says that if the United States were in Haiti, it would cost twice as much as the U.N. operation, but let us remember that the U.S. only pays 25 percent of the U.N. operations, so it is an 8-to-1 bargain, just to use your numbers alone, Mr. Christoff. It is exactly the burden-sharing that Americans want.

Second, it is extremely cost-effective, and those numbers have been outlined by both Mr. Dobbins and by Mr. Christoff.

Third, peacekeeping is probably the most important laboratory for U.N. reform. Congressman Rohrabacher again reminded us of the importance of continuing U.N. reform. Congressmen, progress, significant progress, has been made, and further important recommendations have been made by the new Secretary General. These will require persistent diplomatic support from the U.S., and the U.S. new Permanent Representative, Zalmay Khalilzad, has, I will say, made an impressive start.

I would like, Mr. Chairman, if I might, to put in the record at this point a number of very specific numbers and data about changes that have been made in the whole peacekeeping area and with the issues raised by both Congressman Rohrabacher and Mr. Groves and his comments earlier. These are data not only on very, very specific steps that have been made, very specific on tables from the State Department of their best analysis as to what has been done, but also in a noteworthy fashion of how the U.N. peacekeeping operations and the reforms made there have, in fact, become models for NATO, and what NATO is trying to do in terms of its deployment of forces and its determination of the responsibility of those forces.

I think this data, Congressman Rohrabacher, will be very helpful in bringing you up to speed on a lot of the progress that has been made. I think you have met in the past with Jane Lute, who has this responsibility at the U.N., and she has made this set of policies, you know, very, very strong, and I think they are very impressive, and we are proud of her as an American citizen who is deeply engaged in helping the U.N. to reach the highest standards of behavior. It is an impressive record.

Fourth, if, as Ambassador Dobbins pointed out, peacekeeping becomes a reminder of how important our global reengagement is and our quest to do that; and, fifth, how important it is that we be planning for the future. We are not going to have fewer peacekeeping missions, as Ambassador Dobbins pointed out; we are going to have more of them, and some of the steps that he outlined that have been taken are extremely important.

I would hope, as well, that this committee will be asking the State Department and the Department of Defense about their plans for the future. You know, what do they anticipate are going to be the demands in the future? What does that require of the United States in terms of institutional arrangements, in terms of different kinds of cooperative arrangements with the U.N. and other international forces, and in terms of budget responsibilities?

Finally, of course, the biggest issue here is probably going to be our responsibilities in Iraq. We can anticipate that there is going to be a phase-out at some point of United States presence in Iraq from one level or another. That is going to leave a vacuum of kinds. Who is going to fill that vacuum? I think it is fair to say that we can anticipate that some, if not a great deal, of that vacuum is going to be filled by the United Nations. We are going to be asking the United Nations to do this, and we had better start preparing for that, understanding what has to be done. Again, it seems to me that this would be an important opportunity for this committee and for the Congress, using your oversight capability, to make sure that this planning has begun.

As a final note, if I might, Mr. Chairman, I have taken the liberty of adding a chart over here to the right about the debt of the United States to the U.N. Our U.S. arrears to the U.N. will exceed more than \$1 billion as we sit here today. The question is where is this \$1 billion owed, and how did we get from there to here?

We have sponsored and supported every peacekeeping operation: Haiti, the Congo, Lebanon, Liberia, Kosova. The list goes on. All of the operations we have supported in the Security Council and every one of them was deemed by different U.S. administrations, but in agreement, that they were in the U.S. national interest. We could have vetoed any one of them, but we did not. Richard Holbrooke, John Negroponte, Jack Danforth, and John Bolton all voted "yes" when these operations came before the Security Council, but the United States has refused to pay the resulting bills, and slowly but surely the shortfalls have grown into a deficit approaching \$1 billion.

This deficit for the U.N. is huge; while for the United States, it is less than what we spend in 2 days in Iraq. For the U.N., it is 20 percent of the U.N.'s total peacekeeping budget for the 2008 year, and it is 13 percent of the U.N.'s total central budget. This is a big number.

Where will this \$1 billion come from? The U.N. does not have a bank it can go to for financing. Instead, the Secretary General has to go to other member states and ask them to pony up. The methodology for getting others to pay is simple. The U.N. just does not pay those who have agreed to send their own troops and to ship their own equipment in support of new peacekeeping missions that we have voted for. Others who are sending their troops and who are sending their equipment are left holding unpaid invoices.

Attached to my testimony is a full list of these, Mr. Chairman, in great detail, where, mission by mission and country by country, the debts are owed, and this chart demonstrates this as well. It is a pretty startling list. India and Pakistan, close friends of the United States and two of the most reliable providers of U.N. peacekeeping help, are together owed more than \$107 million because the U.S. does not pay its bills. Bangladesh, one of the poorest countries in the world, is owed \$77 million because the United States is the U.N.'s biggest debtor. Nigeria, the most dependable and far-reaching force for stability in Africa, is owed almost \$4 million. Brazil is owed \$7 million for peacekeeping efforts in Haiti, 90 miles off our coast; Jordan, \$30 million; Kenya, \$55 million.

Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that this is an embarrassing and really unacceptable situation. Some of the poorest countries in the world, some of our closest allies and some of the world's most dependable global citizens are owed millions and millions of dollars because the United States votes for these important peacekeeping missions but will not pay its share. This is wrong, Mr. Chairman, and the Congress should move rapidly to help to reverse this situation. Paying what it owes will make a significant contribution to U.S. reengagement in the world, will reinforce the basic support of the American people, and will provide additional leverage for continuing reform at the U.N. Great nations keep their word, and great nations pay their bills.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to answering any questions that you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wirth follows:]

**UN Peacekeeping:
A Bargain and an Opportunity**

**Testimony by Timothy E. Wirth
President, The United Nations Foundation
and The Better World Fund
June 13, 2007**

Committee on Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights and Oversight
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Members of the committee — I'm pleased to be with you again, and to return to these familiar surroundings.

Your panel today includes some of the country's most distinguished UN peacekeeping analysts; I am honored to be included with them, but would not number myself on a list of experts. Rather, Mr. Chairman, my job (and that of the United Nations Foundation) is to support the UN and UN causes: to help strengthen the UN, to tell its story, to help with its important reform efforts, and to support its many global causes. It is a privilege to be engaged in such a mission, and to share with you our perspective on UN peacekeeping and the important U.S.-UN relationship.

Fundamentally, Mr. Chairman, the UN works where the U.S. wants it to. The UN has always been a key element of U.S. foreign policy, and when the U.S. pays attention and pays its bills, the UN is both a bargain and an opportunity — of special note is peacekeeping, which is a great success story for the UN, and could and should be seen as one for the U.S. as well.

Let me briefly elaborate. One constant of the U.S.-UN relationship has been the consistently strong public support for the UN during its 60 years. The U.S. was the driving force behind the UN's establishment, is its host, its most generous financial supporter, and I would argue, its greatest beneficiary. Opinion polls show that Americans value the UN, see it as an important vehicle for sharing the burdens of American responsibilities around the world, and with characteristic skepticism of government, Americans want the UN to continue to reform and renew itself to become a stronger, more effective institution.

If this consistent public support for the UN is a familiar variable in the U.S.-UN relationship, the centrality of the UN to U.S. global interests has only grown. In 2007, the UN is deeply involved in almost every contemporary global issue, in addition to the subject of today's hearing: peacekeeping and the dangerous proliferation of failed states, the cancer of destructive non-state actors, and the spread of genocidal events. In a remarkable growth of expectations and aspirations, the UN is now deeply engaged in nearly every major global challenge of concern to the United States:

- Stability in the Middle East and the Balkans,
- Poverty alleviation and development, especially in Africa,

- Global disease, from the catastrophe of AIDS to the prospect of bird flu,
- Climate change, with its concomitant economic, political, and environmental components,
- Emerging humanitarian crises, from refugee flows out of Iraq to natural disasters like the 2005 tsunami.

The UN is central to these issues, and therefore central to U.S. interests.

Today's panel highlights the successes and challenges of peacekeeping, the biggest, most resource-intensive, most visible, and fastest growing operational component of the U.S.-UN relationship. As you know, Mr. Chairman, within the last year or so the U.S. and the UN have called and voted for:

- A new peacekeeping mission in Somalia;
- A seven-fold expansion of the UN's peacekeeping mission in Lebanon;
- The expansion of Sudan's peacekeeping mission into Darfur;
- Reauthorization of the UN's peacekeeping mission in Haiti;
- A renewed peacekeeping mission for East Timor; and
- New missions in Chad, the Central African Republic, and Nepal.

The discussion today highlights six key aspects of the U.S.-UN relationship in UN peacekeeping:

1. Burden Sharing. UN peacekeeping brings two types of burden sharing to the table. The first is of vital importance to American taxpayers, and that is financial burden sharing. When the U.S. puts 25 cents towards a UN peacekeeping mission, the rest of the world adds 75 cents. By any yardstick, that is a heck of a deal. Imagine only what the financial cost would be if the U.S., for example, were to be unilaterally engaged in peacekeeping in Lebanon right now. Second and also of great importance is the fact that UN peacekeeping helps keep American soldiers out of harms way. The UN today has more than 100,000 troops and personnel deployed around the world – almost none of whom are Americans.
2. Cost Effectiveness. UN Peacekeeping is also highly cost effective. As you will hear, the Government Accountability Office performed a cost comparison of U.S. and UN-led peacekeeping in Haiti and found that – between the financial contributions of other countries and leaner deployments – UN peacekeeping was at least eight times less expensive than fielding an American force. And for one more cost comparison – the United States has already spent more money this week in Iraq than we'll spend all year on UN peacekeeping.
3. The Need for Continued Reform. Peacekeeping is probably the most important laboratory for UN reform. Progress has been made, and important further recommendations have been proposed by the new Secretary-General. These will require persistent, diplomatic support from the U.S., and the new U.S. Permanent Representative has made an impressive start.

4. Global Re-engagement: Americans also see peacekeeping as an important avenue for re-engaging with the rest of the world. Some powerful new data makes this case: Some weeks ago, we joined a small group of organizations to launch what we thought would be a modest grassroots initiative called “The Price of Peace” Campaign. Designed to highlight the low cost of investing in UN peacekeeping, the campaign has spread rapidly and has become an almost organic movement: more than 28,000 people from all 50 states have signed an online petition calling for full U.S. funding of UN peacekeeping obligations in FY 2008. I am certain that all members of this Committee have received these appeals for full U.S. engagement, and for the U.S. to pay its share.
5. Planning for the Future: The growth in both the size and importance of UN peacekeeping logically leads to a re-examination of the role that the U.S. agrees to play in it, and how the U.S. should be planning for the future. Perhaps this Committee should be asking the State Department and DOD to provide their best thinking about future operations: Should the U.S. expand its headquarters, logistical and communications contributions? Should the U.S. train a broader cadre for humanitarian management and engagement? What responses will be required for anticipated global flows of refugees resulting from rising sea levels, and what institutional strengthening will be needed to cope with new pandemics like bird flu?
6. Iraq: The event you can probably most anticipate is the phase-out of the U.S. presence in Iraq. What will this development require from the United Nations, and is Congress using its oversight authority to be sure that this thinking has begun, and that the necessary organizational and budget changes are being prepared?

Finally, Mr. Chairman, let me speak to the budget crisis which the United States is currently inflicting on the UN, and on some of our closest friends and allies around the world. As we sit here today, the U.S. is on the verge of passing the billion dollar mark in permanent debt to the United Nations and its member states for peacekeeping alone.

As of June 2007, the U.S. was \$569 million in permanent arrears to the United Nations for UN peacekeeping. This debt was left unaddressed in the Administration’s FY 2008 budget. In fact, it was exacerbated when the Administration’s budget request for the UN peacekeeping account in FY 2008 was found to be short by an additional, estimated \$500 million. If this is left unaddressed, U.S. arrears to the UN will exceed \$1 billion by the end of 2007 for peacekeeping alone.

It is welcome news that the Appropriations Committee in the House is doing what it can to minimize this 2008 shortfall. But until we fully fund this account and erase our debt, it will be absorbed by allies that are providing troops for these U.S.-endorsed missions – notably, India, Kenya, Pakistan, and Bangladesh.

