|
Friends, here is Flynt Leverett latest proposal for approaching Iran:
The New America Foundation: Time for a U.S.-Iranian 'Grand
Bargain'
By Flynt Leverett, New America Foundation with Hillary Mann
Leverett, STRATEGA
October 7, 2008
The next U.S. president, whether it is John McCain or Barack
Obama, should reorient American policy toward the Islamic Republic of Iran as
fundamentally as President Nixon reoriented American policy toward the People's
Republic of China in the early 1970s. Nearly three decades of U.S. policy
toward Iran emphasizing diplomatic isolation, escalating economic pressure, and
thinly veiled support for regime change have damaged the interests of the
United States and its allies in the Middle East. U.S.-Iranian tensions have
been a constant source of regional instability and are an increasingly
dangerous risk factor for global energy security. As a result of a
dysfunctional Iran policy, among other foreign policy blunders, the American
position in the region is currently under greater strain than at any point
since the end of the Cold War.
It is clearly time for a fundamental change of course in the
U.S. approach to the Islamic Republic. By fundamental change, we do not mean
incremental, step-by-step engagement with Tehran, or simply trying to manage
the Iranian challenge in the region more adroitly than the Bush administration
has done. Rather, we mean the pursuit of thoroughgoing strategic rapprochement
between the two nations.
Such rapprochement would be most effectively embodied in the negotiation
of a U.S.-Iranian "grand bargain." A grand bargain approach means
putting all of the principal bilateral differences between the United States
and Iran on the table at the same time and agreeing to resolve them as a
package.
* For Iran, this would
mean addressing U.S. concerns about the Islamic Republic's pursuit of weapons
of mass destruction, support for terrorism, opposition to a negotiated
settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and problematic role in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
* For the United
States, this would mean clarifying America's willingness to have normal
relations with the Islamic Republic and recognizing a legitimate regional and
international role for Iran. In particular, this would mean the extension of
U.S. security assurances to Iran -- effectively, a U.S. commitment not to use
force to change the borders or form of government of the Islamic Republic.[i]
<http://www.uruknet.de/?s1=1&p=47873&s2=11#_edn1>
The reciprocal commitments entailed in a U.S.-Iranian grand
bargain would almost certainly be implemented over time and in phases. The key,
though, is that all of the commitments would be agreed up front so that both
sides would know what they were getting.
Missing the Point
A grand bargain, in our view, is the only way in which the
United States can develop and sustain a genuinely constructive relationship
with the Islamic Republic. Unfortunately, the current policy debate about Iran
in the United States is not conditioning the kind of fundamental shift in
American policy that is needed. While there is greater "space" today
for consideration of some sort of diplomatic engagement with Tehran, much of
the policy debate in the United States is still focused on how to contain
various "threats" emanating from the Islamic Republic.
In the rhetoric of too many American commentators, the Islamic
Republic is portrayed as an immature, ideologically driven regime that does not
conceptualize its foreign policy in terms of national interests. Indeed,
apocalyptic scenarios that have been advanced about a millennially inclined
Iranian leadership using nuclear weapons against Israeli targets, with no
regard for the consequences, effectively posit that the Islamic Republic
aspires to become history's first "suicide nation."
But even less extreme views of the Islamic Republic make the
U.S. policy debate about Iran eerily reminiscent of debates over how to
discipline badly behaved children. On one side, a hard-line "spare the rod
and spoil the child" school argues that this immature polity must be
coerced into more appropriate behavior. On the other side, a pro-engagement
"build a problem-child's self-esteem" camp argues that it is more
productive to cajole Iran into better behavior through various material
inducements.
This type of discussion is profoundly flawed on at least two
counts. First, it overlooks an important reality: Iran is not just a threat to
be managed. Rather, Iran's strategic location (in the heart of the Persian Gulf
and at the crossroads of the Middle East, Central Asia, and South Asia), its
growing influence and standing in key regional arenas, and its enormous
hydrocarbon resources make it a country critical for the United States. Prior
to the current Bush administration, a diplomatic opening with Tehran was at
least intermittently viewed by the first Bush administration and the Clinton
administration as falling in the "nice to have" category -- a
desirable prospect, but not essential for America's strategic position in the
Persian Gulf, the Middle East more broadly, and the Eurasian heartland. For the
U.S. administration that takes office in January 2009, strategic rapprochement
with Tehran will fall into the "must have" category -- something truly
imperative for American interests in these critical regions.