The U.S. has sponsored and supported every peacekeeping operation — Haiti, Congo, Lebanon, Liberia, Kosovo — all operations deemed to be in the U.S. national interest. We could have vetoed any one of them, but we didn’t: Richard Holbrooke, John Negroponte, Jack Danforth, and John Bolton all voted “Yes” when these operations came before the Security Council.

But the U.S. has refused to pay the bill, and the impact of shortfalls in this year's proposed budget would be a deficit of more than a billion dollars.

Where will the billion dollars come from? The UN doesn't have some reserve to dip into—and this debt is huge: it is 20% of the UN's total peacekeeping budget for 2008, and 13% of the UN's total central budget. It is a big number.

The UN doesn't have a bank it can go to for financing. Instead, the Secretary-General has to go to other member states and ask them to pony up. The methodology for getting others to pay is simple: the UN just doesn't pay those who have agreed to send their own troops and ship their own equipment in support of new peacekeeping operations – they are left holding unpaid invoices.

Attached to my testimony, and on the chart behind me, is a list of the countries that, in effect, are financing the U.S. debt to the UN — it is a pretty startling list. For example:

- India and Pakistan, close friends of the U.S. and two of the most reliable providers of UN peacekeeping help, are together owed more than \$109 million because the U.S. doesn't pay its bills;
- Bangladesh, one of the poorest countries in the world, is owed \$77 million because the U.S. is the UN's biggest debtor;
- Nigeria has been the most dependable and far-reaching face for stability in Africa, and is owed \$3.4 million;
- Brazil, our very close friend, is owed \$7.2 million for its peacekeeping efforts in Haiti, 90 miles off our coast.


Mr. Chairman, this is simply an unacceptable situation. Some of the poorest countries in the world, some of our closest allies, and some of the world's most dependable global citizens, are owed millions and millions of dollars because the United States votes for these important peacekeeping missions, but won't pay its share. This is wrong, Mr. Chairman. Great nations keep their word and pay their bills. It doesn't make sense to turn our backs on this bargain. It is not in the U.S. interest and it does nothing to help our reputation in the world.

I hope the committee will move rapidly to reverse this situation. Paying what it owes will make a significant contribution to U.S. re-engagement in the world, reinforce the basic support of the American people, and provide additional leverage for continuing reform at the UN.

Thank you, and I look forward to answering any questions that you may have.

APPENDIX I

U.S. Arrears Owed to UN Peacekeeping Troop Contributors



The U.S. owes payments to 57 countries who supply about 80% of all UN Peacekeeping troops, police and military observers.

The U.S. also owes troop and equipment reimbursements to Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, China, Cote d'Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Mongolia, Morocco, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Philippines, Poland, South Korea, Romania, Senegal, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, the U.K., and Uruguay.

APPENDIX II:

Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities Account
 Mission-by-Mission Shortfalls in the FY 2008 Budget Request
(Thousands of Dollars)

Mission	Administration Request (FY08)	Estimate of Current Needs (FY08)*	Shortfall in Administration Request
Sudan/Darfur (UNMIS)	391,070	506,873	115,803
D.R. Congo (MONUC)	168,903	257,550	88,647
Lebanon (UNIFIL)	167,667	217,316	49,649
Haiti (MINUSTAH)	94,889	140,030	45,141
East Timor (UNMIT)	12,345	50,000	37,655
Liberia (UNMIL)	110,188	142,817	32,629
Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI)	55,242	84,225	28,983
Ethiopia/Eritrea (UNMEE)	23,146	30,000	6,854
Kosovo (UNMIK)	19,288	25,000	5,712
Western Sahara (MINURSO)	9,065	11,749	2,684
Golan Heights (UNDOF)	8,673	11,241	2,568
Georgia (UNOMIG)	7,265	9,416	2,151
Cyprus (UNFICYP)	5,069	6,570	1,501
Burundi	--	--	--
Yugo War Crimes Tribunal	19,346	22,679	3,333
Rwanda War Crimes Tribunal	14,835	18,553	3,718
New Mission in Chad/CAR	0	150,000	150,000
New Mission in Somalia	0	150,000	150,000
Total Request vs. Needs	1,106,991	1,834,019	727,028
		FY 2006 Darfur Funds	129,800
		FY 2007 Supplemental	(283,000)
TOTAL FY 2008 SHORTFALL			573,828

**Based on a 26% U.S. Assessment Rate for UN Peacekeeping.*

APPENDIX III

Growing Permanent U.S. Arrears to the UN
(as of April 2007)

UN Budget Category	Pre-Existing/ Structural Debt	2007 Assessment	FY 2008 Budget Request	Prospective New Debt Level
Regular Budget**	\$291 million	\$493 million	\$496 million	\$288 million
Peacekeeping Operations***	\$569 million	\$1,534 million*	\$1,107 million	\$996 million*
Capital Master Plan	\$3 million	\$85 million	\$85 million	\$3 million
Total	\$863 million	\$2,112 million*	\$1,688 million	\$1,287 million*

* BWC estimate of current mission assessments

**In the Contributions to International Organizations (CIO) Account

***In the Contributions to International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA) Account

Mr. DELAHUNT. Yes. Thank you, Senator, and I will turn shortly to the ranking member because, since there are only two of us on this panel, we will have an opportunity, hopefully, to explore for some time the issues that you have addressed.

Senator Wirth, when the United States votes at the U.N. Security Council, in the course of that vote, is it an up-or-down vote, or is there a letter of reservations—I am making that term up—that would somehow condition the payment for that particular peacekeeping deployment?

Mr. WIRTH. Well, both record votes and nonrecord votes are here, but there is no way for the U.S., like, say, this administration has done with various bills, to say, “Well, we are for that bill, but we are only for a piece of that.”

Mr. DELAHUNT. There is no signing letters then?

Mr. WIRTH. There is no signing of a letter. You either say “yes” or “no”——

Mr. DELAHUNT. Or no.

Mr. WIRTH [continuing]. In all of these, you know, not only when the vote comes up, but because of who we are and as one of the permanent five members—you know, we design these peacekeeping missions with great detail ahead of time, and those are agreed to by the P5, the so-called “Permanent Five,” because those five have veto power on the Security Council. You do not want one of them—you do not want to bring something up and then suddenly have somebody raise their hand and veto it. So proposed peacekeeping missions go through, effectively, two filters, one with the P5 to make sure everybody is on board, and then you go to the other 10 members of the Security Council in a public vote.

Mr. DELAHUNT. In all of the—and I know I am just simply, I think, repeating what you earlier stated.

The United States has voted for every single peacekeeping deployment in the past—well, since the existence—let me rephrase the question.

Has there been a peacekeeping deployment that the United States has voted against in the history of the United Nations?

Mr. WIRTH. By the structure of the United Nations Security Council, it cannot be. The U.S. has veto power.

Mr. DELAHUNT. But I think it is really important to be clear about that.

Mr. WIRTH. If the U.S. says no, it does not happen. It is not like——

Mr. DELAHUNT. So, with all of the peacekeeping forces that are deployed all over the globe, the United States has supported them unqualifiedly?

Ambassador Dobbins.

Mr. WIRTH. Ambassador Dobbins might refer to qualifications. We might say, you know, we are supportive of that, and we are worried about what may happen. It will be like anything else. There will be concerns and discussions surrounding it, but we have the option of voting “yes” or “no.”

Mr. DELAHUNT. Ambassador.

Ambassador DOBBINS. Well, I would like to say that the reason that the U.N. is cost-effective is that the mandatory assessment system guarantees that, of any peacekeeping mission the U.S.

wants and the Security Council authorizes, other countries will pay 75 percent of it, whether they want to or not. Even if they do not like it, they are going to pay 75 percent of it if we vote for it, and if we do not like it, it is not going to happen. That is how the system works. It guarantees that, of anything we want, they will pay 75 percent or 76 percent—74 percent. Sorry. They will pay 74 percent whether they want to or not and nothing will happen if we do not want. That is a pretty good system.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Groves, earlier you talked about the concept of a so-called SOFA, a Status of Forces Agreement. It is my understanding—and correct me, and any member of the panel feel free to speak up—that we are having difficulty at this point in time—and I have not thought about a SOFA, but that we are having difficulty in terms of securing, maybe because of the fact that we owe many of our allies the sums that were referenced by Senator Wirth—we are having difficulty finding nations that are willing to contribute troops to deployment. Am I wrong on that?

Mr. GROVES. I am not sure how much difficulty we are having in staffing the U.N. missions themselves, but even if we were, you have to analyze where your priorities are. Is your priority the continuity of U.N. peacekeeping operations, or is your priority the protection of the actual people in the countries where these peacekeepers are sent? You know, it cannot be one or the other, but it should be both.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Well, let me run through one.

In Lebanon, for example, if you were the Permanent Representative of the United States to the U.N., would you have voted against the peacekeeping operation that currently exists on the border between Israel and Lebanon?

Mr. GROVES. Are you nominating me for that position?

Mr. DELAHUNT. I might, if the answer is a good one.

Mr. GROVES. This dovetails into the last couple of responses. The United States supports and votes for peacekeeping missions all around the world. That is the politics of the United Nations. The United States can't even abstain; I doubt very much, politically, that they could even abstain from a mission to Lebanon. So of course we are going to vote for it, but we have skin in that game. We vote for it, and we'll pay what is due, which is our 25 percent, which is what we agreed to with the U.N. several years ago under Helms-Biden.

Others on the Security Council don't have skin in the game. It doesn't cost them to vote for one of these peacekeeping missions. They pay 1 percent or less than the peacekeeping budget. So sure, I would vote for the peacekeeping force in Lebanon.

Mr. DELAHUNT. And in Haiti?

Mr. GROVES. And in Haiti. Haiti is in our back yard. It is much more within our national interest to vote for those missions, but that doesn't mean I wouldn't stop and try to have peacekeepers who have committed crimes be prosecuted in their countries once they are repatriated.

Mr. DELAHUNT. And it would appear that there will be action in—well, the potential, the possibility of a significant increase in terms of the number of peacekeepers to Darfur, would you veto that particular increase?

Mr. GROVES. Again, you're getting into deeper questions of what is and is not a vital national interest of the United States. I think you will get a lot of debate in this room and in this building.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Do you think the potential to stop an ongoing genocide is in the vital interest of the United States?

Mr. GROVES. My personal opinion is yes. I believe the U.S. should use its power and authority as best it can to stop genocide in a place like Sudan. Whether that takes a U.S. troop commitment is beyond the scope of the question. You'd have to really, really look into it to see whether that is viable or not, but an AU mission—by the way, this is an AU mission, not a U.N. mission, there is no really impending possibility of this becoming a U.N. mission. I know people talk a lot about this being a U.N. mission, but the al-Bashir government isn't exactly saying, "We will allow a U.N. mission to come in."

The AU missions that are there, they are not exactly a force multiplier as it is. Private security companies provide all the logistics, supply and even security for the AU missions that are in The Sudan right now.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Supported or funded by whom?

Mr. GROVES. I don't know who pays the private contractors' bills, whether that comes out of the U.N. general funds.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Ambassador Dobbins, are you—

Sorry, I didn't mean to shut you off.

Mr. GROVES. Well, if we are going to move this discussion to Darfur and The Sudan, we need to talk about the peacekeeping operations there, where there is no peace yet; there is no peace in Darfur to be kept. Whether or not U.N. or an AU peacekeeping force is a viable solution to what's going on there, I think remains to be seen.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I think it is a high-risk effort, but I guess what I'm looking for are, what options are there, if we consider genocide or the prevention of genocide to be in the vital interest of the United States? Because we do claim a certain moral authority that we value, and it is important, I think, that we demonstrate that to the rest of the world.

What options are there?

Mr. GROVES. Well, one of the options to get to the bottom of your question would be intervention by peacekeeping forces, U.N., AU, but I think we're a long way down the road from that. If we're actually considering that, it would be a preventative measure; there are people that talk about U.S. military intervention and options, no-fly zones, things of that nature. But I think at the end of the day, if you keep peace there and you stop the genocide, then peacekeeping forces are one option that is possible to be used.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Ambassador Dobbins.

Ambassador DOBBINS. Yes, I agree mostly with what Mr. Groves said.