The imperative for U.S. rapprochement with Iran extends beyond
the strategic dynamics of critical regions to encompass the increasingly acute
global challenge of energy security. For more than a decade, U.S. policy has
declared that the world's second-largest proven reserves of conventional crude
oil and the world's second-largest proven reserves of natural gas should stay
in the ground until Washington decides otherwise, for reasons that have nothing
to do with the global energy balance. Such a position might have been bearable
(if nonetheless shortsighted) in the 1990s, when energy prices were low and the
adequacy of global hydrocarbon supplies was not an immediate concern. Given the
constraints on growth in the global supply of both oil and natural gas that are
likely to persist through the next decade and beyond, deliberately trying to
take Iran out of the international energy picture is profoundly irresponsible.
The United States continues to achieve tactical successes in its
efforts to keep European energy companies out of the Iranian upstream -- that
is, out of the discovery and production of crude oil and natural gas -- with
the effect of limiting Iran's rates of oil and gas production. The lack of new
European investment will also, among other things, delay Iran's emergence as an
exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG). But, from a more strategic
perspective, U.S. policy is leaving the field open for increasingly capable
Chinese, Russian, and other non-Western energy companies to take the lead in
helping Tehran develop its hydrocarbon resources. This point was graphically
underscored in July, when, less than a week after the French "super
major" Total announced that it was withdrawing from the Pars LNG project,
Gazprom's CEO met with Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Tehran to sign
a new memorandum of understanding and restate Gazprom's interest in helping
Iran with several major upstream projects. While Iranian officials readily
acknowledge that this is not an "optimal" approach, they also say
that they cannot "wait on the West" indefinitely.
An expanding Russian role in the Iranian upstream would be
especially problematic from a U.S. and European perspective. Whereas Chinese,
Indian, and Malaysian companies investing in Iranian energy projects have a
clear interest in increasing the supply of oil and gas to international energy
markets, Russia's state-owned energy companies have an interest in limiting and
controlling the growth of hydrocarbon supplies to key global and regional
markets. This plays directly into Moscow's ambitions to "coordinate"
the growth of global gas supplies with other important gas producers, including
Algeria, Libya, and Venezuela, thereby increasing the strategic leverage
associated with Russia's status as a major hydrocarbon producer and exporter.
In particular, limiting Iran's options for exporting natural gas to pipelines
will help consolidate Russia's increasingly dominant supplier role in European
energy markets and allow Moscow effectively to regulate Iran's emergence as a
gas exporter.
Iran's Hydrocarbon Resources
Iran's hydrocarbon resources are truly impressive. The Islamic
Republic has the second-largest proven reserves of conventional crude oil in
the world (after Saudi Arabia). Its Ministry of Petroleum currently states the
country's proven oil reserves at roughly 131 billion barrels. (Oil & Gas
Journal lists Canada as holding the world's second-largest oil reserves,
roughly 179 billion barrels, putting Iran in third place. However, the
Journal's estimate for Canada includes 175 billion barrels of oil sands
reserves. This justifies the statement that Iran holds the world's
second-largest reserves of conventional crude oil.) <http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/Iran/images/iran-worldOilReserves.gif>
In addition, Iran has the world's second-largest proven reserves
of natural gas (after Russia). The Islamic Republic's proven gas reserves are
currently estimated at 940 trillion cubic feet, and there is considerable
upside potential for discoveries of more gas deposits.
If Iran's oil and gas resources are aggregated by converting
reserves statements for natural gas into barrels of oil equivalent, Saudi
Arabia and Iran are virtually equal in terms of resource potential: Saudi
Arabia has 302.5 billion barrels of oil equivalent in proven reserves of crude
oil and natural gas, while Iran has 301.7 billion barrels of oil equivalent.
These figures dramatically eclipse current estimates of the overall hydrocarbon
base for Russia -- the world's other hydrocarbon "superpower" --
which comes in third with a total of 198.3 billion barrels of oil equivalent in
proven reserves of crude oil and natural gas.