First of all, it takes a peace enforcement action to stop an ongoing conflict when the sides aren't ready to stop. And peace enforcement actions are much more demanding than peacekeeping. They require a forced entry or at least a threat of a forced entry, and the U.N. doesn't do that, nor does the AU, so that would have to be NATO or the U.S. or some other nationally-led coalition to do

that. They are also more expensive. Our studies indicate that a peace enforcement operation in the same society as a peacekeeping operation will be ten times more expensive. It will require ten times more men and ten times more money to do.

So, clearly, the cost-effective option would be to wait until the conflict winds down and then put a peacekeeping operation in so it doesn't wind up again, but if you're not prepared to wait, then you have to go to the higher option, and that's why we've had this continued rather unsatisfactory debate about Darfur, because nobody is prepared to go to the higher option. We know what it would take, and nobody is prepared to go to the higher option, so we're hoping a combination of economic sanctions and political pressures and other instruments can allow the less expensive option to become realistic. That's where we are.

Now, in terms of what force you would use if the less expensive option became realistic, that is, if there was a peace to keep, the difference between the AU and the U.N. basically are twofold: First of all, the AU is less experienced than the U.N., substantially less experienced and has virtually no headquarters' capability to control forces.

Secondly, it has no capacity to actually pay for its own operations. So AU operations are paid for essentially by the Europeans and the United States. The AU operation in Darfur is funded by the United States and the European Union, so we pay about 50 percent of the cost of that operation. If it was a U.N. operation, we would only pay 25—

Mr. DELAHUNT. 25 percent.

Ambassador DOBBINS. 25 percent of the cost, and you'd have a more professional operation. It wouldn't be as good as NATO, but it would be ten times cheaper than NATO—

Mr. DELAHUNT. You're doing a cost-benefit analysis.

Ambassador DOBBINS. Yes. So, clearly, the U.N. is the preferable option for Darfur. Why is the AU there? Because the Government of The Sudan wants the AU there. Why do they want the AU there? Because it is less exigent, less capable, and it is less likely to compel them to comply. So it is there for all the wrong reasons.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Senator Wirth?

Mr. WIRTH. To stick on Darfur for 1 second, one final note. I think, or at least I hope, that we are going to see the U.N. more deeply involved for the following reason: Slowly but surely, the parties are coming to understand that there is no military solution to what's going on in Darfur. So that changes the nature of their willingness to sit down and talk. That then changes the nature of the role of the U.N. and the role of negotiators and the role of peacekeepers. If that happens, then what the U.N. does best has the opportunity to move in and, I think, be as effective as we have seen it be elsewhere. If we see it at this higher level of conflict, as Ambassador Dobbins points out, it remains a much iffier and nasty situation.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I'm sure you can appreciate the conundrum that that presents to the administration and to Members of Congress, because while we have the benefit of, I think, a very thoughtful analysis, we've heard on the ground, there is a genocide occurring, which implicates, I believe, everything that we're about. Now, I'm

not advocating military intervention, but what will history say? Not to be dramatic, but how many tens of thousands, how many hundreds of thousands are going to suffer, possibly die, while we work our way through?

I mean, you know, to that point where intervention is feasible as opposed to, you know, where peacekeeping is feasible, as opposed to peace enforcement. You know, these are difficult issues.

I'm going to yield to my friend, the gentleman from California, and excuse myself for a minute.

Go ahead.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Where to begin? Again, let me know, but I believe a lot of the analysis we're getting here in terms of using United Nations troops are based on the concept, the cost-analysis, that we have equal value, that the value of those troops is equal to Americans, which almost always is not the case. Where we've already seen over, and over, and over again, examples of U.N. troops abusing their authority and not even where they are disciplined by the United Nations, which Mr. Groves is suggesting might be a solution to have some control over this, but they are not even prosecuted by their own countries when they go home.

I mean, can anyone here tell me the number of U.N. troops that have been prosecuted for sexual abuse during their mission in Africa? How many of those African troops were prosecuted by their own countries?

Zero.

Mr. WIRTH. Mr. Chairman, I would be very happy to provide to you for the record the data that's come from U.N. peacekeeping operations, the Office of U.N. Peacekeeping Operations on the sexual harassment and abuse allegations. Also the State Department numbers.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Do you have numbers for people who were prosecuted?

Mr. WIRTH. Absolutely.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I would like to hear them. Every time I've inquired, I haven't gotten anything back. What are those figures?

Mr. WIRTH. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, for example, eight soldiers dismissed and barred from future peacekeeping operations, one of these soldiers awaiting criminal prosecution; four military personnel awaiting; one civilian awaiting prosecution.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Awaiting, awaiting. The operative word there is awaiting.

Mr. WIRTH. This is an operation, Congressman, that was, as we say, set up in part in response to pressures from the Congress and from elsewhere to really redo this, and this is what the U.N. has done, is aggressively redo the whole operation.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. But so far, you haven't noted that one person's been prosecuted. "Is awaiting prosecution"? Awaiting prosecution in a Third World country means nothing. They have not acted.

Mr. Groves, am I wrong in this? Are these countries stepping up and actually disciplining their troops when we appoint this at home?

Mr. GROVES. The information that's publicly available is, no, there haven't been. I can only recall reading one article about perhaps a handful of Moroccans who may have been charged, but I don't know if that was for sexual exploitation. I'm not sure.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let's note that what we're talking about here when we rely on the United Nations are quite often countries, not only the troops are not of equal value, but the systems that they operate in are far different than ours. When they go home, it is a different type of situation to be held accountable in those countries. There is, and let me note for the record, this is not a situation again where you have an option of sending U.S. troops or U.N. troops. We have a model of a multilateral activity that went on in the genocide that was taking place in the Balkans.

Mr. WIRTH. If I might—

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let me finish my point, and then I will be happy to let you just say a little something, too.

In the Balkans, we ended up with troops in Croatia. The Croats were under severe attack from the Serbians. The Serbians came in with their heavy tanks, and they managed at the end of the Tito era to get all the heavy equipment in the military and used it in an offensive way against the rest of the people who were part of Yugoslavia, trying to subjugate them.

In Croatia, what did we do? We trained the Croatian army. That option is not even on the table here. You can help people in their country by arming them and training them so they can defend themselves. And it helped in Croatia. It wasn't a U.N. operation. It was a United States' covert operation, I might add. We went in and trained the Croats, and that turned the tide.

What happened when we relied on a multilateral force to do it in that same area? We still have troops today in Kosovo and Bosnia, because we were, instead of acting forcefully with a third option—rather than saying bringing in huge numbers of United States troops that worked.

In several African countries, there was mass slaughter going on. They called mercenaries to come in, and with a couple hundred mercenaries were able to stop bloodshed that thousands of U.S. troops couldn't stop.

Let's note, in Rwanda and Bosnia, where you had the presence of U.N. troops. And what happened during that time? That shouldn't be ignored here. So what if you send U.N. troops in some place, and they are incapable, they are either not trained or the politics of their home country does not enable them to do a job that makes any difference? In Rwanda, it has been estimated up to a million people were slaughtered while U.N. troops were present.

In Bosnia, we know of tens of thousands of people slaughtered while U.N. troops were present. In one instance alone, there were 8,000 civilians slaughtered while Dutch troops stood by and watched.

Now, is that the type of thing we should be relying on? We can—no, I think that that's an example of what happens when you depend on having a political multinational organization, depending on that rather than trying to decide what is in the interest of the United States and what is not, and going out and doing that, even if it is unilaterally.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I would ask my friend to yield for a moment.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. One more point, and then Senator Wirth would like to mention something as well.

Here is a question to the panel: You say we owe the U.N. all this money, almost \$1 billion. I believe that's based on the fact that we have put a cap here in Congress on the percentage of U.N. costs that we are going to cover as American taxpayers. I think 25 percent is a very decent contribution for the people of the United States to have to cover the bills of the United Nations.

I believe the debt that you're talking about is what has been assessed to us over that 25 percent cap that Congress, when it was a Democratic Congress I might add, put that cap on our limit to what we're going to pay for in terms of U.N. costs. Is anyone on the panel suggesting that we should be paying a much higher percentage? And if so, what is the percentage of U.N. operations that we should be willing to pay? And why is it 25 percent, one-fourth of all the expenses, not our fair share?

Mr. WIRTH. If I might?

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Please.

Mr. WIRTH. First of all, on your initial question, I said, for the record, I'd be happy to give you data. Pakistan has sentenced peacekeepers to a year in jail. Nigeria withdrew its entire force from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Pakistan has sent a force in, including an examination for DNA samples. Nepal has three troops in jail and barred others from participating in future U.N. operations. Tunisia is prosecuting one of two soldiers that were withdrawn from the military. India has repatriated troops and dismissed one from the military.

These are the activities that have occurred this year in this data, and I will give you the full amount of data, Congressman.

[NOTE: The information referred is not reprinted here but is available in committee records.]

Mr. WIRTH. On the issue of the debt—

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much.

Mr. WIRTH. The debt that occurs, very, very little of it is the difference between the agreed U.S. share to the U.N. and what the Congress has set. To remind us, under the Helms-Biden compromise of some years ago, the U.S. agreed to pay 26 to 27 percent of the peacekeeping operations. Congress said, "Oh, we don't think that's right." Even though its administration negotiated it, Congress said, "We only want to pay 25 percent."

Mr. ROHRABACHER. What percentage do you think would be—

Mr. WIRTH. Let me just—agreed, say either 25, 26 or 27, none of that relates to this or very little of that relates to that debt. Of the debt, \$450 million is debt because of congressional objections to missions that the U.S. voted for, but the Congress said, "Hey, we don't think those are very good ideas," so the Congress didn't fund them. Sierra Leone is a good example. That's \$450 million, of the Congress saying, even though the government agreed with the Security Council that this is what we are going to do and said we have those obligations, the Congress said unilaterally, "We're not going to pay that." This wasn't 25 or 16; this was zero.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We're saying, we're not going to pay that 25 percent; we're not going to pay anything.

Mr. WIRTH. Sure.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Would the gentleman yield?

I would like to follow up with Sierra Leone. What you're informing or stating then is that it was congressional action that withheld the payment to the deployment in Sierra Leone.

Mr. WIRTH. That's correct.

Mr. DELAHUNT. What was happening in Sierra Leone, why did the United States vote in the U.N. Security Council?

Mr. WIRTH. Well, it was massive chaos; you will remember all of the pictures of people getting their hands and arms cut off.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Right, I have this horrible memory—excuse me, Senator, I have a horrible memory of seven or eight children sitting exactly where you are with their arms cut off, but this Congress decided that we should withhold funds for the support of that particular deployment. Is that accurate? I don't want to misstate, because I want to talk about facts without just making statements.

Mr. WIRTH. That is accurate.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you.

Mr. WIRTH. And it was a former Member of Congress, no longer here, chaired a very important Appropriations subcommittee and said, we're not going to let that money go through.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let us note that children get their arms cut off and children are slaughtered everyday. The U.N. troops that permitted tens of thousands of children to be slaughtered in Rwanda, the troops were right there, and they were slaughtered anyway.

The question is, when we're willing to commit money, it should be spent in a way that's effective, and I don't know if we pulled away.

Did we help finance the Rwanda operation?

Mr. WIRTH. Excuse me?

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Did we withdraw our funding from the Rwanda operation? Did we? Or maybe we should have.

Ambassador DOBBINS. We blocked the peacekeeping.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. They were sitting there permitting thousands of people to be slaughtered, hundreds of thousands.

Mr. WIRTH. Let's make sure we understand what happened in Rwanda.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Ambassador?

Mr. DELAHUNT. I think I think we should extend to the Senator an opportunity to finish his response to your question regarding Rwanda without interruption.

Mr. WIRTH. We were finishing a previous question on the debt; Congressman Rohrabacher asked where the debt came from.

As I said, \$450 million came from Congress said it didn't want to fund these items; \$119 million came from a shortfall last year. State didn't request the amount of money that the U.S. agreed to pay, and the Congress didn't fund it. All right, so we dropped \$119 million more into debt.

This year, our share of peacekeeping is 26 percent; that's what we agreed to in Helms-Biden. Senator Helms and Senator Biden, as you remember, were the leaders of that negotiation.

Our share of the 2008 peacekeeping budget is \$1.8 billion. OMB requested, even though State had asked for the amount, OMB in its mark provided only \$1.1 billion. As the chairman pointed out

earlier, the House Appropriations Committee has upped that by \$200 million. So we have available \$1.3 billion for a \$1.8 billion commitment. That is another shortfall of \$500 million.

So we have a backlog of \$450 million, which we said we're not going to pay that. We have \$119 million from last year; that's a shortfall. And we have a \$500 million that, unless this year the Congress acts to do more than the \$200 million it did, we will have another half billion. So we are well over \$1 billion in debt.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. During that same time period, how much have we spent on U.N. and on peacekeeping operations, et cetera? How much have we totally given then?

Mr. WIRTH. How much did we spend on peacekeeping last year—

Mr. ROHRABACHER. No, what did we give to the United Nations in total, including the peacekeeping operations.

Mr. WIRTH. Including peacekeeping operations, overall 25 percent of our budget was—let me, just a second, I will give you that number.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay.

Mr. WIRTH. Do you want me to respond to Rwanda?

Mr. ROHRABACHER. While you're getting that let me note again the idea that the options are sending U.S. troops or going with an AU operation is not the only alternative.

In Afghanistan, this is something I paid particular attention to in the 1990s when others were not. There was a situation that arose that the Taliban, during their time, when taking over that country, became very vulnerable. They had lost a major battle in Mazari Sharif, and it was an interesting battle because there were a lot of people who lost their lives, but they had lost—a huge number of their people was captured. The Taliban main forces were captured along with their equipment. And the road was open to basically retaking Kabul and bringing a moderate government to Afghanistan.

At that point, our U.N. Ambassador, Bill Richardson, who is now running for President, went to Mazari Sharif and negotiated with who would then become afterwards in the distant future the leaders of the Northern Alliance and said, "No, no, no, this is not the time to be active militarily; this is the time to negotiate. We're going to have an arms embargo, and then we're going to have a negotiated settlement here." And with the U.N.'s support, there was an arms embargo, which was totally violated by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, which dramatically reinforced the Taliban immediately. And the arms embargo, however, was enforced against the Northern Alliance.

Now, all of that led to what? It led to 9/11. It led to the type of, what we call, radical Islamic dictatorship that encompassed Afghanistan prior to 9/11. Yes, we relied on that type of approach. Frankly, during that time period, I was advocating that we arm those people who were opposing the Taliban rather than going through a multilateral approach. Frankly, that would have solved a lot of problems. People never looked at that third option, which is, rather than having U.S. troops come in or just going with a multilateral, either NATO or United Nations, that we should help people in the local areas defend themselves. Had we done that in per-

haps Rwanda or had we done that in Bosnia, those innocent people who were totally unarmed in the face of the Serbs and the other type of ethnic problems that were going on in Africa may not have been as bloody, and there may not have been young kids with their arms cut off, as you are saying.

Mr. Ambassador, do you have another point you want to make?

Ambassador DOBBINS. On the Afghan thing, I think you were probably right back there in the mid-1990s.

On the other hand, I don't think it is quite fair to blame American policy in that regard on the United Nations. The United Nations were about the only people in world that continued to recognize the Northern Alliance. The U.N. recognized a Northern Alliance as the Government of Afghanistan and never recognized the Taliban. The U.S. Government didn't recognize a Northern Alliance; only the U.N. did. So I don't think—

Mr. ROHRABACHER. By the way—

Ambassador DOBBINS. You can blame the Clinton administration.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I was totally fighting that policy.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I'm glad my ranking member was supporting the United Nations in that particular case; it's refreshing to hear that.

Ambassador DOBBINS. I think, on the issue of how you ensure that troop-contributing countries adequately discipline their participants, I think that's a difficult issue, and I think the solution offered by Mr. Groves is not a bad one, although I wouldn't condition my payment of arrears on it.

I would note that the U.N. system that is depending upon contributing countries to discipline their own people is exactly the same system the United States uses in putting together a coalition in Iraq. For instance, we don't try to punish people from other coalition countries, nor do they have any commitment to us to punish them. The fact is, they are on their own. We've had tens of thousands of coalition troops in Iraq. I don't know of any who have been punished, although I'm sure there were some abuses.

What's even more interesting is, until recently, we had no way of punishing our own contractors. We had 40,000 contractors in Iraq working for the United States Government, and there was no way of punishing them for abuses. And there were some serious abuses, including murder. And the Congress did correct that recently by putting in a provision which allowed them to be punished. But so far, none of them have, as far as I know. This is a problem that—

Mr. DELAHUNT. You mean, we're waiting, waiting, waiting, waiting?

Ambassador DOBBINS. Not just the U.N.; it is a real problem, and the solution you suggest is a reasonable one, although, again, I wouldn't condition my payments to the U.N. on it, but I would think it is a reasonable solution to push.

You're right that, with a U.N. force, you don't get the same quality as a U.S. force. They are paid less and are less well-equipped. And that's one of the reasons why they are cost-effective, because there are many missions for which a less well-equipped person is as good as a well-equipped person.

For instance, the U.N. is currently conducting a mission in Haiti. I think it is reasonable to say they are conducting it just as well

as we conducted it when we did it 10 years ago. And we did it at much higher cost, and they are doing it more cheaply, as far as I can see just as successfully because it is a mission that doesn't require—

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Ambassador, let me ask you, as an example, would it not be cheaper for us to identify some decent people in Haiti, who are basically more honest than the other people or more or less gangsteristic than the other people, and just support them, as we did in Croatia, where we went in and trained a military force, just pick a side and basically go in and then let them go—they are now—we arm them and let people we identify as being decent and honest people control the situation rather than bringing in a multilateral force or even our own troops and handling it that way?

Ambassador DOBBINS. I think that's a perfectly valid option in many situations. When you have a civil war, you have essentially three choices: You can flood the place with foreign forces and suppress the war. At the other end of the extreme, you can stand aside and let them fight it out. In the middle, you pick a side and help it win. And there are occasions where that's the approach that most closely meets our national needs. There are other cases, however, in which the side that's going to win isn't the side you want to win. There are cases in which the civil war will probably go on indefinitely because the sides are evenly matched, and it is not likely that one or the other is going to win any time soon.

In the case of Haiti, we are doing what you suggested. That is, we are trying to build up a capacity of the Haitian Government to police its own society. But we, the international community, United Nations, are also providing interim security while they create that capacity. I think when you do have to choose among those options, in many cases, what you are advocating is the correct option.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Wirth, thank you for the back and forth.

Mr. Ambassador, I appreciate all of your words, thank you.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I noted that my friend referenced the fact that we've been in the Balkans now for some time. Maybe one of you can help me; how long have we been in Korea? Are we still in Korea, Senator?

Mr. WIRTH. I was then 6 years old in camp when they, in June 1950, when the North Koreans invaded—

Mr. DELAHUNT. You were only 6, Senator?

Mr. WIRTH. I remember it very clearly.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. The first U.N. peacekeeping mission.

Mr. WIRTH. That was a long time ago. I am told that there are some now thinking we are looking forward to a Korea-length stay in Iraq. My guess is that we will have learned a lot from that experience, and as I was suggesting earlier, one of the interesting things would be how the transition gets made, and what are the expectations made of the international community, and what planning is going on on that front.

I think that's a very important question for this committee and for this Congress to begin, what's the thinking going on out there to push that? You know, I think that we didn't do enough of this

thinking 5 or 6 years ago for our last major incursion. And let's learn from that lesson, so it is not as if we are starting all over again. It is gratuitous advice from a former member, but you are in a perfect position to begin that process of thinking or helping, probably, a lot of people in the administration who want to do it and may not be allowed to do it.

Ambassador DOBBINS. We're actually out of Bosnia. We turned that mission over to the European Union 2 years ago, and we don't pay anything of their costs.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Senator, taking advantage of your experience, both as a Member of the House and having served in the United States Senate, I'd welcome comments from any member of the panel, but we have these kind of hearings, and as my friend, the ranking member, raises different issues, it's all retrospectively.

Since this committee has jurisdiction of international organizations with obviously a special interest in the United Nations, I think we all agree that it is in our national interest to make the U.N. more effective. There are clearly some things that the United Nations cannot do. There are limitations.

Ambassador Dobbins talks about the U.N. never having fielded a deployment in excess of 20,000. You know, I don't blame the United Nations for what occurred in Rwanda. To a large degree, I blame the Clinton administration for not recognizing that there was a genocide underway that resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people. I've heard the former Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, indicate that as she looks back on what is a distinguished career, what causes her the most pain and anguish is not acting more forcefully, and not recognizing that in terms of Rwanda.

It is so easy to sit here and criticize the United Nations as if we are not part and parcel of the United Nations; that we serve on the Security Council and that we have veto power, we indicated earlier. And I agree with what Mr. Groves said, there are ways to do it, but it is a multilateral organization. And it is as if the U.S. House of Representatives in many respects is multilateral, in terms of different viewpoints, different perspectives, obviously two different parties, and it does take time to get things done and to move an agenda forward.

I think none of us can suggest or believe it is easier in a global institution that represents some 190 different countries. But I digress for a moment. I wonder if you would concur with this thought that has been ruminating around my mind as we've sat here; I think it would be worthwhile to have the Ambassador, the American Ambassador to the United Nations, to come before this particular subcommittee when it is anticipated that there will be a request for a peacekeeping resolution so that we can discuss it prior.

I do fault the United Nations and I fault our own executive branch, both Republican and Democratic, for not implicating the first branch of government, at least on a consultative basis.

We come here. We have a single hearing, and that's the end of it. And it is usually to inform us what is happening, because while we have significant philosophical differences about the role of the United Nations—and we are now joined by the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Payne; I will recognize him in a moment. I would

like the Ambassador to come forward and talk about Darfur and what is happening in the United Nations and what we are prepared to do, and if we do have conditions, so that at a later date, you know, the ranking member will be fully informed and know there has been consultation with Congress and is totally aware of the cost so that we don't find ourselves in this, I think, embarrassing situation, where the United States, a great power, to many in the world, we appear to be a deadbeat despite getting our way most of the time.

I mean, what I'm suggesting, I think, it is different—I think it would be a different approach, and does it make any sense? Anybody on the panel, Senator, because—

Mr. WIRTH. You have an advantage here of being able to look over the horizon and have anybody in and not have people pinned down to that being a policy. You can get people to talk aloud together about this and make an interesting record, and that's a tremendous advantage.

Think about Iraq for a minute. As I said earlier, I know as sure as can be that there's going to be a request related to Iraq peacekeeping in some fashion, and the U.N. is going to be invited and asked to fill the vacuum. But the U.S. can't say that right now. The U.S. administration can't say that publicly, directly. The U.N. isn't going to say that right now because it doesn't want to act as if it is asking for the engagement, but you all can ask those questions now and begin to define that turf. I think that would be a very helpful thing to do. That's a real oversight kind of responsibility. What do we anticipate? What will it cost us?

Now, related to that, if I might, is the last remark Ambassador Dobbins made in his testimony about how we are beginning to prepare for other kinds of humanitarian peacekeeping operations. How is the DoD doing that? How is the State Department doing that? My belief is that has to be done in a more systematic way. As the Ambassador pointed out, this administration's been better than the last administration about this, but what else ought to be done, and what other kinds of architecture ought to be set up? What other kinds of budget capabilities ought to be set up? What other command operations ought to be put together in the future? Those are items that you all can help to cobble together, ask for reports. You know what it is like; you ask for a report from the DoD and from the State Department, and they respond. If they don't, you say, what are you thinking about this? It is a very helpful device, and you can play, I think, a very, very constructive role.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Ambassador Dobbins?

Ambassador DOBBINS. When I was still in government, the State Department had committed to come up proactively and consult with the Congress before voting for any peacekeeping operation. And this was normally done at the staff level, but they came up, and they briefed staffs of the Appropriation and authorizing committees of both Houses before any anticipated vote. And this was part of a deal that was worked out in the mid-1990s as a number of missions increased and Congress got increasingly upset about having to pay for missions they didn't vote for. And I don't see any reason why that shouldn't be reinstated. It worked perfectly well. There are occasions when this comes up suddenly, and you vote

very quickly. But those are more the exception than the rule, and I think this worked rather well.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I do believe that, sitting here today, I think that we could reach some sort of consensus as to future problems; is there a role—maybe we should reframe the question—is there a role for the U.N. in “blank”? And what should that role be from the perspective of the United States Congress in consultation with the administration? What are the concerns? Members could indicate their concerns. There would be a record available. And my own sense is that it would provoke this administration and the administration into a serious effort to examine options that might otherwise go unscrutinized; it might simply not happen because of the bureaucratic inertia.