A second deficit in the current U.S. policy debate over Iran is
its disregard of a historical record showing that since the death of Grand
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in 1989 the Islamic Republic has been increasingly
capable of defining its national security and foreign policy in terms of
national interests. While it may not be easy for some Americans to acknowledge,
most of those interests are perfectly legitimate -- to be free from the threat
of attack or interference in Iran's internal affairs and to have the political
order of the Islamic Republic accepted by the world's most militarily powerful
state as Iran's legitimate government.
Moreover, the Islamic Republic has for many years shown itself
capable of acting in instrumentally rational ways to defend and advance its
interests. As Americans, we may not like some (or many) of the strategic and
tactical choices that the Iranian leadership has made in pursuing these
national security and foreign policy interests -- e.g., its extensive links to
a multiplicity of political factions and associated armed militias in Iraq, its
support for groups like Hizballah and Hamas that the U.S. government designates
as terrorist organizations, or its pursuit of nuclear fuel cycle capabilities
that would give Tehran at least a nuclear weapons "option." These
choices work against U.S. interests -- and, on some issues, antagonize American
sensibilities. They are not, however, "irrational," particularly in
the face of what many Iranian elites believe is continuing hostility from their
neighbors as well the United States to the Iranian revolution and the political
order it generated.
The deficiencies in the U.S. policy debate over Iran lead some
to focus on military options and "regime change" as the most
appropriate strategic response to the Iranian challenge. We believe that such a
course would actually undermine America's ability to get Iran to change its
policies. Among other things, U.S. military action against Iran would almost
certainly prompt Tehran to accelerate its nuclear program and other problematic
activities, with even broader support from the Iranian people.
Defining the Goal
Against this backdrop, the rationale for a new U.S. policy
toward Iran seems almost self-evidently obvious: to engage the Islamic
Republic, on the basis of its interests, in order to reach a broad-based
strategic understanding with Tehran. The goal of such a strategic understanding
would be to redirect the Islamic Republic's exercise of its influence to
support U.S. interests and policies, rather than work against them.
This was the model that the Nixon administration applied to
relations with China during the early 1970s. President Nixon and his advisers
recognized and forthrightly acknowledged that a quarter century of U.S. efforts
to isolate, weaken, and press China had not served America's strategic
interests, in Asia or globally. In an act of extraordinary statesmanship, Nixon
redefined America's China policy so that it would serve those interests.
Furthermore, he did so when Chairman Mao still presided over the Chinese
Communist Party and the People's Republic was going through the Cultural
Revolution.
While there was a near-term, Cold War rationale for Nixon's move
-- to enlist China in America's ongoing efforts to "balance" the
Soviet Union's power and influence -- the opening to China had long-term
benefits extending well beyond the end of the Cold War. Today, "China
bashers" in both the Democratic and Republican parties argue for a tougher
U.S. posture toward Beijing on any number of issues. But even the most adamant
"liberal hawks" or hard-line neoconservatives do not fundamentally
challenge the strategic wisdom of Nixon's opening to China.
The next U.S. administration will need to display the same sort
of wisdom and boldness in re-crafting American policy toward the Islamic
Republic of Iran. It is clearly in the national security interest of the United
States -- and in the interest of America's regional allies -- for the next U.S.
administration to try to get Iran to work with us whenever and wherever
possible, rather than against us. This cannot be achieved by trying to coerce
Tehran into near-term (and imminently reversible) concessions. Rather, the only
way to achieve this is by entering into comprehensive talks with the Iranians
without preconditions, with the goal of resolving bilateral differences,
normalizing bilateral relations, and legitimizing a significant and positive
Iranian role in the region. That is the essence of the "grand
bargain" approach.
Détente Won't Do
Against this, some proponents of U.S.-Iranian engagement argue
that the level of hostility and divergence of interests between Washington and
Tehran are simply too great to permit real, "Nixon to China" rapprochement.
The best that American and Iranian diplomats could do, according to the
skeptics, would be to work toward a partial easing of tensions, roughly
analogous to U.S.-Soviet détente during the Cold War.