Joe.

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Mr. Chairman, a couple comments that would help. I suggest you not only invite the U.N. Ambassador but you invite the Pentagon because if it is going to require resources of the U.S. Government to support the U.N. mission, or if it is done unilaterally, you want to know what the costs are, and that should be part of your debate as well.

Also, Senator Wirth brings up a good point, about how we, right now, in the U.S. Government are trying to refocus our future stability operations; how can we do a better job given what we’ve experienced in Iraq? We’re looking at that issue right now and hope to report to the Congress about how the Special Office within the State Department is trying to do a better job of planning to put together a civilian reserve core. You gave them about \$50 million to begin planning that. How is DoD actually including stability operations of equal importance to combat operations? I think you serve an important role in looking at the restructuring within the U.S. Government with the State Department taking the lead.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Groves?

Mr. GROVES. Well, anything that would provide more transparency and accountability to the planning that goes into these operations is always, always welcome. It is just that the government, the U.S. Government and the U.N., are both on a learning curve right now. The number of peacekeeping operations that have come up since the end of the Cold War has just overwhelmed them. The budget for U.S. peacekeeping operations in 1990 was \$81 million; 4 years later, it was \$1.2 billion. And we’ve seen the sea change in what we believe are priorities in terms of stabilization after 9/11. We can no longer allow failed states to sit and wallow in their failure and become a base for extremists, and that is what happened in Afghanistan.

So our theory about where we should put our assets, military, State Department, diplomatic and otherwise, has taken a great right turn since 9/11. I think there is a bit of a learning curve. The more open discussion there is about it for planning operations, the better.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you.

Let me just go back. Mr. Groves, you talked about the Status of Force Agreements. I think it is something we should think about, but then I begin to reflect and think of the position of this administration in terms of their willingness to submit to an agreement that

would possibly open U.S. personnel to jurisdiction outside of the United States. We did not accede to the Rome statute. You are familiar with that; I'm sure everyone here on the panel is. Of course, the byproduct of that now is we have 11 nations in Latin America that have been denied IMET assistance. We no longer have the same relationship between DoD and militaries and military forces in those countries, much to the chagrin of General Braddock and others that served in the position of heading SOUTHCOM. I know that, and I think Secretary Rice has indicated, it has become problematic.

My friend had to leave. There was a vote in another committee that he had to attend to, but I would just point out, maybe you could comment on this, what I find interesting is the number of Chinese military personnel that are now being utilized in peacekeeping operations, not that it is dramatic, but starting from a zero base, it is significant. And yet I predict that once that occurs, those of the minority party, particularly those in the more conservative wing of the party, are going to be saying, "Oh, my God, how did this happen? And God, that U.N., they are going at it again; those Chinese are all over these peacekeeping operations." I presume that they are very disciplined troops, that if they caused any embarrassment to the Chinese Government that they most likely would be prosecuted in a very timely fashion back in Beijing. But, again, I think what's required is thinking these things through. Do we want to play a role? We have 80,000 or 100,000—this is my data and correct me if I'm wrong—we have 100,000 personnel in peacekeeping, and in terms of the U.S. presence, it is a little over 300. That's why I can't understand why we just don't recognize that this is a great return on our investment.

Senator Wirth pointed out, this is a couple of days in Iraq. And we're not in 16 or 17 venues all over the world where I think there would be a consensus that the majority of them we do have a vital national interest. I mean, you know, we had I think 14 or 15 hearings on the Oil-for-Food Program in the last Congress, and we haven't had any yet in this one. But I think maybe we will have one, because I always ask the question about, what were those protocols all about? We know that Saddam was ripping the program off, but how did all these countries have these formal, written agreements that circumvented the sanctions, particularly when the United States, which sits on the Security Council, was aware of it? I just can't understand, but then again, I'm limited.

Well, let me—would you care to respond to the proliferation of the Chinese now in the peacekeeping efforts? I don't mean to be facetious, but I think, honestly, sometimes we do things that we don't go all the way in terms of our analysis. Great training ground for the Chinese.

Mr. GROVES. Well, if China wants to add its forces to peacekeeping operations and they behave in the same way as other U.N. peacekeepers have, they deserve the same punishment back in their own countries. You alluded to the punishments that they often would receive which is one bullet and then charge the family for the price of the bullet. We just hope that other countries that contribute troops, like Bangladesh and Pakistan, won't follow that lead if that's how they would go into punishment. We would be

happy with just solid criminal prosecutions and investigations where there is credible evidence of wrongdoing.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Groves, let me ask you this, if the issue of discipline and punishment could be dealt with to your satisfaction, do you consider the utilization of peacekeeping forces in the venues that we've alluded to during the course of this conversation to be to the benefit of American national interest?

Mr. GROVES. Peacekeeping, yes and no. Peacekeeping operations are as good as they are. We can use them for one purpose but not another. They can do peace and stability operations in Haiti so that we can commit our troops elsewhere. There is a role for them to play, but we have to be very careful in what role we place them.

As the examples that Congressman Rohrabacher rolled off, Srebrenica, Rwanda, there are times when their mandate for use of force was not clear. They stood down while atrocities occurred. We have to be very careful putting them in. We can't just say, well, just send in the peacekeepers into Sudan and everything will be okay.

So they can play a part, they can serve U.S. national interest but—

Mr. DELAHUNT. I don't disagree with what you just said, but I guess what I'm looking for is, since we are part of the P5, why, you know, why—have we just simply not been aggressive sufficiently in terms of the mandate so that when—what occurred in Rwanda was unclear. Are we blaming the peacekeepers, or is it our responsibility as well as the others that were on the Security Council at the time to be clear? I mean, I'm kind of hawkish on that stuff.

I don't think I agree with the ranking member. I don't believe you sit there and watch people slaughtered in front of you. I just think—that's immoral. Mandate or no mandate. But are we being critical—I can understand the lack of discipline, et cetera, but in the end of responsibility ideas say is that of, you know, members in the Security Council that have that veto to be clear. And hopefully, as Senator Wirth indicated, there was a thoughtful analysis on the part of the executive branch when we voted in favor of the deployment of peacekeeping forces. And I know there are different mandates, and each of them I'm sure has their own idiosyncrasies. We can blame—my friend talks about waiting and a lack of prosecution; we have our own problems here in the United States Congress. We've been waiting, too, okay? The American people have been waiting a long time for a lot of things. It simply doesn't happen like that.

Let me recognize for as much time as he needs—if anybody has to excuse themselves for any reason, if you have any scheduling issues, we understand. The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Payne.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much, I apologize for being so late. I'm glad that you're still here. I didn't realize that would happen, but this is a very important issue on something that's very dear to me.

I'd just like to mention about the U.S. arrears to the U.N. I guess, Senator Wirth, you are on top of this the most, and I'm looking at different numbers. Do you have a good fix on exactly what our arrears are, and do we say that that's an accurate number?

You know, we've got some U.N. functions that we dispute the numbers of assessment and whether we thought it was too high or whatever; so where do we really stand on that issue?

Mr. WIRTH. Leaving aside the assessment questions, Congressman, the so-called permanent debt or the overhang that comes from the past is \$569 million, and then on top of that anticipate that this year because of the gap between the OMB mark and what the Congress has done so far and our obligations of what we voted for on peacekeeping, that leaves a gap of another \$500 million. So we know the \$569 million that's there; we anticipate another \$500 million, unless there is another supplemental of some kind and the Congress fills that gap.

Mr. PAYNE. Maybe anyone can try to answer, how do we continue to move forward peacekeeping and even consider additional peacekeeping operations when you continue to have a gap? How is it filled? Who is picking it up? Where is the money coming from?

Mr. WIRTH. There is a chart over there on U.S. arrears. What happens, the U.N. does not have a reserve, a line of credit or whatever. What it does is—the U.N. doesn't just pay the countries that provide the peacekeepers and provide the equipment. So we are tens of millions of dollars in debt in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Italy and so on. I mean, it adds up. That's where the money comes from. So effectively, what we do is vote for these peacekeeping missions, don't pay our bills, and then the countries that have to put the troops in and send the equipment in are footing the bill for that themselves; they don't get paid by the U.N. because we don't pay the U.N.

Mr. PAYNE. Now that we have, I guess, our man at the U.N., the new Secretary General, I guess, was a candidate that had the support of the U.S. and Kofi Annan's era is over, do you, in your opinion or anyone of the men on the panel, have you heard of any change now that we don't have to argue, you know, now that I guess we'll have our way totally at the U.N., we got our guy as Secretary General; do you think there will be a change on the part of the decision makers to request additional funds? I'm not on the inside. I'm a Member of Congress; you might know better than I do.

Mr. WIRTH. I will give you three fast reactions, and then I will let my colleagues respond.

Number one, the mood at the U.N. is so much better. Khalilzad has done a terrific job. He is a diplomat. He listens. He is reaching out. You know, it is a very welcome shift.

Second, I think the mood in the Congress is dramatically different. When we come here and talk to people about the U.N., the overhang of sort of the concerns of the past are still out there, but people are really understanding that we have got major peacekeeping operations. We have got health care problems. We have got climate change. We are in this with the U.N. very tightly. That is very welcomed.

Third, the Secretary General, I think on the peacekeeping area in particular, has done a terrific job of really getting the General Assembly to focus on the fact that our peacekeeping budget at the U.N. has gone up by a factor, as Mr. Groves said, of some 10 times in the last 10 years, and yet it is still managed in a very archaic way. So what the Secretary General has tried to do is to put all

of the management functions of peacekeeping under one roof. Believe it or not, in the past peacekeeping was done with budget being in one office over here, procurements in another office, personnel in yet a third office. I mean, how could you possibly manage this? You know, it is awkward enough to manage an international force with troops coming from all over the place, speaking all of these different languages and so on, and then when you have almost this chaotic situation inside the U.N., it makes it even more difficult. He has, as of last night, I think, gotten agreement from the General Assembly to pull these authorities together and to make a much more coherent, well-managed operation. So these are a very welcome set of changes, all in response to your question.

Thank you.

Mr. PAYNE. Do you think that new Department of Peacekeeping Operations should be separated into the two departments of peace operations and field service? Is that a part of the new configuration?

Mr. WIRTH. Yes, that is the new configuration, and I think everything except one part of either budget or procurement will fall within that. One of the battles, of course, then is—well, I think the final issue is, will there be funding for a second Under Secretary? You know, these are both very, very big jobs—operations and sort of the management of logistics. I think the final question that was being debated last night was the funding for that final senior person to be running that second, new, reorganized, peacekeeping management operation.

Mr. PAYNE. Does anyone else have any views on the new spirit at the U.N., and do you think that it is going to be able to move forward more smoothly?

Mr. CHRISTOFF. I think one of the opportunities for the new Secretary General is to reenergize the reform initiatives, the management reform initiatives, to try to move forward on those. Senator Wirth talked about the restructuring at the Department of Peacekeeping Operations into two departments.

On the positive side, what it brings is that you are centralizing a lot of the procurement initiatives so that you have one department that is responsible for \$1.1 billion worth of procurement, and peacekeeping is practically the bulk of all of the procurement activities. So you have opportunities for dealing with a lot of the problems that we found last year with procurement, as to what is needed to be done. It is still unclear to me as to how these two department heads, with one reporting to the other, are going to work and whether or not you are going to have those clear lines of authority and responsibilities with one department head reporting to another.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Would the gentleman yield for just a minute—

Mr. PAYNE. Yes.

Mr. DELAHUNT [continuing]. Because I will forget the question.

I think I posed it or I made the observation earlier—and I am just drawing an inference—that because of the arrearage and because of the amounts of money that are owed to these primarily Third World nations, I think almost exclusively Third World nations, are we having difficulty recruiting troops for peacekeeping deployments?

Ambassador Dobbins.

Ambassador DOBBINS. Well, I think the generic answer is yes. U.N. peacekeeping operations are generally undermanned. That is, they do not generally get their manpower up to the authorized levels, and the reason is that the demand exceeds the supply of peacekeepers these days with the increasing number of missions.

Mr. WIRTH. I think that has always been the case. I am not sure that it is exacerbated now by the deficit situation, although the size of the new Darfur operation, if it is launched, is 20 million. That is an additional 20 percent on top of an already strained situation. So at that point I think we will see, you know, potentially real pressure on: Where are those troops going to come from? Where is that equipment going to come from? How is that going to get financed? I think that is a big jump-up in one bite.

Ambassador DOBBINS. I will just add to that.

I mean, you know, we have manpower needs for our armed services, and when the Army needs recruits, it adjusts the incentives considerably—signing bonuses, education bonuses. They have got a lot of flexibility. The Congress gives them a lot of flexibility.

Mr. DELAHUNT. But lower standards.

Ambassador DOBBINS. As the demands go up, the incentives are heavily adjusted. The U.N. does not have most of that flexibility. Nevertheless, clearly, there is a supply and demand question that comes into operation here, and to the degree to which you increase the disincentives—you do not pay people on time—it is an obstacle. I do not know how you would quantify that obstacle or demonstrate that it is responsible for this particular aspect of the shortfall, but I think you can assume that if the U.N. paid its bills more fully and more on time it would have a marginally better chance of attracting donor contingents.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Payne.

Mr. PAYNE. Yes.

I am really encouraged then. I know that, Senator Wirth, you are more on top of it, but you seem very optimistic that we are going to be able to get, I assume, the arrears paid up and we are going to be right on time with our payments since we have this new chap at the U.N. and everybody, and we do not like the contentious old regime. So I can go out of here—

Mr. WIRTH. I do not think I said that I was optimistic that this was going to happen. I think that we have got some real problems in terms of that hard core arrears of about, you know, \$550 million. As to this new gap, I do not know where that is going to come from unless there is some kind of a supplemental, and you all say, "Hey, this has got to be in it, and we have got to pay that bill." Certainly, that current \$500 million is priority number one. The arrears will gnaw on us out there for a long time, and you know, that is a lower priority than what has to be done this year.

Mr. PAYNE. Just on the former problems with the sexual abuse—someone probably mentioned it in their remarks. What is the situation currently in general? If anyone would like to give a shot at it. Has it improved? Has it been something that has been made a priority and so forth? Does anyone have any sort of thumbnail assessment of where we stand now as compared to when the scandal broke?

Mr. WIRTH. I will respond, and others may want to respond to this.

You will remember that when Congress first had hearings on this Jane Holl Lute came down. She was the Assistant Secretary General and a former senior Army officer in the U.S., and was responsible for this area at the U.N. She has taken a really tough position on peacekeepers' sexual abuse and exploitation issues. She established a zero tolerance policy, and she says, "I cannot do something about what people are going to do, but I can certainly have an impact on responding to what they do." There has been a real change, I think, in the last year based upon the activities that she has undertaken. Now, how good has that been?

We had some debate about that here. You know, I think that it is getting better all the time, and this is a peacekeeping force of 80,000 troops from all over the world with many, many different cultures and many, many different disciplines. You are very familiar with that, Congressman. I do not have to tell you.

I think it is interesting that, very recently, NATO came to the U.N. peacekeeping operation and asked for help on how to set up, you know, such a zero tolerance policy. How did it work? What were the guidelines?

So, if NATO is coming to the U.N. to ask for help on sexual abuse issues, that would seem to me to be a pretty good indication that some progress is being made.

Mr. GROVES. I will just build onto the Senator's comments. It does appear that the U.N. is taking the allegations and the problem very seriously, and Jane Holl Lute is at the forefront of it, and we are very lucky to have her there. The U.N. has been much better about education and awareness of the problem and putting in conduct units within peacekeeping organizations.

Where my testimony crosses that path is not so much what the U.N. can and cannot do—because they are limited—but where does the member state who contributes these troops that are causing these problems step up. Where do they take on the accountability instead of continuing with impunity in not thoroughly investigating or prosecuting their personnel who have committed crimes?

That was the thrust of my testimony, Congressman.

Mr. PAYNE. Great. Well—yes.

Mr. WIRTH. One final point if I might.

It is a very interesting issue that is raised. Obviously, it is the responsibility of the countries that supply the troops. You know, how do you provide standards to them? Then you get into the question that Mr. Groves raised. How do you enforce that? Clearly, you do not want a central enforcement mechanism, you know, at the U.N., because that is something that the U.S., for example, would never stand for, the U.N.'s being able to reach in and then have enforcement actions against the U.S. military. So we are in kind of a fuzzy area, and I think we are learning about how those standards get set for the troop-sending country and then what kind of accountability there is that those standards get met in that troop-sending country without, you know, some kind of an outside enforcement mechanism that we would never tolerate in the United States.

Mr. CHRISTOFF. I think the United Nations is still trying to get a handle on the extent of the problem as well. I think it was ill-prepared in addressing some of the problems in the Congo, and it just in the past couple of years has actually established a mechanism to try to document the number of cases. You know, the number of allegations has doubled over the past 2 years. Last year, there were 347 alleged cases of sexual exploitation and abuse, but I think they are still trying to determine what is the magnitude of the problem and, without question, deal with it firmly and aggressively.

Ambassador DOBBINS. Could I just add to that?

It is important to see this problem in some perspective. There are probably 100,000 people alive in the Congo today who would be dead if the U.N. troops were not there. There have been 347 cases of alleged sexual abuse. That ought to be reduced, but you do have to keep this in some proportion.

Mr. PAYNE. Oh, yes. There is no question about it. You know, it had been a problem with the military long before the U.N., just in military actions. Let me just conclude.

I agree about Jane Holl Lute. She, actually, originated from my congressional district, so I take special pride. Her father was a very close, personal friend of mine who passed away several years ago, but I know he was very, very proud of her. She was the only girl he had, but I think he was prouder of her than he was of the boys.

Just as a final question, with this so-called "hybrid Darfur peacekeeping group," could anyone explain to me what you think it is right now and when you think it might get going?

Mr. GROVES. My understanding is that Bashir has agreed, in principle, to allow U.N. peacekeepers. There is a wide belief that this is something that he will back out of, and he has conditioned it on that the U.N. peacekeepers must all come from Africa, which is a nonstarter. So I think it is not really close to being in the offing.

Mr. PAYNE. Okay. So he agrees—that is right—in principle?

Mr. WIRTH. Well, I think the other, you know, controversial part of it is how well-equipped are those extra 15,000 additional troops in this hybrid force. How well-equipped are they going to be? What are the rules of engagement that they are given? I mean these are, you know, the very complicated details that still have to be worked out. You know, is progress being made? Well, we hope so.

Mr. PAYNE. Okay. Well, we went from a 20,000 U.N. to, maybe, a 20,000 U.N.-AU hybrid. At one time, it was only AU. So we sit and wait for Bashir to come up with his next proclamation. You know, I think we should have a no-fly zone. I think we ought to go up, and when one of those planes come across—you know, you do not even have to put any boots on the ground—take that one out and maybe just go and destroy another 20 of them on the ground. You know, until Bashir and his government feel that somebody might hurt them, this thing is going to just go on and on and on. It is not going to change. He does not feel he has to change. He has got no reason to change because it is up to him to invite in the people to protect those who he is killing. So you know, it is like Al Capone's inviting in the police. You know, it is just not going to happen, and as long as we sit around and let him dictate,

you know, what it ought to be—we should have taken a couple of planes down 3 years ago, and then I think he would have had a different attitude right now, but until and unless he feels that they are in harm's way, you know, the construction continues in Khartoum, they tell me, of luxury apartments. They have got more Lexuses being, you know, imported and big Mercedes Benzes, and you have got, you know, 1.5 million people living in tents, being fed by the world. I never thought or dreamed I would see something like that happen in 2007. I am a peaceful type of guy. I do not go for aggression. They should have been taken out years ago, period.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I thank the gentleman, and I thank the panel. It has been very informative and illuminating, and I hope to see all of you back here on future occasions.

We are now adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

[NOTE: Mr. Joseph A. Christoff, Director, International Affairs and Trade Team, Government Accountability Office, submitted a revised prepared statement after the hearing. This revised statement follows:]

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

Testimony
Before the Subcommittee on International
Organizations, Human Rights, and
Oversight, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives

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PEACEKEEPING

**Observations on Costs,
Strengths, and Limitations
of U.S. and UN Operations**

Statement of Joseph A. Christoff, Director
International Affairs and Trade



June 2007

PEACEKEEPING

Observations on Costs, Strengths, and Limitations of U.S. and UN Operations



Highlights of GAO-07-998T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives

Why GAO Did This Study

As of June 2007, more than 100,000 military and civilian personnel are engaged in UN peacekeeping operations in 15 locations in Africa, Europe, Asia, the Americas, and the Middle East. In 2006, the United States provided the UN with about \$1 billion to support peacekeeping operations. Given that thousands of U.S. troops are intensively deployed in combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, UN peacekeeping operations are an important element in maintaining a secure international environment.

As requested, this testimony discusses (1) the costs of the current UN mission in Haiti compared with the estimated cost of a hypothetical U.S. operation and (2) the strengths and limitations of the United States and the UN in leading peace operations.

This testimony is based on our prior report and information we updated for this hearing. To estimate U.S. costs, we developed parameters for a U.S. mission similar to the UN mission in Haiti, which the Joint Staff validated as reasonable. We then applied DOD's official cost estimating model. However, it is uncertain whether the United States would implement an operation in Haiti in the same way as the UN.


www.gao.gov/dt/sig/getpdf.cfm/GAO-07-998T
 To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on the link above.
 For more information, contact Joseph A. Christoff at (202) 512-4979 or christoff@gao.gov.

What GAO Found

We estimate that it would cost the United States about twice as much as it would the UN to conduct a peacekeeping operation similar to the UN mission in Haiti. The UN budgeted \$428 million for the first 14 months of the mission. A similar U.S. operation would have cost an estimated \$876 million. Virtually the entire cost difference can be attributed to cost of civilian police, military pay and support, and facilities. First, civilian police costs are less in a UN operation because the UN pays police a standard daily allowance, while U.S. police are given salaries, special pay, and training. Second, U.S. military pay and support reflect higher salaries and higher standards for equipment, ammunition, and rations. Third, U.S. facilities-related costs would be twice those of the UN and reflect the cost of posting U.S. civilian personnel in a secure embassy compound. When we varied specific factors, such as increasing the number of reserve troops deployed, the estimated cost for a U.S. operation increased.

Cost is not the sole factor in determining whether the United States or the UN should lead a peacekeeping operation. Each offers strengths and limitations. Traditionally, the United States' strengths have included rapid deployment, strong command and control, and well-trained and equipped personnel. However, ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have reduced personnel and equipment readiness levels and resulted in shortfalls for military police, engineers, and civil affairs experts. The UN provides broad multinational support for its missions, with a UN Security Council mandate and direction for its operations. The UN also has access to international civil servants, police, and senior officials who have nation-building experience and diverse language skills. Finally, the UN has fostered a network of agencies and development banks to coordinate international assistance with peacekeeping missions. However, the UN has traditionally had difficulties in rapidly deploying its forces and ensuring unified command and control over its peacekeeping forces.

Cost Estimate for a U.S. Operation and UN MINUSTAH Budget



Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense and State Department cost data.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the results of the work we completed for this subcommittee on the cost of a United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operation versus the cost of a similar U.S. operation. As of May 2007, more than 100,000 military and civilian personnel are engaged in UN peacekeeping operations in 15 locations in Africa, Europe, Asia, the Americas, and the Middle East. In 2006, the United States provided the UN with about \$1 billion to support peacekeeping operations out of a total peacekeeping budget of about \$5.5 billion. Given that U.S. troops are intensively deployed in combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, UN peacekeeping operations are a key element in maintaining a secure international environment.