We believe that détente between the United States and Iran is
not an effective strategy for defending and enhancing American interests or
those of America's allies. Détente, by definition, would not resolve the
underlying political differences between the United States and the Islamic
Republic. Seeking to manage tensions to prevent outright confrontation made
sense as an "interim" American strategy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union
during the Cold War, when fundamental East-West conflicts were not likely to be
resolved pending substantial political change in the Soviet bloc and both sides
had an existential interest in avoiding direct military confrontation. It is
not a workable scenario between the United States and Iran, for at least three
reasons.
First, while the United States and the Soviet Union were roughly
at parity in their military capabilities, the United States is and will remain
vastly superior to Iran in every category of military power, conventional or
otherwise. Almost 30 years after the Iranian revolution, the Islamic Republic
is incapable of projecting significant conventional military force beyond its
borders, and would be severely challenged to mount a conventional defense
against U.S. invasion. Thus, absent a broader strategic understanding with
Washington, Tehran would continue to assume and act as if the ultimate
objective of U.S. policy toward Iran were the overthrow of the Islamic
Republic.
Second, in an atmosphere of ongoing uncertainty about America's
ultimate intentions toward the Islamic Republic, Iranian leaders will continue
working to defend their core security interests in ways that are guaranteed to
be maximally provocative to the United States. Candid conversations with
Iranian officials confirm what long observation of Iranian policies strongly
suggests: lacking significant conventional military capabilities, Iran pursues
an "asymmetric" national security strategy.
This strategy includes the use of proxy actors -- political,
paramilitary, and terrorist -- in neighboring states and elsewhere, to ensure
that those states will not be used as anti-Iranian platforms, providing the
Islamic Republic a measure of strategic depth it otherwise lacks. Iran's
asymmetric strategy also includes developing unconventional military
capabilities (missiles, chemical weapons, and at least a nuclear weapons
"option"). No U.S. administration, of either party, would be able to
sustain détente with Iran as it pursues such policies.
Third, U.S.-Iranian détente would not forestall the increasingly
serious costs that will accrue to America's strategic position in the absence
of more fundamental improvement in U.S.-Iranian relations. Simply put, the next
U.S. administration will not be able to achieve any of its high-profile policy
goals in the Middle East -- in Iraq, Afghanistan, or the Arab-Israeli arena --
or with regard to energy security without putting U.S.-Iranian relations on a
more positive trajectory. And that requires more than U.S.-Iranian détente.
Incrementalism and Its Discontents
Alternatively, other proponents of engagement argue that
Washington and Tehran should pursue step-by-step or issue-specific cooperation
as a way of building confidence and slowly improving relations. But arguments
for incrementalism overlook the historical record of U.S.-Iranian relations
since the Iranian revolution. While every U.S. administration since 1979 has
sought to isolate the Islamic Republic diplomatically and press it
economically, issue-specific cooperation has also been pursued by each of those
administrations: by the Reagan and George H. W. Bush administrations in
Lebanon, the Clinton administration in Bosnia, and the current Bush
administration in Afghanistan.[ii] <http://www.uruknet.de/?s1=1&p=47873&s2=11#_edn2> In all of these cases, Iran delivered much --
not all, but much -- of what Washington asked.
A number of Iranian officials -- reflecting a variety of
political perspectives and occupying a range of positions during the
Rafsanjani, Khatami, and Ahmadinejad presidencies -- have told us that they
anticipated that tactical cooperation with the United States would lead to a
broader, strategic opening between the two nations. But this never happened.
In all of the cases cited above, tactical cooperation between
the United States and Iran did not fall apart because Tehran failed to deliver,
or because there were no authoritative or pragmatic Iranians to deal with.
Rather, tactical cooperation fell apart because U.S. administrations broke it off,
usually because of concerns about domestic political blowback in the United
States or because of a terrorist attack or arms shipment that might have been
linked to Iran. In that context, the repeated imposition of sanctions against
Iran by the United States only reinforced Iranian perceptions that the United
States is not interested in living with the Islamic Republic.