My testimony today focuses on (1) the costs of the current UN mission in Haiti compared with the estimated cost of a hypothetical U.S. operation and (2) the strengths and limitations of the United States and the UN in leading peace operations. This testimony is based on our prior report¹ and information we updated for this hearing. We reviewed classified and unclassified information, but we used only unclassified information in this statement. We selected the UN mission in Haiti as a case study because both the United States and the UN have conducted operations in that country, thus providing comparative information on their two approaches. However, it is uncertain whether the United States would implement an operation in Haiti in the same way as the UN, given operational, structural, and doctrinal differences. While the results of the review cannot be generalized to other U.S. and UN operations, we believe this report provides useful insights into the costs and effectiveness of unilateral and multilateral peacekeeping missions.

To compare UN and U.S. costs to implement a comparable peacekeeping operation, we obtained budget data for the first 14 months of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). We developed a scenario for a U.S. operation in Haiti that used the same deployment schedule as the UN, with the same number of military, civilian, and police personnel and aircraft over the same period. Officials from the Joint Staff validated this scenario as reasonable. We used DOD's Contingency Operation Support Tool to estimate military costs. DOD requires that this model be used to

¹GAO, *Peacekeeping: Cost Comparison of Actual UN and Hypothetical U.S. Operations in Haiti*, GAO-06-331 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 21, 2006).

generate estimates for all U.S. contingency operations, and it is used as the basis for the supplemental appropriation requests to Congress.² To estimate civilian costs, we used historical data and formulas from the Department of State. To assess the relative strengths and limitations of U.S. and UN forces, we analyzed UN and U.S. reports, including information on UN- and U.S.-led operations in Haiti, Iraq, and Afghanistan. We interviewed officials from DOD and State to get their perspectives on the strengths and limitations of UN- and U.S.-led operations. We conducted our work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Summary

We estimate that it would cost the United States about twice as much as it would the UN to conduct a peacekeeping operation similar to the UN mission in Haiti. The UN budgeted \$428 million for the first 14 months of the mission, of which the United States was responsible for \$116 million. A similar U.S. operation would have cost an estimated \$876 million. Virtually the entire cost difference can be attributed to three major elements: civilian police, military pay and support, and facilities. First, the estimated cost of deploying U.S. civilian police is \$217 million or about 8 times the \$25 million budgeted by the UN for international police officers. Compensation rates for U.S. police include higher costs for salaries, special pay and training, whereas the UN pays police a standard daily allowance. Second, we estimated that U.S. military pay and support would cost \$260 million, compared with \$131 million in the UN budget, and reflects higher salaries and higher standards for equipment, ammunition, and rations. Third, U.S. facilities-related costs would be twice those of the UN, reflecting the cost of posting U.S. civilian personnel in a secure embassy compound. Several factors could affect the estimated costs of a U.S. operation, including the mix of reserve and active duty troops and the rate of troop deployment. When we varied these factors—for example, by increasing the number of reserve troops deployed—the estimated cost for a U.S. operation increased.

Cost is not the sole factor in determining whether the United States or the UN should lead a peacekeeping operation. Each offers strengths and limitations. Traditionally, the United States' strengths have included rapid deployment, strong command and control, and well-trained and equipped


²Department of Defense Financial Management Regulations, 7000.14-R, vol. 12, Ch. 23, para. 2304.

personnel. However, ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have reduced personnel and equipment readiness levels and resulted in shortfalls for military police, engineers, and civil affairs experts. The UN provides broad multinational support for its missions, with a UN Security Council mandate and direction for its operations. The UN also has access to international civil servants, police, and senior officials who have nation-building experience and diverse language skills. Finally, the UN has fostered a network of agencies and development banks to coordinate international assistance with peacekeeping missions. However, the UN has traditionally had difficulties in rapidly deploying its forces and ensuring unified command and control over its peacekeeping forces.

Background

Both the UN and United States have a long history of conducting operations to promote peace and stability. The UN has undertaken more than 60 peacekeeping missions since 1948 and states that it has negotiated more than 170 settlements that have ended regional conflicts. As of June 2007, 15 UN peacekeeping operations were ongoing in Africa, Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and the Americas.³ As shown in figure 1, the number of military troops and police in UN peacekeeping operations has steadily increased from 29,140 personnel in 1996 to 83,071 in 2007, with a record number of peacekeepers deployed around the world by March 2007. The United States has led and participated in many peacekeeping operations, such as in Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans; as of April 2007, there were 310 U.S. military and police serving in UN operations. In contrast to the relatively few U.S. troops and police in UN operations, the United States has about 146,000 troops in Iraq and about 25,000 in Afghanistan in stability operations as of April 2007.

³Ongoing UN Peacekeeping Operations as of June 2007 include missions in Jerusalem, India/Pakistan, Cyprus, Syria, Lebanon, Western Sahara, Georgia, Kosovo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Liberia, Côte D'Ivoire, Haiti, Sudan, and Timor-Leste. Political missions supported by DPKO include missions in Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, and Burundi.


Figure 1: UN Military and Police Deployed to Peacekeeping Missions


Source: GAO analysis of UN data.

The United States is the largest financial contributor to UN peacekeeping, with payments of more than \$1 billion in 2006. In total, the United States pays 25 percent or more of the annual peacekeeping budget. (Figure 2 provides information about U.S. contributions to UN peacekeeping.) The UN annually assesses the United States about 26 percent of the UN peacekeeping budget (including higher percentages before 2006). However, U.S. legislation capped payments in 1995 at 25 percent, resulting in arrears. Congress has lifted the cap for some years.⁴ According to the Department of State, the amount of U.S. arrears for UN peacekeeping since 2005 is \$117 million. This amount reflects arrears as of June 2007. In addition, the United States, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, approved many UN peacekeeping missions and activities prior to 2005. According to the Department of State, U.S. arrears for these peacekeeping efforts total \$505 million, but State does not have legal authority to pay for them.


⁴The cap level changed in 2001 due to legislation and remained at around 27 percent from 2001 to 2005. The cap returned to 25 percent in 2006.

Figure 2: U.S. Payments for UN Peacekeeping



Since 1993, the UN has maintained a nearly constant peacekeeping presence in Haiti to help stabilize the country, combat crime, and support elections (see figure 3). Since 1994, the United States has led two military interventions and one humanitarian mission to help stabilize the country. The primary task of the current UN mission in Haiti is to provide a secure and stable environment, assist the transitional government with Haiti's political processes, protect human rights, and support the Haitian National Police. Authorization for the mission is set to expire in October 2007, but the UN Security Council has renewed MINUSTAH's mandate since 2004. UN reports cite MINUSTAH's role in attempting to create a relatively stable security environment in most of the country. However, the overall situation is still volatile and sporadic armed violence continues.

Figure 3: U.S. and UN Operations in Haiti



Note: Operations Uphold Democracy and Secure Tomorrow were military interventions to provide security in Haiti and restore government control. Operation New Horizons was a humanitarian mission to develop infrastructure and provide medical and dental services.

The UN has spent about \$891 million from the inception of MINUSTAH in 2004 to June 2006. For the UN's current fiscal year for peacekeeping, ending June 30, 2007, the UN budgeted about \$491 million. (See table 1 for details on budgeted and actual UN expenditures for MINUSTAH.) The current budget of \$491 provides for 7,500 military personnel, 1,000 police in formed units, 897 civilian police, and 1,771 civilian officials and staff.

Table 1: Budgeted and Actual UN Expenditures for MINUSTAH (U.S. Dollars)

Fiscal year of MINUSTAH operations	Budgeted by UN	Expended by UN
05/01/04 to 06/30/04	\$49,259,800	\$34,556,100
07/01/04 to 06/30/05	\$379,046,800	\$377,235,300
Total for first 14 months of operation	\$428,306,600	\$411,791,400
07/01/05 to 06/30/06	\$516,488,500	\$479,636,600
07/01/06 to 06/30/07	\$490,636,200	N/A
Total cost for MINUSTAH	\$1,435,431,300	\$891,428,000

Source: GAO analysis of UN budgetary data.

Estimated Costs for a U.S. Operation Are at Least Twice the Cost of a Similar UN Mission

We estimate that it would cost the United States about twice as much as it would the UN to conduct an operation similar to the UN mission in Haiti. Virtually the entire difference is attributable to the higher cost of civilian police, military pay and support, and facilities. The difference also reflects the additional cost of ensuring high U.S. standards for training, troop welfare, and personnel security. If the United States were to deploy a higher percentage of reserves rather than active duty troops, deploy more quickly, or operate at a higher intensity, U.S. costs would be higher.

Estimated U.S. Costs Are Higher in Major Categories

From May 1, 2004, to June 30, 2005—the first 14 months of MINUSTAH—the UN budgeted costs for the operation totaled \$428 million.⁵ This budget assumed a phased deployment of 6,700 military personnel, 750 police in formed units, 872 civilian police officers, and 1,184 civilian administrators and staff. It also included the cost of operational support, equipment, facilities, and transportation.⁶ Financial responsibilities of the U.S. for MINUSTAH for the first 14 months were about \$116 million.

Using the same basic parameters of troop and staff deployment in Haiti for 14 months, we estimate that a comparable U.S. operation would cost about \$876 million, slightly more than twice as much as the UN. Table 2 details the differences between the UN and a hypothetical U.S. operation in major cost categories.

⁵For a detailed discussion of the methodology used to construct the U.S. operation cost estimate and alternate scenario cost estimates, see appendix I of *Peacekeeping: Cost Comparison of Actual UN and Hypothetical U.S. Operations in Haiti*, GAO-06-331 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 21, 2006).

⁶The UN cost estimate does not include the general overhead costs incurred to support all peacekeeping missions, such as the costs of running the Department of Peacekeeping Operations at the UN headquarters in New York and the UN logistics base in Brindisi, Italy. We likewise did not include DOD overhead costs in the U.S. operation estimate.

Table 2: UN and U.S. Costs for a Peacekeeping Operation in Haiti (U.S. dollars in millions)

Major cost categories	Budgeted UN cost	Estimated U.S. cost	Difference between UN budget and U.S. estimate
Transportation	\$94	\$100	-\$6
Facilities and related costs	100	208	-108
Medical/health costs	5	22	-17
Military personnel pay and support	131	260	-129
Civilian personnel (non-police)	63	46	17
Civilian police	25	217	-192
Miscellaneous	10	23	-13
Total cost	\$428	\$876	-\$448

Source: GAO analysis of DOD and State Department cost data.

As table 2 illustrates, the costs for civilian police, military pay and support, and facilities account for most of the difference between the two operations. These differences are explained below.

- Civilian police.* The UN budgeted \$25 million to deploy 872 civilian officers for MINUSTAH, while we estimate that it would cost the United States \$217 million to deploy the same number of civilian U.S. police officers. The UN provides a daily allowance for police and does not reimburse countries contributing police for the officers' salaries. U.S. costs, however, include salaries, special pay, benefits, equipment, and special training.
- Military pay and support.* The UN budgeted \$131 million for pay and support of military troops, while we estimate it would cost the United States \$260 million for the same number of soldiers. The UN costs are based on a monthly payment of up to \$1,400 per soldier to contributing nations for basic pay and allowances, clothing, equipment, and ammunition. U.S. costs include pay and allowances for troops, as well as clothing, arms, protective gear, and rations. U.S. costs provide a higher standard of living for U.S. soldiers and higher standards for equipment, nutrition, health, and morale.
- Facilities.* The UN budgeted \$100 million for facilities-related costs, while we estimate that the cost to the United States would be \$208 million. The UN budget includes acquisition and construction of troop and civilian housing and equipment and supplies. U.S. facilities must meet State Department security standards, which include posting civilian staff within secure U.S. embassy or consulate compounds. Also, U.S. agencies with


staff in these compounds would be required to contribute to State's Capital Security Cost-Sharing Program.⁷

Alternative Military Assumptions Generated Higher U.S. Cost Estimates

According to U.S. experts, changes in the underlying planning factors significantly affect the estimated cost of a U.S. operation. Based on consultations with the joint staff officials and other experts, we analyzed how the cost of a U.S. operation would vary if we (1) changed the mix of active duty to reserve soldiers from 85 percent active to an entirely reserve force, (2) assumed U.S. forces would fully deploy within 60 rather than 180 days, and (3) increased the intensity of the operation. As figure 4 shows, each of these changes increased the estimated costs for a U.S. operation.