Thus, while tactical cooperation with Iran has periodically
provided short-term benefits to the United States, the repeated cutting off of
these talks by Washington has shattered confidence on the Iranian side, led to
hard-line decisions and policies in both the United States and the Islamic
Republic, and worsened the overall relationship. Without a strategic
understanding of where the United States and Iran intend to go in their
bilateral relations, there will always be a terrorist attack, arms shipment, or
nasty statement that can be used in Washington as justification for cutting off
whatever tactical cooperation might have been going on and imposing still more
sanctions on Tehran.
Constructing a Grand Bargain
Pursuing a "grand bargain" is the only way in which
the United States and Iran can untie this diplomatic Gordian knot. Treating
each agenda item (e.g., the nuclear problem, sanctions, dealing with terrorist
groups, etc.) on its own would essentially require one party to surrender on a
very difficult issue, while hoping that the other party would at some point be
willing to reciprocate on a separate issue. It would also require each side to
refrain from statements or actions that the other would perceive as provocative
on issues not immediately under discussion in diplomatic channels. This is
hardly a promising or realistic approach to U.S.-Iranian diplomacy.
Pursuing a U.S.-Iranian grand bargain should start with the
definition of a strategic framework for improving relations between the United
States and the Islamic Republic -- in effect, an analogue to the Shanghai
Communiqué that conditioned the strategic rapprochement between the United
States and China in the 1970s. To meet both sides' strategic needs in a
genuinely comprehensive manner, a framework structuring a U.S.-Iranian grand
bargain would have to address at least three sets of issues:
* U.S. security
interests, including stopping what Washington sees as Iran's pursuit of weapons
of mass destruction, its support for terrorism, its opposition to a negotiated
settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and its problematic role in Iraq and
Afghanistan;
* Iran's security
interests, including extending U.S. security assurances to the Islamic
Republic, lifting unilateral U.S. and multilateral sanctions against Iran, and
acknowledging the Islamic Republic's place in the regional and international
order; and
* Developing a cooperative
approach to regional security.
What the United States Needs from Iran
From an American perspective, an essential foundation for aU.S.-Iranian grand bargain is the definitive resolution of U.S. concerns about
Iran's potential pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, its ties to terrorist
organizations, its attitude toward a negotiated settlement of the Arab-Israeli
conflict, and its regional role and aspirations (including its posture toward
Iraq and Afghanistan). Thus, for a grand bargain to be possible, the Islamic
Republic would need to clarify its commitment to international security and
regional stability.
In this regard, the United States would need the following
commitments from Iran:
1. To operationalize its commitment to international security,
Iran would carry out measures -- negotiated with the United States, other
states, and the International Atomic Energy Agency -- definitively addressing
concerns about its fuel cycle activities. Such negotiations could build on
current efforts by the five permanent members of the United Nations Security
Council and Germany (the "P-5+1" or the "EU-3+3," as one
prefers) to launch multilateral talks on Iran's nuclear activities. Also,
pursuant to the agreement reached in October 2003 by the foreign ministers of
Britain, France, Germany, and Iran, and Iran's subsequent signature of the
Additional Protocol to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Islamic
Republic would ratify -- and, of course, implement -- the Additional Protocol.
This formulation leaves open the question of whether it is
possible to reach an agreement with Iran over its nuclear activities whereby
Tehran would forego any indigenous fuel cycle capabilities. However, at this
point, we believe that such an outcome is highly unlikely. It is far more
likely, in our view, that Tehran would agree to certain limits on the extent of
its fuel cycle infrastructure and to robust international monitoring of its
nuclear facilities to provide a high degree of international confidence that
the proliferation risks associated with its nuclear activities were minimized.
This is one of several issues on which, by failing to move on comprehensive
negotiations with Iran earlier, the Bush administration has unnecessarily
"raised the price" of an eventual deal.
2. To operationalize its commitment to international security
further, Iran would agree to the negotiation and implementation of similar
measures addressing concerns about activities that may be linked to its
potential development of biological and chemical weapons.
3. To operationalize its commitment to regional stability, Iran
would commit to stopping the provision of military supplies and training to
terrorist groups, including Hizballah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad, and to press
Palestinian opposition groups to stop violent action.