⁷The Capital Security Cost-Sharing Program was developed to accelerate the building of 150 new secure embassies and consulates around the world and to ensure that all agencies with overseas staff assign only the number of staff needed to accomplish their overseas missions. Each agency's assigned cost is based on its total overseas personnel. See Pub. L. No. 108-447, 118 Stat. 2809, 2920, Div. B., sec. 629 (2004). See also GAO, *Embassy Construction: Proposed Cost-Sharing Program Could Speed Construction and Reduce Staff Levels, but Some Agencies Have Concerns*, GAO-05-32 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 16, 2004).

Figure 4: Impact of Three Cost Factors on Base Estimate for a Hypothetical U.S. Operation



Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense and State Department cost data.

Specifically, the changes resulted in these increases in each category:

- By deploying an all reserve force, the estimated U.S. cost would increase by \$477 million. The increase is because DOD must begin to pay full active duty military salaries to reservists when they are activated for an operation. Officials from the Joint Chiefs of Staff confirmed that this is one of a number of possible scenarios of a U.S. operation.
- By fully deploying U.S. troops in 60 days, U.S. costs would increase by about \$60 million due to additional military pay and support for all troops deployed during the operation's initial months. Joint Staff noted this as a possible U.S. option for Haiti.
- DOD measures the intensity of a military operation, or operational tempo, on a scale from 1 to 3. The higher the number, the more heavily the forces use equipment and the higher the operations and maintenance costs. By increasing the operational tempo from 1.5, which is typical for

peacekeeping, to 2, U.S. military costs would increase by \$23 million due to increased expenses such as fuel.

U.S. and UN-Led Operations Each Have Strengths and Limitations

Cost is not the only factor in deciding whether the United States or the UN should lead a peace operation. The United States and the UN each have strengths and limitations that could affect the success of an operation. The traditional strengths of a U.S.-led operation stem from the well-established U.S. military infrastructure, which provides rapid deployment capabilities, unified command and control, and well trained and equipped personnel. However, operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have led to shortages in key personnel and strained troop and equipment readiness. Also, in some locations a U.S.-led force may not be perceived as being impartial. Among the strengths of a UN operation are its multinational participation and extensive experience in peace operations, but the UN has limitations in deploying a force, ensuring it is adequately equipped, and providing strong command and control.

U.S. Military Has Elements Critical for Peacekeeping, but Faces Shortages of Personnel and Equipment

Traditionally, U.S. operations have benefited from the advantages of a strong and well-established military that has provided quick deployment, a unified command and control structure, and direct access to well-trained military personnel and equipment. For example, two U.S.-led peacekeeping efforts in Haiti were recognized as accomplishing their objectives rapidly and with minimal loss of life. In the 1994 mission in Haiti, the United States provided leadership to multinational forces and ensured adequate troops and resources were available to carry out the operation.

The following strengths of the U.S. military have led to successful U.S. peacekeeping efforts.

- *Rapid deployment.* According to a 2000 UN report, the first 6 to 12 weeks following a ceasefire or peace accord are often the most critical for establishing a stable peace and a credible new operation; opportunities lost during this period are hard to regain. UN and U.S. officials have stated that a key strength of the U.S. military has been its ability to rapidly deploy in part because it has traditionally emphasized readiness of the forces as a major objective. DOD systematically measures the readiness of its forces and produces the Joint Quarterly Readiness Review to monitor its readiness posture. This has helped the United States rapidly deploy in past operations. For example, in 1994, the United States deployed an operation in Haiti within 60 days of the issuance of a UN Security Council

Resolution. The 20,000-member force quickly established itself in 500 locations throughout Haiti and achieved its primary goals within 76 days.

- *Unified command and control.* According to the UN, clear and cohesive command and control, including communications and intelligence are critical for effective operations. According to Joint Staff officials, operations in Haiti were effective because the United States used its cohesive command and control structure, a reliable communication system, and good field intelligence. With regard to intelligence, the United States can draw upon the extensive resources of the U.S. intelligence community, consisting of an array of agencies, departments, and offices throughout the U.S. government. For example, the Defense Intelligence Agency, with more than 7,500 military and civilian employees worldwide, produces and manages foreign military intelligence for warfighters, defense policymakers, and force planners in support of U.S. military planning and operations. The Central Intelligence Agency and the U.S. Navy, Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force, among other organizations, also provide intelligence support to U.S. military operations.
- *Tradition of well trained and equipped personnel.* A key element of DOD's mission is to train and equip its personnel to a high standard and DOD spends considerable amounts to do so. As of 2006, DOD was spending more than \$17 billion annually for military schools that offer nearly 30,000 military training courses to almost 3 million military personnel and DOD civilians. With regard to equipment, DOD spends billions every year to purchase and maintain equipment. Since fiscal year 2002, Congress has appropriated about \$38 billion to the Army for the reset (repair, replacement, and modernization) of equipment that has been damaged or lost as a result of combat operations. In addition, DOD uses soldiers and contractors to repair vehicles and other equipment where the equipment is located.

However, ongoing operations in Iraq have challenged U.S. capabilities in key areas. Specifically, current shortages of the critical personnel skills and equipment needed for operations are a limitation that could affect U.S. ability to lead a peacekeeping force. A second limitation of a U.S.-led force is perceived lack of impartiality in some locations.

- *Current shortages of critical skills and equipment.* Our work has shown that ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have challenged DOD's capabilities and created a continuing high demand for certain combat

specialties, including military police, engineers, and civil affairs experts.⁸ Many of these skills reside heavily in the reserve military component due to current force structuring practices. DOD policy restricts the duration of deployment and activation of reserve forces. As operations in Iraq and Afghanistan continue and the number of deployed reservists increases, it is likely to become increasingly difficult for DOD to identify reserve personnel in high-demand areas who are eligible to deploy. We reported that the Army National Guard and Army Reserve, for example, are already stretched to a point where their readiness for additional deployments, or homeland security crises, has been degraded.⁹ In a January 2007 report, we stated that current operations are also taking a heavy toll on the condition and readiness of the military's equipment due to strain created by the high operational tempo and harsh environmental conditions of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.¹⁰

- *Perceived lack of impartiality.* In some locations, a U.S.-led force may not be perceived by the local people and neighboring countries as an impartial and fair force. These two qualities, according to the UN and U.S. officials, are key to gaining the confidence and trust of the people. State and DOD officials stated that Lebanon is a good example. These officials considered several options for assisting Lebanon, following the 2006 hostilities with Israel, including a U.S.-led peace operation, a NATO-led one, or a modified UN operation. U.S. officials concluded that either a U.S. or a NATO-led operation would be perceived by some factions in Lebanon and by neighboring countries as a threat and a potentially hostile force. Thus, the UN operation was considered the most politically feasible option and the UN Security Council, with U.S. support, expanded the UN peacekeeping force in Lebanon.

⁸GAO, *Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight*, GAO-07-308SP (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 9, 2007).

⁹GAO, *Force Structure: DOD Needs to Integrate Data into Its Force Identification Process and Examine Options to Meet Requirements for High-Demand Support Forces*, GAO-06-962 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 5, 2006).

¹⁰GAO, *Defense Logistics: Preliminary Observations on the Army's Implementation of Its Equipment Reset Strategies*, GAO-07-397T (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31, 2007).

UN Has Multinational Participation and Extensive Experience, but Has Limitations in Rapidly and Effectively Deploying Its Initial Force

The UN's strengths in peacekeeping are rooted in the multinational character of its operation as well as extensive experience with peacekeeping and related nation building. The UN has developed a structure for coordinating international organizations involved in nation building and has access to a pool of experienced and skilled international civil servants, including personnel with diverse language capabilities.

- *Multinational participation.* As of May 2007, 115 countries had military troops or police serving in UN operations. According to State and DOD officials, this multinational character and the UN Security Council mandate provide international legitimacy and direction for its operation. MINUSTAH also demonstrates the multinational character of UN operations. During the first year, MINUSTAH was comprised of 7,624 military staff and police personnel from 41 countries, with the United States contributing 29 military and police personnel.
- *Experienced peacekeeping officials.* The UN has developed a cadre of senior officials who have gained experience with peacekeeping and nation-building activities over many missions. The international nature of the UN also provides access to a large pool of civil servants and security personnel with native language speaking abilities and translation skills. As of May 2007, almost 5,700 international civil servants were deployed to UN peacekeeping missions with 12,400 local civilian staff and some 2,000 UN volunteers supporting these operations.
- *Structure for coordinating international assistance.* The UN has fostered a network of humanitarian agencies and development banks that UN peacekeeping missions can draw on to coordinate the extensive humanitarian and developmental activities related to operations with broad, integrated mandates that include nation building. In Haiti, for example, MINUSTAH has established a framework for coordination that is integral to the mission's organization. With UN sponsorship, official donors in this network, including the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, have pledged over one billion dollars in development assistance.

The UN has several limitations in leading peace operations. Three of these are the lack of capacity to deploy quickly, limits on its command and control of forces, and considerable variance in the training and equipment standards of its multinational force.

- *Limited ability to deploy rapidly.* The UN has traditionally had difficulties in rapidly deploying the military and civilian positions needed for peacekeeping missions. According to the UN, the first 6 to 12 weeks

following a ceasefire are critical for establishing a stable peace presence. However, the UN does not have a standing army, a police force, or the needed equipment to deploy a force quickly. For example, during the first 12 weeks of MINUSTAH, only 30 percent of the authorized military troops and police in formed units were deployed by the UN to Haiti.

- *Limits on command and control.* The UN also has limitations on the command and control of its peacekeeping forces. According to DOD officials, the participation of multiple nations diffuses the unity of command, as each troop contingent is under the command of its national authority. The UN force commander is not assured that an individual or contingents will follow his orders. Command and control is also an issue for disciplinary actions against UN peacekeeping troops involved in criminal, sexual, or other misconduct. The UN sets standards of behavior, including prohibiting peacekeeping troops from criminal activities and sexual exploitation. The involvement of peacekeeping personnel in these activities has been documented in several operations⁷ and the UN had nearly 1,200 cases of alleged misconduct or crimes by peacekeepers in 2003 and 2004. However, troop-contributing countries are responsible for disciplinary actions against their own troops. According to the UN, there is widespread perception among international observers that peacekeeping personnel rarely if ever face disciplinary charges. The UN is taking several steps to address this problem, such as developing specific standards of behavior for all UN troops and a model memorandum of understanding on conduct for all troop contributing countries. However, individual countries are still responsible for discipline of their own troops.
- *Varying equipment and training levels.* The equipment and training of military and police personnel provided to UN operations by contributing countries often varies. Developing nations are currently the largest contributors of personnel to UN peacekeeping operations. The UN states that, while many developing countries provide well-equipped troops with high professional standards, there are also situations in which the countries contributing troops cannot meet the equipment standards agreed to with the UN. The UN reports that some troops provided by contributing countries have arrived without rifles, helmets, or other necessary equipment. DOD officials stated that during previous operations in Haiti, the United States provided some equipment, provisions, and military supplies to UN troops that were deployed with insufficient equipment. Training levels vary widely by country with some troops having little previous training in peacekeeping operations. The United States, through the Global Peace Operations Initiative, is helping train troops from member UN nations that contribute to UN peacekeeping.

Conclusion

The costs, strengths, and limitations of the United States and the UN are important factors in considering who should lead a peacekeeping operation. A U.S. peacekeeping operation, as illustrated by the specific example in Haiti, is likely to be much more expensive than a UN operation. This one example cannot be generalized across all operations. However, many of the cost elements, such as police and military costs, are likely to be more expensive for a U.S.-led operation, regardless of location. The higher cost for a U.S. operation pays for a force that has traditionally deployed rapidly, operated effectively, and maintained high standards for equipment and training. However, combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past six years have strained U.S. troops, equipment, and readiness, limiting U.S. ability to lead a peacekeeping intervention. In some situations, a U.S.-led force would not be perceived as an impartial and fair force, further limiting its ability to conduct operations. The UN has certain strengths in leading a peacekeeping operation, including multinational participation and international legitimacy, access to international civil servants needed for peacebuilding activities, and a structure for coordinating international assistance. However, the UN has traditionally had difficulties in rapidly deploying its forces and ensuring unified command and control over its peacekeeping forces.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I will be happy to answer any questions you or the members of the subcommittee may have.

GAO Contacts and Acknowledgments

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