4. Similarly, Iran would issue a statement that, in accordance
with United Nations Security Council resolutions 242, 338, and 1397, it is not
opposed to a negotiated settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict or a two-state solution
to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This statement would also endorse the Arab
League's contingent commitment to normalization with Israel following
resolution of the Palestinian and Syrian tracks.
Pursuant to this statement, the Islamic Republic would commit,
as part of an overall settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, to work for
Hizballah's and Hamas's transformation into exclusively political and social
organizations.
5. To operationalize its commitment to regional stability
further, Iran would also commit to working with the United States to ensure the
emergence of stable political orders in Iraq and Afghanistan. Iran, of course,
cooperated positively with the United States with regard to Afghanistan even
before the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, through the United Nations
"6+2" framework. Tehran intensified its cooperation with the United
States with regard to Afghanistan and Al-Qa'ida following the 9/11 attacks, and
continued this cooperation until May 2003 -- when the Bush administration
terminated the bilateral dialogue.
What Iran Needs From the United States
From an Iranian perspective, one of the essential foundations
for a U.S.-Iranian grand bargain is the U.S. attitude toward the Islamic
Republic. Thus, for a grand bargain to be possible, the United States would
need to clarify that it is not seeking a change in the nature of the Iranian
regime, but rather changes in Iranian policies that Washington considers
problematic. The United States would also need to clarify its commitment to the
ongoing improvement of U.S.-Iranian relations.
In this regard, Iran would need the following assurances from
the United States:
1. As part of a strategic understanding addressing all issues of
concern to both sides, the United States would commit not to use force to
change the borders or form of government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. This
is the essential substance of a U.S. security assurance.
2. Assuming that U.S. concerns about Iran's nuclear program and
opposition to a negotiated settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict were
addressed satisfactorily and that Tehran stopped providing military equipment
and training to terrorist organizations, the United States would commit to
ending unilateral sanctions against Iran imposed by executive orders,
reestablishing diplomatic relations, and reaching a settlement of other
bilateral claims.
3. Under the same conditions, and to operationalize its
commitment to an ongoing improvement in U.S.-Iranian relations, the United
States would also commit to working with Iran to enhance its future prosperity
and pursue common economic interests. Under this rubric, the United States
would encourage Iran's peaceful technological development and the involvement
of U.S. corporations in Iran's economy, including the investment of capital and
provision of expertise to its oil and gas sector.
4. Assuming that Iran ended its material support for terrorist
organizations, the United States would commit to terminating Iran's designation
as a state sponsor of terror and lifting the sanctions associated with that
designation. This phased approach to implementing a U.S. commitment to lifting
unilateral sanctions in exchange for the reduction and eventual elimination of
a state sponsor's ties to terrorist organizations was used by the United States
with Libya and North Korea.
5. To operationalize further its commitment to an ongoing
improvement in U.S.-Iranian relations, the United States would agree to begin
an ongoing strategic dialogue with Iran as a forum for assessing each side's
implementation of its commitments and for addressing the two sides' mutual
security interests and concerns.
A Cooperative Approach to Regional Security
To reinforce their commitments to one another, the United Statesand the Islamic Republic would also cooperate in dealing with problems of
regional security. In particular, U.S.-Iranian cooperation on postconflict
stabilization in Iraq should be the basis for erecting a multilateral regional
security forum for the Persian Gulf and the Middle East more broadly. Such a
forum would go beyond U.S. collective security efforts in the Middle East --
essentially a series of bilateral arrangements with allies like Egypt, Jordan,
and the Gulf Arab states -- to create a cooperative security framework for the
region. This framework would function as a regional analogue to the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.
Similarly, renewed U.S.-Iranian cooperation over Afghanistan
could be the basis for expanding cooperation on other security issues in
Central and South Asia. During their dialogue with U.S. counterparts over
Afghanistan in 2001-03, Iranian diplomats indicated their interest in working
with the United States to establish a regional security framework focused on
Central Asia. Other senior Iranian officials raised such a possibility with us
in 2003-04. Unfortunately, prospects for U.S. leadership on multilateral
security cooperation in Central Asia has been complicated by the maturation in
recent years of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization -- in which Iran now has
observer status. This is another issue on which the Bush administration's
refusal to move on comprehensive diplomacy with Iran has imposed unnecessary
costs on the U.S. position.
Iran and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
<http://www.uruknet.de/files/pictures/sectsco_logo.gif.gif>
Since its founding in 2001, the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO) has emerged as an important forum shaping relations between
China, Russia, and the new states of Central Asia. The organization includes
six core members: Russia and China, along with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Iran was accorded observer status in 2005.
(Currently, three other states -- India, Mongolia, and Pakistan -- also have
observer status.) Since 2005, Russia has been particularly active in pushing
for the extension of full SCO membership to the Islamic Republic; China and
some Central Asian states have been less enthusiastic about this prospect.
Strategically, participation in the organization reduces Iran's
international isolation in a high-profile way that also underscores America's
diminishing influence in the Islamic Republic's "neighborhood." Iran
also sees participation as a way to advance its longstanding goal of ensuring
that Central Asia will not be a source of threats to its interests, in a way
that enhances Tehran's increasingly important strategic relationship with
Russia.
Getting Started
A U.S-Iranian grand bargain is a tall order. The commitments
required of each side are not easy. They are, however, what each side needs to
do to address the other's core concerns. No other approach explicitly seeks to resolve
the most significant differences between the United States and Iran; therefore,
no other diplomatic approach will actually resolve those differences.
Based on numerous conversations with senior current and former
Iranian officials -- including, most recently, with Foreign Minister Manouchehr
Mottaki in July -- we strongly believe that there is a critical mass of
interest in and support for genuine strategic rapprochement with the United
States. However, our conversations with Iranian officials also lead us to
believe that a new U.S. administration interested in a more positive
relationship with Iran will have to demonstrate that, under the right
conditions, it is seriously willing to accept and live with the Islamic
Republic. In this regard, the advocates of an incremental approach to engaging
Iran have a point -- a certain level of bilateral confidence needs to be
restored.
One way for a new U.S. administration to get started with a
redefinition of America's Iran policy would be to affirm the continuing
validity of the Algiers Accord, the 1981 agreement that ended the crisis
prompted by Iran's seizure of U.S. diplomats and other official personnel in
Tehran as hostages following the Iranian revolution. The Algiers Accord includes
a provision committing the United States not to interfere in Iran's internal
affairs. Every subsequent U.S. administration has in some way affirmed its
validity -- except for the current Bush administration, which has publicly
characterized the agreement as a contract signed "under duress" and
hence not valid.
Affirmation of the Algiers Accord's validity by a new U.S.
administration would send a powerful signal about the potential for substantial
improvement in U.S.-Iranian ties. We believe that, in an atmosphere of enhanced
confidence, it would be possible for U.S. and Iranian representatives to
explore and codify a strategic framework for reordering U.S.-Iranian relations.
The next U.S. administration will not have a more important foreign policy
task.
Flynt Leverett, Senior Fellow and Director of the New America
Foundation's Geopolitics of Energy Initiative, served as senior director for
Middle East affairs at the National Security Council. Hillary Mann Leverett,
CEO of STRATEGA, a political risk consultancy, is a former Foreign Service
officer who served as director for Iran, Afghanistan, and Persian Gulf affairs
at the National Security Council.
Notes
[i] <http://www.uruknet.de/?s1=1&p=47873&s2=11#_ednref1> In private and quasi-public discussions since
we left government service, some of our official Iranian interlocutors have
expressed unhappiness with the terms "security assurances" or
"security guarantees." However, when our interlocutors tell us what
Tehran wants from the United States -- acceptance of the Islamic Republic and
recognition of Iran's regional and international role -- the substance of their
rhetoric is fully consistent with our use of the term "security
assurances."
[ii] <http://www.uruknet.de/?s1=1&p=47873&s2=11#_ednref2> Hillary Mann Leverett participated in the
official U.S. dialogue with Iran over Afghanistan for almost two years, during
2001-03.
This paper is the third in our series of Big Ideas for a New
America <http://www.uruknet.de/bigideas>
. To learn more, please visit www.newamerica.net/bigideas
<http://www.uruknet.de/bigideas>
.
The authors also explore the idea of a
grand bargain in the latest issue of The Washington Monthly
|
